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REMOVING REDS FROM THE OLD RED SCAR:
MAINTAINING AN INDUSTRIAL PEACE IN THE EAST TENNESSEE COPPER BASIN,
FROM THE GREAT WAR THROUGH THE SECOND WORLD WAR

by
WILLIAM R. SIMSON

ABSTRACT
This study considers industrial society and development in the East Tennessee Copper
Basin from the 1890s through World War II; its main focus will be on the primary industrial
concern, Tennessee Copper Company (TCC 1899), owned by the Lewisohn Group, New York.
The study differs from other Appalachian scholarship in its assessment of New South industries
generally overlooked. Wars and increased reliance on organic chemicals tied the basin to
defense needs and agricultural advance. Locals understood the basin held expanding economic
opportunities superior to those in the surrounding mountains and saw themselves as participants
in the nation’s industrial and economic progress, and a vital part of its defense. The study
upends earlier scholarship contending local industrial concerns acted proactively to challenges
from farmers harmed by industrial pollution; investigation shows firms hesitated to initiate new
production processes and manipulated local elections. Partisan developments woven amid all
this underscore errors in assuming ancient regional affinity for Republicans. Confederate
heritage gave Democrats an historic advantage that fractured before New Deal progressivism and
expanding basin Republican power.
Markets forced basin firms to merge and embrace technological change affecting
working people’s relationships, forcing workers to improve skills or settle for low-skill jobs.

Excepting TCC managers and supervisory staff, provincialism ruled; suspicions and
competitiveness among workers grew as most miners lived a few scattered villages and most
managers and craftsmen settled in the basin’s “Twin-cities” district. Early union efforts
collapsed before union mismanagement, rational management and a company union based upon
Sam Lewisohn’s ideals. Management managed to wrest control of its industrial relations despite
the effects of Depression and the New Deal’s empowerment of workers. Workers’ infighting,
reflecting neighborhood demographics and ideological differences, benefitted TCC; it convinced
locals TCC could best protect industrial peace. The submissive AFL union installed fit of
ownership’s nationally recognized program for industrial relations reliant on federal power.
After competition crippled local industry, locals continued their reliance on government:
to investigate the medical consequences of extraction work and coordinate environmental
restoration. Recent regional anti-government populism makes the basin’s peculiar historic
reliance on federal help engaging.

Index words: Tennessee Copper Company, Tennessee Company, Tennessee Copper and
Chemical, Tennessee Corporation, Adolph Lewisohn, Sam. A. Lewisohn, Lewisohn Group, J.N.
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Biggs, Polk County, Tennessee, Fannin County, Tennessee, Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, and
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Introduction
This dissertation is about the social and labor history of the East Tennessee Copper
Basin. As such, it will also address the industrialization of the region and the accompanying
political and environmental consequences. Its main purpose is to expand our understanding of
Southern mountain and industrial history by focusing on the great changes affected on the people
and industry of eastern Polk County, Tennessee, from the 1910s thru the middle 1940s. Located
in the southeastern most corner of the state—within a larger region known as the Tri-state, that
includes North Georgia and Western North Carolina—the Copper Basin is unique not only as a
mineral rich geographical region in the Southern Appalachians, but because capitalist extraction
industries established there differed from the lumber, coal, and textile industries usually
associated with Southern mountain industrialization. 1 Furthermore, owing to industrial emissions
trapped by the surrounding hills that rise to nearly 2000 feet, and the heavy rains typical of the
Southern Mountains, a vast deforestation and erosion ensued that denuded some 55,000 acres of
the Copper Basin by 1900. The phalanx of capitalist and natural forces removed not only forest
cover, but also washed away some four feet of topsoil leaving a raw, red clay landscape that
prevented any natural repair of the hills. Even two generations after state-sponsored law suits
forced local companies to change their production techniques, further erosion and regular, if
accidental emissions prevented healing and the raw red hills remained. The area became a
renowned example of all that unregulated capitalism could work upon the Earth. It was said the
Copper Basin’s wound in Appalachia could be seen from low orbit, the scarring being so
1

The general narrative supplied in this proposal is a summary from several different kinds of history on the region;
some of the best of which thus far include, a local survey, published by the author’s family, Robert Edward Barclay,
The Copper Basin, 1890-1963 (Knoxville, Tennessee: Cole Printing and Thesis Company, 1975); see the
introduction to East Tennessee industrial development in Betty J. Duggan, From Furs to Factories: Exploring the
Industrial Revolution in the Tennessee Overhill (Etowah, Tennessee: Tennessee Overhill Heritage Association,
1998). Other useful sources include United States Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, Professional
Paper 139, Geology and Ore Deposits of the Ducktown Mining District, Tennessee, by W.H. Emmons and F.B.
Laney with the active collaboration of Arthur Keith (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1926).
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provocative that it gave the region a peculiar distinction for tourists as “the only desert east of the
Mississippi River.” 2
For most outside observers and visitors to “Ducktown,” an older, popular name for the
Copper Basin, environmental devastation pretty much summed up any historical importance the
area may have held—certainly that perspective dominated the bulk of popular literature. Some
few bothered to learn that the region had undergone booms, busts, and boom again over a
hundred years and then finally whimpered into a gradual decline as national copper found richer
ore reserves in lands far from Ducktown. That process saw pragmatic decisions to shut down
extraction mining in the Copper Basin by the late 1980s. Even scholarly discourse has seemed
fixed on the shocking landscape. Granted, to study the region and ignore the denuded landscape
and its origins would be akin to ignoring poor land husbandry’s role in the Dust Bowl. But, in
fact, national and local attitudes about conservation and reclamation changed dramatically just as
the Copper Basin’s industry was winding down. It was no longer satisfactory to merely live with
The Old Red Scar—at one point one of the major copper companies ran a farm to demonstrate
that one could practice successful agriculture in the region (according to one account, the farm
was a supplier of local produce for Basinites—but just how much subsidy it took to maintain this
“farm” was not revealed). By the late 1960s the ravaged land and its toxicity could no longer be
ignored and additional projects commenced as state, federal, and private concerns began righting
the great environmental wrong wrought in Polk County. Earlier renovations began under the
New Deal but real success wasn’t too noticeable until the late 1970s; progress was slow.
Meanwhile, as the sulfur blasted crust of The Old Red Scar began to vanish under a new
2

This description of the Copper Basin was regularly repeated by locals and although I have not found its origin
popular literature that delved into the origins of the region’s notorious nude hills also recorded common sentimental
feelings Copper Basin residents held for their beloved Appalachian desert. See for instance, Edwin Teale, “The
Murder of a Landscape,” Natural History, October, 1951: 352-356; and, Grady Clay, “The Roving Eye: Copper
Basin Cover-up,” Landscape Architecture, July 1983: 49—54 and, 94-95.
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covering of what some locals call disparagingly, “the common green”—kudzu, trash trees and
sundry pines, wild flowers, and more kudzu—so too did more and more of the infrastructure and
activities that once defined the Copper Basin as the one of the most critical industrial dynamos of
the South. 3
The study’s narrative tells the story of the Copper Basin from the Great War through the
Second World War. Its main focus is on the copper concerns and those whose lives shaped and
were shaped by the nation’s need for the region’s particular contributions to the metals,
munitions, and chemicals industries. Those contributions, particularly in the area of sulfuric acid
production and an collection of other ferrous and non-ferrous products became internationally
known, created a boom-town economy, saw the employment by the copper companies of
rationalized personnel schemes and the harnessing of constant upgrades in technology and plant.
Corporate organization and technological advance galvanized the extraction and smelting
workers to unionize and defend their industrial liberty in the face of concentrating corporate and
federal power and influence. As the nation moved from war to peacetime to war again, the
Copper Basin’s industry became ever more tied to US defense needs, federal programs, and
lucrative munitions contracts all of which increased the main local employer’s ability to quell
challenges to the local industrial peace as it added to the local economy and promoted its own
goodwill.
The nature of US and international copper markets demanded constant mechanical
advances that in turn forced the working-class to maintain its flexibility and improve or expand
skills sets necessary to support expanding product line. This was particularly true for the
chemical and smelting sectors of the Copper Basin firms. But the enormous amounts of ore
needed for production—owing to Ducktown’s relatively low ore grades—saw huge investments
3

Observations based upon a summary of material on display at the Ducktown Basin Museum.
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in underground machinery to get to the necessary tonnage. As David Montgomery and others
have shown, capitalism’s drive for technological change to protect profit margins drove
innovation that greatly affected working people’s relationship with their employers: they had to
keep themselves useful—that burden could be even greater during downward slides in the
economy when economic troughs might provoke a company to upgrade once again .In the
Copper Basin change in the copper markets was manifested in a need for more foremen,
engineers, chemists, leadburners, carpenters, electricians, and myriad other skilled craftsmen
who regularly retooled their abilities.
Meanwhile, as financiers and owners merged copper concerns, labor markets tightened.
At Ducktown most men in the extraction industry had come to work for the Tennessee Copper
Company by the early 1930s. Miners, laborers, and various daily wage men lived in a couple of
mining villages of the central Basin, while most craftsmen lived on its southern rim, in or near
Copperhill, Tennessee and an adjacent sister town, McCaysville, Georgia. The towns sat astride
the Toccoa/Ocoee River—a waterway whose name changes crossing the state line from Georgia
to Tennessee. Unpaved roads connecting these communities were rough and used far less often
by locals traveling from town to town than is common in the Basin today. Excepting for
company managers and supervisory staff, provincialism ruled; suspicions and competitiveness
grew among the workers; folks tended to stay put in their own neighborhoods after work and
aside from sporting or major company meetings generally did not associate much with one
another. The circumstances became ripe for some major disagreements about how workingmen
could best protect the interests of their families, communities, and personal industrial liberty.
Ironically, it would be the very federal programs of the 1930s designed to assist such men in
their organizing that would rend its several communities and empower the corporate coppermen.

5
Little of this is remembered regionally beyond the reminiscences of some surviving
descendants. In fact, aside from the rusting hulk of the last of the great plants at Copperhill, a
solitary mine head mid-Basin, sundry memorials, a dozen or so copper colored lampposts and the
contents of a fine, if small local museum in Ducktown at the old Burra Burra mine, much of what
is being forgotten is going fast, fading like the rusting entry signs that once proclaimed proud
entry into The Copper Basin. With the sensational ruins of The Old Red Scar greening up,
interest in the region as a former industrial center has nearly disappeared.
The study differs from other Appalachian histories in that it describes a facet of New
South industrialization generally overlooked in the literature or limited to a brief mention in the
discourse about Polk County. Taking a different approach, the study acknowledges that locals
perceived the Old Red Scar in a very different way. For many of them, the denuded hills were a
symbol of jobs and economic opportunities superior to those in the surrounding agrarian
counties. Regional farmers sued and sometimes won damages as a result of the toxic emissions
expelled from the great stacks at Ducktown, but within the Copper Basin smoke meant jobs. The
first immigrants to the Basin were not usually people who had been farmers; in fact, the Copper
Basin had never been an agricultural region of much note. Residents had not seen their world
turned upside-down by industrialization; they came to the sulfuric acid-laced billowing clouds
because they wanted to earn money through industrial enterprise. The first boom occurred long
before a railroad linked the Copper Basin to city markets and so it dissipated as a result. Those
craftsmen who stayed and found work at other industrial sites in the Tennessee Overhill did so
because there were simply few good jobs in the agrarian towns that made up most of the
upcountry. Later, when the entry of the railroad returned the boom economy, even farmers
joined the workforce.
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Today, local civil authorities are doing what they can to transform eastern Polk’s wide,
white water rivers under clear blue skies amid the step hill-country’s blanket of green into a
tourist and vacation destination. But those efforts represent a post-industrial attitude. To
interpret The Old Red Scar simply as the product of selfish, misguided industrial action is to
perpetrate anachronism and ignore the then predominant capitalist values that attracted workers.
Thus the study builds on an approach scholar M. L. Quinn outlined when she provided a distinct
account of the Copper Basin that respected the proactive and pragmatic responses of the railroad
era copper firms to state-sponsored lawsuits (after early ore processing destroyed North Georgia
orchards and crops). This is not to say that this study’s approach to the region, nor that embraced
by the copper firms stand as simply relativist. This study differs with Quinn for instance
regarding assessment of the firms’ willingness to enact change—clearly the clean up that is now
being done in the region is testament to changed social values. What it does mean is that this
study is not out to scold or admonish the copper concerns as simply the bad guy. The real story is
more complex.
And as such it will upend central assumptions of the historiography. For example, the
study will challenge some of the broad historical generalizations often made about the mountain
regions’ responses to the New Deal. While much of the industrial half of Polk County seemed to
approve the era’s federal programs, its county seat, set in a primarily typical upcountry
agricultural region, was not so gung-ho about the federal programs. The welcome given the New
Deal by the Copper Basin’s merchant and professional class reminds us that small town
industrial Appalachia was ready to dine on FDR’s alphabet soup, gulping down with enthusiasm
each new program, especially those connected with the NIRA, the Civilian Conservation Corps,
and the Tennessee Valley Authority. All three would have a major impact on the Copper Basin

7
and this study describes some of these developments. With the coming of the Second World
War, the federal presence, now promoting defense industry contracts, became even more
omnipresent and popular. Throughout this entire period however, newspaper editors in the
county seat at Benton, Tennessee attacked the New Deal programs as expensive wastes of money
tied to Big Labor, Big Business, financed by Big Money all on the backs of the Little Guy. The
“little guy” was apparently a group that included housewives, farmers and small businessmen,
but these were all persons who had benefitted from elements of the New Deal, so the
constituency for these editorials was likely a more general anti-government populism. The “little
guy” was apparently not one of the hundreds of regional workers who benefited from the copper
works and mines energized by the New Deal—the editorials were strident in their attacks on the
Wagner Act. Scholar George Tindal argued that “the little guy” was really that set of countyseat elite: bankers, landlords, small-town manufacturers and others who benefited from the older
dependency system that had long favored their class across the South before the New Deal. 4
Despite conceptions of the upcountry as Republican since the Civil War, this was not the
case in Polk County. The county’s ancient industrial importance to the Confederacy sealed local
loyalties to the Democrats. This last point reflects the observations of scholar V.O. Key who
argued that Tennessee state party lines had long been fixed owing to ancient resentments from
the Civil War and Reconstruction eras. Since slavery had never been very profitable in the
state’s mountain counties East Tennessee Republicans had controlled local politics since 1861;
their party later benefitted from “interparty arrangements” born of the intense competition among
Democratic politicians who controlled the balance of the state. Key suggested that an
“equilibrium [existed that was] not unlike what the economists call ‘monopolistic competition.’”
4

See for example front page political cartoons, “Hornets’ Nest” and “Keep to the Right!” Polk County News, 4
August, 1938 and 3 November, 1938; and, George Tindal, Emergence of the New South, 1913-1945, Volume 10.
(Louisiana State University Press, 1967), 618.
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The respective parties came to “follow a ‘live and let live’ policy.” Scholar Gordan B.
McKinney showed that within this dynamic increased use negrophobic appeals by East
Tennessee Republicans during the industrialization of the mountains in the late 1800s were
intended to expand party control beyond its historic boundaries. Many mountain Republicans
supported industry’s advance. And yet, despite industry’s influence in Polk County, race appeals
and support for industry alone did not dislodge Democratic control. What happened in Polk
County during the early to mid-twentieth century was a transformation away from the old
Democratic county-seat elite control of the county that was already being challenged by
industrial interests tied to the Republican Party. New Deal Democratic progressivism challenged
the party’s old political elite and simultaneously empowered the industrial work force. The
change and its reaction set the foundation for a later, conservative Republican control of this
sector of the upcountry. Much of the dynamics that occurred in Polk County antedated the labor
and political campaigns across larger Dixie a generation later. Little of the current scholarship
describes this kind of change in southern mountain communities and none of it looks at
industrialization’s impact on politics in the Tri-state. 5
Union organizing in the Copper Basin began in the same decade that the railroad came to
Ducktown. Early union efforts by localized, raucous, short-lived associations centered at
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, and Iron Company, Ltd, in the village of Isabella, focused on the
most immediate problems with management and resembled more a mob than a confederation of
craftsmen. 6 Consistency in safe and efficient working conditions did not originate among
5

The topic is due for a reinvestigation of the subject by the current generation of scholars. For general observations
see, V.O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Random House, 1949), 76 and 79; and,
Gordon McKinney, Southern Mountain Republicans, 1865-1900: politics and the Appalachian Community
(Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1978), 124 and 138.
6
Miners Indulge in Threats. “Six hundred miners are on strike and the company has arranged to put men in their
places today…. The miners are armed and guarding he mines and refuse to allow new men to enter [and they have]
secured a lot of whisky and are becoming boisterous,” New York Times 9 November 1899.
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organized workmen in the Basin, but from the copper concerns especially after it became clear
that even war’s boom-time economic conditions did not guarantee continued prosperity or
maximize shareholder investment. The Great War, for instance, had allowed the copper
companies in Polk County a fantastic opportunity for profit, but not one of them was able to
avoid some measure of crippling mismanagement, misappropriation of funds or to maintain
dependable control over local labor in the War To End All Wars. Mismanagement and unstable
labor markets led to the entry of a more radical and organized union with national connections:
The International Association of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers first came to the Basin during
the Great War. Mine, Mill secured a contract in the late teens from Tennessee Copper Company
but its fortunes dimmed during the post-war slump. 7 But that passing after 1921 cannot simply
be attributed to weak copper markets and limp labor markets. Some woes came as a result of the
divisive leadership in the union’s international, but the real mortal blow to Mine, Mill in the
Copper Basin came from Tennessee Copper’s simultaneous embrace of industrial rationalism
and an expanded production array.
When Taylorism, welfare capitalism, and company unions came to the Basin they came
after Tennessee Copper reorganized its finances and attempted to amend the chaotic
mismanagement that so misappropriated investor capital during the Great War. 8 Workers’ initial
prejudice against the new regime faded as stable management took the helm, improved safety
and general working conditions, and raised pay. When the metals market was hit hard in 19201921, Copper Basin firms continued to operate owing to the nature of metals production:
shutdown expenses outweighed the expense of risking skilled labor’s exit from the Basin and the

7

Tennessee Copper Company Pinehurst Meeting: Labor Relations. A survey of the company’s labor relations
history by Manager T.A. Mitchell, Week of 28 October 1946. Ducktown Basin Museum collection.
8
R.E. Barclay, The Copper Basin, 29 and 43; and, Samuel E. Sharp, “Safety work at Tennessee Copper Company,”
The Explosives Engineer, November 1934: 317-321.
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costs associated with restarting furnaces—indeed, wages remained relatively stable into the
twenties. 9 Also, TCC expanded into the agricultural chemicals field. As conditions improved,
the dominant firm, Tennessee Copper, extended its welfare capitalism and local workers’
material expectations rose. The dynamic that ensued reflects on a much smaller scale one
observed by Lizabeth Cohen in Chicago. 10 Tennessee Copper Company’s (TCC) pragmatic
management during the 1920s seemed to secure workforce loyalty to the company so that when
the Great Depression hit nationally, TCC worked to keep as many of its workers on the payroll
as possible. Again, the nature of the metals industry saw to it that it was more practical to
continue production. But resentments grew in the early 1930s as Copper Basin firms tried to
reduce labor costs through manipulation of man-shift production and reduced crew-size in the
mining sector. As industrial historians of the period have noted, some of these cuts were going to
happen anyway owing to the industry’s continued embraced of technological advance. 11
The company union scheme, however, did not hold. New Deal labor legislation
stimulated union organizing in the Copper Basin, but as labor rallied it did so to a resounding
chorus that demanded any labor organizing must maintain and protect the racial status quo and
cherished conceptions of personal ambition even as unionizing required collective action. By
1933, local craftsmen and the mining class called for Mine, Mill to return. Three Mine, Mill
locals were established, one each in the main sectors of the Basin and within a year, this revived
Mine, Mill—boosted by protections in the National Industrial Recovery Act—soon secured
contracts with TCC. All this occurred just as TCC absorbed DSC&I facilities (the Isabella firm)

9

See payroll information in Tennessee Copper Company mining department records from the Mine Office,
Ducktown, January 1918 thru January 1923.
10
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 5, 6 and 8.
11
R.E. Barclay diary, 21 August 1939, Barclay, Robert Edward (1893-1981) Papers, 1854-1977, Microfilm Reel
No. 5, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, Tennessee; hereinafter, “R.E. Barclay diary,” entry date.
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and crew. But the new Mine, Mill locals did not necessarily demonstrate the progressive ideals
the union is generally known for especially in regard to race. True, its organizers sought to lift all
working men of TCC through improved wages and working conditions, but when it came to
attempts to garner support among all TCC workers Copper Basin Mine, Mill locals reflected
local, mountain, working-class values. In light of Mine, Mill’s history in Southern Metal’s
industry the entry of Mine, Mill to a region where white supremacy was the cultural law of the
land seems curious. As a defensive move in the late 1910s by labor organizers in Birmingham,
Alabama who were determined to organize blacks but keep them separated from more highly
skilled white workers white union organizers encouraged unskilled and semi-skilled blacks in the
metals industry to join Mine, Mill. However, white organizers could neither control blacks in
this manner nor the prerogatives of Mine, Mill as the union competed for control of all regional
metals workers. As will be further discussed in this study, race played a central role in ensuing
rivalry between competing unions in that town which limited workers ability to create a united
front before management. In the Copper Basin, though it held a nearly lily-white population, the
specter of race and radicalism would affect solidarity among workers. 12
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, by the 1930s, the various Copper Basin
communities held distinct ideas of just how best to advance the fortunes and secure the industrial
liberties of each little burg’s rank-and-file. Ideas of how best to accomplish this reflected not
only the kind of work done by the workers but also how those workers saw themselves before
the balance of the metals industry workforce. Many craftsmen who did specialized, dangerous
work, with relative autonomy viewed industrial organizing schemes that sought a
democratization of union control as insulting if not presumptuous. Certain sectors had more

12

Henry M. McKiven, Iron and Steel: Class, Race and Community in Birmingham, Alabama, 1875-1920 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 125-127
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craftsmen than others; mining required for instance highly specialized operatives trained to use
the increasingly large drills and other underground machines, but mining also included many
men who were known as merely “laborers,” who could do many simple tasks either under or
above ground, but who were not recognized with the title “miner.” It appears that many of these
men did mining work, but over time, the increased mechanization of the mines required fewer
“miners” and more mechanical engineers, supervisors, craftsmen and lesser-skilled day laborers.
As a result of these changes, the Mine, Mill locals in the mining villages of Ducktown and
Isabella sought an expansion of the union’s membership to a broader field of workers, whereas in
Copperhill, craftsmen remained loyal to a craft-based volunteerism ideology that allowed them
to use their special skills as leverage to obtain better wages. The conservatives’ way was the old
Gompers way and it relied on a hierarchical union organization that often assisted employers in
organizing work. 13
Meanwhile, nationally, Mine, Mill no longer found itself comfortable in the tradedominated American Federation of Labor; the nature of American copper being what it was,
more and more workers leaned toward the industrial approach to organizing. When the
International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers fled the Federation’s House of Labor in
the middle 1930s, the different goals sought by the various locals in the Copper Basin came to
the fore. Elections supervised by National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) officials failed to
settle the issue and the CIO/AFL national split soon ended what little local fraternity had

13

Andrew E. Kersten, Labor’s Home Front: The American Federation of Labor During World War II (New York:
New York University Press, 2006), 13-14.

13
remained. Copperhill laborites voted to leave Mine, Mill and return to the Federation whereas the
Ducktown and Isabella locals rallied behind the CIO. 14
The origins of the labor split are important to understand because much of the
conventional historiography on labor during this period has interpreted the difference in terms of
progressive actions taken by the CIO especially in regard to racial integration. But in the
mountain setting of the Copper Basin, it is clear CIO organizers attempted to project a different
image, and tried to create solidarity among local working people as protectors of racialized
regional stereotypes and white supremacy. The CIO’s reputation as racially progressive was in
fact a disadvantage, since it likely reminded many Copper Basin folk of historic threats African
Americans once posed to the local labor markets. Despite the fact that only a handful of blacks
then lived in the Copper Basin and that only a couple of these folk were connected at all to the
copper business, the specter of race invasion rose. As well, the collective, leveling tactics and
rhetoric employed by CIO organizers, usually in a very public manner, made them vulnerable to
AFL charges that such action represented evidence of communism. In fact, the overt racist
attitudes promoted among the CIO unions at Ducktown and Isabella were employed along with
appeals to protect working class families from AFL accusations that CIO sympathizers were all a
bunch of communists set on destroying the patriotic, Christian, capitalistic values cherished by
white Basinites. 15
All this underscores another area which distinguishes the study, because it will support
recent scholarship that argues that nearly all-white Appalachia was the result of a long campaign
by mountain folk to secure a white republic distinct from the mixed demographics common in
14

National Labor Relations Board, “In the Matter of Tennessee Copper Company and A.F. of L. Federal Union No.
21164, Case No. R-574, Decided, March 3, 1938”; and, Case No. R-574, “Fourth Supplemental Decision and
Certification of Representatives, January 26, 1939.”
15
See various articles on all this within The Copper City Advance, April 1938 thru December 1939, passim and The
Polk County News during this same period.

14
the piedmont and flatlands of Dixie. Certainly my research found that a race purity campaign
had long been waged in the Copper Basin from the days of Cherokee removal to the maintenance
of local lore that warned blacks never to let the sun set on them in the Copper Basin. Racist
symbols employed by CIO members/organizers would thus have been familiar, perhaps even
considered respectable in the upcountry of the early to mid twentieth century. They should be
understood also as overtures to the local middle and upper class of professionals, businessmen,
and industrial managers: potent, symbolic weaponry taken up to neutralize cries that CIOs
brought a threat to peace in the larger community.
Meanwhile, Tennessee Copper exploited the circumstances by giving clandestine
financial gifts to the sheriff’s campaign to rid Polk County of the CIO. 16 Tennessee Copper also
used the circumstances established by federal labor legislation. By influencing the NLRB
election process to harness workers’ energies, the company harnessed the hatred behind the labor
split to its own advantage. The company’s actions provided de facto support for the Copperhillbased AFL. The labor war in the Copper Basin encouraged later, more aggressive open-shop and
anti-union campaigns to thrive regionally by the late 1940s. What happened as a result of the
labor split in Ducktown would happen on a larger scale throughout Dixie during the next
generation as conservative AFL dominance allowed for the growth libertarian and pro-Chamber
of Commerce anti-unionism—a marvelous footing for later Republican proselytizing. 17

III-Historiography
This study of the Copper Basin grounds itself in a perspective that acknowledges the
importance of geographical place and environs. William Cronon once remarked that at some
16
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point, in all histories, the place where a narrative unfolds must be acknowledged. The story of
the Basin’s environmental devastation is clearly significant for my study, but Cronon also
encouraged scholars to adopt a more complex view of people’s relationship to their environs.
Various scholars have noted the physical impact of industrial capitalism on the Basin, but of
additional interest here concerns other kinds of questions Cronon asked: “What do people [most]
care about [in the area]? … How do they assign meaning to that world? How does the earth
respond to their actions? What sorts of communities [do the people and nature] create together?
How do people struggle with [one another for control of the region]? And [as a metahistorical
concern] what is the mutual fate of the people and their world?” 18 The environmental story is not
the only one, but the study will keep these questions in mind within the regional narrative with a
discussion on the nature of the copper industry, its workforce in the first half of the twentieth
century and assessments of the local impact of organized labor’s regional and national actions.
The study also chronicles the scope of state and federal power in the industrial economy,
especially as a result of progressive, associative-state, New Deal, and World War initiatives.
Federal programs born during these periods combined with industrial enterprise dominated the
lives of Basinites. But to acknowledge that does not mean it would be correct to presume these
people merely acquiesced to the impact of federal programs or the machinations of the larger
copper industry. Nor did they resign themselves to the designs national laborites may have had
for their lives. Ironically, even today the Copper Basin is being transformed by yet another
combination of federal, state, and private initiatives bent on renovating the resources once
exploited for these interests. Though they are far less noticeable than in the past, this triumvir of
corporate, state and federal government agencies lay behind the massive reclamation projects of
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the area and studies examining the long term effects industrial toxins have had on the environs
and inhabitants of the Copper Basin. As one child of Copper Basin folk told me recently—“those
people are always sickly up there.” 19
Another theme that runs throughout this study is labor’s various degrees of success in
surmounting challenges posed by constant technological change. Because this was a trend that
was both national and local the study approached the subject by considering general studies of
American copper, research on technological change in the industry over time, and labor’s
response. Despite the fact that Copper Basin enterprises extracted and processed hundreds of
thousands of tons of ferrous and non-ferrous ore, none of the major histories of American copper
discuss Polk County operations beyond brief mention, peripheral comment, or as a mere isolated
listing on a production table. 20 The main focus of non-ferrous industrial and labor history has
been on the industry’s vast holdings in the Far West and Great Lakes regions; however,
industrial trends from the general narrative can be seen at Ducktown such as the national slump
in the copper markets that followed Great War. That sharp recession of 1920-21 ended a copper
boom begun in the late 1800s when the American industrial plant converted to electricity from
steam power. Massive investments and profits made during the war boom of the mid-1910s
allowed for the processing of lesser quality ores that production costs had once prohibited. In the
war’s wake cut-throat competition prevailed and forced mergers despite American industry’s
19

See for instance, Ron Clayton, “Copper Basin Cleanup Negotiations Continue Past the Deadlines,” News from
Around the Net, UT System, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, http://web.utk.edu/~enr/news/copper.htm, last
accessed 7 March 2002. See also, Health Consultation: Copper Basin Mining District, Polk County, Tennessee EPA
Facility ID: TN0001890839, US. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for
Toxic Substances and disease Registry, Division of Health Assessment and Consultation, Atlanta, Georgia, May 24,
2005; and, comments by Lori Buckheister interview, July 2007. This subject is discussed in detail in chapter five.
20
Summary of the copper industry during the era comes from a survey of the following key industrial histories:
George Hildebrand and Garth Mangum, Capital and Labor in American Copper, 1845-1990 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991); Charles Hyde, Copper for America: the United States Copper
Industry From Colonial Times to the 1990s, (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1998; and Thomas
Navin. Copper Mining and Management (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona, 1978).

17
general amenability to cooperation through associationalism during that era. It took a massive
infusion of European battlefield scrap copper to force non-ferrous industry leaders to associate,
but they only did so for a short while: once domestic stockpiles had been reduced by the early
1920s, the fragile association ceased, territorial practices, and mergers resumed. Only the most
pro-active firms invested in further mechanization and rationalization of production regimes. In
the Copper Basin, on the heels of Great War fiascos of mismanagement, local firms returned to
the proactive behavior they had demonstrated earlier in the century, an approach that helped
them survive the anemic metals markets of the New Era. The most dynamic of the firms
reorganized in earnest to survive by expanding production arrays, embracing Taylorism, and
extending welfare capitalism. 21
Of all the accounts on the non-ferrous industry, this study relies most heavily on patterns
in American copper outlined by George Hildebrand and Garth Mangum. 22 They described an
industry led by firms that embraced technological advance and scientific management. Of great
interest were the copper companies’ regular manipulations of local labor markets, propelled by
the regular alliances of mine owners, corporate agents, local and state regulatory and police
officials. The coming of the New Deal did not see these trends end and the tenacity of the
corporate-local government alliances survived as a backdrop to progressive federal legislation
aimed at uplifting working class agency as it tried to curtail cut-throat industrial competition.
Corporate efforts in the 1920s drained the coffers of the Western Union of Miners (the
predominant union among the non-ferrous workers) and those of its heir, the International Union
of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, but they did not snuff out workers’ organizing ambitions. The
study extends Hildebrand and Mangum’s thesis to the southeast by demonstrating how their
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general observations about the transformation of the non-ferrous extraction and smelting industry
and its workforce held true for the Copper Basin.
Notable studies on union activity in the fuller copper world are thick with chronicles of
radicalism and the defensive acts of mining barons. The most ambitious of these books are by
Vernon Jensen, founder of Cornell’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, who recounted in
great detail the vicious battles that took place repeatedly between mine and smelter owners and
the Western Federation of Miners. Useful for understanding of the intricacies of labor’s political
drama, Jensen’s works stand as an archetype of cold war liberalism: his studies are as
magnificently reverent to the primary sources as they are dismissive of any benefit the Left (or
anything he deemed “communist”) may have given to rank-and-file non-ferrous unionization. 23
They also tend to be quite thin on the significance of technological change for labor or the
importance of copper markets and ignore the East Tennessee Copper Basin. 24
The best labor histories which chronicle the fight American workers endured to gain
living wages and to improve and maintain respectable standards of living also examine how
workers like those in the Basin fought to control their working environment and formed various
associations and coalitions. Through this they forced capitalists to reckon with working people’s
ambitions. We learn from these general studies the degree to which working folk participated in
the nation’s expanding consumer culture, rejecting upper and middle class conceits that people
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who worked in industry generally needed to be prudent and niggardly in their spending. 25 A
mere cursory review of Copper Basin newspapers would be enough to recognize the thriving
consumer culture extant during the interwar years in the Copper Basin; myriad advertisements
competed for the attentions of the working people of Ducktown, Isabella, Copperhill, and sundry
outskirts. The payroll of local copper was big too: by the 1930s millions annually poured into the
Copper Basin economy through the pay of TCC’s employees.
But workers could not garner the power they needed to secure reliable living wages in an
era of constant technological upgrades and ever-more powerfully concentrated corporate torque
alone. In the 1920s, to thwart unionism and encourage loyalty, many firms turned to welfare
capitalism that buoyed workers’ living standards and established new standards of expectation.
When tough times came, the firms generally pulled back on their extensive welfare capitalist
programs, often reduced hours or simply laid folks off. All this left workers feeling betrayed as
they experienced economic hardship. The consumer driven economy many had just begun to
enjoy was now slipping away. Panic, depression, anger set in for hundreds of thousands. 26 State
and federal authorities came to realize in the 1930s large sectors of the American populace were
losing their liberties owing to the refusal for corporations to change their ways of doing business
and so to protect those liberties state and federal authorities reduced the liberties of capitalists so
as to avoid the development of a permanent labor class. 27 This study chronicles the effects of
welfare capitalism and federal programs in the Copper Basin that initially seemed to mitigate
corporate power as they uplifted working people. But as this study will argue, the Basin’s main
25
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employer also learned it could manipulate the new federal oversight to its own advantage even if
working people would be organized and that the government would enforce collective bargaining
rights.
Just because workers organized did not mean they spoke with a single voice and studies,
like those done by Steve Fraser, underscore the fact that class and skills set distinctions rendered
absolute labor coalitions impossible. 28 By the late 1930s it was all too clear to older-style
American Federation of Labor loyalists that the judicial rulings of the new National Labor
Relations Board sought only the largest possible industrial bargaining units for labor
representation. As one scholar noted, these rulings “infuriated” the “skilled-elite” craftsmen of
the AFL. As the New Deal advanced into the Appalachians, traditionalist ethnic and religious
reactions arose in some circles against what was perceived as pro-Catholic, integrationist,
atheistic labor organizing of the CIO. 29 This study will examine what, upon preliminary
research, appear to be similar reactions occurring among working people in the Copper Basin
especially in light of its growing numbers of craftsmen.
Studies on Southern and Southern mountain industrialization have generally overlooked
the Copper Basin or if they mention it at all they tend, like accounts in the popular literature, to
remain fixed only on the region’s notorious devastation while they ignore the thousands who
relied on its enterprise. 30 In fact, Appalachian industrial history has long remained focused on
well known locales: coal towns, lumber camps, and textile communities. Despite their limited
scope, important conclusions and observations from Southern industrial historiography inform
my study. Regional studies by Betty Duggins and M.L. Quinn somewhat correct oversight of the
28
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Copper Basin in their examinations of the East Tennessee Overhill District, of which Polk
County is a part. Duggins produced a brief, well-written, illustrated introductory survey of the
area’s industrial history that included the Copper Basin’s extraction, smelting, and chemical
industry. 31 Quinn’s studies deviate from the typical pattern by avoiding the predictable and
relentless indictments of the Basin’s copper firms. Instead Quinn emphasized proactive
responses by the copper companies to the environmental damage wrought by early ore roasting
techniques. 32
Quinn’s studies however end around the time of the Great War and thus do not consider
the continuing damage that periodic emissions from the copper plants foisted on local farmers for
over a generation after World War I. Nor did her studies consider long-term health issues
endured by workers and their neighbors or lasting stresses on the environment. Like Barclay,
Quinn focused mainly on the companies themselves and had little to say about the working
classes, their communities, and their respective engagement with the industrial advance
roundabout them. This study takes a cue from her approach by continuing to account for the
aggressive innovation employed by the Basin’s copper firms, but will do so for an era that saw
the entire production and working regime of the Copper Basin’s labor force change, with
corresponding transformations in their towns and societies. As a result of merger, increased
production and product diversity, ever-changing technological schemes, a galvanized, if not
always united, labor force empowered by protective labor legislation, and the stimulus of a
second World War, a regional prosperity was enjoyed by the population. However—as will be
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shown through the larger study—many were left behind, seemingly powerless before the
combined forces of corporate interests, national labor campaigns, federal intervention, and local
police harassment.
The scholarship of Harry Caudill, John Gaventa, Douglas Flamming and Bryant Simon
also informs my study; these scholars considered Appalachian or upcountry industrial
communities during the early to middle twentieth century. 33 Caudill, through his early 1960s
“biography of a depressed area,” the Cumberland Mountains of eastern Kentucky, became the
grand-daddy of Appalachian study. Caudill indicted capitalist barons and their minions, absentee
owners and others who exploited a naïve population and his Appalachians are victims of ruthless
capitalism as coal and timber companies invaded the hollows of independent and hardscrabble
folk and left them dependent and impoverished. Gaventa’s Appalachia—he studied a
neighboring region that stretched from Eastern Kentucky south into Eastern Tennessee—was
seen through his Marxist interpretation. He described a land where capitalists resembled
illusionists: so great was their control of events and circumstances that the working class and
their municipal leaders were distracted from seeing the real challenges that beset their coal
mining communities. Powerlessness for Gaventa was the result of a kind of bewitchment over a
people who were just as pathetic as Caudill’s mountain proletariat, but it was not distinctly a
mountain phenomenon, for Gaventa saw the exploitation as typical of any community affected
by corporate, globalizing capitalism.
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Caudill’s model became the dominant one for observers of Appalachia and it served as an
important catalyst to bring Great Society change to the region as national attention returned to an
area of the country largely forgotten since the New Deal era. The problem with the model is
such approaches are largely condescending and paradoxically serve to encourage continuation of
the “dumb hillbilly” stereotype. 34 Victimization was not a common theme voiced by the many
Basinites when interviewed. This study will serve as a counter to renditions of Victim
Appalachia—though it was tempting upon first encountering images of the ravaged environment
and tumbledown former mining villages that once typified the Copper Basin to presume an evil
grinding capitalism must have exploited workers and stripped them of their dignity just as their
hills were stripped bare. The popular press repeated as much in the indictments of capitalists and
collaborating Basin residents that were written when environmentalism was just beginning to sell
copy. 35 Such simple judgments, however, obscure a more complex story. Exploitation in the
Copper Basin certainly occurred, but blame for it ought not to be laid only at the front door of
TCC’s Smelter Hill corporate office. It is important to remember that capitalism is a collective
enterprise in a commonwealth. Any presumptions that colonial power structures dominated
Eastern Polk County faded once investigation moved beyond the cursory. The major copper
concerns located in the Copper Basin were absentee-owned, resembling the culprits in Caudill’s
and Gaventa’s studies—but locally residing management kept up regular communications with
owners and local managers took a keen interest in the civic affairs and general prosperity of their
community. Industrial relations in the Copper Basin were never perfect; terrific conflicts
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occurred, the copper companies periodically used whatever means at their disposal to manipulate
circumstances for their benefit, and grudges are still held among people convinced that one
neighbor or another assisted management for selfish reasons. In some instances, the relationship
between the corporations and the communities in the Basin resembled the kind of exploitation
observed by Caudill and Gaventa. But, the national importance of the Copper Basin’s sulfuric
acid production kept the region under more scrutiny than was likely experienced in the hollows
of the Cumberlands. Most important, such exposure and federal labor legislation augmented the
Copper Basin’s working class in their efforts to force an engagement with management which
ultimately benefited not a few Basinites.
The study also draws on the broad literature examining the shape and changing character
of Southern labor. In particular, Douglas Flamming’s study of Dalton, Georgia and Bryant
Simon’s examination of upcountry South Carolina textile towns have shaped my research.
Flamming considered the influence of industrial paternalism, the effects of ongoing industrial
technological upgrades, and the rise of a galvanized industrial workforce. To do so he looked to
the larger community beyond mill villages, relied heavily on the local literature of the
communities—newspapers, local histories, etc.—and interviewed residents. He found that
workers considered themselves partners in the town’s industrial enterprise as opposed to being
merely employees. 36 Both studies illustrated how competition between mills provided workers
with leverage to maintain white control over jobs in Southern industry. Similar dynamics existed
in the Copper Basin: A generation before my study begins, whites violently removed desperate
blacks shipped in by coppermen. 37 This forceful shaping of the labor market by white workers
was not owing to empowerment born of myriad employment opportunities, but fears that African
36
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American entry into the limited local labor market would reduce wages. The attitude was
maintained through the development of local lore that warned upcountry blacks to avoid
lingering in the Copper Basin. By exploring the racialized conceptions of acceptable labor
markets, my study extends cultural studies of working-class racism because it shows yet another
example of how race panic existed in the South even in regions where whites had long
dominated the labor landscape. The study will also reinforce recent work by Larry Griffin,
Barbara Ellen Smith, John Hartigan, Jr., and Mary Anglin suggesting that Appalachia can be
viewed as a determined construct wherein regular efforts were employed to maintain a white
man’s republic. That process began in the Copper Basin with the removal of nearly all the
Cherokee in the 1830s. 38
This dissertation builds upon a significant literature documenting the endemic,
internecine, labor struggles associated with the emergence of the CIO at the local level. Scholars
have documented the effect of John Lewis’s alleged tolerance of communists in the CIO ranks,
the extent to which left-leaning union organizing in the CIO was discredited despite the
organizing enthusiasm of the left, and how American Federation of Labor frustration with the
National Labor Relations Board hardened it against the CIO’s industrial, leveling style of union
organizing. 39 In the Copper Basin I have found all these trends. The most potent manifestation
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was anti-CIO action anchored to a race fear married to strident anti-communism. Studies of the
interwar years that look at the national struggle between those who believed labor ought to be
organized by craft versus those who sought the broader unionization within industries have
found that the racial and political conservatism of the Southern white rank-and-file severely
limited the advance of industrial unionism in Dixie. 40 Where industrial unionism did succeed in
the South it relied heavily on federal help as the National Labor Relations Board attempted to
create a level playing field in areas where AFL craft unions had previously dominated. Industrial
unionism did well where companies were subsidiaries of much larger national firms that had
decided that it was more pragmatic to work within NLRB rulings or had other shops under
contract with CIO unions in another area. Mine, Mill’s final success in securing collective
bargaining rights at Tennessee Coal and Iron workers at Birmingham, Alabama came as a result
of NLRB pressure and Supreme Court support of the Wagner Act. As well, TCI’s parent
company, US Steel, wishing to regain the economic momentum the company had enjoyed in
1936 and early 1937 had made agreements at its northern facilities to recognize metals unions
from the CIO’s Steel Workers Organizing Committee in the late 1930s. 41
In the Copper Basin neither DSC&I nor the parent company of Tennessee Copper
Company appears to have made agreements with national Mine, Mill or any CIO union. Once
Mine, Mill left the AFL and joined the CIO, TCC relied on divisions within its workforce to stall
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contract negotiations. TCC management did state that they were willing to work with whoever
the workers chose to represent them before the NLRB, but then the copper company did as so
many companies did throughout Dixie. When CIO organizers came to town, Tennessee Copper
Company worked clandestinely to manipulate workers’ decisions despite NLRB election
certifications. Then the firm relied on local police authority to augment AFL pronouncements
that CIO control of Copper Basin workers would result in an end to the industrial peace and
threatened the traditional—read: racist and capitalist—conventions of local society. The CIO
organizers who came to the Copper Basin were led by veterans from the TCI- Alabama struggles
such as Mitchell C. Anderson; these men apparently decided to embrace racist symbolism in an
attempt to promote fraternal camaraderie and garner validation from all levels of Copper Basin
society. 42 The weakening effects of such racist tribalism on white working-class solidarity and
working-class liberty have been illustrated by the scholarship of David Montgomery and
Michelle Brattain. Both refused to romanticize white craftsmen’s racism and accounted for the
historical foundations of racism in national labor unions. Populist anti-labor campaigns drew
strength from race-baiting among laborites. 43
This study adds to this scholarship acknowledging the immense power of race among
Americans. Race often served as both personal refuge and identification, permitting workers to
demonstrate a supposed superiority while it tragically reduced collaborative effectiveness before
corporate power. Race fear combined with other trends in the local culture to undermine working
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class solidarity, such as existing divisions within communities. Anger manifested into fears of
anti-Christian, anti-capitalist agitation. 44
Although labor historians have traditionally relied upon interpretations of the nationallydefined strategies associated with the AFL and the CIO, this study found that the rivalry was
driven by much more local concerns and locally-based perceptions of each organization. 45 A
problem with studies that emphasize AFL “radicalism” in the early twentieth century is that they
cannot account for the profoundly conservative image and behavior of the AFL unions in the
Copper Basin of the late 1930s. Those AFL locals did not merely challenge a rival union but
were born of conservative secessionist movement in Georgia which attacked all CIO unions and
relied on community race convention and relationships established across the business, police,
and managerial elite of the copper town to form a coalition against mining village workers. For
an organization bent on defending industrial democracy, the AFL in the Copper Basin made a
mockery of it. The study extends observations made by Tindal and others that Southern,
organized, craftsmen “had achieved a degree of legitimacy and public acceptance” –a
respectability—that they did not want compromised by radical laborites. 46
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had little to do with race fear and more to do with distinctions in occupation, ethnic and community traditions,
corporate benefits to suppliers, even religious convictions. Some of these attitudes existed in the Copper Basin as
mentioned but they combined with race fear. Roy Bangartz, American Heritage; Harper, “Bittersweet Experience”
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The study’s cultural analysis of Ducktown resident Carl McConnell’s “Grocer’s Film”
shot during the Copper Basin strike of 1939-40 will also extend the scholarship on strike
processionals. 47 Workers from the mining villages of the Copper Basin used strike parades and
public processionals to garner local support and in all this relied heavily on the participation of
women and children. The existing literature has established the significance of such rituals:
Processionals were at once festival and phalanx wherein workers empowered one another and
drove the reality of their passionate support for a strike into the heart of the larger community.
Strike processionals also served as defensive measures as workers or workers families needed to
appeal to the patriotism and family connections of the broader community. Flag waving, public
demonstrations of one’s civic participation were all designed to show that protesters were in fact
true defenders of American values, and those who opposed them were not. The festival nature of
the strike parade could also enlighten the community and warn of consequences if the strike
failed. The parades nearly always include a mobile drama that narrated the circumstances for the
larger community. Women were particularly important for such events because their
conventional roles as defenders of the family were juxtaposed to public roles of defiant Mothers
of the Republic and Defenders of Liberty whether they were actual members of the work force or
not. Children’s inclusion heightened the drama as the innocent were lifted up before the
community as those who would be sacrificed by defeat. 48
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Some contemporaneous Appalachian industrial communities saw workers take to the
streets, demanding their rights to organize and improve their lot. Basin processionals conformed
to similar patterns, although women played different roles. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall attested in one
study that sexual tension was part of women’s participation in the labor unrest at Elizabethton,
Tennessee; this study did not see evidence of sexual tension in the Copper Basin labor war, no
doubt because local women did not make up any significant part of the TCC labor force. Still,
other similarities existed. In both places women’s support for their striking men meant that
women took to the streets, used alternately patriotic gesture and family symbols. They marched
arm in arm during a 1939 CIO strike parade at Ducktown behind American flags and dressed in
their Sunday best. Daughters, moms, aunts, sisters, and children following public recital of the
Pledge of Allegiance (to appeal to the region’s broader working and middle classes) participated
in CIO public assemblies, marched en masse, or joined noisy car processionals that drove boldly
and noisily through Copperhill, challenging their working class opponents. 49
As is known, federal legislation emboldened industrial workers to unionize in the 1930s,
but the New Deal played an even more expansive and significant role in Appalachia. Because the
Southern Appalachians felt the full force of state and federal policies that infiltrated even the
most remote hills through agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Civilian
Conservation Corps, the scope of this study required a deeper look into the subject than merely
focusing on the effects of the NIRA and Wagner Acts. Regional and national studies have
determined certain trends in regard to the power of the state. A main concern here was to locate
assessments of how state and federal actions affected Copper Basin industry and labor markets;
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the study thus consulted assessments that summarized the history of progressive legislation in the
South, identified groups and trends that encouraged its advance and where opposition to
progressive reform arose. The study tests how well these trends hold up for Polk County and the
Copper Basin. 50
Most Southern national politicos came to embrace the New Deal owing to the desperate
times and Roosevelt’s popularity. But as Tindal shows, resistance to the New Deal sprang up
across the region among “county-seat” elites:
“The New Deal jeopardized a power that rested on control of property, labor, credit and
local government. Relief projects reduced dependency; labor standards raised wages; the
farm programs upset landlord-tenant relationships; government credit bypassed the
[local] bankers and merchants; new Federal programs skirted the county commissioners
and sometimes even sate agencies.” 51
True enough for many areas and for Polk County’s seat, Benton, but as this study will
show there was little evidence of Copper Basin small-town elites attacking New Deal programs.
Far from it, their enthusiasm no doubt encouraged local labor’s embrace of New Deal legislation.
Certainly progressive action burned in the mountains. The tenor of the New Deal ignited
passions among progressive activists throughout the hills as activists and laborites met in an
array of activity to enlighten the public, train local leaders in effective tactics, and embolden one
another’s initiatives. The CIO began conducting special training camps for labor organizers at
the Highlander Folk School near Monteagle, Tennessee. There it trained thousands in “labor
history, economics, strike tactics, public speaking, current events, and parliamentary law.” These
acts provoked conservative locals to organize vigilantes to thwart what they feared would be
50

Tindal, ibid., 446-47; see also, Reed L. Engle, Everything Was Wonderful: A Pictorial History of the Civilian
Conservation Corps in Shenandoah National Park, (Luray, Virginia: Shenandoah National Park Association, 1999),
23-29. Engle’s study provides an excellent overview of CCC life and the activities of the corps in mid-Atlantic
Appalachia. The present study also reviewed correspondence between TCC executives and officials of both the
Tennessee Valley Authority and Civilian Conservation Corps pertaining to Copper Basin and Ocoee River projects;
correspondence contained in Forest Department files, National Archives, Atlanta Division.
51
Tindal, 607-609; 618, 631, 633, 635-636.

32
social revolution. Meanwhile, in Chattanooga, a town that became renowned for its industrial
labor organizing, communists and socialists organized initially through Christian associations
and small popular fronts then did so independently. 52
Progressive legislation aimed at industrial reform was not a novel movement in the
Southern mountains of only the 1930s. Earlier in the century, public pressure had forced
Tennessee’s State Assembly to lay down in law legislation regulating labor and capital relations.
Legislation concerning extraction industries was extensive owing to the industry’s notorious
operations in the eastern part of the state. But enthusiastic public calls for change diminished
once the laws were enacted that to many folks in the middle class looked as though they would
curtail capitalist abuses and settle labor unrest. If the laws passed had been followed to the letter
they would have ended the script pay system, made it illegal for companies to require workers
buy only from company stores, established regular pay periods, set minimum wages and
minimum standards to maintain healthful working environments in factories and mines. These
acts also laid down early provisions for workmen’s compensation for employers of ten or more
persons. But the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of regulation relied on rulings
dominated by conservative courts and were limited still further by the attitudes, abilities,
capacities, and intentions of administrators. There also tended to be significant loopholes in the
laws because many employers could simply elect not to participate in workmen’s compensation
programs without fear of retribution from the state. Mine safety regulations, extensive as they
were on paper, had no real bite in Tennessee and the state bureaucracy lacked the capacity for
adequate administrative oversight. Enforcement was inconsistent and wanting and, as one
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scholar on the topic noted as late as the mid-1940s, Tennessee had passed no “little Wagner Act”
to protect the working man. 53
Some scholarship concludes that an omnipresent conservatism was the primary
determinant of the mid-20th century defeat of progressive ideas both in government and in the
unions themselves. This appears to be the case in capital-labor relations oversight. Studies
challenge any notion that the New Deal made for truly equal bargaining between capital and
labor. Part of the job of the government was to secure industrial peace thus placing government
naturally on the side of business: “The institutional architecture used to achieve peaceful labormanagement cooperation… serves to reinforce managerial domination… by narrowly confining
unions to the role of fiduciaries of an imagined societal interest in industrial peace.” 54 Owing to
this inertia, the National Labor Relations Board shifted from promoting industrial democracy to
simply seeking industrial stability. 55 There may have been no conspiratorial attempt by
government and capital to establish industrial peace at any cost. Nor does it appear that
government sought to co-opt the power of trade unions and reduce their democratic power by
systematizing collective bargaining. In fact, as scholar Melvin Dubofsky observed, the
“relationship between the state and labor [was] far more ambiguous” than any determined
conspiracy. But, “workers and their unions… gained from positive state intervention [only] at
particular junctures in American history.” 56
The evidence suggests that in the Copper Basin, federal government officials, when
overseeing capital-labor relations, rarely served either directly, but neither were they fully
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disinterested and impartially honest brokers. The aim of local, state, and federal government
agents collectively was to establish stability and social peace and so they tended to be
antagonistic to all forms of upheaval. Jurisdictional prerogatives made a difference as to how
personally the power of the state would be welded. For instance, whereas Federal NLRB officials
and the FBI agents who became involved in Copper Basin labor relations did so with national
interests in mind such as promoting industrial peace or securing justice against those who would
destroy federal property, local police authorities were more concerned with maintaining respect
for their offices and promulgating county-seat elite ideas about proper—read, conventional—
capital-labor relations. Federal authorities did not stop local police efforts that led to the regular
hounding of CIO laborites in the Copper Basin, nor did the feds directly intervene in trying to
manipulate local labor representation outcomes. But neither did they investigate claims made by
locals and outsiders that AFL affiliated laborites were regularly colluding with Tennessee
Copper, that local police authorities clandestinely become mercenaries for TCC, or that
allegations and incarceration set on CIO organizers helped end the union’s effective campaign to
organized industrial workers across all TCC. 57
In fact, this last point underscores studies that have looked at open-shop campaigns and
how libertarian rhetoric has been used to bolster anti-unionism and embolden pro-business
forces. In the Copper Basin, the labor market became so riven by fears of “communism,” that
labor rivalries likely encouraged regional open-shop campaigns that claimed that all union
affiliation was a detriment to industrial peace and individual achievement. Even if unionism was
not rejected completely, the atmosphere allowed TCC to promote itself to the larger Copper
Basin and surrounding communities as a reasonable paternalistic entity ready to help Polk
County folk prosper once Labor decided to settle down.
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IV-Methodology and chapter summary
To tell this story of social, industrial, and environmental change the study relied on the
rich cache of local sources, including local newspapers, personal accounts, interviews, federal,
state, and corporate records, and photographic and film materials produced by private citizens
and federal agents located in the Library of Congress, Georgia and Tennessee State archives, and
various Polk County repositories. The materials include the collection of the Ducktown Basin
Museum. Of special interest was a film produced by local grocer Carl McConnell which
captured the activities workers and police authorities during an extended walkout in the late
1930s. The film stands as a rare glimpse of Southern workers in an organized action. All these
sources flesh out the storyline of the Copper Basin with a level of detail unusual for histories of
many small industrial mountain towns in the South. Other important sources consulted for the
study include regional and national labor publications, trade magazines and major metropolitan
newspapers. Mention of Copper Basin developments in these sources underscored the region’s
significance to within the labor movement and to outside investors. 58
Analysis for the study included review of a considerable body of local literature. Though
primarily anecdotal and not sharing the interests of academics regarding cultural, industrial, and
social history, the literature held accounts of local business and church concerns. This is not to
say it was unimportant. The anecdotes, personal stories, reminiscences, and other items from
local primary material enriched the narrative. Polk County itself for instance has produced some
fine compilations of reminiscences and photo essays. Owing to the efforts of the director and
staff of the Ducktown Basin Museum and others, the complex industrial production history of
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the copper companies is now on display. 59 How the industrial history of the Copper Basin
actually affected the local population and what kind of agency those persons had, was an area
most in need of additional assessment. 60
Locally produced corporate industrial history of the region and in particular, perspectives
from copper management were great assets to this study. Locally, the most famous amateur
historian was a man prominent in the management force of the Basin’s dominant firm, the
Tennessee (Copper) Company. ∗ Robert E. Barclay stood as the company’s chief clerk for a
generation, became fascinated with local events, and was a respected force in local civic affairs.
Barclay summarized developments in the Copper Basin through regular articles and public
appearances—even radio interviews. Barclay’s several privately published accounts (though the
first appeared out of Chapel Hill in 1946) chronicled much of the industrial history from the
Civil War era forward. Barclay described in detail the challenges that met the early Copper Basin
industrialists and working people prior to the coming of the railroad. Barclay laid out the impact
59
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of the locomotive’s entry, and provided excellent biographical information about the key
industrial concerns and personalities whose efforts so marked the region. He focused especially
on the machinations of early Copper Basin industrialist Julius Raht and on the significance of J.
N. Houser, who transformed the Tennessee Copper Company after the Great War era. 61
Barclay’s collective account (from all three of his volumes) extends well into the midtwentieth century and it’s clear that his research required considerable time mining local libraries
and newspaper repositories. His literature is problematic though because the narratives, while
always interesting, are somewhat disjointed chronologically—it’s clear that much of material
was put together from notes, but not comprehensively edited. As well, for all the attention
Barclay paid to the minutia of regional corporate history his panorama is too removed from the
day to day life of the workers. Only occasionally does he appear concerned with the
responsibilities or circumstance of the Copper Basin working folk. He tended to be dismissive of
labor organizing, especially the efforts of the CIO. Barclay’s diaries and personal papers provide
more revealing information about management’s perspectives on labor.62 In sum Barclay’s
histories and personal papers stand at once as primary and secondary materials and the study
relies on them because they point the way to forgotten Ducktown, Isabella, and CopperhillMcCaysville communities. 63
Chapter one places the Copper Basin’s industry within the larger economy of the
Southern mountains; it considers the region’s most important communities of Ducktown,
Copperhill, and Isabella and the most important firms Ducktown Copper, Sulphur & Iron and the
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Tennessee Copper Company. The narrative begins with the antebellum discovery of the Basin’s
riches and continues through the embrace of new mechanical technologies and rational
management in the New Era. A review of the producers’ ferrous and non-ferrous industrial
activities that included mining, smelting and chemicals production also considers consequent
effects of local industry: deforestation, erosion and toxic emissions. Tennessee Copper
Company’s progressive owners, the New York based Lewisohn Investment Group, and forwardthinking management, led most impressively by J.N. Houser, distinguished the firm by setting in
motion long range plans for utilizing the region’s low grade ores. Operators made these efforts
after local farmers forced expensive damage suits on producers whose emissions destroyed crops
in nearby North Carolina and Georgia. Whereas previous scholarship argued TCC was
environmentally proactive in this regard, this study found that the company stalled in its response
until its competitors implemented techniques that captured most of the toxic emissions and began
paying reparations to local farmers. In the meanwhile, the placement of rail lines and an
expansion of production arrays initiated in response to the smoke suits shifted the most dynamic
industrial and commercial hub of the Basin southeast; the move diminished the significance of
the region’s two oldest industrial centers.
A major accomplishment of the study is its account of previously ignored regional labor
history and the tenacious efforts of workers to secure their industrial liberty in spite of an
evermore competitive cadre of industrial firms and changing technology. Reflecting the
advances of organized labor nationally, mistreated Copper Basin workers organized an American
Federation of Labor local that initiated regional walkouts and forced some producers to agree to
better conditions and wages in the era prior to the Great War. When the Copper Basin’s World
War I boom came it was unlike anything experienced in the Southern Mountains since the gold
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rush days of the 1830s. But, stunning corporate mismanagement, price wars and the nearcollapse of TCC during World War I—despite its impressive contracts with czarist Russia—
aggravated shifting labor markets. In response, workers secured the presence of the more
aggressive International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a union within the AFL’s
confederation. Intensifying specialization changed the nature of work in the respective
communities throughout this period by reducing the number of skilled workers in the mining
villages and increasing the number of craftsmen and supervisor staff located in TCC’s main hub.
Corporate records and workers’ testimonials reveal that on-going changes in production
protocols in mining, smelting and chemical manufacturing at once required that workers
continually retool their skills and encouraged management to neutralize the workers’ union.
While some Basin firms retained strident anti-union efforts, TCC management used a more
sophisticated approach that relied on the establishment of a de facto employee representative
plan, which coordinated a safety campaign in partnership with a nationally recognized trade
journal. TCC’s EMP dominated the workplace after economic pressure and poor internal
leadership within Mine, Mill left it powerless and all but dead.
Another accomplishment of this study is its placement of the Basin’s political, social,
commercial, leisure, educational, and religious life within the Southern mountain heritage.
Chapter two thus examines the Copper Basin’s partisan political moorings building on general
observations of the region made by scholar V.O. Key and recent scholarship suggesting that
whites constructed Appalachia as a republic generally free of Indian or black competition.
Reflecting the specific nature of the Copper Basin, the study chronicles copper barons’
domination of Tri-State politics, the willingness of locals to protect their white industrial republic
from incursions of blacks into the local labor market and the east-west struggle that emerged
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within Polk County between copper interests and the county’s agrarian elite. A dynasty emerged
during this era as the Biggs family used its alliance with copper companies at the expense of
industrial workers to establish a Democratic force in Polk through the sheriff’s office and other
positions. The Biggs’ dynasty possessed statewide influence through the first half of the
twentieth century. 64
The roots of a damaging parochialism grew from the diverse natures of the Basin’s
several communities and the divergent east-west economic interests of Polk County as reflected
in local periodicals. While the commercial and industrial hub of the twin cities of Copperhill and
McCaysville held diversions enjoyed by all Basin folk, the twin-cities experienced rapid
infrastructure change and an expansion of possible occupations as the automobile age advanced
during the New Era. The latter was a change not experienced as broadly in the mining villages
of Ducktown and Isabella. Meanwhile, TCC’s neo-feudal managerial grange known as Smelter
Hill experienced its most prestigious renown as company operators allowed an expanding class
of local citizens to enjoy the compound’s special amenities. Reflecting national trends in
education, the Basin’s civic elite commenced a campaign to improve Polk County’s school
system. These efforts lifted the local school system out of the era of the one-room school house
and established impressive local facilities but could not overcome tenacious problems of truancy
or a local paradox: The very industrial sector that provided community leaders with resources to
make the Copper Basin’s school system superior to most surrounding communities competed
with educators’ plans to uplift local young men, frustrating plans to establish a regional college.
Beyond a limited number of specially trained chemists, supervisory staff and management at the
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copper firms, the enticing wage system of the Basin’s industrial enterprises persuaded most
young men to establish industrial careers and limited the number of them willing to embark on
advanced education. Industrial life was hard for workers, but energies directed toward sports
channeled parochial competition and inspired pride. Competition appears to have been especially
fierce between the Basin’s mining communities and other industrial centers in the Tri-state. In a
similar manner, religious communities provided a centripetal force that could temper the
frustrations and despair arising from industrial work with their calls for transcendent service.
But, reflecting scholars’ observations for other Southern regions, the establishment of holiness
sects in the Copper Basin aroused fears among established Protestant congregations that the new
“holy rollers” would challenge industrial-capitalist economic conventions. 65
An examination of the debilitating impact of the Great Depression on the Basin’s
industry and communities comprises chapter three; it includes substantial evidence
demonstrating that in contrast to Republican criticism of federal intervention in the marketplace
now dominant in the Tri-state, a bi-partisan embrace of the New Deal existed that crossed
economic demographics. Support among locals emerged because they saw legislation such as
the National Industrial Recovery Acts and the establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority
and Civilian Conservation Corp as hopeful paths out of the depression’s debilitating trough.
TCC’s diversification of its product line assured the company’s stability and allowed it to absorb
its last significant rivals in the Basin. In a manner similar to those observed by scholar Howell
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John Harris, TCC acted in a pragmatic manner to make New Deal labor relations mandates work
for the company. 66 Under New Deal era management, TCC tolerated workers’ re-empowerment
under new federal mandates that protected union organizing and collective bargaining. A revived
Mine, Mill secured contracts from TCC for a few years, but when the union left the Federation to
the join the new Congress of Industrial Organizations, conservative Basin workers connected
with a Georgia Federation secessionist movement bolted Mine, Mill, established new AFL Basin
locals and in the process complicated TCC industrial relations.
As chapter four explains, a Mine, Mill affiliated with the CIO and led by veteran
organizer Mitchell C. Anderson challenged management’s labor-relations prerogatives.
Furthermore, economic opportunities made possible by the commencement of the Second World
War convinced TCC management that it could not afford the costs of a continuing labor war.
TCC operators resolved to use legal and illegal means to enjoin the Biggs dynasty, local civic
elite and conservative craftsmen in order to neutralize CIO influence. In a manner similar to
actions taken by General Electric as observed by scholar Lisa Ann Kannenburg, TCC then used
the opportunity of the labor war that ensued among workers following the CIO-AFL split to
highlight the company’s importance to the nation and the Tri-state. 67 TCC won sympathetic
goodwill through a public relations campaign that stood in contrast to the antagonistic rhetorical
war being waged by the unions. Meanwhile, the CIO had organized a crippling walkout for
which it attempted to gain camaraderie across union lines through public processionals. One of
these demonstrations challenged progressive conceptions of the CIO by relying on appeals to
66

Howell John Harris, The Right to Manage: Industrial Relations Policies of American Business in the 1940s,
University of Wisconsin Press, 1982, 26. TCC owner Sam A. Lewisohn was the author of many progressive articles
on labor and industrial relations. See for instance his address “Humanizing the Management of Industry,”
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, No. 2, War Labor Policies and
Reconstruction, given December 6, 1918, reprinted February 1919: 85-89.
67
Lisa Ann Kannenberg, “The Product of GE’s Progress: Labor, Management, and Community Relations in
Schenectady, New York, 1930-1960, Ph.D. Rutgers State University of New Jersey, New Brusnwick, 1999, ii.

43
white solidarity. TCC’s public relations campaign however established the company as more
responsible to the citizenry than the squabbling unions; it also allowed TCC to dislodge the CIO
and secure a conservative AFL union that assisted the company in managing workers.
Post war reports described in chapter five revealed how TCC used the AFL to advance its
munitions and chemical production through World War II. Created by Sam A. Lewisohn and
TCC manager T.A. Mitchell, the reports outlined how J.N. Houser’s rational management
evolved successfully during wartime. TCC manufacture of critical war chemicals and Sam A.
Lewisohn’s influence with the Roosevelt Administration garnered the company impressive war
contracts; its workers won national recognition from the Army. WWII commenced the most
profitable boom yet for local citizens and made possible TCC’s successful thwarting of another
CIO challenge. The AFL adopted a paternal role toward workers that relied on hierarchy and
secured the maintenance of TCC production quotas, but it could not squelch miners’ ambitions to
bring back Mine, Mill. TCC’s parent company Tennessee Corporation strengthened patriotic
goodwill through promotion of TCC products that supported the government’s Victory Garden
campaign. TCC further burnished its local reputation by utilizing both the TVA and CCC to
commence re-vegetation efforts in the Old Red Scar. Efforts to cover the Basin’s notorious
Martian environs eventually met with much success but proved expensive and required private,
state and federal resources. Clean-up costs and competition eventually prohibited the mining and
processing of local ores. Evidence revealed these efforts did not deliver local folk from the longterm debilitating effects of working in a region still too toxic in many areas for general habitation
despite re-vegetation’s creep of common green kudzu and pine. 68
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Chapter 1 Tri-State Industry: The Copper Basin’s Land, People, and Economy, 1890s through
World War I.

The industrial history of the East Tennessee Copper Basin during the first half of the
twentieth century teaches much about Southern mountain industrial culture and labor relations
beyond the familiar regional discourse on King Coal, timber, and textiles. Key players in this
Copper Basin narrative include the region’s industrial communities, the competitive local metals
concerns and their management, the region’s industrial working class, labor leaders and their
advocates—both local and national—local merchants, professionals, county police authorities
and other members of the civic elite. Federal programs and their respective officials constituted
the national agents that influenced change in the region. Another important cadre who helped to
determine the significance of developments in the region included outside observers bearing
various stripes and agendas whose commentary alternately brought attention to the Basin’s
resources or highlighted industrial effects on the local environs and its residents. Important as
these last outside agents were in the narrative, a major accomplishment of this study is a more
thorough consideration of regional developments that moves beyond the industrial impact on the
environment and instead focuses more keenly on the people living, working, and transforming
the Copper Basin through the first half of the twentieth century.
The Copper Basin sits deep in Southern Appalachia in an area now called the Tri-State
that includes Polk County, Tennessee, Fannin County, Georgia, and Cherokee County, North
Carolina. Political boundaries determined that only a small portion of the Copper Basin sits in
either Fannin or Cherokee counties; therefore, while there were some notable exceptions,
happenings in Polk had more influence on the Basin than did those in the other two counties. 69
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As early as the antebellum period, local business exploits in the region’s extraction
industry periodically made national news. Since the 1870s the Copper Basin non-ferrous and
ferrous extraction and smelting industry had been important for the nation’s industrial and
military advance. By the end of the interwar era the county’s approximately 15,000, nearly
entirely native-born white inhabitants lived primarily in two rival regions: one east, one west;
each region held nearly equal population. The county seat of Benton, sat in the agricultural
western half of Polk. Separating it from the small industrial burgs to the east were high ridges,
river gorges, poor roads, and a very different economic culture tied to fluctuations in the Copper
Basin’s extraction industry and the national metals markets. According to Copper Basin residents
and the attitudes reflected in historic newspapers, the two sections jostled for power in “friendly”
sports rivalries and in more serious political rivalries for control of the county. 70
The Marietta and North Georgia Railroad opened the region for development in the
1890s. After the Great War this system became part of the Louisville & Nashville rail system
serving central and eastern Tennessee and north Georgia. The rail line connected both districts
of Polk County to southerly Georgia towns like Mineral Bluff, Blue Ridge, and Tate. To the
extreme south alone the line sat Marietta, Georgia, not far from the larger Atlanta transportation
hub. 71
Decreasing remoteness after the introduction of the railroad allowed for an extraction
industry boom that became self-perpetuating as more and more firms competed to exploit the
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region’s extensive natural resources. Labor markets improved as the new firms provided jobs
first for hundreds of workers and later thousands. When local labor markets could not satisfy
industry’s needs, companies imported workers from Atlanta and Europe. Copper Basin industries
produced critical war products both in metal and chemicals. Munitions needs associated with the
initial bloom of the Great War boom brought huge investments, substantial war contracts, and
myriad opportunities for profit to Copper Basin firms and their employees, even as corporate
hubris and mismanagement threatened the flush times. The intense war economy and
international competition reduced the number of important Copper Basin firms to two.
Additional economic stress cut that number to one by the middle of the 1930s. During the early
interwar period, one major firm collapsed and another was crippled by prematurely and poorly
negotiated war contracts. To salvage the industrial potential of the region (just in time for the
sharp post-war slump) determined U.S. copper barons, Adolph Lewisohn and his son Sam A.
Lewisohn hired a team of trained industry experts who introduced a rationalized management
scheme that reorganized industrial relations and the production array. 72
Copper Basin industrial workers, many of whom came from great distances to man the
mines and plants, were clearly men who were not going to be ignored or suffer ill-treatment by
management. 73 Their actions and protests echoed in the canyons of Wall Street. Each time local
workers pushed back against management Wall Street investors felt the effects. The significance
of the Basin is hard to comprehend now in light of how obscure it became by the late 20th
Century, its current popularity among whitewater enthusiasts, hikers, and wandering tourists
notwithstanding. Regular reports in the New York Times underscored Wall Street and London’s
interests in the region’s militant workers who by 1900 were already well on their way to
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establishing a reputation of fierce independence and absolute determination to protect white
men’s working class liberties. 74 In the Great War’s tight labor market, workers took advantage
of their power and brought in radical national mining and metals union, The International Union
of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers. 75
The industrial and political change occurring throughout the nation in the era that
stretched between the two World Wars also transformed the several communities of the Copper
Basin. New development commenced in eastern Polk County during the munitions boom of the
Great War. But the failure of local metals firms to properly manage their opportunities prompted
an introduction of scientific management and a simultaneous expansion of production
diversity. 76
This first chapter of the study will provide an overview of the Copper Basin’s
Appalachian environs and its significance within the larger narrative of the copper industry. It
will include an introduction to the several communities that arose as a result of the extraction
industry and region’s two most important copper firms, Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron, and
Tennessee Copper (later reorganized as the Tennessee Copper Company within the Tennessee
Corporation). A chronicle of the industrial and labor history of the region through the Great War
era discusses management methods introduced by the firms after the war.77
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A major theme appearing throughout this study concerns management’s intention to
control not only regional industrial relations between capital and labor but between itself and the
local citizenry. In an age where the media increasing focused on the abuse of the public at the
hands of large corporations and when organized labor learned it could manipulate public opinion
for its own advantage, the management of an image was recognized as important by a larger and
larger share of industrial owners and managers. Many came to see the management of their
firm’s image as critical for the success of the company. Learning from the coordination of
industrial activities by the U.S. government during World War I, a number of “center firms,” the
largest and most influential U.S. corporations in any given industrial sector of the economy,
embraced a more scientific, at times even progressive management style after the Great War. 78
The approach included a combination of techniques that developed independently during the Age
of Reform and in response to the needs for increased technological skills, aggressive organized
labor and a public more aware than ever before of how companies were affecting communities
overall. A “new factory system” resulted that included the use of scientific management
(Taylorism), the use of scientific personnel administration to establish stable labor relations and
improve worker skills, and welfare capitalism to win increased loyalty and dependence of
workers through non-wage benefits. 79
Most firms that employed this newer collection of managerial techniques did not however
abandon older, more belligerent tactics used to prevent unionization or to limit the power of
established unions. The management set saw all unions as a divisive, confusing influence. Even
the most conservative and malleable craft unions of the American Federation of Labor split
workers’ loyalty, dividing the workforce between those workers who were for the union and its
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advantages and those who were not. Split loyalties and resentful workers limited profit margins
by curtailing supervisory and managerial prerogatives. The purpose then of the new factory
system was to keep industry free of unions or to re-direct the purpose of any established union to
the advantage of management. 80
The Tennessee Copper Company, a division of Tennessee Corporation after 1919, was in
a particularly advantageous position to affect a positive image as it had both owners and
management in agreement that old-school, belligerent attitudes toward industrial and community
relations no longer worked in an era of more self-aware workers and observant public.
Tennessee Corporation executive and part owner Sam A. Lewisohn was one of the most
outspoken men of his generation regarding the employment of the new managerial methods.
Lewisohn gave speeches supporting the new management style that were often reprinted in the
publications of the Academy of Political Science, New York, and later collected in volumes
aimed at scholars in the new industrial technical colleges and universities. He trumpeted the
need for corporate owners to replace company operators who bore only broad business training
and experience and to instead secure trained managers that would humanize the management of
industry. Lewisohn’s thoughts on proper labor and industrial relations evolved as union power
re-emerged during the Great Depression. For now it is enough to say that by the time of the
Great War, Lewisohn was keen to require his managers to treat workers with more dignity than
his competitors in the Copper Basin. 81
Another major thread in this narrative about the Copper Basin concerns the development
of a populist radicalism within the region’s industrial workforce. Occupational histories
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contained in this chapter include those of some of the extraction and smelting industry workers
employed in the Copper Basin metals firms. These personal narratives underscore workers’
constant need to upgrade their skills set in light of technological advances in U.S. mining,
smelting, ore processing and chemical production and they reflect the new production regimen
initiated by management’s renovation of the most important Copper Basin firm during the
interwar years. In a dynamic familiar today, it was workers’ constant need to re-tool one’s skills
that created new opportunities, but also added to workers’ frustration. Those who could not keep
up with changing demands were limited in their opportunities to advance or cast aside.82
Understanding the development of worker radicalism also requires a brief discussion
about the Copper Basin’s several industrial communities, Isabella, Ducktown, and Copperhill.
Two of the communities, Ducktown and Isabella were considerably older than Copperhill.
Ducktown’s founding as a Cherokee settlement antedates the industrial era. Isabella was the site
of the Basin’s first large-scale copper mining and processing firm established a generation before
the entry of the railroad. The defining demographics of each community reflected not only the
firms at each site but also the kind of work associated with each enterprise. Miners made up most
of the population of Ducktown and Isabella though ore processing plants at Isabella required an
array of metals and chemical craftsmen to live nearby.
The two most important firms in the Copper Basin’s second generation of non-ferrous
and ferrous extraction and smelting industries were London-owned Ducktown, Sulphur, Copper
& Iron (DSCI) and the aforementioned Tennessee Company. Often referred to by locals and
historians alike as simply the “Tennessee Copper Company” (TCC), the firm had many name
changes. DSCI’s headquarters were at Isabella but its facilities also extended to Ducktown.
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TCC’s main hub was in Copperhill, but it too came to own significant facilities in Ducktown
through merger. Isabella and Copperhill were part of the string of towns that made a necklace of
little railroad-nourished boomtowns—or hoped-for boomtowns—that sprung up across northcentral Georgia and southeast Tennessee. 83
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron and Tennessee Company managed to survive through
economic Darwinism; they were among at least a half dozen other firms that came after the
railroads opened the Tri-State. Weaker firms in the Basin were nearly all absorbed by the First
World War era. The Lewisohns controlled TCC twice. From the firm’s incorporation until 1910
control went to James Phillips, but mismanagement during World War I led the company back
into Lewisohns’ hands. There it remained through the 1950s. During the Lewisohn’s first tenure
as owners they sent agent J. Parke Channing to buy up a collection of mines and smaller copper
firms that had perished in the rough economic years of the 1870s and 1880s. This wise purchase
allowed the company to expand faster than its competitors. 84
The populations of mining burgs themselves reflected the hiring practices of the
dominant companies. TCC especially was responsible for bringing in “large numbers of
employees of foreign extraction [including] Slavs, Poles, and Italians.” The company housed
these men and their families at Ducktown and Copperhill. Reports for DSCI in this regard are
scant, but that firm likely followed a similar pattern of immigration to satisfy its labor needs in
the early 1900s. That said, the majority of workers for all firms in the region came from the
nearby mountains. 85
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Isabella, Tennessee was never a large settlement and its main employer, DSCI never had
a crew much larger than 400. By the standards of the era, Isabella was the most frontier and
rough of the tiny burgs even though it was the oldest. Copper mining and processing had begun
in this town long before the railroad and until the 1930s it was the home of DSCI (reorganized as
Ducktown Chemical and Iron in the 1920s). DSCI must have built some of the workers homes,
but pictures show these to be rough and barely adequate housing. The community sat low in the
Basin and the fumes and filth from its mines and copper processing plants settled all around its
people. Isabella never possessed what one might call a downtown. Village roads were dusty clay
that meandered willy-nilly among the scattering of small stores, homes, and plant facilities. As
the interwar era wore on competition among the various copper companies shifted the Basin’s
main production centers away from Isabella. 86
Small as their village was relative to the other Basin towns, Isabella’s residents had
possessed extreme loyalty to their community and held fiercely defiant attitude. Locals noted
that workers in Isabella fought often with management. Since Isabella workers actually built
their town and works they possessed a sense of ownership in DSCI and when pushed too hard,
reacted in organized action. 87
Meanwhile, as the other communities of Ducktown and Copperhill became ever more
important they also diverged in their primary industrial responsibilities. Ducktown, centrally
located in the Basin and west of Isabella, became the most important mining village in the Basin,
though it too was not incorporated. The town held one of the most important of the eight major
shafts that eventually drove down thousands of feet into the Basin’s ore deposits. Some of these
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would reach 3000 plus feet by mid-century. The Burra Burra mine sat just on the edge of
Ducktown; its mine-head towered on the bluff overlooking the community. Between Ducktown
and Isabella lay three other shafts, McPherson, Eureka, and Isabella. The maze of mines between
Isabella and Ducktown eventually connected the two settlements below ground. All down the
western and northern hill’s of Ducktown from the Burra Burra mine and across a small gap in the
tree less ridges intersected by one of the central highways of the Basin were strings of miners’
homes built by Tennessee Copper. The village’s main street cut across the highway up the slopes
on either side. Along this wide and muddy thoroughfare sat a line of company related
establishments, private enterprises, and community institutions that included a commissary,
churches, even a hotel. As was the case with the roads at Isabella, the main street remained
rutted and unpaved for most of its history. As the most important transportation hubs moved
away from this community, many who might have come to Ducktown went to other more
bustling nearby burgs. Ducktown’s dwindling population soldiered on in their industrial
responsibility. 88
South of Ducktown by about five miles lay Copperhill. Known originally as “McCays”
the community split into Copperhill, Tennessee and McCaysville, Georgia along the TennesseeGeorgia line. The Twin-Cities, as they were often called, lay diagonally across Toccoa-Ocoee
river valley and combined had the most important commercial district in the Basin. TCC’s
massive industrial grange at Copperhill, holding sites absorbed in the acquisition of Pittsburg and
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Tennessee Copper, became a cutting edge smelting and chemical production center. TCC
designed its works over the years to wring every penny possible from the low grade ores of the
Copper Basin. The advance of technology in the Copper Basin and at other sites made the
nation’s copper barons rich. Observed one TCC official, the Basin’s industrial advance allowed
investors, managers, and workers to share “fully in the general activity and prosperity of the
country.” DSCI competed directly with TCC and through the interwar years the Isabella
company made some upgrades to its works, but not as aggressively as did TCC. The discovery
of new ore reserves by Tennessee Copper led to further expansion that required an ever-ready
and adaptable army of men. These workers possessed a great variety of operational, mechanical,
engineering, and chemistry skills. Copperhill, more than any of the Basin communities, came to
hold the highest concentration of these technicians, craftsmen and their families. The town had
several satellite workers’ villages sitting to the north known as New Town, Cole Town and Bell
Town; they all lay over the ridges behind the TCC management and residential grange, a
neighborhood called Smelter Hill. 89

Tri-State copper power and the “smoke” wars
The effects of industry in the Tri-state reported in local papers made industrial pollution
and conservation important topics. Most people had ignored these consequences of industry in
the 19th century, but progressive legal and legislative action in the early 1900s followed reports
that alternately praised and denounced the effects of exploitation of Southern mountain
resources. World and domestic competition in the copper and chemical industries drove
corporate technology and managerial method upgrades. The embrace of new methods was
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critical for firms that wanted to survive slow periods. Copper Basin companies, while small in
comparison to the copper giants of the American West were able to demonstrate considerable
agility for most of the first half of the twentieth century, responding quickly and effectively to
legal demands by Georgia farmers who protested the devastating damage to their lands. For a
time, however, it seemed local reaction to extraction industry pollution might shut down local
industry. Primitive “heap roasting” ore-processing and poor husbandry of local woodlands were
to blame. In the early years companies built massive, open-air sheds that covered scores of
roasting ore piles laid over corded wood. While the ore cooked for weeks, toxic emissions filled
with sulphur dioxide (“SO2”) gas then wafted over the Basin’s edges decimating orchards,
forests, and farms in the Tri-State. The half dozen furnaces in the Basin required daily capacities
of hundreds of tons of roasted ore and the companies built three large yards filled with long heap
roasting sheds to feed the furnaces. Introduction of pyritic smelting ended the use of the sheds
by 1904, but the more efficient metallurgic process did not stop the toxic emissions. No longer
“lazily” rolling about the Copper Basin, the new process funneled the smoke into ever higher
stacks, sending the emissions to ravage orchards and fields farther away. By the early 1900s
most of the Basin’s vegetation had been either killed by the emissions or been used for roasting
shed fuel. Meanwhile, law suits brought against the copper companies by Georgia farmers from
the surrounding hills made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court’s judgment on the
matter forced the companies, under threat of injunction, into action. 90
Historian M.L. Quinn argued that too much discourse on the Copper Basin’s industry has
focused on the environmental damage copper firms wrought as a result of primitive ore
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processing methods of the late 1890s. Quinn points out that DSC & I and TCC had been proactive in employing less damaging production schemes once local people and the court system
threatened to shutdown operations. 91
However Quinn may have been overly positive about the companies’ good intentions and
pro-active efforts. Company influence over the region seems to have been more of a determinant
in quelling farmers’ anger and their demands for new production techniques than threats of
injunction. The fact was that a thriving set of communities was necessary to man, maintain, and
serve the mines and smelter works. DSCI alone shipped 632,000 pounds of copper by 1893.
Pressure to maintain production by investors, operators, and many local civic leaders was strong.
As the territory affected by toxic emissions grew exponentially the number of cases brought by
farmers rose exponentially—so too did the notoriety of the damages in local reports. So while
DSCI general manager W.H. Freeland is credited with developing some of the techniques that
led to the end of heap roasting and the companies did change their production techniques to
somewhat less damaging ones, it took in fact a combination of technological innovation and
sustained legal pressure by angry outsiders over two decades to transform the two major Copper
Basin firms into models of industry. The firms lessened, but never halted their emissions. 92
Revealing and darkly amusing proof that Copper Basin companies initially dragged their
feet in addressing the emissions problem came from TCC Chief Clerk Robert E. Barclay’s
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accounts on the matter. He described a DSCI report commissioned by the company to
investigate the conditions of the surrounding crops and timber. Finding that local gardens “were
good, growing crops were green and healthy, and forests and orchards were unharmed” the
report, according to Barclay, read like one made by “a shrewd horse-trader” who was “trying to
sell by mail.” Reservations about the wisdom on investing in new techniques slowed down the
embrace of new smelting processes. Cautious TCC operators chose not to adopt pyritic smelting
until after DSCI proved the techniques successful. 93
Each company tried to minimize the costs associated with damage awards by stalling and
adopted more conciliatory relationships with farmers only after the courts forced the firms to pay
reparations. DSCI began compliance in 1903. General Manager Freeland wrote his London
office that he would pay damages owed to William Madison, Margaret Madison, and J.A.
Fortner; all were residents of a small community that sat just east of the Basin. The check
Freeland sent to the judge overseeing the awards was $193.50 or about $3,000 in 2007 dollars.
“The log-jam of evaded decrees had been broken,” said Barclay about these first reparations. By
the mid-1900s it was clear to management it could no longer fight the courts and locals because
by now even Copper Basin residents who directly benefitted from local industry had joined in
suing the copper companies for damages. 94
Meanwhile apocalyptic erosion caused by the toxic emissions had denuded some 55,000
square acres of the local Appalachian landscape. The ongoing process destroyed local fishing
and later threatened the efforts of the region’s first hydroelectric power company as reservoirs
downstream filled with silt. 95

93

Barclay, The Copper Basin, 76.
Barclay, ibid.
95
Barclay, The Copper Basin, 74.
94

58
In its reaction to the smoke emissions catastrophe TCC had set upon a two pronged
strategy. In 1905-06 Tennessee Copper shot a 325 foot brick smoke stack upwards from its
Copperhill citadel like some gigantic industrial minaret. This tremendous stack could be seen
from beyond the Copper Basin. Simple in design it was intended to cast residual sulphur dioxide
fumes up and away from the Copper Basin and immediate farming villages. The fumes made it
into the upper atmosphere. TCC’s great stack worked magnificently but created another set of
problems: Now toxic clouds destroyed farms even further away than before. Dozens more law
suits ensued in a smoke war now waged between the allied interests of Tennessee corporate
capitalism and local businessmen—determined to maintain their vital economic interests—and
the agricultural folk of Georgia and North Carolina. More had to be done. 96
TCC then erected a towering garrison of broad, ninety foot high container tanks on a
bluff west of Copperhill that condensed much of its smelter emissions into sulfuric acid. The
acid containers were completed by 1907. DSCI copied TCC in erecting its own acid plant by
1909. The firms’ conversion of the emissions into sulphuric acid was a resounding success,
bringing in enormous profits. Within a few years TCC and DSCI were known collectively as the
largest producers of sulphuric acid on earth. Owing to the acid’s importance in munitions
manufacturing, the region’s production of acid would earn international notoriety. 97
Meanwhile, defoliating “accidental” emissions of SO2 (“white gas”) still settled with
regularity across orchards and gardens all around the Basin and in counties downwind, mostly in
Georgia. A team of legal agents from TCC joined forces with New South, pro-business political
elites. Political careers were made and broken in the continuing smoke wars. Enabled by an
indulgent court system, the controversy over “smoke” lingered well into the interwar years; the
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courts refused to shut down the economies of whole communities once the companies had shown
attempts to relieve the damages. One letter published in the Atlanta Constitution during this era
illustrates the anger and frustration many farmers had about it all. Will H. Shippen, of Elijay,
Georgia complained bitterly about the costs imposed upon farmers and North Georgia politicians
in trying to defend their property through the extended legal wrangling of the emissions suits-suits that were supposed to have been settled by the U.S. Supreme Court some years before.
“How long will the Georgia legislature permit its valuable time to be taken up by the paid
lobbyists and attorneys of a foreign corporation [DSCI], making a football of this
matter… On the one hand we have the state, whose domain is being ravaged, and her
citizens whose timber, orchards and crops are being destroyed and on the other hand the
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper, and Iron Company… eagerly working to make big dividends
for its wealthy stockholders. Our property owners are sick and tired of being hauled to
every legislature by the copper company in their efforts to undo the United States
supreme court’s [sic] decree in this important matter.” 98

TCC created a special office devoted to address damages from SO2 emissions. The
company hired men whose sole duty was to inspect damages and pay reparations to local
farmers. Proactive as some of these actions have appeared to some scholars, bundles of law suits
remained stacked in abandoned TCC buildings years later; just how the company handled these
cases is unclear. For a poor farmer whose crops had been ruined, company estimates of “losses”
may well have been too late and not enough. 99

98

“ Says Time to Call a Halt in Copper company Legislation,” Atlanta Constitution, 16 July, 1918.
Barclay, ibid, 40; General summary of the development of the Basin industrial works, see, W.H. Emmons and F.
B. Laney with the active collaboration of Arthur Keith, Geology and Ore Deposits of the Ducktown Ming District,
Tennessee, ibid. Newspaper reports on the emissions controversy include: “Smoke From Sulphur Works Causes the
Citizens to Try to close Copper Mines,” Atlanta Constitution, 15 August 1901; “Injunctions Are Dissolved: Farmers
Claimed that Fumes Destroyed the Growing Crops,” Atlanta Constitution, 21 August 1901; “Injunction is
Dissolved—Copper Mines at Ducktown Will Go On As Usual,” Atlanta Constitution, 22 August 1901; “To Enjoin
Sulphur Fumes: Ducktown People Object to Emissions from Roast Plants,” Atlanta Constitution, 20 January 1902;
“War on Smoke Nuisance: Judge Allen Makes Ruling On Ducktown copper Suit,” Atlanta Constitution, 21 January
1902; “Furnaces Denude Georgia: Vegetation of Five Counties Destroyed and Great Damage Done to Property by
Tennessee Plants,” New York Times, 11.2.1903. “Ducktown Copper Co. Forbidden to Increase Sulphur Ore
Burned,” Atlanta Constitution, 9 May 1917; “Agreement on Claims Between Georgia and Ducktown Company”
Atlanta Constitution, 9 January 1919; Articles that give a sample of the politics in the region include, “Use Apples to
Buy Votes,” The New York Times, 22 November 1910; and, “Copper Company Charges Brought Against Brown”

99

60
When the Lewisohns regained control of TCC in the mid-1910s they recognized that
newer methods had to be employed to deal with the region’s low grade ore and the smoke
emissions nuisance. The changes made at TCC affected industry in the entire Basin and served
the strongest firms politically and economically. Thus goodwill was a consequence, but not
initially a driving force behind the Lewisohns’ efforts. To make a profit from the region’s low
grade ore demanded production array diversity and innovation. Ever tenacious and optimistic
about how to make the area’s resources work, Wall Street investors repeatedly supported the
purchase and development of new technologies so as to grind out every possible penny from
local production. Of course by then the most severe denuding of the region was complete. An
astonishing four feet of topsoil was eventually washed out of the Copper Basin according to
some reports, never to be replaced. The erosion created the basis for Basin’s sentimental if
cynical nickname, “The Old Red Scar.” 100
Early unionism in the Copper Basin
When it came to labor issues, Isabella workers, like their Ducktown and Tri-State
neighbors had little hesitation to taking on the copper companies when the need arose. Within
the first few years of their company’s founding DSCI workers went on strike for better wages
and working conditions. In fact, it was in reaction to DSCI management that workers first chose
to form an AFL local in 1899. Local lore and newspaper reports suggest that from tiny Isabella
tenacious labor radicalism spread across the Basin through Ducktown and eventually to
Copperhill. To provide themselves with a measure of privacy from corporate headquarters, the
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AFL union first organized at Ducktown. About 350 miners joined the new local. Initially all
local firms refused to hire the AFL men, but when skilled employees organized a strike and
refused to work they shut down local works; the companies capitulated, some more quickly than
others. DSCI tried to remain resolute in refusing to bargain and the battle it waged with its
workers alarmed investors who demanded regular reports of the developments. 101
The actual records for DSCI are no longer available for review, but workers’
circumstance can be reconstructed from the sympathy they elicited from even pro-business
commentators such as local historian and chief clerk of TCC, Robert E. Barclay. In recounting
the battles, Barclay pitted DSCI workers against a management he described as “inflexible” on
the union issue, refused to budge on wages that were “invariably below” rival firms. He
commented more than once on workers’ conditions at Isabella and suggested this was why they
went on strike so often, but that even when such action resulting in shutting down the works
strikes “always ended unfavorably for [DSCI] workers.”102 Contemporaneous New York Times
and Ducktown Polk County Republican accounts lend credence to Barclay’s observations. A
letter in Barclay’s account from DSCI management to the company’s London owners
acknowledged management’s actions against the AFL men.
“Growing suspicion that we have been ‘posted’ by the union men discharged, but I know
you will uphold me in preventing unionism from gaining a footing, or recognition of any
kind on your premises, even at the expense of temporary hindrance to work in hand.” 103
Local wage differences between companies were known to the workers; when wages did
not match from one company to another the workers might just strike. Certainly this was true
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later when in 1916 DSCI workers went on strike to obtain wages matching Tennessee Copper
workers’ pay. By comparison, Tennessee Copper workers at this time earned more on average
than industrial workers anywhere in the East Tennessee Overhill. The company tended not to
fight unions and its wages measured favorably in a comparison. 104
The AFL union forced a settlement on DSCI in 1916, one of the very few union contracts
the company ever agreed to. TCC settled with its miners and gave them a ten percent raise. The
AFL’s early success in the Copper Basin garnered credit among workers. For the next
generation periodic demonstrations of union power made local and national headlines. It appears
there was some connection of this AFL union to more radical western Federation brotherhoods,
but the records are unclear. One important distinction about this union should be noted: there
was no one particular craft or set of trades associated with the new local; it was an industry-wide
amalgamation of men from the various job-types used in local extraction, smelting and chemical
productions. As such it was not organized along the lines typical of the western non-ferrous,
metals and mining AFL brotherhoods. 105
Resentful of what it considered union incursions, DSCI soon returned to its strident antiunionism and remained so. It may have done so through blacklisting and the purging of union
men over time, but the records on not clear on this subject. Certainly supervisory and managerial
personnel would have known exactly who organized DSCI workers. Depending on the critical
nature of their work at DSCI these men may or may not have been allowed to return. But this
does not mean that workers were powerless in the face of DSCI’s reaction. Into the 1920s they
found employment in one of the several other firms. Into the 1910s, the half-dozen firms in the
region held plenty of employment opportunities: besides the aforementioned DSCI and TCC,
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those firms included Pittsburgh and Tennessee Copper, No. 20 Copper Mining Company, Ocoee
Copper (later owned by Chattanooga Copper), and Copper Pyrites Corporation. 106
The local labor market was made up of many desperate men in from the farms looking
for better wages. Many in this potential pool of workers had a willingness to work hard but were
unqualified to take on the skilled jobs required at the local mines and works. Some men made
the farm-to-industry transition quite successfully but the man who had experience at a trade held
considerable leverage with operators. 107 DSCI’s reaction to the AFL notwithstanding, market
competition and labor needs appear to have dissuaded local firms from organizing another joint
offensive against union men for a while after the AFL’s victory. The firms no doubt also
realized the union might help them. Even though a union competed with companies for workers’
loyalty an AFL local could organize work crews and train employees. The union being a part of
the Federation likely also assisted in tempering some measure of leftist ideology in the rank-andfile that may have challenged capitalism. 108
During these years, workers’ loyalty to protecting their jobs can be explained in part as a
reflection of the work they put into constructing their works and towns and as a consequence of
the specialized skills they developed. Workers’ attitudes towards their companies, even for those
employed by DSCI, reflected the kind of loyalty members of the Amalgamated Association of
Iron and Steel Workers had once held for the notorious Carnegie Homestead Works at
Homestead, Pennsylvania. Those men had built the works, their homes, and their lives around
the works. Managerial annoyance was accepted as just another job hazard. Divorcing oneself
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from familiar settings was often simply too difficult. This was especially true if workers had
families. To quit or get fired from one firm and move to another company nearby would be
difficult enough. Any seniority earned would be lost. Word of a man’s particular working habits
no doubt would have been exchanged among managers, even competing managers. This would
have been particularly true if one were a known troublemaker.
In addition worker loyalty could also be a function of logistics. It should be remembered
that TCC had brought in many men of foreign extraction to man its mines and works. Before the
age of the automobile, travel itself was difficult. But even into the automobile age most workers
continued to travel by foot or on hoof to their jobs unless it was their business to use the
company rail line. Horses had always been expensive; cars remained so for many despite Mr.
Ford’s contributions. Both these travel options were out of reach for many men. Only a family
man who had the best of jobs could entertain joining the new automobile class. Therefore, just
to up and go for most fellows was too radical an option until they were somehow betrayed by
their company or were offered a guaranteed position with another firm. For all these reasons, the
seeming abundance of opportunities that might lay before a man in the Copper Basin during era
of the intensely competitive copper firms was in fact more limited than it might seem.
Frustrations in these circumstances no doubt contributed to men remaining in their communities
for years on end, sticking with their companies out of necessity. Such men might join a union in
the hopes of affecting added security. 109

The Great War changes everything: From boom to bust to rational management
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The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 revealed several things about the copper industry:
it was now global, “sensitive to international affairs” and it was susceptible to its own “princeand-pauper nature” that underscored the boundless and sometimes misguided optimism of
investors. The war boom was short and white hot; it gave copper-mining companies profits “the
equivalent of a 200 to 300 percent return on their 1915 book value.” Since its two major firms
produced oleum, a high-powered sulphuric acid critical element in the creation of TNT and other
munitions, the war seemed to be a golden opportunity for copper Basin firms and workers. 110
Wars are effectively economic revolutions and as such difficult to control; the dynamics
of war aggravate already risky variables and in regard to Copper Basin firms, those variables
affected some particularly ill-fortunate mutations. The possibilities for profit offered by the war’s
mass death notwithstanding, marriages between capitalist and war-making interests made during
this era were not always advantageous. Unforeseen economic consequences of the war contracts
dampened the giddiness of investors. The hollow American neutrality of the early years of the
Great War allowed the international reputation of Tennessee Copper’s sulfuric acid production
capacity to catch the eye of imperial investors from Russia. In 1915 the company made an
agreement with the Czar of All the Russias, Nicholas II. Hammered out in Atlanta one
September day between TCC agents and representatives of the Artillery Department of the
Imperial Russian Government, General A. Sapojnikoff, the contract stated that “the manufacturer
agreed to manufacture, sell and deliver and the purchaser to buy and take and pay for 4.8 million
pounds of Trinitrotoluol [TNT].” 111
With the czar’s investment of $1.5 million, Tennessee Copper Company built Nicholas
his own TNT plant in the Copper Basin. Meanwhile, DSC & I sealed its own war acid deal
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which seemed advantageous when signed. These deals awed Wall Street and locals as reports
told of the wonderful deals. Ducktown soon swarmed with thousands of pairs of eager hands
ready to partake in the boom’s necessary building and swim in what promised to be a sea of good
wages. Within a few short months the payroll of TCC trebled into the thousands and the
population of Copperhill swelled. One report claimed the excitement coming out of Ducktown
in those first months after the announcements of the war contracts was “like gold fever days.”
The new rush for copper-based product brought in 5000 new people by May 1916. Housing
opportunities dried up and the shortage instigated a building boom to keep up with rush of
incoming families. “I do not know how many new buildings are going up,” said one witness,
“but all are two-storey brick, and very good buildings.” TCC advertised for “white” brick layers
and lead burners and for other jobs needed at its sites. The brick layers were going to have to lay
“ten million brick” claimed W.H. Eaves of Copperhill. The response to labor advertisements
overwhelmed local facilities so much that TCC had to run special trains 13 miles back and forth
to outlying towns every night just to give men a place to lay their heads. Men on the make
making money seemed everywhere. For a time, the flood of cash, high wages, and new
construction and supply opportunities seemed endless. The ecstatic labor market led organizers
from the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers to the Tennessee hills. 112
TCC then got itself stuck in a pricing war with one of its customers when the price of
acid shot high in the commodities markets. TCC wanted a better price for its product than its
contract with International Agricultural Corporation would allow. TCC closed down its
production for a time claiming it had been forced to “make repairs” for several months, but when
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asked TCC’s president Utley Wedge said the repairs were to allow for a substantial increase in
production. This last comment was likely referring to the expansion necessary to support the
Russian investment, but the reports are unclear.113
In June 1916 Tennessee Copper Company announced it would pass on its quarterly
dividend owing to “perplexities.” In light of all the attention and critical importance placed on
the Copper Basin to help protect civilization from the Hun, nervous Wall Street investors
suspected all was not happy in the Old Red Scar when rumor of work stoppages and unpaid bills
hit the market. Corporate disclosure revealed catastrophe and confusion in the Tennessee copper
fields; the “perplexities” had in fact been “owing to the situation brought about by the fire at
Copperhill, which has not yet been adjusted, and also to the expenditures needed for other
construction.” Subsequent reports showed that TCC managers misappropriated the Russian funds
and used much of them to build a substantial grange of other structures in addition to the czar’s
TNT plant. 114
More revelations ensued. The “fire” had in fact been a massive blast that flattened the
czar’s new TNT plant. The mysterious nature of this incident was all the more in light of the fact
that the place had been under guard. Initially it seemed company insurance protected all losses,
but Russia’s money in the affair was, as one report put it bluntly, all “burned up.” TCC
maintained it was not blame for the fire, but Russians disagreed and sued TCC for $1.3 million.
Had not the intervention of two political revolutions in 1917 distracted Russians and given
Bolsheviks a victory that November TCC may well have been pinned with the costs of loss.
Meanwhile at TCC a revolution of its own took shape. The toxic whiff of “convenience” hung
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over the entire Russian affair and this fact was not lost on many. Bills for TCC had been and
remained due. No one was getting paid beyond a surety company and managers in the Copper
Basin who appeared to be lining their own pockets. Company official R.E. Barclay claimed
evidence of myriad misappropriations and the pocketing of cash lay everywhere at TCC. In his
account of this reckless period in the company’s history, local management “approvals” of an
“orgy of” unnecessary, poorly executed construction projects were as much to blame as any
“fire” had been: “Men in squads and platoons [who] worked on building that would never be
used, on contractions that were never completed, on unloading supplies and materials that no one
knew for what purpose they were ordered [accompanied] men receive[ing] pay checks for labor
and salaries never performed.” The losses both financial and in reputation from all this buffeted
Tennessee Copper and almost capsized a firm that just a year earlier one paper had called the
“most winsome of the ‘war brides’ of 1915.” 115
Economic shocks from the blast at TCC’s Russian plant were even more damaging and
surprising in light of the company’s reputation as a money-making engine. Tennessee Copper
had paid respectable dividends regularly in the general copper boom as national industries one by
one electrified themselves. Since 1913 Tennessee Copper had been on a roll, paying dividends at
a rate of “75 cents a quarter on shares of $25 par value, or at the annual rate of 12 per cent.” And
remember, all this had occurred during the high water mark of the smoke emissions war. 116
After the U.S. finally declared war in April 1917 and the Wilson Administration realized
it had to closely administer the nation’s industry to meet war needs, copper firms benefitted from
passage of the Federal Reserve Act, which secured an environment where banks were willing “to
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provide 90 day loans for copper in process.” Now commodities markets became even hungrier
for the red metal. The War Industries Board set copper prices at 24 ½ cents per pound through
the balance of the conflict. But the boom only lasted a couple years and when the war ended,
there was nothing to stop a plummet in the commodities price of copper. Hundreds of millions
of tons of un-purchased copper overwhelmed the market. Countless other tons of scrap copper
now lay on old battlefields. War needs for oleum disappeared. The fact is that copper cannot be
put back into the ground once dug up. Slow response time on the part of non-ferrous producers
made matters worse; it took between 90-120 days for many to respond to the slackening needs.
In response to the world oversupply, the largest producers formed a cartel, the Copper Export
Association. Made legal by Congressional action in the 1918 Pomerene Act that “exempted
export cartels from anti-trust law,” the cartel sought to limit production and protect producers
from cut-throat competition. Through the twenties, the cartel managed to keep copper prices
around 14 cents per pound, far below war highs of 29 cents, but much better than if the producers
had competed with no cartel at all. 117
TCC’s oleum production served as its saving grace during the war, but could not save
management after the Russian fiasco. Adolph Lewisohn and his sons regained company control
in late 1916. By that point, the company’s stock prices had collapsed to $42 per share from
earlier highs of $70. The Lewisohns folded TCC into their Tennessee Copper and Chemical
Corporation. The company thus finished the war under new management and eked out some
profits. Tennessee Copper and Chemical (later called Tennessee Corporation) had its offices on
Broadway in New York City and included these subsidiaries: TCC, Capital Fertilizer, Southern
Agricultural Chemical, The New Haven Copper Company, U.S. Phosphoric Products, North
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Carolina Exploration Company and the Mining Exploration Company. This realized profits of
over $1.3 million in 1917 and $477,512 in 1918 demonstrating the Lewisohns’ know-how in
corporate organizing and oversight. Not wanting to make the same kinds of mistakes the
company endured early in the war, the Lewisohns then instituted a rational management and
production regimen that would become an industry archetype and transform the lives of TCC
workers. 118

J.N. Houser reorganizes TCC within the Lewisohn model
The man given charge of Tennessee Copper from1919 onward was “J.N.” Houser. As
General Manager of TCC until his death in 1949 Houser was also a member of the Tennessee
Corporation’s board of directors. Houser administered the overhaul of the company’s product
line building on the work accomplished by a clean-up managerial team sent to the Basin
immediately after the Lewisohns regained control of the firm. The team fired TCC’s acid plant
superintendent and chief engineer. Houser took charge of TCC. Houser hired a new
management cohort that included a mine captain, mine foremen, carpenter foremen, time keepers
and supply clerks, a civil engineer, master mechanics and mechanical engineers. This team in
miniature represented the same kind of new, more finely focused rational management the best
U.S. metals firms adopted during the Progressive era. Added later to this team was a trained
manager who oversaw a new Personnel Department. 119
The new GM understood the company’s challenge was as great in the late 1910s as it had
been during the smoke crisis twenty years before. His answer to the challenge would be to
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expand the company’s production array through a comprehensive building and product
development program. Known as the All-Milling Program and approved by the New York
office, this “tremendous undertaking” would extend facilities to process the notorious low-grade
ore in the Basin. One of the main goals of the project was the “eventual elimination of the blast
furnace as the keystone in the recovery process” owing to inefficiencies. The immediate postwar slump of 1920-21 slowed progress on the project but by 1923 conditions had improved
enough for the erection of a new acid production concentrator and the construction of a selective
flotation plant near the company’s London Mine. Selective flotation “is based on the counterintuitive phenomenon that occurs when heavy metallic substances cling to the bubbles of an oily
froth and rise to the top, where they can easily be skimmed off.” The chemical reaction process
removes about 94% of copper from ore and was thus perfect for use in the Copper Basin.
Adding to all this, by the end of 1924 Houser called for the “erection of [new] four roasters and a
sintering plant [sat] at Copperhill.” 120
These developments by 1930 gave TCC the ability to produce in addition to copper,
commercial and textile acids, sodium hydro, ferric sulphate, copper sulphates (for use in
fungicides and insecticides), iron sinter, zinc concentrate, sundry organic chemicals, and
granulated slag. Copper use in electrification and for conventional metals products for this era is
known. Birmingham fabricators used TCC iron sinter just as scrap might be used. The balance
of TCC’s products reflected the Lewisohns’ new interest in chemicals. The expanded array of
products made possible by Houser’s All-Milling Program reinvigorated optimism among local
businessmen. 121
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Houser maintains industrial peace
Houser accompanied this production overhaul with efforts to maintain industrial peace by
way of welfare capitalism and rationalized personnel management. Keen on limiting the power
of an independent union, but unwilling to make direct attacks it, Houser “loved the union to
death” by recognizing it had a right to exist and then circumventing its mission by establishing a
new chain of communications for employees. The GM’s efforts here rested on a de facto
company union or employee representative plan (EMP). Houser bolstered the legitimacy of the
EMP by making sure around TCC mines and works that “the Manager’s door was always open.”
The EMP was typical of those established by progressive firms during this era that wanted to
dissuade workers from joining independent unions. Houser’s efforts built on those of his
predecessor, H.T. Harper who had placed guards around new, more-dangerous pieces of
machinery. Harper had also adopted uniform safety measures in all TCC mines. The upgraded
system’s primary focus was to institute better safety habits among all men by crew. But it also
instilled greater loyalty among workers once the system proved it could truly reduce accidents
and death on the job. The EMP improved the company’s bottom line by reducing the expenses
associated with misused machinery and lost “man-hours” owing to injuries or death. 122
The EMP tamed arrogance among a certain set of workers who tended to hold onto
procedural ignorance out of a misplaced sense of masculinity. Pride born out a the independent
natures useful in the Southern Mountains frontier society often made it difficult to train men in
safety and efficiency protocols. This is not to argue that the new EMP system was perfect. It
apparently relied too much on an administrative hierarchy intimidating to some workers and
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condescending to others as will be shown. But it had its good effects and was much better than
the disinterested, bottom-line only approach TCC employed during the Lewisohn’s interregnum.
Company officials also claimed the EMP provided workers a place where they could forum.
TCC manager T.A. Mitchell recalled the twenties under Houser’s new system. “During that
period of 10 years, it was the practice to hold frequent meetings with large groups of employees”
to encourage more worker input in safety procedure effectiveness, disseminate policy change,
and discuss production quotas. Workers could also discuss new wage schemes and were
“encouraged to discuss with their supervisors and the Personnel Department any grievance or
other matters about which they had concern.” In this manner, the EMP affected exactly what
Houser’s boss and TCC owner Sam A. Lewisohn believed was necessary when Lewisohn argued
that a modern manager had to be sensitive to the circumstances of his workers so as to
“humaniz[e] the management of industry.” 123
So successful was the Houser EMP program that it made the pages of the national trade
magazine, Explosives Engineer. Reflecting the associationalism common during the Republican
controlled, pro-business administration of the twenties, the Hercules Power Company periodical
joined the U.S. Bureau of Mines to assist Houser’s commencement of a “Sentinels of Safety”
campaign at Tennessee Copper Company. Mining companies and men who demonstrated the
safest work habits received an annual award from the magazine in a public ceremony addressed
by representatives from the Mining Bureau. The trophy was an evocative sculpture of a woman
holding a baby aloft designed to remind workers that it was their personal embrace of safety on
the job that would allow them to return safely to their dependent, vulnerable families. The
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magazine’s own notoriety added even more legitimacy to the EMP’s mission to purge TCC of
the old-fashioned every-man-for-himself mentality that formerly characterized a miner’s life.124
At a Ducktown presentation of the trophy that had been typical of such events, U.S.
Mining Bureau official W.W. Adams gave each man on TCC’s recent winning crew “certificates
of honor.” Men interviewed about the safety campaign approved of it. Blaster T.W. Davis, from
the Burra Burra Mine, when asked, “expressed his appreciation to the management for what they
had done to forward safety in mining and to the Explosives Engineer and Bureau of Mines for
the trophy and certificates.” The Sentinels of Safety campaign highlighted the fact for workers
that they did not operate alone in this world. A driller named I.H. Verner likely typified miners
when he said that “looking at the trophy… he was reminded that he had a wife and youngsters at
home confidently expecting him to return safely at the end of each day’s work.” 125
Granted, as a for-profit venture for a blasting powder company, the Explosives Engineer
could have cherry-picked men’s reactions to the safety campaign and the whole event may have
intimidated men dissatisfied with management nannying on the job. But these caveats aside, the
establishment of Houser’s safety-focused EMP and the Sentinels of Safety program underscored
certain facts about mining life and the mining industry in Tennessee not addressed prior to
Houser’s tenure at TCC: Progressive Era legislation in Tennessee had simply not been enough to
end the danger for Copper Basin industrial workers that lurked everywhere on the job. Too
many injuries still occurred on jobsites in the early twenties. The state’s inspection system was
too susceptible to corruption and full of holes even after a generation of reform. Laws sat on the
books that stated that the state’s Chief Mine Inspector could shut down any mine deemed unsafe
for non-compliance of state regulations, but actual implementation and enforcement depended on
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the personal prerogatives of too few inspectors. Houser and the Lewisohns understood the costs
associated with injured or lost man-hours and that laws alone would not protect workers. Most
important, TCC operators knew that not all accidents could be blamed on unsafe properties. Men
made impulsive decisions that led to accidents more often than did substandard facilities. To
institute a private safety program would also keep government officials, workers’ advocates, or
sundry concerned citizens from establishing intrusive government regulation. Furthermore, the
TCC program followed patterns embraced by much larger firms that also included functioning
pumps, good lighting and adequate ventilation in underground systems. 126
The situation at TCC before the installation of the EMP had not been pretty regarding
safety. A sampling of injuries at TCC from 1914 gives us a good comparison. For the three
months of October, November, and December thirty-two TCC men met injuries that ranged from
strained backs and bruised ankles to neck dislocations lacerations of the hands, chest, and hip,
amputations, fractures of arms and legs, crushed fingers and toes and myriad “contusions.” 127
With regularity, men injured themselves or were victim to falls, being crushed by ore “muck,”
rock falls, wrecked motors, and all the sundry rock-and-hard-place opportunities mining work
allowed. 128
In contrast to these figures, within ten years of the commencement of the EMP and
Sentinels of Safety campaign crews at the Burra Burra mine and other TCC facilities had worked
over 300K hours without any lost time for accidents. One measure of popularity among the men
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was the buy-in of workers to the program. At Ducktown there was considerable success; the
village’s mining team became the company’s safest crew. 129
Houser’s safety program, good as it was, did not vanquish all the hazards of mine and
smelting work. Periodic reports from the interwar years in the Copperhill paper told of tragedies
such as that which befell Clarence Crawford, a 42-year brakeman and popular vet among the
TCC crews who, while riding on the back of one of the company’s train cars, was crushed
between two of them. Four cars had snapped loose and rolled down a grade into an awaiting car.
Crawford had been in between. That he survived for anytime time at all was astonishing. The
rescue team worked feverishly to save popular “Horsefly” as he was known by his TCC pals
using steel torches to cut him loose from the wreckage. Despite the efforts and his “iron nerve”
Crawford succumbed to his multiple amputations and crushed chest. Horsefly Crawford left
behind his widow, two daughters and a host of local kin spread from Copperhill to Blue
Ridge. 130
Such tragedies became more uncommon at the Basin’s mines and works in the thirties.
The year 1923 saw 288 injuries at TCC per million man-hours worked. Following installation of
the Houser EMP safety program that rate fell to 169 per million man-hours and by the middle
thirties it had dropped to zero per million man-hours. Miner Samuel Sharp quoted himself on the
subject. “Every man in the mining department is convinced that if everyone will think about
safety, talk about safety, and try to work safely, we will continue to enjoy the great achievement
of having few or no workmen maimed or crippled at their work.” Sharp acknowledged miners
had once held great doubts about the program, but that it had been proven effective. No system
could be could ever be fool proof. Scholar Thomas Navins argued that even the best systems
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could be compromised by all-too-human obstinate attitudes among workers. “Miners may be
provided with health-protecting measure, but if they are reluctant to incur discomfort…health
measures are difficult to enforce.” 131
Houser’s employee representative plan co-opted a considerable amount of the energy that
lay behind the Copper Basin’s union movement—a result no doubt that had been assumed in the
general manager’s original calculus. Once shown successful for miners, Houser extended the
program across the TCC works to electricians, railroad operators, smeltermen, leadburners,
chemists—in short for all company crews. Their influence notwithstanding, the EMP’s
establishment cannot be given complete credit for union impotency in the Copper Basin during
the twenties. Unions had plenty of interior challenges that led to dormancy: political infighting,
fizzled membership rolls and shrunken treasuries. Additional clandestine efforts to erode union
power by the general manager may not have been necessary since the EMP was used in
conjunction with other aspects of rationalized management: reasonable wages and ongoing
incentives for men to upgrade their skills before advancing mining and processing technology. 132

The nature of the work in extraction, smelting, and chemical facilities
As for the men who manned the region’s copper company mines and processing plants,
reports and interviews published by Tennessee Copper Company and interviews conducted
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during this study reveal much about the spectrum of skills and attitudes toward work embraced
by some of the companies’ hundreds of men. Some of these men were the kind sought out by the
unions; others had been in the union movement, but were later removed from official
membership rolls owing to their positions as foremen, chemists or supervisors; still others had no
intention of ever joining a union or found unionism a hindrance to their personal ambitions.
Consideration of the conditions under which these men worked and an acknowledgement of their
ability to master the skills their jobs demanded of them provides a better understanding for how
pride in work might combine with the necessity of work, emboldening these men to defend their
industrial liberty. Copper company rolls represented an assortment of workers some of whom
represented low-skilled, lesser wage day-laborers while other possessed many industrial skills.
TCC chief clerk Robert E. Barclay summed up the top tier of Copper Basin workers among the
several firms as being a collection of master mechanics, locomotive, civil, and mechanical
engineers, copper mining and smelting experts, carpenters, time keepers, supply clerks,
commissary management, even a surgeon. 133
One of the most telling things about work in the Copper Basin was that it was not at all
uncommon for a man to hold a dozen different jobs during his career. He might work for DSC &
I or Pittsburgh Copper for a time and then later for Tennessee Copper Company. Upgrades in
mining and production methods became regular features of working life which required men to
retool their skills. As mentioned, dangerous circumstances were nearly omnipresent
underground. The extremely high temperatures and pressures exerted in the extraction, smelting,
and chemicals production wore equipment down fast and required a vigilant maintenance and
133
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repair that only increased upon the adoption of new production methods. Any yet, even though
men might change their jobs and take on new ones that required a different set of skills a
paradoxical regimen could set in. For many, their daily tasks became mundane owing to the
company’s non-stop production, which ran twenty-four hours, seven days at week, 360 days a
year. Repetitiveness could become a danger as men might do nearly exactly the same job over
and over again, not unlike a hazard that faced assembly line attendants. Attention to detail and
safety could wane; failure to maintain vigilance in focus led to accidents. 134
Many Copper Basin miners enjoyed the relative autonomy of their work. Even when they
were in teams, individual work was done in a manner that left each man to do his own task. Said
Mockingbird Nelson about his TCC mining work, “nobody interfered with you.” 135 He worked
on and off in the mines for nearly forty years beginning during the early Houser years of the
1920s. He said that “he thought he’d try the work and found that he liked it.” 136
The dark, sometimes even dank mines were cool year round. It may even have been
much better to work underground than to work topside despite mining dangers that included
regular ore dust inhalation, periodic cave-ins and explosions or accidental electrocution. You
could choose your hells to some extent in the Copper Basin: working in the threatening but cool
world below ground or in the acid-emissions blanketed world above. The latter was made worse
in summer’s searing heat in a landscape of barren hills shorn of shade trees. Top-side work also
meant usually working with hot, dangerous equipment in un-air-conditioned environs. Such as
they were, for all their possible dangers, mines had at least ventilation requirements set by law.
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Many work areas, up or down, would have been loud. LOUD with a cacophony of men yelling
over the on-going, clank-and-banging, the pulling, grinding, rolling, and hauling of “muck,”
sundry machinery, hoists, trams, belts, locomotives and motors running day in and day out. 137
So to some extent, a miner’s world thus seems protected, even sheltered. Pay lured many
underground. Contract men “received extra pay for extra production.” Extra effort brought
home extra money and it was done without the fetter of someone else’s needs or complaint. The
work could be dangerous, yes, and many miners recounted how they escaped being killed or
severely injured as gravity worked against them, but most chose to stay underground
nonetheless. Take George Swanson for instance. A miner for over thirty years, Swanson
recounted that he was once trapped for over two and one-half hours by a twenty-ton rock. The
incident did not prevent him from going back; in fact, neither did bats that swooped down
occasionally in men’s faces scaring some men silly and encouraging ghost story telling among
the lot. Foxes too made their homes in the mines and sometimes the men fed the critters scraps.
Most miners took it all in stride. 138
The legacy if not loyalty of some mining families to the Tennessee Copper Company was
captured perfectly in one of the biographical reports in TC TOPICS, the company magazine.
“There aren’t many places where you will find three generations working for the same company
at the same time—much less the same department.” 139 Harvey, Virgil, and Sony Ledford had
that distinction; they’d worked in the Basin for years at TCC and as of the early 1950s still
worked for the Mining Department. The patriarch, Harvey had been born in 1876 and at 75
dutifully reported to regular work. He worked through both the First and Second World Wars
without missing a single shift. Most of the years he spent underground he worked a as a trammer
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(a man who loaded raw ore into underground tram cars), then as a dumper, and a skip helper—
these were lift assistants. In fact, Harvey did not start working mining yard maintenance topside
till his early seventies. When he first began working for TCC he used to walk eight miles each
day to and from his job sites. His son Virgil had worked for TCC since 1919—he was as old as
the century when he begun work with TCC. Since the late 1920s Virgil had worked
underground. Harvey had once worked at the bottom levels of the mines making his daily rounds
as a motorman on the electric trains used underground to move ore. His day had began at 7 am,
picking up mine cars loaded with ore and delivering them to the shaft stations for hoisting
topside. After work he returned to his Turtletown home just north of Ducktown. The youngest
Ledford, Sony, worked in the mines before going into the Air Corps in the early 1950s and had
been in the Mining Department in the Ducktown shafts. 140
A surprising primitivism survived at certain Copper Basin work sites. Reports of mine
work show that as late as 1927 miners at Isabella still had to use wheelbarrows to load ore from
some of the smaller mines to truck beds for transport to the processing plants. In the larger
Copper Basin mines which at this time ranged to 500 to 1000 feet deep, men guided mules well
into the century to haul the broken “muck.” Electric locomotives when installed eased the burden
of hauling ore to the surface but they were not added until the 1930s. 141
Introduction of new technology could completely change working conditions. By the
1920s compressed air drills in the mines had replaced the sledge hammer and for blast holes,
dynamite replaced blasting powder. One of the constant problems in the Eureka mine had been
caused by pit-mining techniques that ripped a huge hole in the surface; rain water raced into the
underground shafts and threatened flooding the mine. Massive pumps had to be installed that
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could remove 850 gallons of water per minute to prevent flash flooding of the mines which could
come up without any warning whatsoever in Appalachian summers. 142
Miners who actually worked on developing new areas of the mines, either in the blasting
crews or who used machinery to extract the tons of raw ore, never worked alone. These men
worked in 3 crew shifts over 24 hours—the day, evening, and what were known as “hoot owl”
shifts. Day men were responsible for production drilling, maintenance, and repair while the other
two shifts and who were responsible for loading ore into mine cars and hauling or motoring ore
to dumps for hoisting to the surface and for whatever repair work still needed attention. The
smallest crews worked the “hoot owl” overnight shift. 143 Mine jobs outlined in TC Topics
included various levels of skills, but all miners developed an array of skills and abilities so they
could be ready to pick up other tasks when necessary. Mine jobs included those of electricians,
balk ground men, drill men, powdermen, blastmen, trackmen, timbermen, drag operators,
“stope” or drilling head production foremen, and perhaps most essential, the skip or hoist
conductors. These men manned the machines that hauled men up from the depths. Skips had to
be ever vigilant as to the conditions of the machinery; equipment failure on a watch could
mangle men or leave them dead. 144
Electricians, such as Waldo Brookshire were responsible for cleaning and maintaining
electric motors used throughout the mines for hauling ore and for keeping generators humming.
Compressed air was used to clean such equipment and by the 1950s workmen used masks to
keep the dust out of their nose, throat, and lungs, but for much of the previous fifty years this had
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not been the case, the air hanging with particulate matter. As men cleaned the machinery they
filled their own lungs with mineral, exhaust and lubricant detritus.145
Electricians also installed and maintained miles of electric wiring in each of the many
Basin mining shafts—the danger here being electrocution from exposed lines, poor lighting,
pools of water and wet equipment. Connections thus had to be absolute and solid. Nearby
someone like balk groundman Steve Anderson used long pinch bars to pry off scaly rock in
hallways where mine cars operated; balk ground men were “one of the few miners who
performed most of their work by themselves.” 146 They patrolled ladder shafts and hallways
constantly looking for loose rock or reinforcing weak areas with roof bolts. Shooting lines were
used to set off the explosives used to open new extraction sectors of the mines. Safety in the
mines for blasters would come to be a constant concern in the years after the mid-1920s, but for
years all these tasks were learned no doubt on a one-to-one basis; procedural independence was
fiercely guarded as a man’s own way of doing his job. Overseeing it all would have been a man
like Edgar Rose, who, as general foreman, had a job that landed him a reputation for being “on
the exacting side.” But his responsibilities for keeping everything in the mines operating
smoothly “come hell or high water” explained his attitude. 147
Another veteran of mine work, who after nearly forty years in mining got a job topside as
a change house man, was C.V. Cain. Cain was born in a small burg just west of the Copper Basin
in 1890 and when he was twenty-two, Tennessee Copper hired him to load “green ore” (raw ore)
into stockpiles near the mines. Within a year he was underground and he said the life took some
serious adjustment. Terror chased him out of the mines. He only returned when the Depression
of ’21 forced him to abandon his band saw work at a North Carolina lumber mill. Through the
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nineteen-thirties he worked underground again, sinking new shafts to the 15th level as a driller.
Eventually the toll on his body was too much and his rheumatism crippled his ability to “lead the
scrambling, active life of a miner.” 148 Remarkably, he’d gone for more than thirty years without
any lost time for accidents. He and his family were residents just outside of Ducktown. 149
Cain, his family, and other miners’ kith and kin likely shopped at a TCC commissary,
like the one run by H.L. Greenway in Ducktown. For over thirty years Greenway managed one
of several Tennessee Copper Company Smelter Stores as they were known. Ninety percent of
his customers were TCC employees. Like Cain, Greenway had come to copper in the slump of
1921 having been previously employed by a small chain of banks centered in McCaysville. The
future store manager up and took his family to Ducktown where they’d lived ever since. The
work was necessary, reliable, and paid a respectable income. So successful was his run as
Smelter Store manager that he’d been able to send all five of his children to either college or
university. 150
Leadburner Ernest Wagner’s more than thirty-year career at TCC makes for a good
example of the kind of innovation workers themselves had to sometimes demonstrate if they
wanted to fix aggravating problems around the plants. For over twenty-five years, day-in and
day-out, Wagner and some other leadburners inspected the water pipes that sprayed down into
the cavernous, 90 foot high sulfuric acid contact chambers at Copperhill, the whole complex of
which covered an area the size of a football field. The Copper Basin’s regular erosion muddied
the waters used to cool the steaming gas that would condense inside the massive containers; mud
would clog the pipes and if not attended they could rupture. The leadburners had the
“disagreeable” chore of unclogging the pipes, a task that required men to walk wooden runways
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while avoiding where the hot pipes entered the tanks. Each man had to pull up the nozzles for
cleaning. “Acid-laden gas would rush out like a miniature volcano.” The extremely hot
conditions did not permit consistent inspections and thorough cleaning. Frustrated by the heat
and inefficiency of the process, eventually Wagner tapped into some skills he had learned simply
by watching men in the mechanical shops. He devised spring-hinged flaps that automatically
shut over the holes in the tank. Wagner added this innovation in the 1940s—but this means that
before Wagner’s fix TCC crews for the previous forty years had endured geysers that would
have made the god Vulcan proud. 151
Wagner’s story underscores a paradox common in the metals industry: While there had
indeed been great technological advance in production and processing methods embraced by
Copper Basin industries in the first four decades of the century, much work still entailed slow,
pre-industrial hands-on innovation and mechanics. These conditions remained even after
Houser’s extensive production initiatives and rationalization of the work place. For instance,
owing to site specific criteria used around the works, leadburners throughout the 1920s and
1930s still had to hand cut huge sheets of lead that were then pounded, rounded, and welded
together to make the company’s ducts. Such work held countless opportunities of incurring
lacerations and other injuries—as well as the possibility of ruining the project itself by
accident. 152
Blacksmiths working in TCC’s Forge Shops regularly employed the kind of preindustrial work that was still in demand for industrial maintenance and repair. Elmer Patterson
worked in the shops for thirty years and the narrative of his career clarifies how flexible many
men were expected to be in picking up new skills. When they did, it advanced their pay scale.
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Early in the century, Patterson had worked on and off for both TCC and DSCI; he did so at the
latter as a trammer and drill helper. When he was hired at Tennessee Copper he started as a
bricklayer and assistant in the paint shop. At some point he developed skills to be a blacksmith
and moved into the Forge Shop; there he remained. Smithies were to fabricate and maintain
items used throughout the plant, from small tools and fittings, to massive pieces such as railroad
car axils, fan shafts, or crane hooks. Throughout the first third of the twentieth century smithies
used smoky, coal-fired forges. Poor ventilation kept the shops filled with choking emissions and
in low light. In his shop, half a dozen smithies pounded on old-style anvils and relied not on
thermometers but their own trained eyes to gauge metal temperatures in the forges; they gauged
the hot metal by color as it went from red to pure white, each color representing a precise phase
in the heating when a particular kind of work might take place. Exactitude was required for the
smithy. “He knows that at 900 degrees Fahrenheit, steel looks black red; then as the heating
continues the steel becomes in turn, dull red, bright red, salmon, mild yellow, light yellow, and
finally at about 2400 degrees –white hot.” 153 Steel quality that is common today was quite rare in
the twenties and thirties so blacksmiths only placed fine steel on tool heads. In each era, smithies
had to keep up with newer fabricating methods company scientists developed to create newer
metals and alloys that improved metals hardness. Smithies thus resembled de facto metal chefs
having to learn about the nature of manganese, molybdenum, tungsten, chromium, nickel,
silicon, vanadium, and other alloys. 154
Young Querry, a smelting expert, joined Tennessee Copper Company during the
Depression. During his twenty-odd year tenure with the firm he had not experienced one
accident. He was one of only a few TCC men who had gone to college (Robert Barclay and chief
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draftsman, J.B. Monty Moncrief were two others). After high school, Querry attended Tennessee
Wesleyan College at Athens for a time, but then transferred and graduated from Georgia Tech as
a chemical engineer. By the 1950s he had become the Smelting Department’s assistant
superintendent. He began at TCC as a chemist and worked at the firm’s Isabella works. Like
many of the foremen’s class he had been active in his community’s civic life, as a member of the
Epworth (Fannin County) Men’s Club, as head of the Morganton Association Baptist Training
Union and as a member of the local school board. Also like many TCC supervisors he had
benefitted from the company’s merit system. Querry’s excellent memory allowed oversight of
purchasing, specification, construction, and repair details about the range of equipment used in
the smelting process. A company chemist, Querry could never be a union man within Mine, Mill
after that union’s secession from the AFL. Sources do not indicate whether he supported the
union movement in the Copper Basin, but we can be assured that he represented the upper tier of
TCC employee skills. He would have enjoyed a comfortable salary that allowed him a
respectable place in the region’s middle class. 155
George W. Grizzle also worked in the Copperhill smelter works; he did so as a repair
leader and for over thirty years had mended conveyor belts and maintained the great ore roasters.
The works’ high temperatures placed enormous stress on its metal structure and so demanded
essential and regular maintenance of precision and timely efficiency. It was “hot, hard work.”
Into his sixties Grizzle continued at his job, though in his later years he admitted that he did not
“have quite as much wind as he did three decades ago.” Grizzle was raised on a farm. Prior to
coming to TCC, he had worked with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (the L&N). In fact he
helped build the TCC Copperhill rail yards. After TCC hired him he worked first as a trammer—
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that jobs seems to have been a sort of vetting task for so many men—but was then recruited to
tap blast furnaces and eventually became a shift foreman. 156
The heat of the work must have gotten to him and for a time Grizzle had returned to his
family down the L & N from the Copper Basin to grow cotton at Talking Rock, Georgia.
Desperation in the Depression brought him back to TCC. Work at TCC had allowed him to keep
the family homestead but he could not afford to leave TCC for the risky world of cotton farming
despite the farm’s “powerful call” away from the poisons and pain of working in the Basin. Once
he had become a foreman Grizzle would have been ineligible to follow Mine, Mill in its
migration from the AFL, and thus may have favored the Federation controlling local shops.
Grizzle’s influence over other men’s lives at the company could have helped determine the
potency of any union they joined. 157
John Deal was another boy would come to the copper fields from the farm. He been a
resident his entire life in the region and watched the great iron horses puffing their way through
the valley from a bluff on his family’s farm. The trains he knew hauled freight and passengers to
and from the Copper Basin day in and day out. From his home he could also see the great TCC
emissions stack towering hundreds of feet over the valley, the firm’s monster acid plant and
smelters looming just beyond. As an adult, Deal spent nearly his entire career of almost 50 years
working with TCC locomotives. He loved his life on the rails so much that he married his wife
in the open air beside the “camp train” that served as his lodgings. The same love of trains
apparently extended to his son who for a while served on Deal’s own engine as a railroad
fireman. Later the boy became an engineer for TCC in his own right—just like Pop. During the
interwar years, the locomotives in the Basin were, like everywhere, those great steam behemoths.
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Life on the rails, Deal said, had seen radical technological change come with the diesel engines
after WORLD WAR II. These new beasts had been initially resented as ending the traditional
life ways and curtailing the responsibilities of engineers who had long prided themselves in
being able to handle all the complex tasks necessary to keep steam engines running properly.
The danger and adrenaline associated with the steam engines was a constant: “With the old
steamer you had to keep the amount of water in the boiler just right.” If the water was too low
the engine might blow up and if it was too high there wasn’t enough power for the engine. The
thousands of gallons of water used every hour by the engines required constant vigilance and
men like Deal lived anxious lives as a result. 158
Grizzle’s and Deal’s stories were not atypical of craftsmen who had come in from family
farms and even after years of working for the copper companies, yearned to return to the quieter
acres of the farm. The hard scrabble life of farming at once prepared them for the rigors of the
industrial crafts, but the pay these men received kept alive hopes that they might one day return
to the farm. Such accounts seem to be much rarer among miners in the Basin though. Most of
these men appear to have come from families that had long ago left the farm or had little to no
history of farming. Distinctions among the region’s industrial workers arise when we compare
number of men employed in the mines relative to the number of men employed at other locations
in the copper fields and plants. According to the census reports, a higher percentage of
craftsmen chose to stay in Copperhill and McCaysville than in any of the other communities of
the Basin. In 1920 the percentage of craftsmen to miners in the Twin-Cities was almost even at
26% and 21% of the total workforce respectively; these workforce percentages held true across
the Basin, though it must be said that Ducktown and Isabella always had more miners than
craftsmen, representing 50% and 32% of the villages’ total workforce respectively in 1920. Over
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the course of the 1920s, even though the absolute number of craftsmen increased, TCC craftsmen
represented only about 21%. In mining by 1930 the number of miners living in the Basin
constituted about 37% of the total workforce or a little over 600 men. None of these figures
includes the scores of men who had moved outside the Copper Basin, but they do show certain
things. Technology required craftsmen, but until huge production increases necessary for
defense in the late 1930s, the number of craftsmen as a percentage of the population dropped.
These men became concerned about their relative power in a workforce increasingly filled with
miners—many of whom did not have the same level of skills. This fact helps us understand why
loyalty to the AFL was stronger among the tradesmen of the smelter and acid plants and why
Federation loyalty remained high in the Twin-Cities. 159

Copper Basin industrial wages
It is difficult to determine wages across the whole spectrum of TCC jobs, but most
measures suggest they were high for the region. Certainly that was the reputation lingering
among descendants of TCC workers and management who were interviewed for this study.
Conflicting information from TCC Mining Department reports suggests that some men worked
five days a week and others worked six. National census reports on the Southeast’s nonferrous
metal mines—the Copper Basin and North Carolina (Fontana) mines being the only significant
nonferrous mines in the region during the interwar years—state that workers tended to have 5
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day work-weeks. Later reports from the Depression era state that the same workers had shorter
work weeks, but that many also received time-and a half owing to long shifts. Other sources
claim however that workers often worked six days per week. The census officials themselves
acknowledged that getting accurate work information from many employers was difficult.
Moreover firms could very quickly adjust their production regimens or the size of their crews
even in industries like extraction and smelting where the typical costs of renewed production
tended to limit shutting down production completely. If workers at TCC worked a five-day, 48
hour week, total weekly wages would have been substantially higher. But even if Copper Basin
workers worked six day weeks, their wages would have been still been above wages earned in
the neighboring farming communities. 160
As national markets allowed, Houser lifted miners’ wages to $4.14 per miner, per man
shift. The post-war slump had its effects though. By January of 1922, the average rate per man
excluding staff was at $3.81 and for underground workers, just under $4.00 (or 39 cents/hour).
Men who worked underground made about 25 cents more per hour than men above ground
during the first decade of the Houser years. But the wage plan was strict and, as was the custom
in many industries, men were not paid when they arrived on company property, but when they
reached their job site. This convention remained till May 1937. 161
In light of Houser’s scientific managerial approach and the kinds of supervision of
workers he set in motion in the 1920s, it seems unlikely that he would have deviated from
industry-wide work-week conventions. Given the demands of the Great War, workers may have
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taken advantage of the region’s tight labor markets and temporarily secured a five day week; this
seems especially likely during the Russian investment boom. By 1920 (at least at TCC), Mine,
Mill locals had been able to shorten shifts from 10-12 hours to eight. Houser did have his
influence on working regimens it seems. Five day work-weeks were not regularized by TCC till
the New Deal era. When wages were converted to 2007 dollars a better measure of just how well
TCC workers fared is revealed. Of particular note is the rise of wages for TCC men after the
company signed labor contracts with Mine, Mill in 1919. The study will return to this subject in
later chapters.
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Wage calculations for TCC employees. The wage notes below apply to the Mining Department
at TCC only. Wages for men at other TCC facilities are not available in the sources. Note that
after 1922 wages are divided by above and below ground jobs. The wages do not include the
salaries earned by TCC foremen and staff. Note too that wages earned in the Copper Basin
generally went further than those earned in urban settings owing to a lower cost of living.

•
•

Jan 1918
per week/per hour
10-12 hour 5 day week
$15.77/ $ .26 hr
10-12 hour 6 week
$18.93/ $ .26 hr

2007 equivalent**
per week
$469.58/ $725.00
563.68/ 871.00

Dec 1919 (after Mine, Mill contract)
•
•

“8 hour” 5 day week $21.70 / $.54
“8 hour” 6 day week $26.04/ $.54

$573.56/ $858.00
688.27/ 1029.00

Jan 1922 (after 1921 Recession)
•
•

“8 hour” 5 day week $19.08/$19.90 undgd* .49 hr $561.75/589.03 / $864.00
“8 hour” 6 day week $22.90/$23.88 undgd .49
677.82/706.83 / 1036.00
Jan 1923

•
•

“8 hour” 5 day week $20.70/$23.65 undgd .59/hr $565.50/646.09 / $851.00
“8 hour” 6 day week $24.84/$28.38 undgd .59/hr 678.60/775.30 / 1022.00

*Underground workers
**Calculations made with an application on www.Measuringworth.com. The site
compares values only through 2007. Each figure in the last column represents two values: 1) that
of the “consumer bundle” or how far the wages would go in purchasing basic goods and services;
and 2) “unskilled wages” in light of historical inflation. So-called “8 hour” shifts at TCC before
1937 did not include the travel time it took men to get to their job sites, which could be
considerable in light of the depths of the mine or difficulty in traveling on foot or via company
rail.
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Unionization further considered: The AFL’s relationship with leftist, “western” radicalism
Geographical remoteness and great distances from the larger metals fields of the Far
West and the Great Lakes region did not deter American Federation of Labor union activity in
the Copper Basin following on the heals of the railroad. The presence of the AFL and tenacity of
this union to see organized labor’s goals to empower metals workers and miners underscores
national labor leaders’ belief that Ducktown was a critical part of the nation’s metals industry.
This early AFL local was robust enough to coordinate labor actions across the Copper Basin
metals firms beginning in late summer 1899 that made the pages of the Atlanta Constitution. 162
Reports state that the union was organized in part to respond not to poor pay, but to
trouble with DSCI’s abusive use of a doctor. Just what that meant is unclear from these
accounts, but Tennessee labor law suggests what angered DSCI men about the use of a doctor.
A new Tennessee labor law passed that same year, 1899, “affected the use of ‘company
doctors.’” The act made it unlawful for a company to require its employees to use a doctor hired
by the company. Employees were to be allowed their own choice of doctors: “A company
cannot withhold wages for payment of a company doctor without full consent of the employee.”
The point of the law was to prevent company intimidation that would affect medical treatment in
workers compensation cases. That said, enforcement of such laws was lax and even if officials
found companies operating outside the law the penalty for violating these rules was a mere ten
dollars. 163
It seems likely that DSCI, notorious for its oppressive exploitation of its workers, would
have used the same kind of “company doctor” forbidden by the new legislation: a doctor who
162
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possessed little real objectivity when it came to workers’ health, safety and condition. The
company could use such a fellow to weed out troublesome, pro-union workers. The labor
actions taken that late summer and fall by the new AFL local actually had two parts to it. The
first part was settled when Dr. H.H. Rogers tendered his resignation to the DSC&I and the
company posted notices that from that point forward no man would have to pay for any doctor’s
care while at work. During the first strike, only eight non-union men in the company’s employ
and at local mines came to work. For a time things appeared settled, but only to those who did
not live in the Basin. The second labor outburst began just about a month later when the union
claimed that it had not been properly recognized by either DSCI or Tennessee Copper and that
the companies had begun firing union men. The AFL brotherhood then ordered a second strike
and this time 500 men or more left work from both firms. This action left only 20 non-union men
doing any work for the companies. Initially the copper companies began firing workers and
claimed that they would hire only non-union men. This occasion brought the Polk County
sheriff owing to “desperation being feared” among the men. 164
The fears were well placed. National and regional accounts of the strikes underscored the
region’s importance to the nation’s economy and the investor class. In light of the copper
companies being the only firms in the region that could provide many men with a decent living,
violence joined with frustration and what likely appeared economic terrorism was directed at any
who opposed the union—not solely at the local business and political elite. The copper firms
secured their own private mercenary army of about one hundred men to thwart the brigades of
the AFL. The union posted its own guard around the companies’ yards to protect the property—
to protect what many men likely saw as partly their property—and no doubt to harass any strike
breakers. Said one New York Times report about the level of anger now common among the
164
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workers, “the miners are armed and guarding the mines, and refuse to allow the new men to
enter.” 165
Conventional firearms were not the only weapons welded by angry union men. The New
York Times reported that some of the strikers’ more potent weaponry came from stills in the
surrounding hill-country. “The strikers have secured a lot of whisky and are becoming
boisterous.” It would seem this “Mountain Dew” fortified the strikers’ spirits. Their strike
lasted until just before Christmas. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron fired more strikers,
discharging all union men from its Mary Mine. But at Copperhill, enough pressure was put on
Tennessee Copper when hundreds of men left their jobs that the firm agreed to the AFL’s
demand for a ten percent pay hike and an eight hour day. The union was not successful in getting
DSC&I to agree to the new conditions despite persuading furnace bosses to quit and workers
“occasionally show[ing] some violence.” 166 One foreman even had his horse shot out from
underneath him before the AFL and TCC came to an accord. Workers returned to their jobs
unsatisfied at Isabella, but followed the armistice anyway. Just why they did return is unclear,
but apparently the union decided that the TCC contingent of the union represented it bulk; those
men must have had the deciding vote on whether to continue the strike or not. 167
Reports as to the make up of this late 19th Century AFL union are sketchy at best but
what can be said of it was that at this time in the metals industry, they were likely to be skilled
because the skills-set required of individual miners and metal workers was greater than would be
required in the more highly mechanized age to follow. The precise number of men organized in
the ranks of the union is unclear, but it is clear that hundreds of men participated in the Copper
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Basin actions. Records do not reveal just how they were organized or whether there existed
membership exclusions. Based upon the available sources however, some speculation seems
permissible. AFL brotherhoods typically organized craftsmen and only occasionally included the
unskilled. At Ducktown, the union was not organized by job or task, nor by company, but only
by region. It is likely that its ranks were significantly smaller than the total population of men
employed in the metals industry of the Copper Basin. Employing traditional AFL strategies of
having the craftsmen lead a strike probably increased the effectiveness with the firm’s
management. As well, AFL unions did not participate in “indiscriminate” strikes and usually
preferred collective bargaining; when a union local chose to strike it was owing to management’s
intransigence. Just what happened to the Basin’s AFL local in the many years intervening before
the Great War era is unclear too. It does not appear to have remained a vibrant local through the
early 1910s although there was some strike activity centered once again at DSCI. Local accounts
say “the union” initiated a short strike that “had been a good [strike] because no real work time
was lost.” 168 Other than this brief mention, there is nothing more about this early Copper Basin
AFL activity.
Despite its organizing of strikes and earlier aggressive labor activity, the brotherhood as it
was first organized in Ducktown and Isabella did not satisfy some men. Local division in the
Basin mirrored the intensely bitter ideological feuds that arose in the more organized and
politically radical copper fields of the American far west. One of the great mining internationals
which formed in the labor battles fought on those fields was the Western Federation of Miners,
founded in 1905—six years after the AFL had come to the Copper Basin. This organization had
a tumultuous relationship with its adoptive parent, Gomper’s American Federation of Labor.
Many within the WFM were sympathetic to communism or socialism or some variation of leftist
168
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political ideologies and as such resented what they saw as an acquiescent leadership in the
Federation too pro-capitalist in its leanings. These men considered the AFL’s embrace of
volunteerism (aversion to government interference in labor relations) and pure and simple
unionism (a focus on economic gains through wages versus challenges to the political system) as
ideologies that were stultifying, suffocating, divisive, short-sighted, and weak-willed. To
underscore the differences, the Federation refused to financially support some WFM actions.
Resentful, the WFM’s rank-and-file chose to leave the AFL and joined the International Workers
of the World and “the Wobblies” efforts to establish a brave new world of One Big Union.
The WFM remained in the IWW until 1908 when the miners’ union leadership decided to
leave the Wobblies over a combination of jurisdictional disputes and ideological differences. By
now there were at least a half-dozen or more unions competing for workers’ loyalty each with
varying shades of ideological purpose ranging from the most conservative AFL craft unions to
the radically communist IWW. Owing to AFL influence in the western copper fields, the WFM
had been drifting toward a more craft focused and less industrial organization of its rank-andfile. This drift led to more jurisdictional confusion among the competing unions and no doubt
confused members of the union’s rank-and-file. This change notwithstanding, in general WFM
members held onto their varying degrees of leftist ideology. More important in determining their
effectiveness was the view in the public’s mind that the WFM was still connected with the
IWW—and with radical communism. This perspective held true for the public even after formal
separation from the Wobblies and WFM re-affiliation with the AFL in 1908. The public’s
perception and IWW leadership’s intention to raid union organizing meetings and wrestle control
of the miners’ union away from pro-craftsmen organizers did much harm to the WFM.
Jurisdictional competition between the IWW and WFM only increased during the Great War
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boom. WFM membership rolls dwindled to perhaps 17,000 members because the union was
unable to excite as many workers as did the craft unions and IWW organizers. 169
To distance itself from its IWW reputation, maintain its integrity, and vivify its
ambitions, WFM leadership reorganized their union as the International Union of Mine, Mill &
Smelter Workers (Mine, Mill). The leadership also abandoned the union’s mission to restructure
society or to instigate The Revolution. The latter can be seen in the union’s 1916 preamble,
which toned down its predecessor’s radical fixation on class struggle, placed more focus on
improving working conditions and economic circumstance, and supported civic efforts that
would uplift working people:
We the workers in the metal industry are united for the purpose of increasing wages,
shortening hours, and improving working conditions by removing or providing as far as
may be, the dangers incident to the work, eliminating as far as possible, dust, smoke,
gases, and poisonous fumes from the mine, mill and smelter: to prevent the imposition of
excessive tasks; to aid all organization of working people in securing a larger measure of
justice, and to labor for the enactment of legislation that will protect the life and limb of
the workers, conserve their health, improve social conditions and promote the general
well-being of the toilers. 170
In the Copper Basin, the contortions of its war economy in the wake of the Russian TNT
plant explosion and the general topsy-turvy labor market of the late 1910s wrecked and frustrated
industrial relations. The lives of enough workers had been tossed about so that many demanded
action. For a short time the local economy had held great promise, then crashed, and then…
stabilized only for a short while before it slumped again in the early 1920s. The economic ups
and downs left working people vulnerable to their employers. Perhaps in such an atmosphere the
AFL was not as aggressive as some men wanted. The Federation tended to falter at just such
times and become too cozy with management. Its brotherhoods had done so time and again in the
western non-ferrous mines and smelter works and many men no longer trusted the Federation to
169
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protect them before their employers. Certainly this had been true for men loyal to the WFM-now
IUMMSW. 171
Whatever the reasons, the International Association of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers
came to the Copper Basin upon request by some of the workers by 1916. This must have
happened just after the destruction of the Russian TNT plant and right on the heals of the
International’s reorganization as Mine, Mill. Locals were established according to TCC reports
at Copperhill and Ducktown, but not in Isabella. Whether these new Mine, Mill locals simply
absorbed the old AFL union—that did have representatives from Isabella—sublimated the AFL,
or merely competed with the jurisdiction of the earlier union is unclear. None of their activities
were recorded in the local press beyond strikes initiated during the war itself. According to
company records, Tennessee Copper Company did not formally recognize Mine, Mill until 1919;
those same records say nothing about a separate AFL craft-based local. In light of the late-WFM
now Mine, Mill’s drift toward increased influence of craftsmen in organizing the rank-and-file,
absorption by Mine, Mill may not have been a difficult process. The company established
contracts for a brief while with Mine, Mill before all union activity at the Copper Basin went
dormant in the 1920s. There is no word if DSCI ever recognized this new union. It probably did
not. In light of Barclay’s summary of DSCI management’s antagonistic relationship with labor,
it’s doubtful that the London-owned company ever maintained a formal relationship with Mine,
Mill or the more conservative AFL brotherhood. 172
It should be remembered that wide-spread and potent anti-union and anti-communist
sentiment arose in the late teens. That fact makes it tempting to assert that the combined effects
of the Red Scare and the post-war slump did in Mine, Mill for a time in the Copper Basin. Red
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Scare vitriol would have battered Mine, Mill in the Old Red Scar just as it might anywhere else.
But scholars who chronicle the demise of Mine, Mill in the twenties do not blame Red Scare
passions alone; instead they lay blame on internal union politics and a moribund leadership that
was petty and still stuck in pre-war organizing methods and—this last point is particularly
damning in light of Mine, Mill’s heritage—the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter
Workers lost membership nationally to the IWW during the twenties. The Wobblies enjoyed
very strong growth owing to their larger treasuries that could fund the far-flung organizing
campaigns typically required for organizing workers in remote mining and smelting
communities. There was no IWW component to the Copper Basin labor movement. Houser’s
EMP would dominate labor at TCC at least until needs arose and opportunities for resurrection
came in the Great Depression. As for DSCI workers, they had to endure the “inflexible” antiunion labor policy that kept wages “invariably below” that of TCC and terrific mismanagement
which brought that firm low. 173
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Chapter 2 Living in the Copper Basin: Politics, class and culture 1910s-1940s

Reasoning exactly how seemingly disparate aspects of community life may affect one
another to bring about social change has been a central concern of social scientists for over a
century. Yet identifying exact cause and effect relationships that transform communities is often
elusive owing to the complexities of social groups and the factors working within and without
them. The purpose of this sector of the study is to assess general trends located in some key
facets of the Copper Basin life that at once came about as a result of the advancing industrial
economy and which affected industrial relations; subjects discussed here include local attitudes
toward race that affected political partisanship, the development of the Biggs political dynasty,
commercial life and changes in local infrastructure, the transformative effects from the advent of
automobile age, campaigns to improve educational opportunities, the breadth and significance of
popular diversions and leisure activities and the impact of religious communities.
It should be remembered that unlike generally sustainable industries such as forestry and
farming, the extraction industry by its very nature will always end at any given site once the
costs of extraction exceed profitability for a sustained period. Prohibitive costs may or may not
precede exhaustion of the given region’s natural resource reserves. In the Copper Basin the arc
of profitability in extracting and processing the region’s ferrous and non-ferrous ores lasted
about a generation beyond the main period assessed in this study, but this was only owing to
continuation of the kind of technological investments outlined thus far in the study that never
dismissed how the new technologies reduced labor costs. That said the social and cultural life
described in this chapter reflected the high points of community life in the region which could
not be sustained, because over time fewer and fewer workers were need to get and process the
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ore. In fact, there was really only one generation that experienced a broad application of the best
opportunities the Copper Basin’s extraction industry economy could provide. The fragility and
fleeting nature of that economy was likely not something that all workers or even management
though of on a daily or perhaps even a yearly basis. Once the industrial concerns in the region
had stabilized and began providing most workers and those in supportive industries a foundation
for enjoying a generally vibrant working class and middle class life expectations that such a life
ought to continue or should be expanded became the main concerns of working people. Behind
alternately every striking worker’s picket or defensive conservative tradesman’s stance against
“radicalism” were folk who wishes to maintain not only their industry liberty, but also their
political liberties, familiar community demographics, community security, opportunities to enjoy
leisure time with family and friends, and an ability to worship in a manner that fortified and
sustained them in difficult times or allowed rejoicing for industrial abundance.

White racism, political trends and mountain partisanship
Whites in the Tri-state, and especially in the Copper Basin, worked hard to maintain the
racial purity of their white, industrial republic. These efforts were in keeping with similar efforts
affected throughout Appalachia. But, the anger and violence associated with the maintenance of
white dominance in Polk County adds credence to broader claims that its citizens held a general
aversion toward outsiders and rallied quickly to fend off perceived threats. 174
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After the elimination of most Cherokee, whites periodically took action when they
believed their economic liberties were being threatened. Establishment of a black community
employed in the railroad shops at Blue Ridge, Georgia, kept alive fears among negrophobic
whites that black infiltration into local labor markets would continue as the industrial economy
expanded deeper into the Southern Mountains. Several notorious, widely-reported, late 19th
century incidents at Isabella and in the Ocoee River Gorge, just west of the Basin, demonstrated
the region’s antagonism toward blacks. In each, whites perpetrated violent and sometimes lethal
action against African-Americans. In some of these incidents whites claimed they were entitled
to protect economic opportunities they believed to be threatened by employment of blacks. At
other times the incidents stood out as sensational wanton acts of race hatred. The national
importance of the region to the metals industry meant that sensational accounts of white
harassment of blacks periodically made the pages of the New York Times. These reports also
underscored the dangers that lurked in a mountain backcountry which still held elements of
frontier instability. One such report described the fate of a young black mail carrier who was
killed in an attack on his regular run from Parksville, Tennessee to Ducktown. “Contractor G.B.
Carter of Cleveland, Tenn., thinks that the colored boy who drove the rig [had] been murdered
and his body thrown over the rocks” reported The New York Times. The drive team fared no
better than the boy; lashed together, the animals were forced into the raging Ocoee to drown . 175
Resembling the rise in lynching that occurred during this same period, white violence in
the Basin demonstrated an aggressive sense of white political and economic entitlement.
Sometimes it was spontaneous, but more often it was premeditated. The intention by white
vigilantes and politicos to maintain the color-line in public lead to an acceleration of attempts to
175

“The Missing Mail Carrier,” New York Times, 18 November, 1889. The Copper Basin’s reputation and other
incidents of racial animosity shown toward blacks came from reminiscences recounted by Ms. Edna Dickey, in
“Blacks in Fannin County,” Facts on Fannin, 35-37.

105
reverse any economic and political advance blacks had gained in the region since
Reconstruction. White-supremacist activity built on Jim Crow legislation, but it was revived in
the late Progressive Era under the Wilson Administration, an unapologetically white-supremacist
political regime. 176
In the Copper Basin, the intention of white workers continued to be what it had always
been: keep the region lily-white, and protect white workers’ economic opportunities. Sources
reveal other factors were at work on the region beyond racial solidarity: Political partisanship
and the forces advancing the region’s industrial transformation intersected with battles for local
control among elites. At the same time cultural conventions and new popular culture influences
informed and transformed Copper Basin communities from the 1890s through the interwar years.
An April 1894 episode provides a revealing, if disturbing example. Resentful whites
organized to fight against what they considered an intolerable incursion by black workers into
the local community. Charles Livingstone, builder of three miles of railroad spur for the local
Pittsburg and Tennessee Copper Company, brought in fifty black men to Isabella Station “after
waiting in vain two weeks for white labor to do [the rail-laying] work.” Livingston’s
employment of the blacks sent local whites into a fury. Any substitution of blacks that white
workers considered work reserved for them could not be tolerated; they threatened Livingston,
making evident their intentions to do him harm. Ever-more-shrill threats at once underscored the
builder’s vulnerability and wounded his pride. Livingston pledged to hire whites to assist in
finishing the job. But before he could act an armed band of dozens of local whites went on a
night time rampage through the PTCC camp, shooting it up and wrecking the place as they
chased terrified blacks through creeks and out of the Basin. Determined to protect his
managerial prerogative, himself, and his black workers (who by this time were fleeing for their
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lives), Livingstone went to local police authorities to try and secure the services of the Polk
County sheriff and constable. There he found little help even in spite of offering a $100 reward
“for the arrest and conviction of all or any one of the party, especially the leader.” The offer of
this impressive sum had little effect on local white solidarity and garnered no confessions. 177
The tenor apparent in local historian R.E. Barclay’s later telling of this same incident
underscored a tenacious racism still typical among local elites. And it suggested the story itself
had become a popular local parable warning anyone who might risk the possible consequences
by trespassing upon local race conventions. Additional details revealed by Barclay clarified two
things: First, local white workers sometimes were unwilling to work under the conditions
demanded by the new industrial regimen; and second, those workers would impede regional
industrial advance if they believed that certain actions threatened the character of the local labor
market. Apparently, the work Livingstone wanted completed was exceptionally difficult and
consisted of laying rail on a winding grade. He decided to use more blacks than whites because
even though he would pay both races the same wages, he calculated that blacks, being more
economically desperate than local whites, “would trade-up their earnings at the company’s
commissary.” This fact that blacks would be willing to barter instead of take direct cash wages
meant it would take “but little cash to meet the payroll earnings of the colored employees.”178
Resentful whites apparently saw the terms of exchange as attack on white supremacy and
local customs. That the matter occurred before the Basin’s economy expanded in World War I
to include thousands of workers meant that job opportunities were still limited. Although there
were craftsmen recruited from outside the Basin manual labor was one of the only ways local
men could enter the new extraction and smelting economy of the Copper Basin. Replacing local
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whites with imported black workers therefore bred intense resentment. Race integration of the
Copper Basin could not be allowed to happen. The resulting offensive on the PTCC camp was of
a character not seen in the region since the expulsion of the Cherokee. Though armed
themselves, Livingston and his foreman could not halt the advance of fifty white workers who
toted rifles and other weapons. In Barclay’s description:
“The invaders then moved forward and surrounded the camp [and] as they did so called
out loudly for the now thoroughly frightened blacks to come out running and to keep
running, and not to come back… the colored men were [now] itching for the open road…
the camp … disgorging a mass of tumbling, fleeing men… the avalanche began rolling,
guns began blazing…. The mass cascaded… from there it thinned… in the direction of
the nearby Ocoee River. When the river was reached some began swimming, some
wading, while through the pale darkness some of the more earnest fugitives [my
emphasis] could be seen taking off in mightly [sic] effort at leaping entirely across the
hundred foot wide stream.” 179

Barclay claimed not one of the blacks had been shot or injured, but this is difficult to
confirm with certainty as whites controlled the town’s newspapers. It’s clear that the black men
lost not only their jobs and whatever wages may have been owed to them, but any property left
behind. Moreover, they would have had to make their way south through a notoriously
unsympathetic Piedmont where they could easily have met with more white wrath. Barclay
finished his retelling in the same manner a proud white mountaineer might recount tales where
Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett or Old Hickory fought an Indian menace. The terrified blacks took
off and “while they ran, they prayed…. The triumphant posse could see standing out against the
skyline, the forms of Livingstone and his companions as they moved about on a hill above the
railroad. A few sticks of light dynamite tossed up the hill cleared [the ridge and] the negroes [sic]
did not return.” 180
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Raw statistics reveal certain demographic characteristics of the Basin’s population. Some
Copper Basin residents had mixed white and Cherokee heritage. Many more were descendants
of Scots-Irish, Germans, Welsh, and English extraction-industry specialists of the first generation
of industrial workers later joined by the Slavs, Poles, and Italians who came to build the
industrial works at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. That said, the vast majority of
Copper Basin people by the late 1800s, 98% in fact, were native-born local whites. Whites from
nearby North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee assisted in refurbishing the older mines, digging
them deeper into ever more complex systems and constructing the elaborate smelter and
chemical plants. Many never left the area. Fewer than 300 people in all Polk County were
African-American and of these, 144 were men. In Fannin County, there were even fewer black
men, 76. The Basin itself had less than a half-dozen black residents. The only town near the
Copper Basin that had any sizeable black population was Blue Ridge, Georgia wherein nearly
190 African-Americans lived. The adults in that community worked at the Louisville and
Nashville rail yards and repair shop or as domestic help to white families from the North who
came to nearby Mineral Springs for health reasons and built grand houses. Some of these
wealthy white families had as many as five black servants per household. But as Mineral Springs
fell into disuse and after L & N yards relocated to Etowah, Tennessee, blacks began to leave
Fannin County. By the end of the 1950s just over a dozen blacks resided in all of Polk County
and thirty years later only a handful remained in the old hub of Blue Ridge. By this point
apparently no blacks lived in the Copper Basin. 181
A few brave blacks lived in the Copper Basin during the interwar years despite the
region’s negrophobia. Former Copperhill mayor Bob Barclay, Jr. recalled that a black couple
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took care of the Cowanee Club on Smelter Hill and that a black man served as an assistant to the
Basin’s Doctor Strauss. Barclay remembered that his father used to drive the family’s AfricanAmerican domestic servant back and forth to her home in Blue Ridge; she did not usually spend
the evenings in the Copper Basin. It was common knowledge, according to Ms. Edna Dickey,
longtime African-American resident of Blue Ridge and former cook to another manager’s family
of the Tennessee Copper Company, the Longworths, that the Copper Basin, Copperhill
especially, was hostile to blacks. Black visitors would have met even more suspicion. Dickey
had lived for a time on the third floor of the Longworth Smelter Hill mansion. When she first
started working for the family she was afraid to go any further than the garbage can, but came to
learn that people would be nice to her once they knew who she worked for. Still, the town’s
reputation lingered and she knew not to risk too much presumption. Dickey claimed that there
used to be a sign when one entered Copperhill that warned blacks to stay out. “They also said
that if a train stopped as it went from Atlanta to Knoxville [on the old L & N line], they would
pull the shades on the train windows while it stopped in Copperhill so folks wouldn’t see the
colored people in the train.” 182
These stories reveal much about racial attitudes that affected labor relations in the region.
As historian David Roediger has argued, white working men of the industrial era came to
measure the integrity of their manliness and wage security as freedom from Native American (in
these hills, Cherokee) and African competition. Over time, the general absence of non-whites in
most of Appalachia fostered a conviction that the region had avoided racial problems more
common to the cities and to the flatlands of the South. Scholars Larry Griffin and Barbara Ellen
Smith have argued that Appalachian whiteness incorporated neo-Confederate attitudes forged
over the generations in a white industrial republic constructed through the process of purging
182
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non-whites. White residents of Appalachia worked diligently to maintain the mythology of their
innocence from perceived taint of colored labor or association. 183
The fact that minstrelsy, one of the most popular forms of American entertainment in the
19th century lingered well into the twentieth century as a popular, indeed, respectable
entertainment style for Copper Basin folk suggests the people’s casual acceptance of a
condescending white supremacist attitudes. A June 1933 solicitation for the public to partake in
permissible mischief at “the Busy Men’s Bible Class” “black-faced comedy” beckoned from the
front page of the Copperhill City Advance. The First Baptist Church of nearby Elijay, Georgia
sponsored the show, which featured well known “Copperhill talent” and would entertain all
comers as “Mr. White and His Black Parade… buck and wing danced.” Enticed the ad: “those
who are in the know, claim that this dark complected [sic] troupe is the most hilarious
aggregation of black-faced fun makers that has ever shown throughout this section of the
country.” 184
Minstrelsy, as has Roediger explained, served the American white working-class
exceptionally well because it at once allowed for complete segregation of the races—only whites
were allowed to portray the stereotyped black characters—but the masked faces allowed for a
kind of anonymous tom-foolery and sexual energy usually forbidden on the stage in respectable
theatres. Minstrelsy crowds could enjoy how the shows often spoofed elites and those who
ridiculed such entertainment as low class. Empowerment based on social class and neighborhood
identity grew among audience members. Most important, the stereotypes strengthened whites’
conceit that they were superior to blacks in morality and work ethic. Minstrelsy’s continued
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popularity discredited any local racial innocence as pure myth. When paired with the history of
actual violence, it suggested the local population’s commitment to maintain the white industrial
mountain republic’s racial integrity. 185
Race fear informed the eternal partisan competition. The Republican Party, having long
since abandoned any notion that it might uplift blacks, pulled hard to loosen a firmly rooted
agrarian Democracy. The Grand Old Party only used blacks in the Appalachians when it found
large concentrations of black voters beneficial to maintain office-holding. Typically, upcountry
Republicans were just as racist as the Democrats—perhaps more so in light of the GOP’s
defensiveness regarding its sponsorship of Reconstruction and its periodic use of the black
electorate. Violence associated with anti-black attitudes, according to one scholar, was “quilt
like” in the mountains. Mountain towns that had sizeable black populations attracted by boom
economies saw violence whenever economic unpredictability aggravated white resentment of
black labor. But the fear of itinerant blacks coming in and taking jobs spread beyond areas of
sizable black populations. In short, whites wanted to make sure they would benefit economically
and politically from any change entering the mountains. In some areas, white dominance quieted
racial animosity as white labor kept its control over black labor. It appears however that despite
the overwhelming presence of whites in the Copper Basin, paranoia of a return of black labor
kept racist attitudes very strong. 186
Unlike other Southern regions in this period that saw strains of Progressivism arise from
Populist Movement activism, Polk County retained a pattern of rivalry between the older
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hegemonic interests. George Tindall referred to the older power structure as “county-seat
‘elites’”; this agrarian lot competed with an industrial power structure coordinated from the
faraway Northeast or London. Certain progressive efforts did manifest in the region, in
education and through what one might call “progressive” legal efforts mounted by agrarian
coalitions who fought against the debilitating effects of the Copper Basin’s industry. But often
the leaders of the legal attacks were fierce defenders of the economic status quo. Few measures
beyond those for education reform and improvements to civic infrastructure taken by local
leaders look very “progressive” in this study. Few grand movements by local politicians or civic
leaders made any defense of the common man before the power of industry beyond union
activity existed. Rather, the “better sort” of respectable, well-connected civic leaders that Tindall
found leading Progressive efforts in other regions, Copper Basin elites sought to shut down the
incorporation of “radical” organized labor or joined forces with big copper to manipulate
elections. 187
Tri-State agrarian interests were not anti-industry per se; they understood the new
industrial extraction economy filled holes that the old hard-scrabble farming could not. The
coming of the railroad helped by tying the area to urban markets and led to both the introduction
of better farming technology and access to export markets (for fruit, for instance). But the wave
of the industrial expansion in the 1890s swept over the region on a scale never before seen.
Boom towns popped up all along the railroad’s advance and brought scores of new immigrants to
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the region; many had little interest in farming. The dynamism promised a lot of fast money,
sometimes hard earned. All this was not without cost: The immense financial power that lay
behind the industrial advance threatened to overwhelm agricultural interests altogether. To many
residents faithful to their farming society, the careless, impersonal and debilitating manner of
industrialization all had a Republican cast. Deforestation and crop destruction angered many
Tri-State farmers and benefitted few. 188
George Tindall observed the development of another set of resentments as industrialism
advanced in the South during this period. “A widely prevalent rural-progressive opposition”
developed against sectors in the new economy connected with “a scheme for the profit of
munitions makers and financial interest.” 189

Such an opposition no doubt existed somewhere

in the Tri-State in light of the widely publicized ties of Copper Basin industrial firms to the
munitions industry during the Great War era. But thee is little evidence of objection to local
industry’s connection with national defense in the Basin. Certainly none appeared in the local
papers or it seems unlikely among the thousands who responded to the Great War boom. If
anything, a proud regional patriotism contributed support for the Basin’s munitions
contributions. 190
Polk County’s voting record in national elections reflected local concerns about which
party or candidate would best suit people’s interests in the new industrial order. Only a few
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elections looked anything like a landslide. In general, from the late 19th through the mid-20th
century, the Democrats upheld their party’s regional support for agrarian interests and the
Republicans were known as the party of copper and its allies. Both fought for the loyalties of
working people. The 1890 election returns show the railroad’s mark on Polk County’s
reinvigorated industrial east. Republicans Harrison, McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft captured
voter loyalty through 1908 and Republicans would have won again in 1912 had not the GOP’s
vote been split by the advent of Teddy’s Bull Moose Party and Wilson’s Southern heritage. But
Wilson never appeared to have the Copper Basin vote despite his Southern ties. The string of
New Era Republicans from Harding to Hoover won the electorate’s favor though in 1924 Davis
of the Democrats almost defeated the Yankee Coolidge. Farming was already troubled by the
middle twenties and the up and downs of the copper markets may have also had some effects
here. The decline of unionism in the face of TCC General Manager J.N. Houser’s renovations at
Tennessee Copper during this period may have pushed some votes toward the more solidly prolabor stance of the national Democrats. 191
These statistics are important when reflecting on national contests, but it’s important to
place the partisanship of the Copper Basin and Tri-State within the context of the Southern
Mountains and look more closely at how local contests actually affected the citizenry. East
Tennessee north of Polk had been a Republican stronghold since the 1860s and had remained so.
Democrats swept federal offices in the center and west of Tennessee owing to old Confederate
loyalties. East Tennesseans regularly placed Republicans in position of local government
control. The arrangement suited both parties because the political power in each supported low
taxes and conservative government, with little regulation on industrial development. 192
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Republicans eventually came to control some North Georgia regions but typically in
Georgia the agrarian power, strengthened by Tom Watson-inspired populism (that included his
later negrophobic appeals), remained Democratic and overwhelmed the politics of the towns,
even the industrial towns in some North Georgia counties. The county unit-system also
“deflat[ed] the vote of the larger counties and balloon[ed] the influence” of the small ones.
Resistance to Democratic control was weak in much of the state as a result. 193
But in Fannin County and Polk County industrial activity had always had kept the
Republicans competitive. The Copper Basin made this Tri-state region an odd man out
politically. Before the war, Polk County had no slavery of any consequence, thus limiting the
number of blacks coming to the area. Fannin had some slavery, but not in its northern extreme
within the Copper Basin. Since the Copper Basin was an important antebellum metals center,
locals wanted to remain connected with their Southern markets and thus stayed loyal to the
South. During the Civil War, the Confederacy relied upon the Copper Basin’s metals industry;
local people held true to the CSA government and remained Democratic. After the Union
victory, the return of industrial development brought Republicans back to power in the Copper
Basin while tarnish on the Democratic brand temporarily removed them. Because of the
surrounding region’s agrarian economy, Democratic (that is, Conservative)-Republican
competition remained fierce. In gubernatorial elections from 1896 onward Polk went Republican
and remained so until the Great Depression.
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Partisan competition increased in Fannin County, revealing the new power of copper in
the Tri-State. Though Fannin had voted Democratic in the gubernatorial election of 1900, this
dominance did not last long. In the 1910 election, “Big Copper Men Frederick Lewissohn [sic—
brother of Adolf Lewisohn and one of TCC’s owners] and C.W. Renwick” used their money and
local industrial influence to bring about a Republican “revolution” to the region, casting
Democrats out of nearly every post from county coroner, through tax collector, school
superintendent, and on up to state representative. The Fannin victory for copper was near total.
National and regional papers carried news of the sweep. Republicans ousted Democratic officials
in Fannin who had in some cases held office for twenty years and more. “Only the state senator
remained in his seat,” noted one report on the sweep from the Atlanta Constitution. 194 Here was
a story of American electioneering fascinating in and of itself for the level upon level of
alleged—and likely genuine—incidents of political corruption. The Constitution alleged that
bribery, intimidation, and vote buying were part of the Lewisohn “revolution.” Political change
provoked resentful Democratic officials to launch an investigation which flung indictments
hither and yon. The list of the Republican guilty, according to a besmirched and stinging
Democracy, included the leading business and professional men of this section. Frederick
Lewisohn had apparently been watching local elections for some time and wanted to end
Democratic resistance to his industrial aspirations. He was also keen on curbing continued legal
annoyances and stopping hostile court attention to TCC emissions. Democratic farmers lay
behind most of the suits and Democratic politicos championed the interests of local farmers in
very public ways to benefit themselves. The “smoke” suits had already forced TCC and
Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron to adopt expensive, more efficient, somewhat cleaner
technology, but it’s clear from the reports that the Lewisohns simply wanted more industry194
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friendly men in local government. The investigation’s final report concluded that Frederick
Lewisohn and his allies had been engineering elections in Polk County for these reasons and
charged that they wanted to expand the sway of the copper firms south. 195
Unnamed witness accounts given before a grand jury in Fannin included one former
loyalist to the Democrats. This man said flatly that had it not been for three ten dollar bills he
would have voted as he always had, for the Democratic Party. His account underscored the new
power of copper as it changed the common-man’s fate in the Tri-State. Having saddled up a
mule and started his journey to the polling place the witness recounted he ran into an old pal who
tried to get him to vote Republican. When persuasion failed to change his vote, his proselytizing
friend had pulled out a roll of bills and remarked, ”how about that note you owe the bank over
there in Copperhill? Are you ready to pay it when it falls due next week?” Shocked that anyone
had “the slightest idea [he] owed the bank a dollar,” the man was further stunned when his GOPsympathetic pal peeled off several bills and said he would pay the Copperhill note if our man
would not vote at all. “I didn’t vote, and that note is paid.” 196
Some “paying apples” also made sweet rounds too in that season’s harvest of the local
electorate. An Atlanta Constitution report on the bribery employed by local Republicans to
influence the election began routinely enough for such accounts: “By no means was the election
a cheap one; on the day of the election, money was on evidence at every poll.” 197 But the paper
went on to reveal the innovative nature of the Republicans’ reliance on the region’s well known
orchards. Word went out to possible attendees of a mass meeting where there would be
discussion about some “mighty good, juicy apple[s]” on the GOP ticket. Partisans distributed
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Republican election tickets and directed voters to their payoff. “After you vote that ticket, eat
that apple!” Each apple contained a $5 bill. 198
Another witness to this same election claimed,
“A worker [for the Republicans] would stop the voter en route to the booth and
hand him a ticket, telling him to vote that ticket and then go to his home and ask his wife
for a note to some one. The voter would vote and then call at the home indicated and be
handed a sealed envelope. In that envelope the man who had cast the vote indicated on
the ticket would always find a piece of money.” 199
Despite such obvious welding of well-heeled Republican influence, the rural vote still
mattered just enough in Polk and Fannin Counties to keep contests competitive. Democraticleaning county seat power refused to disappear completely in the wake of industrial intimidation.
While Republican weight mattered a lot in the Copper Basin, to its west and at the county seat of
Benton, agrarian power smoldered, despite Lewisohn influence. The uncertain economy after
the Great War eroded the Republican influence held during the boom and within a year of the
Great Depression’s onset, the Democrats regained control of Polk County, sweeping Polk
County offices “with good majorities.” 200

The Biggs Dynasty: vassals of the copper companies
Persistent influence of Democrats in North Georgia and Polk County during the twenties
reflected a rejection of the industrial economy it is important to remember that the Democratic
Party dominating Southern 19th Century post-bellum agricultural towns was also the party of
New South boosterism. While party leaders could and would periodically denounce the power
of unbridled capitalism to co-opt certain Populist strains in the electorate, they were just as likely
to ally with industrial interests if it aided their political agenda. This kind of periodic shifting of
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support for competing camps appears to have been employed by the Biggs political dynasty that
came to rule Polk County from the 1930s to the late 1940s. The election of 1930 marked a
reinvigoration of the family’s political clout that had begun in the early 1900s and which by the
end of World War II saw the Biggs hold “virtual total control” over Democratic Party affairs.
Biggs men, led by patriarch Burch E. (“B.E.”) Biggs, Sr., and carried on by sons Broughton and
Burch, controlled Polk’s Democratic Party machinery through the offices of police chief and
sheriff. Old man B. E Biggs was elected sheriff seven times and his sons themselves served
terms between those of their father. B.E. Biggs maintained power even while out of office, and
served as the local state representative to the Democratic National Convention. Over the years
there seemed always to be a Biggs man in charge sitting on sundry boards and commissions,
such as the county’s election commission and rationing board during WORLD WAR II. Control
of local police authority gave the family an especially powerful position from which it could
maintain its influence over county affairs by navigating between the set powers at the county seat
and the municipality’s industrial east. But Biggs political influence did not end at the county
line. The elder Burch Biggs also served as the Tennessee Senate’s sergeant-at-arms from 19391941, during which time the senate gave him a medal for being “All-American Sheriff Number
One.” 201
The Biggs family would be dislodged only after the concerted efforts of the local Good
Government League that arose after WORLD WAR II. Led by none other than Robert E.
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Barclay himself, who stood as chairman of the League from 1946-1957, it was he who reasserted
Republican partisan control over the county. He argued that the Biggs’ rule over Polk had
become a threat to the greater interests of the community. Some of this resentment is difficult to
understand in light of the Biggs’ determined efforts to maintain an industrial peace in the region
as will be discussed below. But it may simply have been the style with which Biggs men held
control over the region. Thousands would attend rallies of the Democrats while the Biggs were
in power. By the early 1940s the Biggs faction of Democrats could pull in state congressmen,
senators, commissioners, even the governor for barbeque and speechifying, including a 1942
local glad-handing affair considered “the most distinguished political group ever to visit Polk
County” by the local press. 202 That Polk County’s Democratic Party leaders were hardly
champions for the industrial working class makes the competition between the Biggs crowd and
Barclay’s efforts that much more difficult to decipher. Again, it may have been a difference of
opinion about form and leadership style rather than substance.
Biggs family alliances with the Copper Basin industry began early in the century. During
the first years of the smoke litigation suits against the copper concerns, Ducktown, Sulphur,
Copper & Iron hired T. T. Biggs to serve on a committee charged with surveying emissions’
effects on local agriculture. R.E. Barclay later derided the repot as being a most transparent ploy
for the copper company. The circumstance was one in which Biggs men took advantage of over
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the years, but which also tended to heighten tensions between the farming and industrial
communities. 203
In office, Biggs men wielded a tough law-and-order approach popular with many Polk
citizens who wanted a check on the rougher elements in the industrial workforce. Biggs support
was apparently supported some few folk living in the mining towns who were fearful of miner
violence and attraction to radicalism. The respectability of order was seductive. To keep their
rule secure, a Biggs could usually be found at public assemblies where dignitaries emphasized
the benefits of education lest the young men and women of the Copper Basin become juvenile
delinquents. Local reports showed that while routine deployments of the law by the Biggs to shut
down illegal stills riled only the inconvenienced, more questionable actions taken by a Biggs
dominated sheriff’s department did upset citizens. In several cases deputies were accused of
killing unarmed citizens. In one such case during 1936 after the killing of a North Carolina
contractor at Isabella in controversial circumstances, the wife of the dead man sued Burch Biggs
and two of his deputies for $100,000 in damages. Though acquitted in the criminal case, there
was apparently enough evidence in the hands of the widow’s attorneys to allow for a case of
conspiracy to be brought against Biggs. The case was dismissed but not until a federal judge
directed the jury to do so under circumstances that some locals suspected as all too convenient
for Biggs. The case underscored for many local people that Biggs men would not hesitate to do
what it took to uphold the sheriff’s authority and protect his interests even if that meant
manipulating the legal system. 204
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The Biggs faction inflamed local passions and garnered national notoriety when it
commenced “a bold and uncompromising fight against repeal of the poll tax.” The dynasty had
held a lock on controlling this tax. During the Depression and through the raucous years of labor
unrest in the 1930s, the sheriff’s office helped maintain the peace by intimidating outspoken
miners and farmers through manipulation of the poll tax. Apparently until midway through the
Second World War, Barclay and other municipal leaders had supported Biggs in these efforts for
a time because Tennessee Copper Company benefitted. But after the war Broughton Biggs’
nearly total control of the local party politics bred resentment. To many returning veterans and a
collection of “already embittered Copper Basin Republicans” the Biggs dynasty appeared to
stiffle change. A move to oust the Biggs had grown to a movement by 1946. By the end of the
decade it was over and the Biggs clan had been ousted, though national reports show that
vitriolic and sometimes lethal partisan rivalry continued in Polk County well into the 1950s. 205

Community and Town Life in the Copper Basin
Though actually filled with low rising ridges, most of the Copper Basin does not appear
like a valley in the traditional sense. The notoriously denuded character of the Copper Basin
from 1900 through the mid-twentieth century distorted perceptions of distance and height.
Photos from the era reveal the once treeless terrain exaggerated the real height of the towns’
adjacent hills. Today, about a quarter mile down the Ocoee from the center of the twin cities of
McCaysville/Copperhill sit the remains of the once massive Tennessee Copper Company plant.
Through the mid twentieth century the whole TCC complex and its rail yards along the Ocoee
resembled an ominous, impenetrable, rusting and snarling dragon’s lair, an image that rang
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especially true for locals when the company dumped its hot slag at dusk from giant belching iron
buckets and glowing ooze flowed down perimeter bulwarks. Excursions to view the molten
rivers were popular among locals. 206
Life in this mineral upcountry of the Tri-state was an especially rough one in the early
years following the advance of the railroad up from Blue Ridge. An explosion of population in
the Copper Basin never occurred because the copper concerns of the 1900s through the mid1910s didn’t need a large workforce. Furthermore, rival upcountry towns all had claims of future
bustle of their own. Boosterism for the new towns was regular, rampant and sometimes
downright silly from our perspective. Claims by some enterprising folk that sulfur toxins
suspended in the Copper Basin air, the “sulfurettes,” initially led to Ducktown being promoted as
a health resort. However, the truth about those emissions and the consequence of other toxic
wastes from local industry could not have been farther removed from the fantastic claims that the
sulfurettes benefitted one’s health. The region’s industrial emissions took an enormous toll on
the local people. Young or old routinely fell ill and upon each fell the most dangerous maladies,
including silicosis, and a host of diseases not even recognized in the early 1900s. Due to a
combination of ignorance, a lack of resources, and analytical technology it was not until the last
years of the twentieth century that locals got extensive studies conducted on the long term
consequences of living in the Basin. 207
Other booster claims and billboards along greener stretches of the rail routes lured green
immigrants as well as many on the make who came to take advantage of the frontier town
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conditions in the Basin. Some local claims among the mineral towns were actually based on
substantiated economic fact. Blue Ridge, Georgia, for instance had established itself as an
upcountry railroad hub and repair works and nearby Tate’s marble quarries held enough of the
sparkly pink rock to satisfy regional needs for “the next 30 generations.” But many a waystation town’s dreams of being the next “Queen City” of the South faded as their inhabitants
dwindled away to some of the few hubs that could sustain themselves. 208
The Copper Basin itself had seen a number of “towns”—hamlets really, a station, a
string of workers quarters, a post-office that served as a town center—but many of these
vanished with the fortunes of failed companies. Even among the surviving burgs, pictures show
these “crude little mining village[s]” well into the 1920s resemble the quintessential wild west
towns: raw wooden, generally unpainted, structures scattered willy-nilly across what had perhaps
been a farm or Indian path, covered with dust, collections of the rougher sorts of men
underemployed, or worn-weary and impatient after 10-12 hours in the smelters or dark-to-dark
shifts in the mines, whisky-riled, hanging out in the men’s haunts of barbershops, pool halls,
fearing little retribution given the lack of an organized police force. Violence and robbery had in
fact, spurred tiny McCaysville when it had just barely become a settlement, to incorporate as
early as 1904. Just across the state line the wealthier set in Copperhill kept incorporation at bay
to avoid the costs and responsibilities incorporation would require, but their resistance had a
price: Copperhill endured public menaces typical of towns with sizeable transient populations.
209
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folks to who grew up in neighborhoods like Buzzards’ Roost, the amount of drinking among the
miners—especially on weekends after payday—forced many mothers to keep the kids away
from drinking men-folk and forced many a wife to find a husband before all the family’s money
went to mountain dew. 210
Travel remained laborious for most Copper Basin folk despite the coming of the rails and
the slow invasion of the automobile. Traveling by horseback or wagon still dominated local
commercial and industrial traffic into the Great War era. And while things changed in the
interwar years with increases in car-ownership regional parochialism did not disappear. Few
roads were paved. Even Main Streets around this hilly district alternated between sloppy
quagmires, torrents, and choking dustbins. For most folk, walking remained the standard mode
of transit well into the forties and was a popular way to go to various itinerant diversions,
football and baseball games, shopping at company stores or the retail strip of downtown
Copperhill, and of course, to church each Sunday. Prior to the Second World War, Bob Barclay,
Jr. remembered that animals roamed freely about eating the refuse tossed from homes and stores
and that kids used to chase them around the neighborhoods. Between Copperhill and
McCaysville, no major bridge crossed the Ocoee/Toccoa till the 1910s and even that new bridge
was designed primarily for wagons, not automobiles or heavier trucks. For years Basinites had
to travel over thirty-five miles through the Ocoee River Gorge and then north, to a regular court
at Benton, Tennessee along what was known as the Old Copper Road, some of which is now
Route 64—but most of this route remained unpaved through the interwar years. Until the state
legislature saw fit to allow for a regular court at Ducktown, Benton’s economy relied heavily on
the inconvenience of those who had to appear before a judge—someone had to feed and house
these people while they dealt with the court. The new Ducktown court slashed Benton’s
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monopoly and precipitated increased western county enmity toward the Copper Basin that
festered as the century wore on. 211
Interestingly, the ability to use local river power brought utility companies early to both
Copperhill and McCaysville. The sister towns obtained phone service by 1900, a local electric
company by 1906, and water and sewage systems by 1917. New Era projects improved the
infrastructure of Copperhill: The city managed to finish paving its streets by 1929 and a stronger
concrete span crossed the river to McCaysville by the mid 1930s. Advances such as these
instilled pride in many locals but according to R.E. Barclay, well into the century the best of the
Basin’s burgs still resembled a “hastily drawn-up mining town” where flood and fire slowed inmigration; the isolated mining villages of Ducktown and Isabella had even less development, let
alone much the smaller hamlets and neighborhoods of New Town, Coletown, Belltown, Chancey
Town, Postelle, Ducktown Station, Reesetown, Newton, McGeetown, McAllister Hill, and
Buzzards Roost. 212
The denuded local hills contributed to devastating flooding along the Ocoee, the worst
being in 1906—most of the Twin Cities went underwater. Before townspeople could fully
rebound from that disaster a city-wide fire in December 1910 at Copperhill turned to ashes
nearly all the major structures and left most of the population homeless and exposed. Aid in
materials and supplies came instantly from The Tennessee Copper Company, improving the
company’s goodwill with the people, but rebuilding still took years. Had it not been for the
construction of a dam up river in Blue Ridge in the early 1930s, the Ocoee would have
devastated the Twin Cities again. As it was, even with the new dam, local boy scouts and
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townspeople had to pitch in to prevent an overflowing Ocoee from destroying the towns in the
rainy summer of 1938. Downstream, that same deluge over-washed the great Parksville Dam by
six feet, flooding the farm valleys beyond. 213
By 1920, the total population of Fannin County, Georgia and Polk County, Tennessee,
26,346 was actually slightly less than it had been in 1910 despite the Great War’s boom. One
might attribute this stagnation as collateral damage from the Spanish Flu pandemic, but reports
show that only a small percentage of local people died from flu—though Polk closed its schools.
A more likely reason was the tenacious, frontier character of the region where volatility in
copper markets during the post war economy almost shut down national copper markets,
severely affecting the local labor markets and dashing many men’s dreams no doubt born of
fantastic booster claims. The truth was that the region’s greatest proportional influx of
population had followed the introduction of the railroad. Memories of busts made men cautious
and appears to have limited the influx of workers even during the boom times of the World
Wars. Government contracts garnered by the copper concerns and additional opportunities
supplied through regional TVA and CCC increased regional work opportunities in the 1930s.
The need for professionals expanded throughout this period, especially in areas of education and
various kinds of public work. By 1930, the number of non-industrial jobs in the Copper Basin
rose to over 478 from just 239 ten years before. When fortune returned generally in the late
thirties (as copper use increased for reasons later explained), the previous decade’s hardship had
already forced considerable contraction in industrial opportunities. As a result the population
had decreased 959 persons in the 1930s. Between 1900 and 1950 the population of Polk and
Fannin counties rose by less than seven thousand. This occurred in spite of the fact that families
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of the lower working class (where men held jobs recorded by census takers as “miner,”
“laborer,” and “odd jobs [man]”) typically had between four and six children. 214
Other demographic characteristics distinguished the region. The large number of children
in these families diminished the general age of the population; in both counties over fifty percent
of the population was less than twenty years of age during the interwar years. Both Polk and
Fannin counties had slightly more men than women, reflecting the copper industry’s need for
highly skilled workers. This was clear in the Copperhill and McCaysville reports which showed
a considerable number of single men living in boarding houses. More than a third of the adult
male population worked in the skilled crafts connected with the extraction industries and another
or within the professional and merchant communities. 215
Changes in the demographics of the local labor force provide some insight into local
labor relations. Census reports can produce conflicting information, but figures captured trends
in occupation change among Copper Basin workers for the first half of the interwar years. While
certain figures suggest that the nature of work remained steady, examination of specific
communities revealed considerable change in occupations and increased community
specialization through the twenties and thirties. In 1920, of the 810 local industrial workers
recorded by census workers, the percentage of those who lived in McCaysville, Copperhill,
Ducktown, and Isabella and employed in the mines, smelters, and local railroads stood at 70 %
or 571 workers; the balance of the workforce worked in supportive enterprises with just 4 % of
these persons being employed in professional and public work. In 1930, even though the number
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of persons in the work force had risen by 180% to just over 1481 persons, the percentage of
persons working at the Copper Basin’s industrial works dipped slightly to 67.5%. There was a
slight increase in the number of persons working at professional or public jobs to 6.5%, but the
total number of persons working in such areas had risen to over one hundred. This change
reflected a general increase during the twenties for professional work such as doctors and
dentists, but also for work in education and new utilities. 216
A comparison of figures by community reveals considerable differences that underscore
the changing natures of the towns and the expansion of the professional and non-industrial work
available in the Twin-Cites of McCaysville and Copperhill. The table below provides a quick
comparison of the numbers.
Copper Basin job-types 1920 and 1930 from U.S. Census reports 217
1920
Industry
Profess/public
Other
Total

McCaysville
84/ 61 %
2/ .01%
52/ 38%
138/ 100%

Copperhill
175/ 67%
18/ 6%
70/ 27%
263/ 100 %

Ducktown
101/ 84%
9/ 7%
11/ 9%
121/ 100%

Isabella
211/ 73%
2/ .07%
75/ 27%
288/ 100%

Total
571
31
208
810

1930
Industry
Profess/public
Other
Total

McCaysville
264/ 57%
23/ 5%
178/ 38%
465/ 100%

Copperhill
162/ 49%
38/ 11%
132/ 40%
332/ 100%

Ducktown
298/ 82%
35/ 9.5%
32/ 8.5%
365/ 100 %

Isabella
279/ 87%
5/ 2%
35/ 11%
319/ 100%

Total

%
70
4
26
100

%
1003 67
101
6.5
377
26
1481 100

In 1920, the percentage of total industrial workers living in McCaysville and Copperhill
was between 61-67%; by 1930 these percentages had dropped to 57% and 49% respectively.
Meanwhile in Ducktown and Isabella the percentage of industrial workers remained high and
either steady (Ducktown, 82%) or rising substantially; at Isabella, the percentage of total
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industrial workers rose from 73% to 87% of the employed. As a consequence of the increased
significance in the mining burgs’ industrial workforce the overall percentage of persons in
supportive enterprise decreased. This was most apparent in Isabella. There, even though the
number of professionals or persons doing public work increased by a factor of two, the overall
percentage of the workforce in professional or public work dropped to below two percent. In
Ducktown the percentage of the workforce in professional and public work dipped slightly
though the number of actual workers tripled. 218
These figures underscore that the overwhelming majority of workers in the mining burgs
would have been sensitive to changes in industrial policy, much more so than in Copperhill and
McCaysville which both had considerably more diversified workforces and thus more stable
economic structure. While categorization of job-type changed in census reporting differed from
1920 to 1930 with the latter being more specific, a comparison of the non-industrial jobs
underscores the broader diversity in the workforce in the Twin-Cities. For example Isabella, the
total number of different categories of non-industrial jobs increased from 7 to 15 by 1930; in
Ducktown similar figures show that the number of different non-industrial job-types doubled to
almost 20 occupation types. 219
In both McCaysville and Copperhill, the number of non-industrial job-types by 1930 had
increased as well, but had been twice as varied as in the mining burgs already reaching 43 and 46
respectively; the broader array included all those occupations found in the mining burgs plus a
collection of vocations typical for small prosperous industrial towns of the era. But the list also
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included certain other occupations, like a Coca-Cola bottling works and automobile dealerships,
which underscored the importance for the community to the Tri-State economy. Such
diversification in the Twin-Cities no doubt exposed industrial workers of the copper fields to a
broader spectrum of possible responses to the era’s economic challenges than did the narrower
array of workers who lived in Ducktown, Isabella and the region’s cadre of other smaller
industrial hamlets. The broad array in job opportunities also would have given the Twin-Cities a
labor market dynamic where fewer people would have been attracted to a union unless they were
craftsmen; even then, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the differences in trades practiced
in TCC smelter and acid works favored AFL organization over the industrial-style organizing
embraced in the mining communities. The Twin-Cities’ business class engaged competitively in
commerce and would have seen such competition as normal; they were not typically involved in
collective enterprises to advance their personal economic advantage beyond membership in the
Kiwanis Club—and this organization appears to have been made up of the more affluent
members of this class. This everyman-for-himself attitude survived among the commercial class
in the Twin-cities until crippled by the Great Depression.220

Smelter Hill—Tennessee Copper Company creates a place for those above the rest
On a ridge west of the Copperhill cemetery sat Smelter Hill, TCC’s old managerial and
residential compound for its executives and middle management. Begun just after 1900,
construction on Smelter Hill continued through the Great War boom and then saw another spurt
220
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of building in the early 1920s. The grange sat high and proud above all the surrounding
communities; its planners had laid the compound out in a neo-feudal manner, stringing a grange
of company offices and residences across the Basin’s barren ridges like a great necklace of
crown jewels for the Ocoee. The better one’s position in the company, the higher one lived in
elevation. Local resident Roy Lillard once summarized the significance of the Smelter Hill
grange.
Company housing provided instant recognition of status in the company. The
more important the employee, the bigger his house and the better its location [and
likewise his home’s conveniences and furnishings]. Even though the miners were highly
skilled, many of their homes did not have indoor plumbing until mid-century, in contrast
to management housing. For the ranks of management, a step up in position meant
[literally] a move into a new home higher up the hill. 221

In its original plan, a shaker-sided craftsmen-style mansion crowned Smelter Hill.
Corporate owners intended this place for their General Manager. As the top local official for the
firm the TCC General Manager in the early years could look forward to returning each day to a
servant-catered 13 room home with a massive front porch under a sombrero of roof tiles, its
welcoming reception room and grand staircase warmed by steam and fireplaces that ran up and
downstairs. Two lavatories and a culinary triumvirate of a formal dining room, pantry and
kitchen attended to the master’s needs where after dining he and his managerial associates might
retire to the billiard room while the ladies retired to the parlor. Overnight guests and children
could be easily accommodated upstairs in the extra chambers and the nursery. 222
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The company replaced this home with an even grander neo-Federalist manor in the
twenties. It was balanced, elegant in design and it is likely a generation of managers lived in the
home. General manager J.N. Houser never did. The punishing nature of the Basin withered the
company’s lofty intentions for the neighborhood. Smelter Hill was, like its surroundings, almost
completely stripped of trees and vegetation—and this situation remained well into the 1940s.
Bob Barclay Jr., who grew up on Smelter Hill recounted that as grand as many of the homes and
facilities were his mother found the neighborhood trying. A non-native to the region, she never
got used to having to wage constant battle with the Basin’s red dust which covered her home’s
furniture, walls, rugs, and flooring. And it was hot, hot like a blaster furnace at times. Reports
claimed the summer temperatures could reach 115 F. This inferno was cooled only by mountain
breezes which of course brought more of the infernal red dust. Perhaps Houser’s wife had
visited some of the managers’ homes on Smelter Hill and refused to live under the regime of the
Basin’s oppressive overlords: SO2 gas, dust, heat, and constant industrial noise. Whatever their
reasons, the Housers chose to remain in cooler, greener, more genteel Knoxville; when needed at
TCC, Houser simply took the train to Copperhill. 223
The Smelter Hill grange also included company offices—rebuilt in the thirties—a
hospital and some lovely accommodations: a set of dormitories, the Cowanee country club and
tennis courts. Three superintendents’ homes lay in order below the general manager’s house
down the slopes of Smelter Hill in a manner suggesting the Visitation of the Magi. Residences
averaged eight to ten rooms in size, many with turrets, beveled glass and various degrees of
Stickley-era ornamentation. Thirteen more of them strung loosely nearby around the grounds of
the local country club all set in a grouping known as The Circle. Some of these houses wore
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picket fences around their yards adorning them like Indian headdresses. Inside many homes were
sliding door-partitions, full-fixture lavatories, and kitchens all providing the finer luxuries of the
day. 224
A small platoon of homes for other company officials and clerks ran back up the ridges
away from the main TCC works and toward the workers’ neighborhood of Coletown. At one
time, between Smelter Hill and Coletown, a modestly grand, thirty-eight room company
dormitory known as The Blue Goose kept a roof over the heads of the firm’s “unmarried”
executives. Before “The Goose” stood an impressive band pavilion. Other single men working
for TCC were scattered about in the dozen or so boarding houses around Copperhill,
McCaysville, Ducktown and Isabella. For years these finest structures in the regions built of the
best masonry and wooden materials crowned Smelter Hill as a Stickley era acropolis. 225
Smelter Hill’s grandeur lay not only in dimensions but also in conveniences. The
compound had its own power and water supply. The company installed central steam heating
and electrification for all the managerial and executive buildings. TCC equipped the whole of
Smelter Hill with a special and expensive dual water system. Springs supplied clean water for
interior use, while water pumped up from the Ocoee allowed for use around the house. This last
amenity was likely an early gallant attempt to promote the growing of suburban-styled lawns. 226
These details stood in marked contrast to workers’ far simpler housing in places like
Coletown or Newtown. It is unclear who built the workers’ homes as there are conflicting
reports. Many were torn down and replaced with better accommodations. But in the
neighborhoods like Coletown and Newtown a typical worker’s home was single leveled,
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sometimes designed for one family but many were duplexes or dorm-styled. Rents came directly
from workers’ pay. Few of the separate homes had more than a few rooms and very few had
lawns or trees to speak of. Originally none had plumbing. Until mid century only the rarest of
homes had a yard of more than raw dirt or clay. The few trees that grew were stunted by the
elements. Other workers’ housing stood out as being of a better grade. TCC records show the
company built a lot of housing stock which contained between four and six rooms, generally
bearing sinks and stoves. But few of these appear to have had steam heat, electricity or kitchens,
let alone running water or lavatories when first constructed. The company did however regularly
paint the little houses and strings of them lay over the Basin’s hills. Many of these modest
structures remain in neighborhoods now on the National Register of historic places . 227
Barren as the Copper Basin was for decades, TCC management and their families could
find some fun not only on Smelter Hill but also in the lovely woodlands of region, especially the
Ocoee River Gorge along which ran the Old Copper Road. When they could spare the time,
many went on trips to the great metropolis of Atlanta on the L & N. Social life on Smelter Hill
lasted according to locals well into the early 1960s. A lot of the gaiety revolved around events at
the English-styled Cowanee Club. Founded in 1909, its first quarters sat near fume-laden
Isabella, but the Cowanee sought better quarters on the Smelter Hill heights. Elevation did
provide some advantages, such as relief from bottomland flooding and a general relief from the
low lying clouds of sulphuric emissions. But even this new site remained far from picturesque.
Photos from the 1920s demonstrate the marvelous juxtaposition of this genteel artifice for
aristocrats sitting inglorious before the smoking heap of The Company’s industrial pile. 228
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The Cowanee Club’s five or six dozen active members orchestrated myriad annual events
that included about sixteen band-serenaded dances. Formal dinners were a regular occasion as
were bridge parties and open house soirées for extra-managerial guests. “Smokers” provided a
special time at this former most sophisticated institution in the Tri-State. Though intended
originally solely for the enjoyment of management, depression and war wore down the ability of
TCC’s elite to flaunt its distinction above the hoi polloi. Notices from as early as 1912 show that
the Cowanee was open at times for the benefit of the company workers and the citizens for such
affairs as an annual Halloween dance and other fetes because, as “hereby constituted,” the
purpose of the Cowanee was for “the promotion of social enjoyments and of athletic and
gymnastic sport of every kind including, baseball, tennis, polo, trap shooting, boxing, fencing
and other sports of like nature. 229
The Cowanee held its “terrific” dances nearly every Saturday night for over thirty years.
Lorin Myers remembered that when he was a sophomore he played the Cowanee as part of a
Copperhill and Isabella ensemble of trumpet, banjo, and piano. The guys got five bucks for a
three hour evening gig. Yet for all the dancing and merriment, the Cowanee had one tenacious
annoyance for the drinking class: not a drop of liquor or any alcoholic spirits could be consumed
within its walls, house rules. It was rumored that the Lewisohn family, the New York Jewish
family who owned TCC and kept the Club’s Reading Room filled with quality books, had
ordered the prohibition. All was in keeping with Lewisohn paternalism. The Cowanee also
maintained its respectable tee-totaling was also a respectful nod to local Protestant custom.
Copperhill was not a dry mountain town, but you could not buy any more than beer—legally.
Still, local puritanical conventions had their limits. Folks remembered trotting out to their cars
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between favorite songs or on band breaks where they imbibed on mountain spirits tailgate-style
or piled into someone’s Plymouth or Ford. 230
While generally off-limits to kids without chaperones, the Cowanee still provided many
delights for some little folk, unless like young Bob Barclay and his buddies they sneaked in.
Upstairs executive suites, private lavatories, billiards rooms, reading and “ladies” room filled the
floors. A large gang kitchen and walk-in refrigerator served the staff. But for kids—and the
young at heart—the really treasured spots of this old place lay on the ground floor: adjoining an
exercise and locker room was a heated indoor pool and a small bowling alley. Kids delighted in
these on many an afternoon. On scorching days, the cool of the basement’s attractions provided a
rare lair for local tournaments and mischievous escape. 231
Behind the Cowanee Club, on a small plain before the Circle’s residences, lay perhaps
the only facility on Smelter Hill perfectly suited to the site. Here was a clay-surfaced tennis court
where white pants probably lasted only minutes before being soiled either by Basin’s fouled air
or red dust. Shouts of “love” and “deuce” from sweater-clad, Gatsby-looking fellows would be
extremely rare in these parts today, but in the first half of the 20th century, tennis was a popular
game and the young elite played in tournaments as crowds cheered on their favorites. On less
formal, but no less important sites on the Hill sandlots served as clay “diamonds” where local
boys crisscrossed on their bikes between rousing innings of America’s favorite past-time. 232
One hero among the Smelter Hill set was TCC landscape technician, Jacques L.
Schneider. “Jack” managed some success in the ongoing war with the Basin’s toxic elements
winning back some desired green to a few local yards. His must have seemed a queer occupation
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to a lot of Basin people not only because his expertise was rare in these parts, but also because
his fine skills might have seemed to some wasted on the Martian environs. Jack’s presence made
a real difference though. For years locals could only muster growth of a trashy triumvirate of
privet, Bermuda grass and red cannas, but Jack worked landscape miracles. Lawns and bushes
greened-up and thrived, fortified you can bet with genuine TCC chemicals. His own garden was
known for its hardy tomatoes. 233
Despite the Basin’s omnipresent desert and rare spaces of green, company officials
willfully constructed and maintained a golf course for management and other gentlefolk by the
1920s. Rare photos of play on this still-extant and bizarre facility indicate that though popular
with Smelter Hill management, its “greens” appeared to have no green grass. Perhaps it was just
poor photography, but fading images appear to show a lack of grass on the course. Wanting
greens notwithstanding, the new Copper Basin Gold Club soon sponsored regular tournaments in
which, R. E. Barclay himself competed along with other members of the area’s well-to-do. 234
Over the years, the notoriety of Smelter Hill residents and the compound alike alternately
soared and soured. Reflecting the shifting turns of jealousy and pride locals held toward the site’s
comparatively fine residences, accommodations, and perceived residential privileges some called
the place “Snooty Hill.” Others became convinced that Smelter Hill kids got favored in games, in
school, in life generally. In light of the opportunities most managers’ children probably got just
owing to differences in economic class, it is understandable how such resentments arose. In
interviews, a variety of opinions existed but it seems Smelter Hill had always been a somewhat
controversial place. After mid-century, the slow decline of the region’s industry and changing
attitudes took a great toll on Smelter Hill’s prestige. It seems too that more and more managers
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moved out of the Basin and lived in greener nearby hills. What had once been allowable
distinctions for management no longer were acceptable. When Cities Service bought Tennessee
Copper Company in the early 1960s Smelter Hill appeared far less comely than the Camelot it
may have once seemed; one of the first things the firm did was to level all the lovely buildings
that crowned Smelter Hill. Locals then raided the ruins to grab what pretty remnants of the
citadel they could. But destruction of the old grand grange is not really the end of Smelter Hill’s
story because neither its raising nor the passing of decades lessoned the stigma some folks placed
on former “Snooty Hill” residents. A mayor of Copperhill recounted that he shied away from
admitting he grew up there. It was just too upsetting to people, he said, and they were not sure
how to act around him, so he just kept quiet. 235

Society and commerce beyond the industrial mines and works
Copper Basin town life, diversions, and the collection of services, occupations, and
employment opportunities beyond the region’s industrial mines and works came alive through
census returns, periodicals, local reports, photographs and reminiscences. Interwar census
reports reveal that one of the contributing factors informing change in the local political climate
was the expansion of the merchant and professional classes during the interwar years. Through
the 1920s the number of persons employed in the merchant and professional classes, and what
was then known as “public work”—civic and utilities employment— increased. This last sector
refers not only to government jobs, but also ithose in utilities, education, public safety or in
various federal and state agencies. The 1920 U.S. Census figures show that of the over eight
hundred working people in Copperhill/McCaysville, Ducktown, and Isabella, one third of the
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communities’ non-industrial jobs were in the merchant-professional classes. By 1930 those
percentages had increased in Copperhill/McCaysville; nearly 20% of the total working
population there was now employed in the merchant and professional classes. A comparison
with the mining villages is stark; in those communities, the percentage of merchant and
professionals had fallen to a mere three percent of all working people. 236
Census rolls indicate support services and enterprises for the copper companies increased
and yet there was a decrease in the number of general laborers not connected with industry.
Mechanization and the advent of the automobile had a hand in this. Significant growth also
occurred in the retail trades. More restaurants and hotels sprang up in the region demonstrating
the increase in visitors and transient folk in the community likely connected to expanded works
in the non-ferrous industry. Trades associated with electrical work, carpentry, plumbing
flourished. The number of school teachers and administrators living in the Copper Basin grew.
In contrast, the census shows a contraction in the agricultural sector of the economy. What little
farming was still being done in the Copper Basin through 1920 had vanished ten years later, only
a few truck farmers remained. 237
Growth in the number of local merchants and salesmen of every sort was the most
startling change in local employment in the 1920s. The total number of persons who owned or
worked in retail shops, groceries and other small shops in the Copper Basin by 1920 was about
sixty persons; by 1930, despite the Crash of ’29, that number had risen to 131 sellers—a more
than 118% increase. Some eight-five percent of these jobs lay in the twin cities. In the little
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burgs of Ducktown and Isabella, the number of such occupations actually went down; in Isabella
they fell by one-half. 238
The Copper Basin’s mercantile community was typical for early twentieth century smalltown America, their advertisement filling local papers. Family-owned businesses dominated the
line-up of local enterprises. Many of these had become beloved or at least familiar legacies by
the interwar years. Occasionally a local cadre of merchants and small businessmen organized
special booster campaigns. Some of these campaigns were rather creative, combining patriotism,
civic mindedness, and an American, can-do spirit with consumerism. One of the more
entertaining of these communal capitalist crusades occurred in the springtime of Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s Administration. Following passage of the 1933 National Recovery Act and the
government’s introduction of the Blue Eagle Campaign, merchants of Copperhill, Ducktown,
and Isabella combined their efforts to put on a local beauty pageant to select “Miss Copper
Basin” over two nights at the Cherokee Theatre, Copperhill. The pageant “being sponsored … by
the city’s best families” was conducted by the Jordan State Beauty Show who employed out-oftown judges to assure objectivity. The prize was to be “a beautiful silver loving cup” given to
the newly crowned mountain beauty who would then go to Nashville the following September to
compete in the Miss Tennessee pageant. From there the possibilities for the young miss would
be truly dazzling: she might advance to the Atlanta City finals and radiate before thousands in
the national Miss America contest. 239
Some general reflections on the local press serving the Copper Basin are in order. As
was not atypical of small town papers, both of the region’s most important newspapers, out of
Copperhill and Benton, Tennessee, took to their booster duty as holy mission. Reflecting the
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interests of their respective communities, each filed regular reports for the citizenry about
various good things happening in regional and national commerce and industry. The reports
varied in their actual reflection of the nation’s economy; the degree of veracity and strident
optimism varied with the depths of any given recession or depression. Most items intended to
keep locals abreast on the health of the national economy also seemed always to declare the Tristate’s industry or economy was on the mend, if not already cured. Few statistical reports lay in
their pages. The determination of The Copper City Advance to keep its editorial compass
pointed toward recovery held true even during the Depression winter of 1933. Positive
economic spin in the papers could be found throughout the year, but editorial boosterism was
especially apparent in both publications through the Christmas season to New Year’s. 240
One memorable piece in The Copper City Advance illustrating entertaining consumerism
came in the form of a poem by Dorothy and Bunzie Strauss. In verse that originally contained
some thirty-four stanzas, the Strausses accounted for the many ways local establishments served
the consuming public of Copperhill and McCaysville. Here is an excerpt from poem.
There’s a town down on the border
Of southeast Tennessee
The name of the good town
Is well known to you and me.
In a certain place one never finds
Gloomy, sour company,
But you’re always greeted with a smile
At the Tennessee Power Company…
You may shout it from the housetops,
But don’t slip off the roofs,
About the bargains you will find
When shopping at Maloof’s
Now don’t let your money
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Grow musty and dank—
Start a savings account
At the First National Bank.
On down the street
Is where Mom fixes up for Pop,
When she spends a half hour
At the Ocoee Beauty Shop…
You’re sure of a friendly greeting
Tho’ looking for a coffin or a bed
When you call at Abernathy’s Furniture
For the living and the dead.
If you’re feeling down and out
And your nerves are all a twitter
Relax after the daily grind
Down at the Cherokee Theatre… 241
A notable establishment among the many mentioned by the Strausses was Maloof’s. This
general mercantile establishment run by a family of Lebanese origin began their mercantile trade
through the selling of notions at the Ducktown Sulphur Copper & Iron commissary in Isabella.
Family lore had it that the their patriarch came to Copperhill in the middle 1910s because the
town had four times as many cars as did his original place of business, Andrews, NC. At that
time Andrews had only one automobile. Run for years by old man Maloof until his sons Louis
and John Maloof took over in the late 1930s, the family business plied in the retail trade around
the Copper Basin for three generations. Just before the Great War the family built brand new
accommodations by going into considerable debt and added a ladies department, the first such
specialty for Copperhill it seems. Older Copperhill customers complained however that the
twenty-five steps to the second floor store were too burdensome. Reacting to these complaints
and hoping to entice more customers in the post-war slump, the family completely remodeled
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their store. That rough patch in the early twenties had taught the Maloofs enough shrewd skills
to keep them in business through the even more difficult years that followed. 242
Boosterism notwithstanding editorial selectiveness could not overshadow the stark
economic realities experienced during the Depression as revealed in one annual assessment.
Printed in The Copper City Advance the list of Polk County properties up for auction owing to
failure to pay back-taxes underscored the impact of hard times. By 1942 such lists held a
staggering number of properties, each one identified by the owner’s name and lot. The size of
the properties up for auction varied from dozens of acres to small lots. Although the 1942
assessment did not include delinquencies before 1938, it still held the properties of hundreds
Polk County citizens. Most had not paid their taxes throughout the thirties, but many others had
only recently joined these embarrassing ranks by falling behind on their taxes by a mere one or
two years. Local papers never investigated the particular circumstances that lay behind the
myriad delinquencies. The weak farming economy of the era had had its effects. As this kind of
auction was a regular occurrence at Benton’s Chancery Court throughout the interwar years, the
length of the list was all the more remarkable. It provided an indirect record of how many
people still could not catch up from the economic ruin of the Depression despite the late thirties
higher wages and increased opportunities in the late 1930s. The delinquent tax list also pointed
to other community realities. The repetition of names included in the delinquent tax rolls from
year to year reflected a resistance by locals to buy a neighbor’s property. The shared experience
endured during the Depression limited opportunism in part because there was no anonymity in
these hills. Few would have wanted to be known as someone who pulled a man’s land out from

242

Copperhill City Advance, “Down with Depression” 1.2.1933; “Miss Copper Basin will be Selected” 6.2.1933;
and “Dedicated to the Merchants and Professional Men of Copperhill” 3.(?).1938; Facts on Fannin, 410.

145
underneath him. Furthermore, wretched property conditions owing to poor maintenance would
have had their affect on salability too. Investment in a failed farm was too risky.243
Legend and local myth reinforced understanding of the harsh economic conditions
experienced in the still somewhat frontier Tri-state. Residents recalled some merchants in the
Basin needed cash so badly at times they even resorted to the selling of their children. These
affairs were not slave auctions though and while it may seem the stories were passed down in
jest, locals recall them as fact. The tales themselves illustrate the blending of Appalachian
custom and rigors demanded by a desperate kind of capitalism. Local proprietors would
sometimes market their daughters as best they could before the marriageable (and well-paid)
young engineers and craftsmen who came to work in local industry. Grayson Newman, a retired
US Marine major who wrote for the Polk County News, described one peculiar transaction type
occurred thusly during one rough period in before World War II: A merchant’s daughter “would
be given the best room in [the store owner’s] house, the one with the store-bought furniture and
nice vanity dresser and a pretty counterpane bedspread. The idea was that if a prospective
husband came [sic] calling he would be impressed by the housekeeping abilities of the girl.”
Merchants got the idea to promote the feminine assets of their families from an “earlier, rumored
local custom wherein marriageable girls were given a new pair of shoes each Christmas and
enough material to make herself a new dress.” With these new togs the young ladies of the
mountains could better package themselves to proper suitors. 244
As workers’ pay increased in the late 1930s and early 1940s grocers and retailers could
offer better products for local consumers. H. L. Greenway, manager of the Ducktown Tennessee
Copper Company “Smelter Store” (a company commissary) noticed how buying habits had
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changed in his three decades working for the company. Earlier in the century Smelter Stores
carried only the most basic of goods in bulk for workers. Folks still made nearly all their own
meals from a limited assortment of starches and proteins, supplemented by seasonal fruits and
vegetables. Owing to a lack of electricity for most, they preserved little. Throughout the interwar
years, Greenway had stocked his store with twenty-five and fifty pound bags of flour, shipped in
by railcar load. He shipped in some bread during this period, but sold few loaves because most
folks still made their own. As for meats, despite the proximity of farms, salt pork was one of the
mainstays for miners and their families. Workers families were often too poor for regular cuts of
beef, but “the Ducktown store bought 2000 to 3000 lbs of salt side meat at a time.” Smelter
Stores also carried supplies and gear useful to miners and other workers: work-clothes, candles,
ropes, and sundry industrial tools. Women saved money by buying piece goods and cottons for
homemade dresses. In the late thirties things began to dramatically change in local eating
customs and for women as wages improved. Working families stocked-up on fresh meats and
purchased store-made bread as a sign of their prosperity. Company commissaries began selling
manufactured dresses; working-class women snatched them up. Changes in the textile industry
during the 1950s really changed fashion opportunities for locals. Smelter Stores expanded and
began to carry the latest styles for their customers made from lower-priced synthetics. 245

The Automobile Age commences
The impact of industrial expansion in the Tri-state coincided during the interwar years
with the advent of the automobile age. No longer would the railroads be the only method of
quick transport beyond galloping hoofs. The combined impact of motor cars and trucks on the
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economy and labor markets was remarkable; locals wanted more and more of them. They also
demanded better roads to connect them with outlying regions; when completed the roads would
extend the reach of local industrial enterprise and arose new interest in the unique attractions of
Tri-State environs. A 1917 report in the Atlanta Constitution announced that “prominent citizens
of Ducktown, Tenn. Plan[ned a] Circuit Road Through North Georgia, Tennessee and North
Carolina.” This road project was to be a massive affair, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars;
it would open up the Southern Mountains in a manner even more impressive than the rails had
done a generation before. The “big loop,” as it was called, would run from Atlanta, through
North Georgia, to Mineral Bluff then up to North Carolina and back west into Tennessee,
through the Copper Basin and link back onto itself at Blue Ridge, Georgia. Proponents of the
project wanted captured World War I German soldiers to do a lot of the heavy construction work
and state monies to finance the pike. One report in the Atlanta Constitution described a possible
future. “The entire highway will consist of some 1,000 miles, practically all of which will be
macadamized [paved] and approximately 75 miles of which will extend through the forest
reserves and copper districts of Tennessee.” By the early twenties it was almost all done and
this new “Panorama of Incomparable Mountain Scenery” prompted Constitution reporter James
A. Hollomon to opine at length. Great treasures of Appalachian scenery were now available for
willing Atlanta tourists. If the earnest took the trip—which would have taken about half a day’s
driving at best—Holloman told readers they could view not only mountain splendor, but “the
celebrated copper mines” and “the only place where one can see what approaches the bad lands
of the Dakotas” before venturing beyond to the virgin forests of North Carolina. 246
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The advent of the automobile age led to a transformation in the Copper Basin’s labor
market. In the twin-cities of Copperhill and McCaysville over thirty men worked as car
salesmen, mechanics, or for petroleum companies. Other jobs connected with the automobiles
grew in number as well, especially in the transport industries of trucking and taxi services or as
highway department officials and employees. The total jobs resulting from this new sector of the
economy represented 11% of the labor market or about sixty persons. Such jobs represented new
niches that would only grow as the century advanced and offset some of the contraction of jobs
in the older industrial economy occurring as technology displaced workers in mining, smelting,
and chemical work. Contraction in the job market became full collapse in some sectors like
wagonning. By 1930 there were no longer any men employed as teamsters in or beyond the
region’s industrial mines and works. Likewise, fewer and fewer horses now delivered groceries.
All this had not been the case in the 1910s. Period photos showed DSCI teamsters trekking
across company granges through the Great War. But TCC company records chronicled the
replacement of horse teams with trucks. Wrote Superintendent of Mines H.B. Henegar in a 1919
monthly report to new General Manager J.N. Houser, “on September 23rd we started using a
Packard 3 ½ ton truck at the mines. This will eventually replace one team each of mules and
horses and eliminate the stable expense.” In short, for industry and the community at large new
automotive-era jobs allowed some folk to remain in the Basin that might otherwise have been
forced to immigrate to more prosperous labor markets. Alternately, the new economy forced
many men to seek alternative occupations. 247
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Photographs from the 1930s illustrate the changes wrought upon the village and town
streets when the car came to town. Copperhill’s main street became choked with cars; other
images show cars jammed along the dirt streets around Ducktown and Isabella. Nearly every
photo of town scenes in the region after the 1910s holds a car or truck somewhere in view.
Soon, only Benton rivaled the twin cities along the Ocoee as an automotive center in Polk
County. 248 It is difficult to determine from reports exactly what influence the increase in the
number of cars meant for such things as intown property values, but there was clearly some
connection here. Commuting increased among the workforce and the old requirement that one
live within the community where he worked broke down. An increase in the number of men
employed at TCC in the boom years of the 1940s did not match the total number of workers who
actually lived in the Basin. As well, there was an increase in the number of real estate agents.
The class of workers most able to take advantage of greener, more sublime and less toxic
environs would have included the upper tier of craftsmen, chemists, engineers, foremen, and
managers; the latter no doubt continued their flight from Smelter Hill as the opportunities arose,
their new cars speeding them on their way.
For all its benefits, the new automobile age would also cut deeper the lines of parochial
and class division. Ride-sharing as a general custom almost certainly began in the first weeks of
the automobile age. But most workers in the lower economic echelons, such as miners and day
laborers, did not possess the financial means to join personally in the new transportation
revolution for some years—even though the Ford Motor Company cut the costs of some of its
models to less than $300. For many left in the mining villages and industrial hollows of the
Copper Basin, the distinction (and shame) of being a working male, head-of-household who did
not own a car would have increased as the interwar years progressed. As soon as families could
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get a car they did. Film and photographic records of Ducktown from the late 1930s show the
town’s streets were jammed with cars during a workers’ demonstration. 249
Automobiles and trucking allowed for more travelers, independent haulers and salesmen
to come to even the most remote villages. Many of those remote locales had no local inns for
flatfoots. Ducktown managed to hold onto its little hotel, owing to businessmen who came to
tour the town’s mines and works; traveling salesmen took advantage of these places too. The
newer facilities were not as grand in conception as some of the first generation of resort-styled
inns and hotels had been; but fortunes at these early enterprises had long since faded along with
any belief in the once fantastic and ignorant claims that the toxic “sulfurettes” from local
industry had been good for respiratory illness. 250
Employment in service sectors related to the hotel trade expanded too. The number of
persons employed in hotels and restaurants doubled to over sixty by 1930. Beauticians’ services
also expanded and remained an important and stable part of the economy throughout the
Depression years. Women, while they may not have had a lot of money, maintained their
spending on hair-care—the beautician’s parlor (or home in most instances) was a place for
socializing and maintaining important contacts with ladies around the town. Taxi services
depended upon women who had no cars or who depended on others who could drive. R.E.
Barclay recounted now and again in his diary about driving women here or there, home, or
shopping. 251

Progressive Education efforts
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During the early years of the second industrial boom private schools dominated local
education. These were few in number, but bold in their claims. Ducktown academy principal
L.D. Patterson boasted that the educational opportunities at his Hiwassee High School were the
finest in the Southern hills. For a fee, ranging from $ 1 to $2.50 per term not including
“contingent fees” of a dime per month, students from the first through tenth grades would be
educated in geography, arithmetic and higher math, English and Latin, composition and rhetoric,
Tennessee geography, natural philosophy, civil government, chemistry, general history and that
of Antiquity. And for those seeking education in truly practical arts, Patterson included book
keeping and the theory and practice of teaching both without extra cost to the student. The
textbooks employed were comparable to those used at public schools and Ducktown’s polymath
principal offered “special inducements to clubs of young men and young women desiring to
prepare for teaching.” Copper company management may certainly have taken advantage of
Patterson’s offer; for many miners, these fees may have been a bit extravagant. Records are
unclear as to how successful Patterson was, but within a few years public schools became the
norm in the Copper Basin. 252
A review of Polk County Board of Education minutes, local histories, and newspaper
reports from the early 1900s through the 1920s—records for the late interwar years are spotty at
best—revealed that a coalition of local elites joined with certain business interests to enact
progressive educational reform that were in keeping with the best efforts statewide and
throughout the South. 253
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Typically mountain communities, Polk and Fannin counties included, had small local
school houses; usually these facilities were not much more than a one room schoolhouse without
electricity or indoor plumbing, maintained by the immediate community. Wealthy families in the
Southern Mountains always had the ability to send their children private nearby academies—if
they existed—or out of the hills for formal education in the cities. For the rest of the inhabitants
of the hill country, the conventional manner of family-centered education and experience sharing
reflected agricultural economies and “provided continuity for the culture, reinforcing traditional
values and beliefs.” 254
Neither Polk nor Fannin County citizens were innocent of formal schooling. Polk County
records reveal the development of educational opportunities there. By the 150th anniversary of
Polk County’s founding in 1839 over 70 different schools had served the citizenry (some being
tiny, typical one room affairs and others multi-room structures). By 1990 consolidation had
reduced that number to only six schools serving the needs of the county’s young people.
Schooling for the copper communities of Isabella, McCays (the later distinct towns of Copperhill
and McCaysville), Ducktown, and Turtletown began respectively in 1860, the late 1890s and the
1910s—dates that reflect the economic ups and downs of the region prior to the Great War. A
high school was established for a short time at Isabella, but by the 1910s only Ducktown and
Copperhill held one. The county’s third high school was established at the county seat in Benton
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in 1913—a point which underscores the fact that the industrial communities in the Copper Basin
had more resources to advance educational opportunities among their citizens than did the
county’s agrarian west. 255
Important promoters of county education included Dr. John Brewer, who served as
principal of Polk County High School from 1912-1937 and as local school superintendent during
the First World War. Brewer represented a new era of professionally trained educators whose
university education and participation in statewide educational associations led to higher regional
teaching standards that included “a well-rounded curriculum… with emphasis being given to
athletics, agriculture and the library.” He also developed a character-building program for Polk
students noted for its accomplishments by the Boston Journal of Education. According to local
historian Roy Lillard, as a result of Brewer’s work, Polk County’s high school was the twelfth to
be certified by Tennessee and for years set the standard for excellence in teaching statewide. 256
For two decades the active county board oversaw regular increases in teacher and
principal salaries that became an envy of the region; they also consolidated old one room school
houses into finer, more modern structures, all fortified by corporate gifts and public goodwill.
As a result Polk County schools developed a regional reputation that enticed many good teachers
to come work in the Copper Basin who might have normally eschewed its remote and
intimidating surroundings. By the end of the thirties, the general experience of school children
in the Copper Basin was no longer one of sitting on long, rough wooden benches using hand held
slates and chalk in buildings without electrical wiring or plumbing. Now new brick multi-room
edifices sat high in each community, their tall windows augmenting electric lights, their teachers
improved by regular attendance at professional development conferences held at East Tennessee
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State Teachers College. Board and school officials knew how to maintain proper budgets, use
standardized tests, compare and apply new pedagogical practices that incorporated world events
into classroom instruction and regularly kept clear typed records for official and public
scrutiny. 257
Literacy rates in Polk and Fannin counties show that illiteracy for persons over twentyone collapsed between 1910 and 1930 from 21% and 18% respectively to 3% and 9%. These
declined more slowly than statewide rates initially, then rose above state improvements in the
1920s, and stalled during the Great Depression. To establish a nearly completely literate
populace would take considerable time. Over a thousand persons above age of ten were still
illiterate in Polk County by 1930. Fannin records show that it had only a third that many illiterate
citizens. Why Fannin County did better was difficult to determine, but it may be that Georgia
enforced attendance more strictly than Tennessee. School buses and stronger compulsory laws
whittled down the size of the educationally innocent in the thirties; by the end of the decade
fewer than six percent of citizens in both counties had experienced no schooling whatsoever. 258
Polk County paid its principals quite well. Salaries for principals for the 1920s show that
W.B. Rucker and Dr. Brewer of Benton and Copperhill earned $ 3,240 and $ 3940 respectively.
The equivalent of the best of these salaries in today’s dollars would be over $130,000 per year.
In the mining villages, salaries appear to have been much lower—especially for Isabella. J.C.
McAmis earned $ 2280 at Ducktown’s smaller academy and the Isabella principal earned a mere
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$100 a month. Both pay grades highlight the general affluence in the Twin-cities which allowed
for opportunities for improvement limited in the mining villages. 259
Teachers were paid initially by the day in Polk County. In the middle teens teacher
salaries stood at around $2 per day or about $146.00 in 2007 dollars; over one month this would
be about $2900 for twenty days of teaching. Until well into the 1910s pay by the day was still
the norm for teachers, reflecting the sporadic nature of Polk teaching schedules. This pay method
held for a time even after the state passed compulsory education laws in 1913. War inflation
forced the Board to increase teacher pay to $50-$60 per month by 1916--ranging $3600-$4380 in
2007 money. Over the years, teachers’ changing economic circumstance as measured in the real
value of money reflects changing fortunes in Polk generally. So while teachers saw their
monthly pay increase in the late teens and early 1920s to from $80 to $90 per month, this was the
equivalent in many cases—owing to inflation—to a reduction in the actual teacher salaries for
the highest paid instructors of hundreds of dollars per month. The trend through 1920 reflected
the tempered Copper Basin and agrarian economy of the period as the local economy went from
the flash of the war boom into the post war industrial and agricultural slump. There were no
records for teacher salaries into the late twenties and thirties, but it seems likely salaries would
have continued to fluctuate—when the Copper Basin flourished, teachers benefitted. 260
By the middle 1930s, the progressives had managed construction of a remarkable and
rare symbol for that region that crowned the high educational aspirations they held for local
students. When completed near Ducktown, the Kimsey Junior College represented not only the
most impressive new public structure in this sector of the Tri-State, but also “one of the finest
259
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school buildings in the South.” Locals named the building after Lucius E. Kimsey—a most
popular and respected early local doctor in the area and a man who had been an influential and
progressive power on Polk’s education board. Made of the finest and most modern materials of
its day, the vast new structure sat on a 160 acre tract of land controlled by one of the local
townships. The broad parking area in front of the school lay ready for platoons of cars. A deal
had been struck to help pay for the project through a lease that had allowed school authorities a
percentage on all copper mined there. 261
However, certain truths about the limits of educational reform were apparent long before
the general decline of local industry and their existence suggested why the Kimsey College failed
to become a working institution. For one thing, progressive reforms had never been successful
in creating a large population of students who had the financial means, interest, or willingness to
go college in the Copper Basin. In fact, for many, High School graduation remained the mark of
making it—and not everyone found that an important goal. The typical size of graduating classes
in Ducktown and Copperhill was just a few dozen students per year. Limited financial resources,
outmigration, family concerns, the seductive promise of industrial wages, aversion to the toxic
industrial environs or the combined effects of some composite of these factors kept the Kinsey
College building from ever holding college convocations let alone graduating commencements.
Impressive as it was—the “collegiate-gothic” structure remains on the National Historic
Register—the “college” served for a time as a high school and then eventually became a local
elementary school. In the minds of some residents the Kinsey Junior College had been an
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extravagant, if misplaced appropriation of funds and a sober reminder of the limits the Copper
Basin’s industrial economy and culture placed on local educational aspirations. 262
But despite the energy and monies put behind these efforts and slow improvement in the
number of Tennesseans who attended public school regularly during the interwar years, cultural
inertia limited any real hope of establishing a functioning college. One of the persistent local
challenges for educators and their supporters was truancy, which remained a tenacious problem
among older children in the Copper Basin as late as 1939. When asked about the effects a new
high school building in McCaysville would have on Copperhill High’s attendance, the
Copperhill principal said it would reduce truancy, but he knew that new buildings along were not
the answer. Other than some Georgia “riff-raff” who had dropped out of Copperhill High and
about a dozen or so McCaysville kids who would be leaving, the remaining student body of 160
to 180 students would now be entirely Tennessean. Were Tennessee to actually enforce its own
compulsory laws, he added, Copperhill attendance might rise to 200 enrollees. The principal had
little patience for anyone who might argue that working-class boys did not need a high school
education. 263
Truancy existed even after the passage of compulsory attendance laws and Polk Country
responded with improved prevention mechanisms. Truant officers, such as W.N. Morgan were
paid $3 a day and were “to be called upon by any member of the board when needed.” 264 By late
1919 the Board decided to increase incentives for truant officers who were now given two cents
for each student in their district who would complete their grammar education and a penny for
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every student who had previously completed grammar school. The seeming slightness of the
incentives did not so much reflect limited county funds, but the large pool of truant kids upon
whose “reform” an officer might build a respectable salary. 265
These efforts had mixed success. Copper Basin students seemed to have been more
susceptible to skipping school than kids in rival Benton, Tennessee. An annual attendance
assessment done for county grammar schools in the middle 1920s shows Ducktown and
Copperhill schools had a much lower average attendance rate than did Benton—the former being
on 81 % and 77 % compared to the county seat average attendance of 92%. An exception to the
poor showing in the Copper Basin happened in of all places, Isabella—generally the poorest of
the Basin’s little industrial burgs. Someone must have been throwing the fear of God into the
tikes of Isabella; the community had a 91% average attendance out of 301 enrolled students.
Other statistical facts deserve recognition here as well. The Copperhill School, with about 630
students, stood at nearly twice the size as the Benton academy. When it came to general
attendance, Copperhill percentages were significantly higher than Benton’s. Ducktown and
Copperhill grammar school attendance was on par with regional norms. 266
Moral education was an accepted part of the curriculum and no doubt supposed to limit
seduction of certain activities for potential truants. Education Board members were keen to
prescribe scriptural prophylactics when they could. A receipt from an offer to sell Polk County
scores of Lamar and Barton’s King James Version Teacher’s Bible no. 7848 for a ten percent
discount below the regular catalog price of six dollars lay in the Board records. That summer, the
Board bought the bible stock to supply school rooms in the Copper Basin. 267 School
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administrators also relied on important local divines to advance young people’s moral instruction
on public property. At one such session, “the much beloved minister” A.B Couch of Atlanta
visited Copperhill High to deliver an inspired commencement sermon. A former resident of
Copperhill, the Right Reverend had been quite popular when a preacher at the local First Baptist
and as his reputation grew throughout the Southland, so it was said many locals wanted to come
hear his advice and admonitions to another crop of young men and women from CHS. 268
Certain other patterns in Copper Basin culture slowed educational reform which seems to
have peaked during the Second World War boom. Economic hardship owing to mismanaged
funds (the board incurred an enormous debt of $ 50,000 owing to failed bond schemes in the
1920s), the general effects of the Great Depression, and a certain degree of class-based antiintellectualism augmented by the seductive appeal of local industrial jobs (that sometimes
required little book learning) all had a part in limiting education outcomes for the Copper
Basin’s students. The enormous indebtedness incurred in Polk during the twenties appears to
have led to a legal battle in 1929-30. Local resident Roy Lilliard reported that “several members
of the Board of Education were charged with misconduct.” These developments may be the
reason Polk Board of Education records for the late twenties and thirties are mostly
nonexistent. 269
That is not to say Copper Basin educational reform simply stopped or that county
officials did not take advantage of new pedagogical techniques when they could afford to do so.
The copper concerns also gave money on a regular basis too, but the details of these kinds of
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gifts did not lie in the records. Former resident Barbara Holder remembered however that when
she was a kid, the Tennessee Copper Company regularly supplemented incomes for Copper
Basin teachers and coaches; the company likely give considerable monies for other school
related activities. The Copper Basin had long since developed a reputation for having great
teacher pay. Holder said it was not uncommon for young women to come to the Copper Basin as
teachers attracted by the good wages “and then marry young engineering bachelors.” 270 Local
papers kept alive excitement about school-related developments in every issue. These reports
even included details on personal affairs budding in the school hallways or born from chance
meetings at sporting events and underscore the aspirations of communities where parents hoped
their children might get educational opportunities not previously so pervasive. But post-war
international competition to local industry after the 1940s reduced employment opportunities in
local industry and this affected education jobs as well, making other labor markets more
attractive to young teachers. 271
Diversions for young and old
Even in the leanest years there were many ways one could part with his or her money or
find amusing free entertainment in the Copper Basin. All the diversions soon described reflect
the vibrant nature of the Twin-cities during flush times, but also the fleeting, parochial nature of
many of the activities in an economy especially susceptible to market whims.
Lest one get the impression that Copperhill held ceaseless opportunities to enjoy delights
through a procession of itinerant circuses, freak shows, movie openings, minstrel, dramatic,
choral, band, gospels, revivals, and other performances, it should be noted that these diversions
rarely crowded local calendars. In fact, the sporadic nature of their occurrence no doubt would
270
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have seemed absolute proof that the Old Red Scar was a true Sahara of the Beaux-arts. Aside
from the pool and dance halls, ice rinks, Cherokee and Doradelle theaters few commercial
diversions existed. Outside of work, life was routine, family-centered and typically ran at a
much slower pace than now. The dearth of diversions helped focus attention to any development
out of the ordinary. The personal nature of participation erased any anonymity possible in larger
communities. When, as will be described in later chapters, union organizers turned to public
demonstrations of power, the lack of other diversions would have fixed locals’ attention to
picketing, strike parades or other actions.
For those who were looking for something to pass the time between mining shifts or as
part of a young couple out on the town Grayson Newman ran the Idle Hour Café, Dance hall, and
Roller Rink where one could skate or dance the evening away. The regularity of politicos
peddling their promises in the Basin always precipitated storms of partisan barbecues fired hot
by pandering blowhards. Tamer fare could be found at family reunions, American Legion square
dances, or meetings of a most tenacious Twin-City Garden-Club which held annual flower
shows. Choral performances of popular and immortal song by Sunday, elementary and high
schools, sundry service organizations, and countless fund raisers joined locally produced
musicals and the aforementioned minstrel shows in a manner not atypical for small Southern
towns. New picnic grounds opened along the Jack’s River at nearby Gavelly Gap along a new
Forest Service Road. The grounds allowed locals a chance to enjoy forests like those that once
covered the Basin. Reported the Copper City Advance, “clean toilets, cold mountain spring
water, fire places, plenty of wood, and fine picnic tables” made idyllic enjoyment of the beautiful
local waterfalls, ample fish and brisk mountain air possible. 272
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For the young, relief from boredom could came from pen pals. Third grader Ruth
Robinson wrote to The Letter Writer’s Club based in Atlanta announcing in her hopeful letter of
introduction that she was the only girl among a family with three brothers. Ruth loved her
teacher, her classmates, was studying reading, spelling, English, arithmetic and geography. “I
want to join your happy band,” she pleaded. “Some of you boys and girls write me and I will
answer all the letters I receive.” 273
For most kids the new “talking pictures” at Copperhill theaters stood out as being the
most predicable way to find amusement and thrills. Major Newman recalled the excitement,
neighborliness and periodic mischief that accompanied these activities.
“On Saturday afternoons… all the mothers got a break because the kids all went to the
newly opened talking picture show, the Cherokee Theater in Copperhill. The streets were
full of kids, some with show fare, some without. After the kids with fare entered, a kindly
old traveling photographer, Mr. Burger, told the ticket lady to count the kids without
show fare and let them enter. When [done and] after seating the less fortunate kids, she
looked around for Mr. Burger to pay. The old gentleman was gone. He hadn’t said he
would pay, He’d said ‘count them and let the ones in that have no show fare’” 274

The railroad brought a number of itinerant novelties to Copperhill not experienced
anywhere else in the Basin. One traveling enterprise featured a “corpse” that reports described
as “alive and well.” Grayson Newman said that the so-called deceased had been “ceremoniously
buried in downtown Copperhill in a vacant lot [where] a stand-up pipe ran from inside the coffin
to a place above the grave.” The pipe allowed the public to look down on the ‘corpse’ resting in
peace. Proprietors of this attraction hoped that by viewing the dead man one might be inspired to
“drop a coin.” Sometimes iterant novelties were not intended. One dead celebrity appeared by
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way of a “nameless gambler” who died suddenly in Copperhill. Taken to the Center &
Abernathy funeral home, the proprietors “propped the body up in the window” hoping—
apparently—for someone to recognize the corpse. 275
Circuses rode regularly into Copperhill on the L & N. The Sun Brothers troupe and Jack
Hoxie’s Big 3-Ring Circus were just a couple. Hoxie’s troupe advertised itself as “America’s
New Big Circus.” With two complete shows, it featured among its 200 members “the famous
screen star” Jack Hoxie and “his wonder horse Scout” along with “thrilling modern circus
performances… a mammoth tent city… 100 arenic stars [sic--of the arena?] 27 dancing horses, a
tribe of Indians, a herd of elephants, wild jungle beasts, and clowns galore.” A telling
qualification in the advertisement underscored the small audience base. Hoxie’s extravaganza of
pachyderms and pageantry would be in town for a single late April night—and a Wednesday one
at that. 276
Basinites reserved a special pride toward the Boy Scouts owing to locals’ claim of
organizing the first troop in Tennessee in the early 1900s. Certain nights saw local scout troops
show off the stuff in through entertaining fund raisers. Isabella Girl Scouts sponsored amateur
nights with local celebrities, and a “crack Copper Basin Band” and beauty pageants for the little
ones. 277 For adults, good health, vivacious music, and Christian camaraderie could be had at the
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Ducktown YMCA or playing in its band. 278 Other clubs in the Copper Basin during the interwar
years were typical of an aspiring middle class and included the Ducktown Columbian Literary
Society, the Copper Basin Music Club, the Mine City Masons, and the Myrtle Chapter Eastern
Star. The most notable service organization in the Basin was the local chapter of the Kiwanis.
Founded in the 1910s as a business networking association, it began to assist the poor.
Copperhill’s chapter organized in the early twenties and turned its philanthropic attentions to the
local needy and raising funds through patriotic and entertaining affairs. Its membership included
many of the town fathers and its band seemed to be at any major holiday affair. 279
Radio performance stood as the era’s standard to measure celebrity. Copperhill’s High
School Orchestra became locally famous after it performed over WDOD, Chattanooga,
sponsored by Abernathy’s Furniture Company. Not missing a chance to brag on their city and
region’s bounty, city fathers took the band’s good fortune as an occasion to feature the
“historical background and commercial progress of Copperhill and the Copper Basin.”280
By the late thirties the combination of automobiles and railroads allowed more
opportunities than ever to escape the doldrums of the Old Red Scar and the weekly chronicles of
locals’ to-and-fro could be found in the City Advance’s “Local Happenings.” The society
column summarized the importance of visitors and the many social events at a time when folk
rejected social anonymity in the pursuit of bragging rights as these announcements served as a
sort of barometer of one’s social standing; they elicited admiration and envy, scrutiny and
278
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celebrity. Likewise, Atlanta papers reported when wealthy Copper Basin visitors came to the
Queen City for special social occasions or simply wanted to escape a slim array of local
diversions by taking the L & N to Atlanta for high shopping and theater. 281
Little enmity directed towards those affluent enough to escape the routines of the Old
Red Scar appeared in local papers. However, the same could not be said when outsiders came to
the Basin and then went home to tell sensational tales about the Basin’s notorious red hills. That
kind of condescension met with quick retorts and admonishment in the defensive local press.
“By Ginger!” exclaimed the Copper City Advance one summer day after one Atlanta report
called the Basin the “Great Copper Desert” and a “painted waste” and accompanied the ridicule
with a half-page of miserable photographs “of the most barren spot that could possibly be found
in this vicinity.” Such “trifling exaggeration” could be amusing admitted the Copperhill editor,
but to locals, even though “our hills cannot be described as beautiful in the strictest sense of the
word, they have a picturesqueness [sic] all their own… We can disparage them, but woe unto the
outsider who does so!” In an amusing if serious defense of their home, City Advance editors
comforted their readers with verse by poet A. Guiterman that underscored local pride for the
Copper Basin’s precious, sometimes jarring distinctions:
“I never loved your plains!
Your gentle valleys,
Your drowsy country lanes,
And pleached [braided] alleys.
I want my hills—the trail
281
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That scorns the hollow.
Up, up the ragged shale
Where few will follow!
High on my hills of dream—Dear hills that know me!
And, then how fair will seem
The lands below me!” 282

Copper Basin Sports Life
It was likely that anyone in the Copper Basin rich or poor who enjoyed a good ball game,
tournament or general conviviality could find friends, fun and high spirits—if perhaps not always
friendly competition—at the regular sporting events. Local sports rivalries with Copperhill
teams intensified after the merging of Ducktown and Isabella high schools. The mining-football
alliance soldered DSCI and TCC families through pigskin wars, on the diamond, over the net or
between the hoops. Season after season, year after year, Ducktown High kids battled their
southerly neighbors from Copperhill. Battles with McCaysville were intense too, but local
reports gave the author the impression the Ducktown-Copperhill games saw the most intensity.
Rivalry sustained community parochialism, but also took team members to towns and villages
they might not go otherwise, broadening their experiences, expanding career opportunities,
making new friends (and enemies) and perhaps landing a courtship with a possible future
husband or wife. The centrality of local sports in small town life would be hard to overstate.
Issues of the Copperhill City Advance and the Polk County News regularly featured accounts of
these clashes and the Ducktown Basin. The Atlanta Constitution regularly reported on
competitions with Copper Basin teams, a reportage common for all regional papers out of
Knoxville and Chattanooga. The Ducktown Basin Museum’s cache of photos was replete with
images of the myriad town teams, male and female, youth and adult.283
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The local teams tended to be smaller than are typical today. Many were barely nine in
number. Beyond the obvious support that came from local fans and family, evidence pertaining
to exactly who subsidized these teams is scare. For all the popularity of sports in the Copper
Basin almost no financial reports could be found. Locals recounted that the Tennessee Copper
Company contributed a significant amount of money to local teams, but these remembrances are
more anecdotal than substantive. Company subsidies notwithstanding, TCC’s needs superseded
local baseball team necessities. One of the few shots of a baseball game held near Copperhill
showed a diamond where the company began later began to dump its slag near the Ocoee rail
yards. The games likely went across the river to fields in McCaysville or behind the old
Copperhill High School. 284
The limits of social conventions being what they were did not limit locals’ enthusiasm for
girls’ teams. A plethora of reports and team pictures support this assertion. Town papers carried
word of girls’ sports victories and defeats just as they did for the boys. Some social conventions
remained to distinguish the teams by sex, but a 1924 basketball team picture showed girls had
abandoned wearing the smocks, skirts, and huge bow-tied head dresses common in the early
years of the century. This Copperhill High School girls’ basketball team made for a fierce set of
eight young lasses, decked out in smart uniforms. A photo of the Copperhill boys’ basketball
team of the same year shows that while they too enjoyed the benefits of official uniforms, theirs
was a more scrappy and fierce looking lot. These boys were not the towering giants so common
in the sport today; many looked to be just about 5 ½ feet at most. Their short height may have
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been a factor of the toxic environs, but they could just as likely been a result of being kin of
mountain Scots-Irish. 285
Accounts in the pages of the City Advance tell of fans and players giving their all to beat
their rivals. In the twenties, fierce showdowns between Ducktown and Tate, Georgia in baseball
developed that brought unusually high crowds. There seems to have been an especially rivalrous
air among competing mineral towns of the region. The passions ran hot in these series and if
players did not exert this effort, editors like Ed Middleton, would let them know he disapproved
in sometimes merciless coverage. Middleton was also the first to come to a player’s defense if
circumstances warranted journalistic justification, intercession and protection of hometown
honor. At times these reports captured hints of the notoriously defensive character attributed to
locals. In one such piece Middleton excoriated the Copperhill Copperheads for sloppy basketball
playing and carelessness. But then Middleton came to his team and town’s defense when Athens,
Georgia editors accused the Copperhill boys of unsportsmanlike behavior. The editors claimed a
certain slap was not only to an unfortunate referee, but to all Athens fans. The claim riled
Middleton’s local pride. He stated flatly that the charges did not “exactly come as a handful of
orchids to Copperhill fans. We do not intend to encourage players’ hitting referees, but there are
two sides to every question.” 286
Within months of that winter game, Copper Basin folk would find themselves embroiled
in a labor war that revealed a defensive anger and determined effort in common with
Middleton’s. Workers of the Tennessee Copper Company plant would take sides along lines that
matched those demarcating sports teams and which pitted the mining village folk against a
285

Ibid.; a typical report on a girls’ team lay in “Basketball Season is Opened Monday,” Copper City Advance, 17
December 1937. The girls took top billing over the boys’ game.
286
“Canton Defeated by Ducktown” 21 June 1924; “Strong Tate Team Beats Ducktown,” 13 June 1924; “Tate Shuts
Out Ducktown Nine,” 12 July 1924, Atlanta Constitution; Ducktown Basin Museum photographic collection; and,
“Copperheads Win One, Drop Two” Copper City Advance, 21 January 1938.

169
Copperhill phalanx. Throughout that era, local sports continued, but the battles waged on
diamonds, courts, and fields took on even greater significance for fans, families, and players
while the labor wars flared hot.

Religion in the Copper Basin—Holiness comes to Baptist hills
The myriad passions resulting from sports and hard work resemble those given to religion
and can be alternately cooled, harnessed, or strengthened by it. Direct connections to all three
are difficult for any study of the Copper Basin owing to a rarity of printed testimonials. God
appears thus everywhere in the records and yet no where can He be pinned down. Getting to the
heart of religion’s importance to folk is difficult because few comments beyond descriptions of
general moral uplift and guidance exist. Local newspapers reveal certain aspects of church life
like Sunday school fundraising contests and sermon notes in every issue. Church histories recall
long and intricate chronicles of vigorous faith-based communities that shied away from
recounting the spiritual mechanics of lives rooted in religion. For many the purpose and value of
it all must have been plain, needing no explanation. Claimed one witness of his church, it stood,
he said “on the principle of doing Bible things Bible ways and calling Bible things by Bible
names.” Another religionist stated a broader, yet all encompassing kind of approach for his
church. Congregants were part of …
“…a mission-minded church that believes strongly in spreading the gospel at home and
to the ends of the earth. From among [its] membership, preachers and other Christian
leaders have gone out to serve in other places. But of great significance, too are those
who follow. Many faithful members practice principles of Christian service and
stewardship day by day. They are saints, those good and faithful servants who have
experienced the floodtides of God’s love and have been motivated by the fires of His
Spirit. Through them the history [of their church and community] has been lived out
since … 1900.” 287
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Such declarations represented a religiosity common in the region alternately
demonstrating strength, determination, absolute faith and dutiful acquiescence; they also outlined
the proud heritage many congregations enjoyed in the Copper Basin in a world where lines
separating church and state blurred. 288
This study will not duplicate summaries of previous assessments done by local historians
that chronicle the Copper Basin’s religious history except to comment on the general nature of
the religious communities and their influence on local society. 289 Polk County published a list
of the churches established in the area. Yet as long as this list was—it contained more than
ninety house of worship—the editors admitted it was “undoubtedly incomplete.” 290 The list
shows the Copper Basin held a cache of high and low churches; Mainline Protestant presence
was certain and came with some of the first industrial enterprises. Episcopal and Northern
Methodist religionists came in this wave. They joined an already established community of
mostly Baptists that included independent and so-called primitive congregations which had
thrived for generations. Much later Pentecostal and Church of God congregations organized.
The overall mix in the Basin was broader than was typical for the Southern Mountains though
some of these religious communities had no an actual house of worship until midway through the
twentieth century. The Episcopal Church for instance never had many members, perhaps a only
few dozen. Catholics may have had a small home but there are no surviving records.
Overwhelming percentages of citizens were in Baptist congregations and this fact remains to this
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day. The Methodists and Church of God congregants, the next largest contingent of religionists,
made up less than ten percent of the populace by mid-century. 291
Well into the first half of the twentieth century, outside baptisms were still regular rites of
passage for many folk of the Copper Basin—especially during the warmer months. Images from
the turn of the century and through the interwar years show hundreds gathered for baptisms on
the margins of the Toccoa/Ocoee near the Twin-Cities. Preacher Hampton presided over one of
these dunkings in 1924. Children lined the river banks, sitting in rows, their legs folded in sitting
Indian-style to watch the miracle; others lined up barefoot to dutifully watch older brothers and
sisters become purified in the waters. Dressed in their Sunday best, many prepared for dunking
into salvation at locales long since overrun by commerce. A photo taken earlier in the century
near one site captured a strange juxtaposition of wet and dry: a huge baptismal service was held
near, as someone scrawled on the photo, a “blind-tiger,” an enterprise that sold “intoxicants
illegally.” 292
Many preachers and ministers were reliant on charity of sorts and nearly all did other
work to get by. Even as late as the 1920s the McCaysville Methodist ladies had to go door to
door to get enough groceries to provide for their pastor’s family. Some congregations appeared
to have garnered enormous wealth over the years. The affluence generally of the local Baptist
community was evident in the size of their churches. McCaysville Baptists built an enormous
new house of worship that opened in late 1926. The imposing classical structure had no steeple,
but it massive columns and proud pediment would have compared favorably in size to any
respectably sized town’s city hall. 293
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While a general religiosity was accepted and encouraged as normal and healthy, certain
sects were not welcomed owing to their populist, charismatic enthusiasm that tended to attracted
what some saw as a dangerous element among the poorest members of the working class. When
Holiness adherents tried to organize their congregation six miles east of Ducktown, over 100
citizens of Shoal Creek, North Carolina, rose up in rebellion against a sect they saw as
blasphemous for “preaching sanctification or the second blessing.” 294 Scholar George Tindal
summarized certain reasons for the aversion by many to Holiness. The makeup of these new
believers were folk on the religious fringe who “substituted ‘religious status for social status’ …
and [wished to] abandon this hopeless world.” 295 Holiness theology was seen by many as
attacking the very heart of the capitalist system, American governing conventions, and the
spiritual détente American Christians had accepted as part of the natural order. As challengers to
the status quo followers of the new “holy roller” sects had to be dispersed before their contagion
took root their critics claimed. The righteous mob at Shoal Creek burned that Holiness Church
“while a Methodist minister preached a sermon to the infuriated mob.” Afterwards locals passed
public resolutions forbidding the sect to build any new structures in the county. “Serious trouble
is feared” from all this, warned the Atlanta Constitution. 296
Condemnation of Holiness theology and its radical challenges to the social order came
from the very top of established religious orders in the South. Holiness theology took direct aim
at older theologies because its followers believed the older sects had become tainted with
materialism, compromised by sin, and had abandoned missions to help the downtrodden. In
reports that would have been read by Copper Basin faithful, Bishop Warren Candler of Georgia
attacked and ridiculed Holiness followers at a Columbia, South Carolina Methodist conference.
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Prejudice against the sect remained for a generation after the most violent acts, Holiness
believers referred to this period as “The Persecutions.” 297
Holiness did represent something new. Changing times had called forth a transformative
theology that responded to the extremely difficult and unpredictable industrial life ways of the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Scholar Wayne Flint concluded that the emergence of such
sects throughout the South resulted in even clearer class lines. “In many mill villages and
mining camps, churches represented distinct classes, with Methodists and Presbyterians most
frequently enrolling middle and upper classes, Baptists split and Pentecostal and Holiness
congregations tending toward lower class.” 298
In the early 1900s a Church of God congregation began out of a rented store building in
Copperhill. Its popularity became so great that the congregation had to move to a larger building
in McCaysville. By 1912, the congregation had their own, plain, unornamented worship house
where they could practice the behavior-centered, text-legitimated theology of that sect. Like
many Church of God congregations, the new congregation suffered discrimination and
recrimination. Church “Evangel Records” describe “the persecutions” as a time where believers
were apt to collect themselves against oppressive forces in their communities. Studies on the
sect show these folk were also apt to join unions in efforts to uplift the common man. Church of
God communities challenged the industrial hierarchy in the boom towns. Some capitalists would
have none of it. “Owners tried to keep [Church of God and Pentecostal churches] out of their
villages.” 299 Church of God communities responded to attacks led by industrial operators by
assisting striking workers and dispensing charity; they used Biblical instruction “to mobilize
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against the oppression of the poor by the rich.” 300 These would have been exactly the kind of
congregations some of the most pro-union, radical laborites might join for religious comfort and
communal support in the Tri-State. Reports clarify that the arrival of the Church of God in the
early 1910s coincided with the revival of an aggressive labor movement in the Copper Basin
during the Great War era. 301
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Chapter 3 New Deals come to the Copper Basin

The Great Depression’s impact
The machinations of foreign and domestic copper markets, the actions taken by producers
and the effects of government officials determined to resuscitate the nation’s economy all had a
significant impact on the Copper Basin’s industry in the 1930s. As the full impact of the Great
Depression’s contraction settled upon its residents; however, Copper Basin company managers,
civic and commercial elite, and working people developed different conceptions about what an
appropriate response to the crisis should be. Industrial management, businessmen, civic leaders,
and workers all wanted stability and protections against further erosion of their economic
circumstance. Rejection of certain New Era standards began as companies now demanded
increased government protection from foreign competition. Workers did too, but they also lost
faith in rational management approaches designed to counter union organizing. Despite their
differing prerogatives, by 1933 desperation led nearly all the key players among capital and labor
in the Copper Basin throw their support behind New Deal initiatives and mandates designed to
assist industrial management, small businessmen and working people; these groups did so with
great fervor and in the hope that a different collection of strategies might yield results. The
strategies embraced by these groups all involved some sort of collective enterprise, but
ultimately, the ambitions of management and local businessmen diverged from those of many
workers. All would have to come to terms with new federal mandates that allowed more legal
maneuvering by organized workers than ever before, but which also sought to restore vitality to
the nation’s industrial producers.
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When the boom of the New Era died in the copper commodities markets, it did so in
spectacular fashion. The speculative price of this most important metal for an age of
electrification collapsed in 1931 to about 6 cents per pound, down from highs above 18 cents just
the year before. As a result, in 1931, Tennessee Copper and Chemical profits (the name
Lewisohn operations in the Copper Basin assumed for much of the twenties) collapsed from over
$1 million to just over $5,000. 302
Then the news got even worse because over the next couple of years the contraction only
continued. A report from March 1933 stated that U.S. consumption stood at only 27% of 1929
figures. Overseas consumption fell by a third. Corporate losses sustained at Tennessee
Corporation were over $ 759 thousand in 1932 and another $ 97 thousand in the first year of the
New Deal. The latter number may reflect tempering effects of new NRA pricing and production
codes but only peripherally since it took producers months to redirect their production levels. 303
To improve their own positions after the collapse the commodities markets, US copper
producers eventually took advantage of federally-mandated associationalism. But, this had not
been their first response. Intense competition among producers had regularly compromised the
efficacy of their cooperation. Improving markets—however fleeting—had typically revealed the
fragility of such associations and producers returned all too soon to cut-throat competition.
However, the 1929 Crash and subsequent price collapse in copper shut down many smaller
producers and precipitated near panicked calls for protectionism by the industry’s leaders.
Further economic deterioration ensued in the copper markets after Congress capitulated to
pleading copper barons and threw up the tariff wall of the Hoover era: domestic stocks
burgeoned as foreign governments retaliated with their own protective tariffs. In spite of an
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embrace of impressive mechanization in the industry and rationalization in its management, the
copper industry as a whole needed reforming. Yet even under the intense stress placed upon it
during the early 1930s producers came to cooperate only reluctantly. When they did join the
Roosevelt Administration’s association schemes as allowed through the National Recovery
Administration, they did so on their own terms. Constant wrangling among copper producers
over price and production quotas limited short-term benefits to the industry. 304
Tennessee Copper Company managed to wrestle much from contracting copper markets
despite the Depression’s grip. It used its superior position to overtake its stumbling local
competitor through merger and finished the consolidation of non-ferrous production in the
Copper Basin. It advanced still further into agricultural chemical production to buoy its bottom
line. Regarding labor relations, the goal of TCC management was to preserve the rational
organization of production and labor relations established in the 1920s by J.N. Houser at the
direction of Sam A. Lewisohn. The Lewisohn-Houser regimen had depended upon a de-facto
company union that centered on job safety. Foremen and other supervisory staff directed work
through the craftsmen. A phalanx of efficiency made up of smelter, mine, and chemical
craftsmen had joined with foremen, engineers, and chemists; together their efforts reduced
injuries on the job and had allowed expansion of the company’s production array. As long as
copper prices remained strong, wages substantial, and job security somewhat secure this system
seemed to work well enough to maintain an industrial peace—despite technology driven
decreases in the need for skilled miners and corresponding increases in unskilled workers. The
collapse of the economy in the thirties put enormous stress on the Lewisohn-Houser scheme.
Management instituted a stretch-out to prevent desolation of employment rolls but some workers
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thought management could do better. Miners and craftsmen responded positively to their chance
to organize on their own terms under the New Deal’s federal protections. 305
When the Roosevelt Administration announced and Congress passed the National
Industrial Recovery Act in spring 1933, the typically resolute, upbeat, now careworn, Copper
Basin civic and business leaders leapt at the chance to support their President—and revitalize
local aspirations. For some while, Copperhill and Benton, Tennessee editors had been
admonishing citizens not to heed cynical, negative voices of “depression.” Regular turnover of
local newspaper ownership during the early thirties, especially at Copperhill, reflected the failure
of this admonishing tactic. Offering hope and collective support through a much more engaging
campaign than any scolding could provoke, the New Deal gave these men a chance to leave
behind emptier, booster sophistry. A flourish of optimistic patriotism helped galvanize a resolute
coalition of Copper Basin businesses. They would do their part in healing the national economy.
Periodic Cassandra condemnation of New Deal expense and inflationary pressure sometimes
crept into Copperhill editorials, but more of this came from the editor at the county-seat whose
constituency had more to lose from the New Deal’s erosion of the rural ancient regime. In the
industrial east of Polk County and throughout most of the Tri-State, a general assent to the
federal government’s invitation for businessmen to adopt certain NRA codes stood as a prelude
to locals’ later enthusiastic support for federal programs like the Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Civilian Conservation Corps and US government munitions contracts. 306
Workers too had an opportunity for empowerment under the New Deal, first through the
1933 National Industrial Recovery Act and then through the 1935 Wagner Act and subsequent
supportive court decisions. Workers took more immediate advantage of these NIRA
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opportunities than had their managers, quickly organizing into unions and putting to the lie any
myth management may have come to tell itself that workers had been fully satisfied with
company unions or employee-representative plans instituted in the 1920s. But, by the late 1930s,
it was clear that Copper Basin workers could not agree on the best way to protect their interests.
Some sought refuge in the new CIO and its industrial organization of workers, while others
preferred AFL-style volunteerism and pure-and-simple unionism that sought to maintain a
special voice for craftsmen. 307
Division in the workforce resurrected anti-communist attacks from within and without
labor. Management became frustrated with the intensifying internecine squabbling and used the
schism to its advantage. TCC owner, Sam A. Lewisohn had long held that labor ought to be able
to organize and that it was critical that management treat labor with respect and consideration of
the workingman’s circumstances. Years later, Lewisohn acknowledged there could also be a
place for government to enforce mandates guaranteeing workers collectively bargain with
employers. For his opinions and for his philanthropic work which underscored his devotion to
community uplift, Lewisohn was recognized by the Roosevelt Administration as a model,
moderate statesman in the industry. His discussions on the subjects of industrial relations,
rational management, and proper wage schemes from the Great War era forward determined not
only his company’s policies, but set standards in other industries as well. 308
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However, for all his defense of the workingman as a respectable component of industry,
Lewisohn’s opinions of how much power a union should have changed over time. Though
allowing latitude at his works in the early New Deal, by the late thirties it was clear that
Lewisohn and his management team at TCC were increasingly uncomfortable with some of the
demands put forth by Mine, Mill union workers. Lewisohn did not want a union or workers
advocates dictating national wage rates for copper workers, nor should unions demand too much
control of the shop floor. Wages were to be locally determined based upon particular
circumstances, regional labor markets and commodities prices. Closed shops were not to be
allowed and seniority based solely upon time on the job made little sense to him. 309
As a result of Lewisohn’s positions, TCC let it be known through its supervisory staff
that the company preferred an AFL union over one allied with the CIO. The company then
coordinated a phalanx of conservative workers supported by commercial, civic, and police
authorities to a push-back CIO influence. 310 Members of this confederation saw the future of the
TCC as key to their own prosperity. While the warring unions defended their efforts and
competed for sympathetic support among workers and local citizens, Tennessee Copper took
advantage of the circumstances. The company managed to forge a new public image for itself
that would over-ride earlier perceptions of the company as an exploitive firm, guilty of
destroying countless acres of Appalachia. TCC came to be seen by influential local citizens as
the most reasonable voice among an antagonistic, ever shriller, cacophony of organized workers.
Commercial and civic support for the New Deal
An April 7, 1933 Copper City Advance editorial pointed readers toward the “brightening
skies” over the nation since the installation of its new president. Summarizing the enthusiastic,
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bi-partisan support that existed among the region’s businessmen and citizens for Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s “New Deal,” editor Don King admired the president’s “quickness and
aggressiveness” in addressing the staggering depression—a crisis now in its fourth year.
Roosevelt had already impressed King with his handling of the banking crisis the month before
since. The president’s actions appeared to herald a new era of balanced budgets and reduced
taxes. Prices in the agricultural markets were on the rise: dairy products, hogs and cattle, cotton
and tobacco prices, all were going up. “Better days for the farmer,” he reminded readers, “means
[sic] better days for the towns… [which] means more sales for merchants and more work for
carpenters and bricklayers.” It seemed to King that the nation should follow this man Roosevelt.
“Toward every issue he has touched he has exhibited candor and fearlessness.” In wishing the
man success King seemed particularly relieved FDR was “laying permanently to rest the fear he
might pursue an occasionally radical course.” The presumed direction taken by Roosevelt was
important to King. As architect of this “New Deal” King was cheered Roosevelt seemed mindful
of certain proven conventions of the American economy; policies would be vast in scope and
aim, but also considerate of the associationism initiated in the Hoover era. Its pragmatic,
proactive course, directed by what came to be known as the Brains’ Trust, included advice from
businessmen and professional economists. King believed many of his Republican readers could
heave a sigh relief over the intentions of the new president. Communism and fascism had
alternately already seduced millions of Europeans, but the new American president had not fallen
for these false charmers. Standing like a barometer before his readers and linking health of the
economy to the health of the public generally, Don King sent communal salutations from the
Copper Basin to the administration. “To wish success for President Roosevelt is simply to wish
success for one’s state, one’s business, one’s self.” Well wishes aside, King told his readers he
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would stay keen however to any aspects of the new administration’s policies that smacked of
dangerous, superficially tempting, anti-capitalist ideology. 311
For its part, TCC operators took the lead in July by ending a stretch-out, returning to a
five-day work week and providing a 12 ½ percent raise to all workers. The Copper City Advance
said that general manager Houser had decided to take this action in support of NRA codes.
Local businesses followed Houser’s lead but with much more enthusiasm. By August that year,
the contagious acclaim and excitement behind the New Deal was evident in local headlines. A
chorus of local businessmen heeded the president’s call to action as outlined through National
Recovery Administration mandates. Full page notices announced the Twin-Cities’ business
community support for the Blue Eagle campaign and locals’ intention to adopt NRA codes on
operating hours and fair competition. An “Honor Roll for Copperhill, Tenn. and McCaysville,
Ga.” listed forty-one of the most important enterprises, banks, offices, shops, grocers, and
service stations of the surrounding environs. Kincaid’s Meats and Groceries, A. Maloof & Sons
Dry Goods and Clothing, Center & Abernathy Furniture and Hardware, and a dozen or so
smaller companies joined with the First National Bank of Polk County, TCC Smelter Stores,
local proprietors of the Atlantic & Pacific Tea and Standard Oil companies to proudly stand with
their president. Having met in a mass meeting of merchants and civic leaders, the body had
pledged its “100 percent cooperation” to the campaign, though it acknowledged that restaurants,
drug stores, barber shops, garages, and filling stations were to set their own conditions.
Operating hours across the Basin now became standardized under this “blanket code”: 7:30 AM
to 5:30 PM through the work week, Saturday not included. Patriotic symbolism filled the pages
of the paper as it announced the new regimen. “We pledge allegiance to the President’s
Program!” announced the business confederation in the Copper City Advance. Recognizing the
311

“Brightening Skies” and “Success to the New Administration” , Copper City Advance, 4.7.1933.

183
seriousness of this advance, businessmen admonished citizens to rally to this cause: “Service to
one’s country in peace is as deserving as service in war!” Acknowledging the importance of the
working man in this new scheme, the City Advance announced it was important for all to
remember that a new accord could exist between capital and labor if all followed a “live and let
live [policy] thoroughly in accord with the intent of the NRA.” Retailer A. Maloof was all for
the Blue Eagle campaign and all its components. “We believe in the NRA 100% and will
cooperate to the limit.” 312
The national devotion and community-spirit evident in all this stood in stark contrast to
the fury some Basinites had expressed earlier that year when an angry, armed mob of 150 men
shutdown local highway work to protest imported work crews. Rioters failed to heed threats by
the road company (“Reconstruction Finance”) that their officials would call in the state militia.
The crowds only retreated after Polk County Sheriff Broughton Biggs explained the level of
expertise required for the work. This incident underscored just how angry the Depression’s
desperate times had made Tri-State mountain workers. It was also a reminder that local folk had
little fear of organizing and arming themselves en masse when their interests appeared
threatened. They would defend what they saw as justice in their economic rights. 313
Other signs of the Depression abounded. While it would not be official for some years,
the number of persons in the county who could not pay their taxes had exploded, For the year
1931 alone, over two hundred properties went delinquent in Polk County, nearly all these went
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for auction. In many cases, the taxes owed amounted to less than ten dollars or about two days
work, but even this seemingly meager amount represented too much for scores of locals. 314
People who could not pay their taxes did not shop as much as they had in the past. Times
being what they were, it should be no real surprise that the heavily Republican merchants and
business class initially collaborated to support FDR’s actions. They had not abandoned
capitalism; they had just become desperate and so joined ranks to cheer the Blue Eagle. But, it
also seems plain that this same alliance of local businessmen saw NRA measures as a temporary
fix. “Together we are going to put this thing over” they made plain. If they had been successful
in vanquishing the depression locally all on their own it would have been an impressive feat,
together, their numbers only represented five percent of the working population. 315
As established by many historians, the enormity of the economic wound created by
international crisis was deeper and broader than any single New Deal program could handle.
Local leaders had to do something they believed and this explains why aspects of the New Deal
benefitting industry had broad support in the Copper Basin. Fannin and Polk County census
figures illustrate how the circumstances in both the farming and industrial sectors had eroded and
how tenuous any recovery actually was in spite of any optimism that might flow from an editor’s
pen. The post-war farming slump of the twenties had certainly not helped matters in a sector of
the economy that was already weak and which had only benefited a little from President
Wilson’s farm loan bills during the war. The hard-scrabble nature of so many of the tiny farms
of the region took its toll. One in ten farms in Polk were less than ten acres in size. In 1920 more
than a third of local farmers were tenants. The percentage of tenants was as high as forty-three
percent, down ten percent from the 1910 census, but by 1930 that percent had again risen above
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fifty percent. Fannin County’s number of tenants had crept up as well. With farmers making up
twenty-seven and eighteen percent of the counties’ population in the 1930s, under-employment
and hard times for them simply aggravated pressures on the total population of gainful workers.
According to the census of 1930, approximately twelve percent of Fannin County men and
fourteen percent of Polk men were underemployed (partly employed, laid off, or
unemployed). 316
But these figures may be too conservative, and thus misleading, for several reasons. The
worst part of the Depression did not hit until Fall-Winter of 1932-1933, although editorial
comments in local papers suggest that the years 1929 and 1930 had been particularly rough. In
the decade’s first few years, the biggest employer in the region, Tennessee Copper Company,
relied on a version of the stretch-out. In it TCC official reduced workers’ assigned shifts and
claimed they did so in order to keep men on the payroll, but those who remained complained that
they had to do more work to make up for the reduced crews. Few men were allowed to work
full-time, officially. 317
Despite the several extensive programs initiated in the Tri-State by New Deal legislation
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Civilian Conservation Corps, underemployment
and unemployment remained a tenacious problem. Things actually got worse for many people.
Records for 1937 show that nearly twenty percent of the male workforce in both Polk and Fannin
counties were still listed as either fully unemployed or only working part-time. The actual
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number may be higher still however, given the pride of local men and reluctance for people to
admit to their being fully unemployed. 318
The City Advance kept watch on the Blue Eagle’s attack on the Depression. In late
August 1933, the Copper City Advance reported businesses were hiring extra hands to help reap
a new consumer harvest; the hiring fortified hopes. Editor King kept up a good watch and knew
he needed to. A number of previous editors of the Copperhill news had failed to rally local
commerce and so the responsibilities of local journalism fell to new owners. 319
Apparently rallying support for a revival of business optimism even in the early New
Deal was not an easy task. For all its potential Tri-state readership, which ran into the thousands,
the Copperhill newspaper appears to have been always just on the edge of going bust in the early
thirties. Editors tried various methods to at once promote business and relay the news while
turning a profit. Success was fleeting. Clarion calls by Copperhill newspaper editors during the
first years of the crisis had tried to warn readers away from destructive pessimism that would
drag the country down further still. “Down with Depression” heckled one editor while another
commanded readers recognize their duty. “Now was the time to spend” he said illogically, the
ongoing banking and underemployment crises notwithstanding. 320
When the economy first began to contract so severely, the editor of the Copperhill paper,
Fred Sheets, believed the attack on consumer confidence to be as dangerous as any invading
force. Sheets had seen little to hope for after the 1930 election failed to change local
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representation. He put a new onus onto Copperhill’s citizens to change their fortunes stating
flatly that they must take matters into their own hands and decide their own fate among the
possibilities. Sheets was not supporting any particular candidate or even any particular protocol
beyond calling upon readers to take a personal interest in better their own lives; the responsibility
for economic recovery lay at their own feet: “Prosperity is [now] up for election, running to
overthrow depression…. It’s time for the people to decide which will be chosen.” Sheets’ charge
failed to energize local consumer spirits in spite of his impressive credentials—he held
membership in the East Tennessee Press Association, the Tennessee Press Association and
(“since 1930”) the National Editorial Association. The editor’s boosterism and barking did little
more than scold readers. Local consumption consumerism alone was not going to fix the
problem of the Depression—and most readers knew this. Shortly after Sheets’ notice, the
Copperhill paper (then known as simply The Copperhill News) got “new management.” 321
The paper changed its name in 1933 to the Copper City Advance and with the new name
came a new, more vigorous spirit to promote “the development of various resources of Polk
County.” This was when Don King took over management of Copperhill City Advance. a
position he held until Spring 1933. Assisted by Mrs. M.C. King, Don King engaged local
businessmen to fight the depression and instructed the populace on Roosevelt Administration
beliefs that inflation might be the cure for the economy. Unfortunately, the editorial team’s
upbeat mood and Don King’s hard work rallying local businessmen failed to bring in revenue
substantial enough for him to hold onto the paper and editorship changed once again. 322
Mr. R.E. Cross, of Clayton, Georgia took over publication in June 1933 and held the
paper through summer and fall. It is clear from his editorials that he realized the winds buffeting
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the Copper Basin’s industrial works hailed from far, far away. Administration experimentation
with the economy was a necessary evil, Cross argued, and collaborative action across industry
and at home would also be necessary. Patriotism and collective action would now be a single
gesture, led by the president. It was Cross who oversaw the business community’s embrace of
the NRA in the summer of 1933. His August report on the success of the NRA in the Basin
among merchants was as vague as it was selectively optimistic, focusing mostly on
developments at the local A & P while claiming other businesses were experiencing “steady…
considerable… improving… increases.” Cross appeared to be an avid New Dealer, but his
editorials held contradictions: He trumpeted support for the New Deal, but made clear his
opposition to business regulation; his concern for workers’ safety reflected Taylorism rather than
any humanitarian concern. Government need not regulate safety he claimed; instead he argued
safety was an inside job and the accident prone had to change their ways. For all his organizing
of the local business community to support the NRA codes, Cross failed to garner necessary
revenue and the paper slipped from his hands.323
Just before Christmas 1933 a man familiar with captaining the Twin-cities’ paper
returned to its Copperhill helm. Frank L. Middleton, lately of Athens Tennessee, had worked for
Fred Sheets. This all around “general-newspaper man” brought his considerable experiences to
as a former printer and linotype operator. Precocious in the business, he held a state record by
being an editor and a publisher by age sixteen at the Byromville, Georgia Herald. Calling
himself a “South Georgia man” in his greeting to his readers, he was, he reminded them, “by no
means a stranger to the Copper Basin, having lived here for years.” Middleton and his wife had
a young son and thus understood the challenges endured by many local families during the hard
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times. But the couple intended to expand reportage during the crises, not allow it to limit them.
They wanted to report on the news of the day beyond the difficult developments of the
Depression. Mrs. Middleton announced she wanted to expand the society pages; the addition
would highlight the considerable life and activities goings on about the Basin in spite of the
downturn’s hardships. The couple also expanded sports coverage in the City Advance. Local
people took to the Middletons and the paper prospered; the couple kept control of the Copper
City Advance through the Second World War, refreshing the look of the weekly early in the war.
Throughout the period, the editorial stance of the paper remained true: It supported government
programs that helped the extraction, smelting, munitions, and chemical industry, local commerce
and in turn the general citizenry of the Copper Basin. 324
By Christmas 1933 things were looking up enough in the Basin, with the passage of New
Deal legislation and the accompanying sense of optimism, that Frank Middleton was able to
report that local consumers had been opening their wallets and purses for some impressive
holiday shopping. Local holiday business had shown a big increase over 1932 with “more than
$10,000 spent” just the Saturday before Christmas. Middleton gave a lot of the credit for the
revival to the influence of $4,000 in weekly payroll streaming in from local Civilian Works
Administration projects. Several local towns experienced similar boosts in commerce, some
with increases as high as thirty to forty percent greater over 1932 figures. 325
Meanwhile, beyond the red hills of the Basin, John Shamblin and his wife Eula put out
the The Polk County News from the county seat in Benton, Tennessee. 326 The News was a much
more conservative organ than the Copper City Advance. Except for support of the Civilian
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Conservation Corp, under Shamblin’s leadership, the paper remained a strident critic of the New
Deal and stood as an advocate for often reactionary positions into the forties. Every issue held
political cartoons on the front page, often by Nat Collier, that drummed home the message that
the New Deal was part of a march toward socialism and communism—ideologies Shamblin
never tried to distinguish. Indeed the paper conflated communism, socialism, “John L. Lewisism,” closed shop advocates, officials of the National Labor Relations Board, taxation, deficit
spending, and sundry government regulators, regulations, and officials. Shamblin’s editorials,
augmented by Collier’s cartoons and the editor’s selection of imported special features
highlighted an ongoing menace. If left unchecked, Shamblin warned, this collection of
ideologies, institutions, and personalities advanced by the New Deal and its advocates threatened
the liberties of decent, right-thinking people. The editorial tenor of the PCN anticipated the
reactionary opposition to the New Deal set in many Southern county seats as observed by
George Tindall. Fearful of policies that threatened their ancient hegemony, county elites, Tindal
argued, resisted efforts that eroded their control of “property, labor, credit, and local
government.” 327
Though holding at times contradictory positions through the thirties and forties, Polk
County editors did not engage in an editorial war. In fact, while both papers were quick to report
labor trouble neither paper supported the CIO-movement or were willing to report on the many
alleged instances of police brutality, company exploitation and intimidation, or the dire economic
circumstances endured by many Copper Basin workers.

Tennessee Copper Company in the Depression: a model Lewisohn subsidiary
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In the twenties and thirties rationalizing schemes adopted by many non-ferrous firms
combined investment in new technologies with pragmatic scientific management. At the
Tennessee Copper Company rational transformation had included better use of the Basin’s lowgrade ores and production of “blue stone” copper sulphate used in the manufacture of
agricultural chemicals. Parent company Tennessee Corporation had set up a guaranteed
customer for TCC blue stone by establishing Southern Agricultural Works adjacent to the
Atlantic Steel Works in Atlanta. 328
Despite logical advantages to rationalization, when the strategy was extended to the
possibilities for associationalism, non-ferrous companies were far more resistant. In fact,
competitors regularly damaged domestic markets through development of their overseas
reserves. The American Bureau of Metals Statistics reported that development of foreign
reserves in late summer 1931 led to new highs in refined copper stocks from South America
despite cuts in domestic output. A meeting in Brussels the following December among some of
the most important world producers resulted in a 26% reduction to maximum production
capacity. Limiting the effectiveness of such international “agreements” were self-serving moves
by major domestic and some foreign producers to circumvent production quotas established by
the (relatively weak) international Copper Exporters cartel. Phelps Dodge Corporation for
instance managed to get an exemption for certain “individual producers” which permitted them
to “sell at prices lower than the established quotation.” 329
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There is no indication Tennessee Corporation let alone Tennessee Copper would partake
in this kind of an exemption. Nor did parent company Tennessee Corporation participate
directly in overseas development beyond selling. However, the Lewisohns’ proactive expansion
into the chemicals markets likely saved TCC from the fate of many small companies in the early
thirties who had fewer customers. Rationalization at TCC through implementation of the
Lewisohn-Houser’s work regimens served as an additional bulwark against the onslaught of the
first waves of the depression in 1930, but could not hold back some over-wash during the worst
years of the storm, hence the provocation for the TCC’s use of the stretch-out. Although
managers referred to this policy as “spreading employment,” the result was a four-day work
week and some reduction in workers’ wages, though the exact amount is unclear in the records.
Ducktown Basin workers began to suffer greatly, but at least many of them had a job. 330
To stem the debilitating effect of foreign stocks on domestic markets, Sam A. Lewisohn
directed Tennessee Corporation vice president Emory H. Westlake to speak to corporate
shareholders about the desperate circumstances foreign producers forced upon their domestic
competition. The speech was typical of those given in an industry-wide campaign by domestic
producers to get Congress to approve protective tariffs. Claiming the non-ferrous industry and
copper producers were on the brink of catastrophe, Westlake described how the state of Arizona
was just about to go bust owing to reductions in copper company tax revenues. He then outlined
how outsized foreign reserves threatened whole communities of Americans. His portrait of the
situation existing in the Copper Basin did not resound with strains of defiant corporate greed or
arrogant exploitation, but instead as comments by one who had to direct painful decisions that
affected the fate of workers under his employ.
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“For thirty-three years [in the Copper Basin] the Tennessee Corporation has been
able to give steady employment to their workmen and a settled community has grown up
with permanent investments in all the modern necessities of a prosperous American
community. The new low price of copper and lack of purchasing power of the farmer
have compelled us to greatly decrease the scale of operations and to reduce the number of
men employed in Southeastern Tennessee and Northern Georgia. Despite our best efforts,
many families have been deprived of their accustomed earnings and the community is
suffering from unemployment.” 331
Westlake went on to argue for at least a five cent-a-pound import tax on copper because
most producers could survive only if the price rose to 9-10 cents per pound. “People in the East
do not realize that the clamor for an import tax on foreign copper has reached the proportion of a
crusade, “ he concluded, “people facing want and destitution are looking to Congress for aid in
their great distress.”
Westlake’s speech and others like it got lawmakers to act; Congress imposed a four cent
import tax “but only on copper brought into the US for purposes of consumption (as opposed to
copper brought in for refining and reshipment to Europe).” 332 Foreign buying of copper
increased for a time “in anticipation of the tariff’s implementation.”333 The brief turnaround gave
some optimists proof that a recovery in the domestic markets was in the making. Sam A.
Lewisohn was among those who heralded an end to the depression. He declared in late 1932 that
“in spite of our large American stocks and the disorganized foreign market [no doubt referring to
the Copper Exporters cartel], copper is undoubtedly at the beginning of an era of recovery.”
Lewisohn even went so far as to declare that perhaps the severe downturn had been a good thing
for producers and the nation’s economy: “Necessity is the mother of invention and in this age of
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electricity the depression is prodding our engineers and inventors to use their ingenuity to find
new uses for electrical devices…. Copper will share in that increase.” 334
Lewisohn’s prophecy was over-optimistic. Once prices stabilized after the
implementation of the four cent tax, “imports resumed their competitive threat.” 335 It would take
NRA production quotas to rein in production. For about thirteen months these quotas held, but
fears among the largest producers that the quotas would limit them if recovery returned, severely
hampered any real rationalization of production across the industry. So copper went up and
down even as it began to recover. That said, since copper markets did not enjoy the quick and
robust recovery hoped for, much of the good fortune the Lewisohns achieved with Tennessee
Corporation and TCC came from a diversified use of the Basin’s resources. 336
The Copper City Advance grasped for whatever good news about the non-ferrous
industry might come its way. An August 1933 headline declared with enthusiasm, “Copper is
Coming Back!” 337 The improvement was the bounce experienced in many commodities markets
owing to effects of the New Deal and investor optimism, but the article gave credit elsewhere.
Improvements in the copper markets reflected actions taken by the nation’s largest producers, the
editor dutifully reported. More incentive was needed though to improve the markets and make
them stable. Opined the paper, “the mining states [need to do] everything in their power through
friendly legislative and tax policies to help the industry readjust itself to changed conditions.”
The paper reiterated its support for protective tariffs. Interestingly, in light of all the recent local
excitement over the NRA codes among the business class, little was said about national
producers’ struggle to establish workable production codes. Perhaps this was because word had
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gotten back to the Basin from Washington that the copper producers were making a hash of the
NRA code negotiations. Certainly the dissolution of the Copper Exporters cartel underscored
producers’ inability to resolve the problem of excess stockpiles. 338
Copper markets and improvements owed to several developments: increasing overseas
demand, the embrace by most domestic producers of NRA production codes, additional domestic
need created through the effect of Public Works Administration and naval projects and expanded
domestic use of copper for homes, automobiles, and appliances. Embrace of the NRA codes was
important because it signaled a new willingness on the part of producers to cooperate to save
their industry. Companies signed onto the new NRA price and production codes, codes which
admonished producers to remain committed to federally mandated association: “No member of
the industry shall engage in destructive price cutting.” By the summer of 1934 “virtually [the]
entire industry” had agreed to a 9-cent per pound price for copper by limiting production. A
“rising tide” of consumption commenced and domestic stock levels dropped 450 thousand tons
in a year a half. “Profits Replace Losses in Copper” extolled one jubilant report. The good news
provided proof that the NRA codes benefitted industry; still, most industry leaders chose to
benefit from the codes and keep silent on the issue of quotas because they remained
uncomfortable working together. Copperman and industry leader R.H. Houston did not. He
joined the few who praised the codes and claimed that their existence would assist the United
States into leading “the greatest prosperity ever known.” 339
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TCC benefitted from other developments in the thirties. New Deal agricultural programs
helped farmers, encouraged the use of non-ferrous based agricultural chemicals and thus helped
TCC’s bottom line. Perhaps even more important though were expanding demands for copper
overseas. Aggressive military buildups by imperial Japan and Hitler’s Germany increased
tensions abroad that provoked a rush among nations to expand their defenses. These actions
sucked up a lot of foreign metals stocks. US copper producers representing “virtually the entire
industry” relied on NRA copper prices and production quotas until the U.S. Supreme Court
declared the program unconstitutional. Industry did not return to completely to its old ways in the
wake of this judgment. Producers established a new, more disciplined foreign copper cartel that
managed production levels. Meanwhile, military rearmament continued through the thirties by
the most aggressive nations. As a result of all this, the price of copper never dropped below 9
cents a pound for the rest of the thirties, but this was just a few pennies above production cost.
So, overall it was not a very good decade for any producers, especially for those who were
limited in their production array. Non-ferrous business scholar Thomas Navins commented that
“managing a copper company during the Great Depression must have been a dismaying
experience. All the major forces bearing down on the industry were beyond anyone’s control.” 340
Given these conditions, TCC’s experience is distinguished all the more and underscores
the wisdom of the Lewisohns’ choice to diversify. Even in bad times then they could expand
their holdings. Tennessee Copper Company operators managed to use the relative weakness of
its last major competitor, Ducktown Chemical & Iron—the former Ducktown, Sulphur,
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Chemical & Iron (DSCI)—to finish consolidation of the Basin’s non-ferrous and ferrous
extraction and production. The irony of the outcome was that earlier in the century, it had been
TCC that lagged behind the technological advance of its old Isabella rival. But, poorly
negotiated war-contracts had weakened DSCI’s position in the Copper Basin. By the mid-1920s,
“7.000 acres of land, mines, and mining equipment” owned by Ducktown Sulphur, Copper &
Iron had been sold for $5 million to a Delaware firm by its London founders. Reorganized in
1925 as Ducktown Chemical & Iron Company (DCI), the firm’s new investors had plans to
expand production of iron sinter to take advantage of the Chattanooga metals industry which had
formerly purchased iron sinter at Cincinnati and other points. DCI wanted to “supply local
foundries and consumer of pig iron.”—and to follow TCC’s example. 341
Within a couple years of this change, DCI absorbed the smaller Copper Pyrites Company
in Ducktown, a merger that brought “two-thirds of the copper land in the Basin under one
control, the other third being owned by (then) Tennessee Copper and Chemical Company”
(TCC). 342 Tennessee Copper Chief Clerk R.E. Barclay later stated. “There was a period of some
four or five years following these events when the outlook for the Isabella [firm] was probably
never brighter.” 343 The problem for DCI was that despite its ownership of more land than
Tennessee Copper it was in much worse financial shape. Agreements with federal and local
authorities as to what would be the legal amount of toxic emissions had not gone in DCI’s favor;
damages from emissions were still draining company coffers. The firm had also never fully
recovered from getting unfavorable acid contracts during the Great War and fallen behind its
rivals who garnered much better wartime profits. Furthermore, a distracting circumstance in the
early 1920s led the company to protest against a local electrical utility merger that DCI officials
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believed would negatively affect their profit margins. There’s no evidence that TCC
management found the merger a problem. In the end DCI lost its fight against the merger, but the
episode’s real effect was to highlight DCI’s vulnerability to changes in local utilities markets;
failure to influence the deal stood as more proof of the firm’s loss of clout in the region. Details
are scarce as to the exact financial concoctions weakening this firm, but corporate reports in the
early 1930s show DCI was hemorrhaging. Apparently, instead of concentrating on new
innovations and developing its managerial and workers’ skills owner decided to engage in a lot
of the complex, speculative tricks all too common in the New Era. DCI’ annual losses grew to
the hundreds of thousands of dollars and unlike TCC, DCI was not able to rely on diversified
markets to ease the catastrophe of the Depression or on the kind of creative and proactive
management that had gotten through the difficult years in the early 1900s. 344
Other matters were operational and concerned Isabella’s notorious labor relations.
Barclay had little good to say about the management, owners, or accountants of DCI or DSCI for
the last two decodes of the Isabella firm’s existence. When owned by the British the firm had
never treated its workers with adequate respect; when taken over by an American investment
group, the firm suffered from ownership by men who engaged in dismissive treatment of the
workers and financial “hi-jinks” that R.E. Barclay called a kind of “pyramiding of ownership.”
What he meant by these remarks it seems was that DCI owners were involved in some shady
creative accounting of assets that finally could no longer be sustained: holding companies within
holding companies all owned by the same men. In the end, the company had come to have little
real value as a player in the field except to disguise improper management. DCI’s compromised
fiscal circumstances forced the Isabella firm to first sell its prized Fontana, North Carolina mine
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to TCC (the discovery of this mine had been a local sensation just a few years before). Then the
early thirties dealt a mortal blow to DCI’s bottom line; not even its sales of iron sinter could save
the company from being absorbed. For about ten years Barclay said, rumors of TCC acquiring
the old Isabella firm had made the rounds in business circles. It would not have been a huge
purchase. DCI and its production facilities were never large; average employment stood by the
mid-1930s at about four hundred persons. Actually, the biggest risk for TCC in acquiring the
Isabella works was the scar on its labor force. Accounting and depreciation schemes could
handle obsolete technologies, necessary renovations, and salvages; it was the unstable labor
relations of Isabella that might cause the most harm in any acquisition. DSCI and later DCI
management had had always held onto the kind of rigid, anti-labor attitude that the Lewisohns
considered reactionary. 345
Meanwhile, Tennessee Copper had been gobbling up smaller mine companies around the
Copper Basin. The firm had the power and financial clout of the Lewisohns investment group in
Tennessee Corporation to make it all happen. In 1936, with the assistance of additional
capitalization granted through the issuance of $1.6 million in fifteen-year, six percent debenture
bonds, Tennessee Copper Company acquired Ducktown Chemical & Iron. Its workers no doubt
cheered being saved by a company whose pay scales they had often held up as a measure of
decent pay in the Basin, one run by relatively benevolent operators. But to management, the
DCI purchase resembled necessary surgery; the patient, by this point, was only the remnants of a
once considerable rival. R.E. Barclay tended in his journal to dismiss the mostly redundant
works at Isabella as simply “that place.” 346
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Lewisohn influence on industrial management and TCC
Further investigation into the Lewisohn investment group that owned Tennessee
Corporation and TCC provides a fuller understanding of the difficulties in placing them within
any reactionary camp of industrialists. Sam A. Lewisohn had followed his father and uncle into
the non-ferrous business after graduating from Princeton. Patriarch of what came to be known as
Adolph Lewisohn & Sons (“the Lewisohn Group”), father Adolph Lewisohn and his brother
Leonard moved into copper mining in the late 1880s and for a time the team was part of the
powerful set of early copper barons who established the greatest of the non-ferrous firms. The
Lewisohn were present, for instance, at the establishment of American Smelting and Refining
Company (ASARCO) in the late 1890s and over time sold considerable mining interests to
Anaconda Copper. Aggressive takeovers of many of their properties (not-atypical in this most
competitive of commodities businesses) moved the Lewisohn into the second tier of copper
mining and smelting firms; Guggenheims, Phelps-Dodge, Calumet & Hecla and other more
powerful interests established themselves as the first division of copper companies in the first
decades of the century. Still, by attending to the refining and selling of copper in Europe and
concentrating on developing their operations, the Lewisohns came to oversee a considerable
collection of works and held a respected voice in the industry. 347
Their most extensive holdings lay at Miami mine, Arizona and in the Copper Basin, but
they had significant holdings at smelters in New Jersey and production facilities in Atlanta and
substantial foreign interests through the South American Gold and Platinum Company. Ore
qualities at both the Arizona and Tennessee locations were low; however the Lewisohns made
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the best of this fact by relying on smelters and shared-interest customers that could process such
ore into multiple products. In Tennessee, as has been said, the Lewisohns directed an aggressive
move by TCC into the agricultural chemicals business. Eventually their TCC works alone
produced some thirty-six different products ranging from non-ferrous metals and derivatives to
iron sinter. 348
Adolph Lewisohn remained the key executive officer in the group until his son took over
officially in 1938, but it appears that Sam had been effectively in charge since the twenties. Both
father and son set fine examples as philanthropists renowned for their extensive gifts to
educational, medical, penal, religious, and artistic institutions: Just a short list of their gifts is
impressive: $300,000 to Columbia University’s School of Mines, construction of the 6,000-seat
Lewisohn Stadium and sponsorship of much-acclaimed and subsidized concerts in that
colonnaded arena through the mid-century; $300,000 to Mount Sinai Hospital, an impressive
German library and art collection to New York City College that included early editions of
Goethe’s works; and “hundreds of unrecorded” artistic and philanthropic gestures by father and
son which further distinguished them. “I love the beautiful,” wrote Lewisohn. 349
In the realm of civic life, Adolph had “worked ceaselessly for improvement in prison
conditions” at Sing Sing and Auburn prisons and stood on commissions directing the use of
public lands to assist the poor. For all these contributions and many more, the Mayor of the City
of New York, John F. Hylan gave Adolph Lewisohn, then 70, “a large American flag in
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recognition of his patriotic and public services.” 350 Not immodest about his contributions
Adolph Lewisohn said of his role in business and society,
“Whatever I have undertaken has been successful… there have been difficulties, but I
have been able to overcome them. My aim in life has always been to do something that in
my opinion makes an improvement in the world or in the people, to improve the
condition of people in all the different walks of life, according to my opinion.” 351
Lewisohn’s philanthropic work in the prison system provides insight into how Adolph
Lewisohn intended his workers be treated. He demanded prison labor be paid fair wages “so that
the delinquents would not lose their self-respect and he continually worked for hygienic
conditions in the penal institutions of the country.” 352
Sam Lewisohn’s contributions to the civic and artistic realms of New York life continued
after the death of his father. Though his work, characterized as “magnanimity of spirit,” was cut
short by a fatal heart attack in 1951, Sam Lewisohn had long since developed a reputation as a
businessman “tolerat[ing] no pettiness or triviality, no pretense, no pompousness about place or
power.” For thirty-five years, like his father, he gave enormous sums of money and energy to
help orphans, prevent juvenile delinquency, and comfort and improve the lives of the mentally
ill. 353
Concurrent to establishing all this public goodwill Sam Lewisohn earned a reputation
during the Roosevelt Administration for being a “statesmen of industry,” a term used to describe
those business leaders whose approach to business and labor relations as took a “long view,
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instead of a short cut.” United States Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Ernest G. Draper
declared Sam Lewisohn among industry’s statesmen. Draper considered Lewisohn part of a
select few industrial capitalists who exhibited the kind of attention to employee needs and
generosity in public service that would “engage in enriching the many as well as reward the
few.” In Draper’s eyes these were qualities too many corporate owners and managers had
neglected prior to the Great Depression. Lewisohn corporate non-ferrous and chemical product
was well known and the Lewisohns used their clout and reputation as industry leaders in product
development, management protocols and philanthropy to land some very fine government
contracts; government financing that accompanied these allowed the Lewisohn Group to further
develop its holdings. 354
Just how good a friend to the New Deal was Sam A. Lewisohn? It depended on the
subject. Lewisohn had, for instance, been selected by FDR himself to participate on a team to
formulate “recommendations for social insurance” considerations that led to the development of
Social Security. But this friend of the New Deal was no radical-left member of the Popular
Front. Regarding the Social Security Act, though he had some problems with it in its final form
he did not publically condemn it. On many other issues of the day, his opinions reflect
commonly held conservative notions. For instance, Lewisohn argued against a regular or
permenant distribution of a direct dole to the unemployed believing such a regimen threatened
the character of good men and could lead to inflationary pressure in labor markets. Nor, he
stated, should any unemployment insurance be solely overseen by the government; instead
Lewisohn advocated that the public establish a trust paid for by bonds that could be called upon
for a rainy day. As for other aspects of the New Deal, this study found no direct mention by
Lewisohn on his opinions of the considerable influence of the TVA and the CCC on the labor
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markets in the Tri-State, but it would not be too difficult to speculate what he might say based
upon other comments he had made. Lewisohn agreed with New Dealers that there was a place
for government-run public works projects, but only as a necessary evil owing to the emergency;
they should not be a regular feature of the economy, because again, they were inflationary and
pulled good workers away from industry. 355
A summation of Sam A. Lewisohn’s considerable public comment on subjects relevant to
industrial relations illustrates how he built on his father’s embrace of science and technology to
move the business forward. It is important to note that in their public comments about industrial
management the Lewisohns always put people before profit. Adolph Lewisohn had argued that
all work in establishing solid and respectable industrial and labor relations was for the greater
good of society. The goal was to secure better pay for workers while simultaneously earning a
good profit. Toward that end the Lewisohn brand of corporate management relied on the
incorporation of scientific management into production regimens reliant on the latest mining and
processing technologies. Sam Lewisohn said in various address and reports from the Great War
era forward that in light of the logistical difficulties inherent in modern corporate ownership,
managerial organizations must not only include “specialized… technically equipped managers”
(capable of maintaining and improving plant and production technology), but must also include a
professional, college-trained, personnel department. The latter was a new addition for many
firms in the twenties. Lewisohn demanded that his personnel department be staffed by men
trained in “enlightened” communications skills, building on sociological observations just then
coming into vogue at the nation’s major universities. This new class of personnel managers was
to then to listen to and be pro-active in respecting workers’ needs. Old-fashioned, dictatorial
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management models had to go. Lewisohn understood that expensive production problems and a
waste of human resources provoked by “insensitive” management had been especially bad in
mining; as a result, strikes, violence, sabotage, and slowdowns had been regular features of the
industry.
“When put in charge of plants, such [reactionary] men resist the introduction of modern
methods in handling labor and even though they finally consent to an employment
manager being put in charge, they do not give him the proper support or encouragement
and are inclined to be obstructive….even if they are willing, it is difficult for them to
cooperate intelligently.” 356

As to the issue of wages, Lewisohn argued against national, “living” wage standards by
insisting that the statistical data employed to argue for such regimens failed to consider the
particularities of local labor markets. If used improperly to set national wage schemes, the
practice would allow reactionary, free-market “extremist” critics to attack the wages with “quack
economic theories.” The data used to determine national wages, he argued tended to assess cost
of living expenditures based on expensive urban centers of the East. To set “living wages” on
these figures would place “false hopes” into the public mind and raise unrealistic expectations.
Lewisohn stated time and again that wages need to be considerable and substantial, but that they
had to be determined based upon the particular skill set of the workers and the wage levels
earned in local farming sectors. Often his suggestions, while sounding humane and reasonable,
were vague in their notions and susceptible to self-interested interpretation. Living wages, he
said, should be capable of supporting a “decent life” for workers and represent a level “every
enlightened person desires that a workman should have.” There is no direct evidence to sustain
allegations that Sam Lewisohn’s rhetoric was merely a cynical attempt to raise false specters
which he could then use to keep wages lower at his own facilities and thus allow for more funds
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to support his notable philanthropy. Granted, the costs of “doing good” can be considerable.
Wage levels at TCC, though only average for the non-ferrous industry as a whole, were higher
than most Tri-State industrial or farming wages. But it is clear from the record that Lewisohn
did not support wage schemes determined only through what he called “the haggling [sic] of the
market.” Good wages, wages that respected workers’ skills levels in a particular labor market
had to have input from enlightened businessmen, civic leaders and workers’ advocates.
Otherwise wage regimens failed to do the public good. 357

Sam Lewisohn’s reputation for progressivism on labor relations among Washington and
Wall Street’s elite did not temper his aversion however to industrial unions. His attitudes
allowed TCC to embrace a surprisingly reactionary response to the CIO movement and the
company made pragmatic use of New Deal institutions to secure a more conservative union.
Lewisohn-influenced corporate management simultaneously employed a progressive program of
civic responsibility and a cutting-edge use of public media to shape a positive corporate image in
the Tri-State. A comparison of TCC policies and actions to much more reactionary anti-union
efforts taken by other copper companies, places TCC managers into a group scholar Howell John
Harris described “the Realists” These “realists” were firms where management was “compelled
to accept unionism as a fact, often after strong opposition,” but did so “reluctantly, under
pressure, and with ill grace.” Realist owners and management “were acutely conscious of the
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union as an infringement upon their power, and supported political action to amend public
policy, and propaganda to reorient public opinion.” 358
In the Copper Basin, Lewisohn’s ideas about proper management determined TCC’s
choice to stand behind the AFL, but only because the company saw the CIO movement as the
worst of two evils. To its credit TCC’s labor relations policies appeared far less anti-union than
those taken by companies such as Phelps-Dodge and Ford Motor Company during the early
thirties. Once labor relations were settled TCC used the union to maintain industrial peace and
lifted wages on a regular basis as markets allowed. But TCC’s actions also reflected the rising
conservative tide that Harris identified as setting in as the New Deal’s power appeared to wane in
the 1937-38 recession and as labor’s “window of opportunity was slowly being shut”; the latter
resulted in part from efforts by a coalition of “resolutely anti-labor Republicans and southern
Democrats” who were determined to shut down powerful labor and New Deal programs that
threatened their power. TCC’s reaction was however neither complete nor swift. Nor did it
herald a full resurrection of twenties’-style anti-unionism. National belligerency towards unions
among industrialists faded in one company after another after the Supreme Court upheld the
Wagner Act’s protections on organizing and collective bargaining rights and as the war economy
empower government’s oversight of labor contracts. But management teams increasingly
demanded that unions be responsible, bureaucratized, and no longer part of a revolutionary
vanguard. 359
Reflecting the Lewisohn brand of industrial relations, the company used to its advantage
a continuation of pragmatic scientific management whenever it could, advanced production
regimes, expanded product diversification and shrewdly manipulated the media—both directly
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and indirectly. As a result TCC worked within the new order established by the New Deal but
on its terms, not those dictated by a union. 360
Signs of the owners’ influence upon company policy exist in several kinds of sources:
company reports, newspapers and periodical articles, and observations made by federal agencies,
such as reports of the National Labor Relations and reports made by social observers
investigating Copper Basin labor relations. Comments made by TCC Assistant General Manager
T.A. Mitchell as he looked back across twenty years of labor relations provided one summation
of Lewisohn influence. Mitchell outlined key aspects of the employee representative plan
established at TCC by J.N. Houser (at Lewisohn’s directive) in the mid-1920s; the plan remained
a central component of the company’s welfare capitalism. Mitchell recounted it had been “the
practice to hold frequent meetings with large groups of our employees [wherein] those attending
… were selected from all departments.” Houser “would discuss the company’s program and any
subjects of interest, including wage rate changes” All communication with management went
through crew superintendents and [the newly established] Personnel Department.“ Mitchell
concluded the result of this new system meant that workers could always find satisfaction if
disgruntled because “the manager’s door was always open.” 361
Interestingly, a most important aspect of Houser’s employee representative plan,
supervisory oversight of safety training, remained a part of the company’s organization of its
crews even after the return so-called independent unionism in the early thirties.

Company
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superintendent on operating staff that “maintained the mines, machinery and equipment in good
condition.” In a similar fashion, after mass meetings wherein management disseminated general
policies, selected foremen or mine engineers coordinated the aforementioned safety program by
training small crews of 4-6 men in proper safety protocol. 362
Reliance on crew heads and specialized tradesmen to coordinate work and training was
not uncommon in industry; management often used such men to assist in organizing the
workforce. But even though the use of skilled tradesmen to organize and supervise had been
increasing, other trends in industry were limiting job opportunities. The Lewisohn insistence
that the latest in technological processes be implemented had its costs. Assessments by the Work
Projects Administration on the interwar transformation of the copper industry confirmed that
rapid technological change embraced by operators cut opportunities for skilled workmen;
meanwhile the number of unskilled positions rose. The change frustrated men working in copper
mining and smelting who just a generation before could rely on a strong set of skills to provide
them leverage in negotiating wages. Now they saw their negotiating power eroded as companies
embraced the newer processes. 363
Lewisohn influence on J.N. Houser can be observed through the general manager’s
response to TCC workers’ choices in union representation in the thirties and forties and were
plain in the record. The company preferred the conservative American Federation of Labor over
any union allied with the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The Federation’s historic support
for organizational hierarchy controlled by powerful tradesmen and its “pure and simple”
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volunteerism did not threaten company labor relations prerogatives as did the industrial unionism
promoted by the CIO. Lewisohn’s ideas about what defined proper labor relations clearly
informed his Copperhill management team. This proved important because while the AFL
harnessed regional anti-communist feeling, it was company actions that determined the outcome
of an internecine war in TCC’s rank-and-file. Company financing of police authorities and
regular managerial and supervisory acceptance of on-the-job worker intimidation assisted in
neutralizing the CIO movement in the Copper Basin. So while Sam A. Lewisohn could outline
in broad terms progressive industrial and labor relations schemes before the public or through
articles in major social scientific and industrial periodicals of the day—and he had been doing
since the Great War era—it was the actions of his management team at Copperhill that
determined just how those policies would be implemented.
Those actions did not exactly put the lie to Lewisohn’s rhetoric, but they did show some
essentially conservative intentions. They thus resemble other historic nexuses where the rhetoric
of celebrated captains of industry who outlined progressive labor relations tended to diverge
from their own corporate actions toward workers. Lewisohn was no reactionary. His company
did not fight the return of unionism just as it had never fought unionism when he was owner of
Tennessee Copper. But Lewisohn’s general manager, J.N. Houser, as described, had in fact
neutralized union activity in the twenties by providing a more reliable and effective alternative
through a very successful welfare capitalism combined with rational management scheme.
However Houser had done so in an era when the leadership of the major non-ferrous unions
suffered from petty infighting and, so distracted, failed to keep up with new worker needs. 364
The labor policies implemented at TCC during the 1930s underscored several areas
where management refused to allow unions or other outside institutions to intervene too much:
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wages, job assignment and training. Never fully acquiescent to the mandate given by New Deal
legislation to the new National Labor Relations Board, TCC management and supervisory staff
stalled and complained about NLRB decisions when these were determined to be not to the
company’s advantage. Likewise the same cadre at TCC used the Labor Board when it needed to
install a conservative union, a union upon which management could rely on to refrain from
interfering with the protocols employed in the Houser safety and training crews.
A most important qualification on the influence of the Lewisohns on the Tennessee
Copper Company is in order, lest Sam A. Lewisohn be described in an ahistorical manner as a
micro-manager. There is no evidence of any kind of that TCC General Manager J.N. Houser
was Sam A. Lewisohn’s shill or that Lewisohn had a great deal to do with any day-to-day
matters that lay before Houser and his team in the Copper Basin. In fact, the record do not reveal
a single instance where Lewisohn came to the Copper Basin for even a short visit to the
properties. Money, influence, and opinion he sent, yes, but Lewisohn himself stayed out of the
Old Red Scar. As corporate owner and executive officer Lewisohn was certainly made aware of
some of the more questionable actions Houser took to route the CIO from Ducktown and
Isabella, but if he disagreed with Houser’s actions nothing in the records confirms this. He was,
as he had once described himself to be, an absentee owner, but not a wholly disinterested one.
Therefore, Sam A. Lewisohn shaped the parameters of corporate standards, but he appears to
have let the final forms and specifics of policy up to Houser, his trusted, enlightened, rational
manager, to the staff of the Personnel Department, and supervisors over workers at the
Tennessee Copper Company.

Radical miners vs. conservative tradesmen

212
Revived in the 1930s, the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers,
naturally gravitated to the CIO movement’s promotion of industrial organizing within the
Federation. The 1937 Supreme Court decision supporting the constitutionality of collective
bargaining measures in the Wagner Act further emboldened the union. Whereas in many areas
of the far west where Mine, Mill’s reputation was one of intense radicalism associated with
violent disagreements between polemic conservative and leftist workers, Copper Basin workers
who had called Mine, Mill to organize locals during the Great War had not had this experience.
The reputation of the union may have helped it secure written contracts with Tennessee Copper
Company in 1919 through 1922. 365 Scholar Vernon Jensen argued that similar success at other
sites owed to Mine, Mill locals’ establishment “in virgin territory,” in places where the union
did yet have a long history of antagonism with workers in a given labor market. 366
As the union regained it footing in the thirties memories of the substantial pay hikes once
garnered by the union excited the ambitions of Mine, Mill rank-and-file. Pay hikes in the late
1910s at some locales had been as much as 34.6% pre-war levels; for salaried men the increase
was as high as 116.5%. Mine, Mill understood that the economic climate had changed
dramatically from the heady days of the First World War—the amount of contract work in the
domestic non-ferrous industry had increased by 515% during the Great War—but its leadership
wanted to take advantage of the new legal protections for collective bargaining established under
the New Deal. Mine, Mill recruitment took off; men flooded into the revived union across the
nation. The number of Mine, Mill locals expanded from “a few weak [mostly Montana-based]
locals” with a “skeleton crew of officers” often using their own funds, to twenty-eight within
months of the passage of the NIRA. It would be some years before the ranks of the union
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swelled into the tens of thousands, but in the Copper Basin a Mine, Mill “committee from the
mines and flotation plant” at Ducktown was fully functioning by November 1933 and by the
following April, “a Copperhill local was ready to do business.” Soon the union forged a joint
council to consolidate negotiations with TCC. 367
During the first years of the New Deal the labor relations between the Tennessee Copper
Company and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers appeared generally
peaceful and productive. But this accord depended on a combination of circumstances, none of
which remained stable in this tumultuous decade: cooperative management, reasonable union
demands and continued support for hierarchical systems among the workers which assisted
operators in producing, developing resources, and improving markets.
In actions that support a view of TCC as being pragmatic and not reactionary TCC
management decided not to challenge NRA production and labor codes nor the later Wagner Act
labor relations mandates. Cooperation, indeed taking a lead in the region underscored why
Lewisohn’s popularity among some New Dealers was no accident. At TCC his general
manager’s choice to take the lead among businessmen in embracing NRA wage and operations
codes is illustrative of a company willing to allow the new programs a chance. TCC owners and
management understood the economic crisis of the thirties had threatened their entire industry
and that the workers had endured an incredibly harsh period. From their perspective, the stretchout had been a necessary evil. Unlike some of their larger, more obstinate competitors, TCC
chose initially to go along with the new government-company-worker cooperation that drove
New Deal ideology. Fighting workers was always an expensive proposition. Such actions could
lead to shutting down operations, making economic and social circumstances in the Basin still
worse. The pleas Westlake had made to legislators to enact legislation to help the industry had
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been passed, but there were strings attached: federally mandated labor relations and oversight.
TCC could live with some of this as long as an empowered labor did not indulge too heartily in
controlling labor. 368
Improving commodities markets allowed management to be more generous and TCC
raised wages in mid-1933; this was the first increase since the Crash. TCC workers got a wage
increase of 12½ percent, but this raise does not appear to have been as a direct result of Mine,
Mill pressure, though pressure may have been indirect. General Manager J.N. Houser had
decided in late July 1933 to initiate support among the local business class for the Blue Eagle
campaign. His actions and the raise provided TCC workers with a minimum wage of $14 for a
forty-hour work week. Houser also increased the number of men from 775 to about 825. 369
But the extraordinarily swift revival of Mine, Mill must have had a stunning effect on
TCC management and the company cooperated with the new union. That said, while industry
representatives pleaded in Washington to reset federal anti-trust laws (so producers could secure
limited output and assure themselves higher commodities prices) producers also wanted to make
sure that an empowered labor would not overwhelm them. These men understood federal
authority might even protect the efforts of “the most militant and powerful” unions and their
advocates. There was reason for concern. Many workers now believed their President wanted
them to organize and were becoming more and more willing to demand control of conditions on
the shop floor, wages, and whole sectors of labor relations traditionally governed by
management. NRA code-setting hearings in Congress gave organized labor an additional forum.
Mine, Mill put forth its own opinions for industry standards, but, thanks to an industry push-
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back, the union had little success; the union had proposed a five-day, thirty-hour week with a
minimum wage of $36. In light of such aggressive, coordinated labor proposals, companies like
TCC decided that if unionism was going to come it would be best if they could rally conservative
workers and tradesmen on the producers’ side instead of allowing the ideology of the workforce
to shift radically left. 370
Reasons for Mine, Mill’s revival and its evolution toward radicalism in the late thirties
are many. First, for all its practical assistance to workers in reducing accidents and saving lives,
Houser’s employee representative plan must have intimidated enough workers that when they
had the chance to establish forums where they were more in control of they took it. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the reduction in broken limbs, burns, and assorted other averted mishaps, the
general living and working conditions in the dusty, toxic, “only desert east of the Mississippi”
just wore people down after a while. At least that was the impression of outside observers who
came and investigated working conditions in the area. 371
Other frustrations came from the effects of TCC’s merger with Ducktown Chemical and
Iron, the old Ducktown, Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company. Reports are unclear, but indications
are that TCC, after absorbing DCI crews, did so in a manner that was denigrating to “new” crew
of Isabella workers. In fact, in light of later complaints by Isabella men, it seems TCC folded the
DCI men into the established employee representative plan, but that the firm seems also to have
made the mistake of assuming Isabella men would not resent the consolidation. DCI men’s
concerns appear to have been channeled indirectly through TCC craft workers. Their resentment
would help explain the later popularity of the CIO in Isabella. There was one improvement in
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these men’s lot though: As part of TCC, the absulute anti-unionism that had once prevailed at
Isabella was no more. 372
Mine, Mill meetings allowed workers to speak more freely than at the Houser EMP
affairs. Without the fear of supervisory eyes and ears bearing down on them, the men could
speak out and learn from union leaders about their rights as workers and hopes for ever more
empowerment. For a time, the big-tent of the union’s ideology of far left and far right (that is,
before Mine, Mill bolted from the AFL) would have seen radical and conservative miners and
tradesmen side by side. This is not to say it was a workers paradise at the Mine, Mill meetings,
but freedom from management’s keen ear would have made ideological pluralism easier to
endure.
Workers attending Mine, Mill meetings could discuss the frustrations that had been
arising for some while: the effects of lay-offs owing to TCC’s embrace of new technology or the
fact that as TCC diversified its products—into agricultural chemicals for instance. Most
opportunities seemed to benefit other workers and not miners. New sintering plants came online
and the floatation plants near the London mine were expanded. Additional apprehension grew
around the size of the company as TCC increased its power over mining and production works at
Isabella. The absorption of DCI shaved down competition, consequently reducing employment
opportunities in the local labor market. If a man could not get along with TCC supervisors,
where was he to go? Barclay himself acknowledged that the Isabella merger had been a real blow
to the psyche of the village’s workers. 373
There were other smoldering concerns about the red hills according to CIO advocates,
The National Committee For People’s Rights. In its investigation of local labor conditions,
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which included an investigation of court records, dozens of interviews—including Sheriff Biggs
and local law enforcement officers—the NCPR reported workers were still angry years after
TCC’s stretch-out ended. Unsettled matters abounded: workers alleged they were owed back
pay. Their slimmer wages in the early thirties had brought enormous shame and discomfort;
some families could barely pay for food or rent; living conditions deteriorated as housing
maintenance suffered. These experiences would have been especially hard to endure after the
generally rising incomes in the 1920s. A number of miners said their pay had been as low as $8
for six-day weeks of double shifts during the stretch-out. Sympathizers and family of these
miners believed TCC owed them compensation since commodities prices were on the
rebound. 374
These claims could have been true. Exact pay records for the era are scarce except for the
TCC mining department, but it is clear that TCC paid crews who worked below ground more
than new hires or above-ground men throughout the 1930s. Furthermore, until the union
demanded it and the company changed its policies under contract in 1937, it had been common
not to pay men until they reached their worksite, not when they arrived on the property. 375
Additionally, workers’ perceptions of the company’s economic health would have been
somewhat confused in the thirties owing to the tumultuous markets. The downturn of the early
thirties had been horrible. Things appeared to improve for copper in the first several years after
FDR’s inauguration but were still not a certainty. Workers would have been keen to read reports
on business improvement in the steel, metals, machinery, flour, textiles, retail, and apparel
industry, all of which The Copper City Advance claimed, would “affect the dinner pail, dividend
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checks and tax bills of every individual.” International or national concerns were “inseparable
from local welfare” workers learned. 376
Headlines from the middle thirties heralding the significant rebound in copper and nonferrous markets were encouraging in some respects, but many men already understood these
improvements relied on companies curtailing their production capacity. Furthermore, word of
rebounding commodities markets no longer guaranteed men would be needed to extract and
process the Basin’s ores as in the days of the Great War. It seemed technology was limiting the
number of men needed even in good times. A comparison of man-days required for production
from the highs of the late twenties—a period already being transformed by technological
efficiency—to the industrial revival just prior to the Roosevelt Recession showed that necessary
man-days stood at about one third of 1929’s need. 377
Granted, some improvement came to Copper Basin workers when Houser raised wages
and increased employment rolls in support of New Deal initiatives. But there was uncertainty
that this improvement could last. In fact, it was somewhat short-lived. While TCC’s parent
company experienced the best year in 1934 than it had since 1930, the year 1935 saw corporate
profits contract. Additional uncertainty accompanied the Supreme Court’s declaration of NRA
codes as unconstitutional. The decision brought uncertainty to the copper and chemicals industry
and killed the optimistic, collective and patriotic Blue Eagle campaign. Just as was experienced
by management, workers experienced powerlessness before uncontrollable outside developments
which must have frustrated workers and their families and seemed never-ending. So while even
if the most well-informed workers might have understood the dynamics now affecting them, this
did not mean they would have been happy about the situation.
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The period had been better for owners and management. Code adherence by the
Lewisohns meant money could be made again. Tennessee Corporate profits leapt to $230,000 in
1934 and by 1937 the company enjoyed earnings it had not had since the middle twenties. The
year 1937 saw profits of $937,000. There was also now plenty of money for corporate salaries.
According to the New York Times reports of salary figures filed with the new Securities and
Exchange Commission, Tennessee Corporation Executive Vice President E.H. Westlake made
the equivalent of over $1 million in 2007 dollars while his miners earned nineteen times less.
Meanwhile, the minimum wage in the middle thirties for TCC miners stood at about 3-4% of
what company top executives made, or around $672. Wages increased over the 1930s, however,
significantly as the union gained strength. Average wages for January 1938 stood at nearly twice
what they had been in 1933. 378
In the thirties, the International Union of Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers, joined forces
with John L. Lewis’s committee within the AFL to expand industrial union organizing. Mine,
Mill’s actions in all this revived leftist sentiments among many of its rank-and-file who saw the
New Deal as a chance to rollback corporate power after the reactionary twenties. The
Federation’s resistance to industrial unionism angered Mine, Mill leaders and rekindled union
rank-and-file suspicions of AFL conservatism. Mine, Mill leadership came to see the AFL as
being dangerous to the interests of miners and smeltermen. At the same time, among more
conservative craft workers, the actions of Mine, Mill’s leadership were alarming. But according
to National Labor Relations Board examiners, workers in Isabella and Ducktown shared many
experiences on and off the job which bound them together. Miners’ working experiences in
crews, often underground, forged in them a collective will to protect themselves from perceived
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threatening corporate prerogatives. At Copperhill’s diversified industrial works smaller crews
had always promoted autonomy and preserved higher status among the many trades manned by a
class of generally more conservative craftsmen. Furthermore, men working in Copperhill TCC
facilities had been directly benefitting from the expansion of the company into agricultural
chemicals since the 1920s; there were now more opportunities for advancement that apparently
still allowed for considerable autonomy on the job. Advancement into quasi-managerial roles
like foremen and engineers appears to have been easier in Copperhill. So a lot of workers in the
agricultural and smelting sectors of TCC did not appreciate Mine, Mill’s push for industrial
unionism. Conservative craftsmen had much less empathy for workers in mines at Ducktown
and Isabella. Only a few of these men saw miners daily or left Copperhill for assignments. As
such, Copperhill men came to have their own concerns and saw aggressive moves by Mine, Mill
as being driven by miner resentment, jealousy and sour grapes and led by a rougher sort of
worker. 379
Aggravating circumstances further, national Mine, Mill leaders began calling for “closed
shop” union organization so there would be no jurisdictional confusion within the workforce of
non-ferrous mines and works. Mine, Mill leaders also restated their commitment to democratic
treatment of the rank-and-file in opposition to hierarchical power structure typical at Federation
locals. Mine, Mill leaders claimed their approach and their interests with the CIO represented
equal power-sharing among mine and smelter workers on all issues, from the shop to union
governance, and a rejection of hierarchy led by senior tradesmen. At first the CIO insurgency in
the Federation prompted admonishing remarks of caution by union President William Green. He
replaced these with outright attacks when it was clear Lewis and his allies would not retreat from
379
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their demands for organizing reform. Eventually controversy led to violence and a vote by the
majority of AFL rank-and-file decided against industrial unionism. Green went even further and
expelled CIO unions including Mine, Mill. Now independent, the mission of the CIO stood in
direct competition with the Federation for workers’ hearts and minds. Many CIO unions tore up
their old Federation constitutions and composed new ones that “broadened representation,
strengthened accountability, and provided guarantees against the kinds of organization abuses
suffered [under] AFL organizers.” 380
Mine, Mill’s leadership also shifted left at this time. Union men pushed aside their
“elderly leaders” whose fiscal ineptitude and resistance to young men taking charge of
recruitment and organizing campaigns had “stood in the way of progress.” In 1936, Reid
Robinson won the election for union president and he moved the union toward the left. Scholar
Vernon Jensen said Robinson had not always sympathized with the left, but that he was soon
“courted by” leftists, vulnerable as a consequence of his own ambition. 381
How Mine, Mill’s original approach would have changed the local meetings, protocols
and traditional tradesmen’s power over the Copper Basin rank-and-file is unclear. Missing from
the record are summaries of the kinds of ideological positions held by the rank-and-file. What
was said in union halls, in speeches by local organizers or in conversations on the job as workers
diligently completed their assigned tasks, passed a tool to one another, huddled in skiffs, or
chatted between shifts and shared a cigarette remains a mystery. Other than limited copies of
union papers printed by the CIO, most Mine, Mill records are missing and may have been
380
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purposefully destroyed. Testimony and witness to workers’ frustrations comes from outside
sources, reports from federal agencies, court records, R.E. Barclay’s commentary in his diary and
local histories, and local newspapers. 382
What is certain though from examination of these sources is that in the Copper Basin,
Mine, Mill’s list of demands for stretch-out compensation, for a closed shop, and the union’s
new association in the CIO, became a flashpoint for company owners and operators. Neither the
1933 National Industrial Recovery Act nor its constitutionally more robust descendant, the 1935
Wagner Act guaranteed the legality of the “closed shop.” Unions demanding closed shops met
with strong opposition from managements that decided to stall in the collective bargaining
processes. 383
The most heated anger over the course of Mine, Mill’s actions likely was expressed by
Copperhill workers who by early 1938 wanted to bolt Mine, Mill, seek shelter in conservative
AFL ranks and then go on to rid the Basin of the “reds” and “communists.” They insisted
communists filled Mine, Mill and the CIO’s ranks. Mine, Mill’s renewed interest in bringing
about industrial organizing across Copper Basin labor markets infuriated the conservatives. 384
The kind of split seen among workers in the Copper Basin had to do with the way union
activity in the Basin had evolved from the beginning. The establishment of Mine, Mill in the
Basin during the Great War has always seemed odd in light of the previous AFL local in the
region. Did Mine, Mill merely lay itself jurisdictionally across the Basin and absorb the AFL
locals extant before the late 1910s? If that was the case, it is very unlikely that there ever existed
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a true synthesis of needs and demands among unionized Copper Basin workers—the
particularities of company and location in the region worked against sustainable amalgamation.
Scholars Judith Stepan-Norris and Maurice Zeitlin contend that “unions… organized
independently by a mix of Reds, radicals, and ‘pure and simple unionists” competing both to
organize the unorganized and to win their trust provided the conditions in which rival blocs or
caucuses could flourish.” 385
Factional self-interest at once intensified rivalry and yet paradoxically limited executive,
international union leadership power. What this meant was that interests remained parochial.
Therefore, in the mining villages, paranoia about Copperhill’s ascendancy limited trust between
TCC’s diversified crews. As debate intensified, Mine, Mill men questioned the legitimacy of
union dues accounting conducted by certain Copperhill tradesmen. Likewise, conservative
tradesmen in the Basin viewed the growing relationship between the Mine, Mill and the CIO as a
threat to their interests. The intensity of these men’s hatred of alleged communism in Mine, Mill
and the CIO betrays a real fear of communist influence in the labor movement. 386
Editions of The CIO News, Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers chronicled the challenges
union rank-and-file and their families endured across the nation at the hands of AFL thugs and
recalcitrant company operators. Metals industry workers stood in the thick of these battles. The
CIO News reported their union president’s efforts in the Copper Basin. Ducktown and Isabella
folk could take heart that they stood side by side in their battles with conservatives alongside
their brothers and sisters fighting for power against the most powerful firms in the industry:
Anaconda, American Smelting & Refining, Kennecott Copper, National Lead, and others.
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Corporate profits were rising, announced The CIO News, but the paper reminded workers that
“producers [were] still in the saddle” controlling working people’s fate. With their allies in the
National Association of Manufactures, producers in anti-labor drives eroded the intent of the
New Deal and ignored “laws which the majority of the people deem wise and necessary.”
Through all this, union leaders and their sympathizers shaped Mine, Mill’s association with the
CIO as akin to the struggle engaged by revolutionary patriots of old. 387
Patriotic appeals made by CIO and Mine, Mill advocates did not convince conservatives.
For them the CIO insurgency was working now to end much more than work-related institutions
such as “bureaucratic” business unionism, the so-called cozy relationship enjoyed between
tradesmen and supervisory staff for which many workers had worked hard to achieve. The new
radicalism seemed like a revival of the kind of Bolshevism that advocated abandonment of longcherished social conventions. Communists in labor’s ranks were now advocating “specific
minority rights” to uplift the circumstances of blacks and Mexican workers. To sometimes
hysterical conservative white workers these calls seemed to be precursors for demands for the
confiscation of property, the promotion of Jewish overlords, and atheistic attempts to banish
Christianity. 388
Scholars’ conclusions about the nature of Mine, Mill’s leadership and of the ideologies
many western rank-and-file members held substantiate charges by conservatives about
communists’ influence. Jensen described the union’s leadership as being “closely knit and active
group of Communists and sympathizers” empowered further by CIO affiliation. 389 Although
none of the Copper Basin sources investigated here revealed direct evidence of any union
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member being a communist or of union leadership advocating “communist” ideology. Still, it
was perception among locals that mattered. Actions taken by those who wanted to curtail Mine,
Mill’s influence and shutdown the CIO Movement are most critical to this narrative.
Conservatives in the Copper Basin took Mine, Mill’s alliance with the CIO seriously. They were
thus unwilling to separate actions taken by the union’s locals in the Copper Basin from the
conduct of Mine, Mill’s international or the CIO. Mine, Mill’s radical-left heritage and its
concentration of left-leaning leaders left locals no room for doubt. Studies examining the impact
of communists in the labor movement similarly have seen the communists’ in Mine, Mill as
critical for reviving the union and the CIO movement in the thirties. To these scholars, through
“hard work, courage, commitment, and sacrifice to organize the unorganized” the communists
and their sympathizers had provided energies without which “the CIO could well have been
stillborn.” 390
Fear that CIO affiliation might lead to a reordering of society prompted conservatives
tradesmen to turn on their old Copper Basin ally. In the most immediate sense, the traditional
values of the Federation held out more possibilities and stability than did Mine, Mill’s leftists or
any imagined benefit that might come via a Lewis-led confederation in the CIO. Conservative
tradesmen of the Copper Basin knew that as the oldest and most powerful national union, the
American Federation of Labor had as one of its “founding beliefs” the idea that a union should
be exclusive and focused directly on conditions at work and on wages. To reach these ends, the
union had to be dominated by tradesmen who led the rank-and-file and kept close association
with supervisory staff and company management. As such, Federation unions were to be
organizations of workers “with the same problems, the same purposes and the same needs.”
Federation membership historically “provided the key to … a worker[‘s] apprentice training,
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employment, contracts, and representation in disputes between employers and between
unions.” 391 Industrial unionism was a threat to this kind of an approach. The CIO Movement,
by splitting the labor movement, stood as an attack on all working men. 392
CIO and Mine, Mill efforts at organizing black workers was a particular point of
contention. The AFL “clung almost religiously to policies that excluded people of color and
women.” In this way, the Federation could continue in its mission to promote the interests of
white manhood. 393 It was a reason the union leadership had been so adamant it its attacks on
open immigration and had assisted in the passage of the Immigrant Act of 1924. The AFL
position of defending the color line absolutely contrasted with a number of actions taken by CIO
unions. Where it suited the new confederation of internationals, CIO unions would work with
people of color and at times have integrated unions. On a number of occasions, the CIO
organized African Americans, Latinos and other persons of color, as well as immigrants and
women. In fact, the union had even allowed for the creation of some desegregated unions in the
North and West of the nation and a scattered few in the South. This is not to say that every CIO
organizing campaign during this period sought to end the color line or promote racial and gender
equality in the workforce. The discourse on this aspect of the CIO’s efforts in the labor
movement in fact shows quite the contrary—especially in regard to race. In many instances,
where it suited Southern CIO organizers, they bent to local social conventions of color and either
kept the color line or exploited blacks to uplift whites. As one historian summarized, “the CIO
was a broad church, and the racial record of its member unions varied enormously.” The more
leftist unions within the CIO promoted the most liberal racial policies, but others simply “felt
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that blacks needed to be organized” to prevent blacks from taking actions that might limit the
interests of the organized labor in general. 394
Instances where the CIO did allow for or promote a relaxation of the color line in
employment or in organizing became notable or notorious depending upon one’s opinions on
integration. In the South of the 1930s and 1940s, any relaxation of the color line in union
organizing, such as CIO attempts to empower black and female workers in Memphis, Tennessee,
stood out as “radical” challenges to the dominant social conventions. Radicalism, like
communism, became a code word used by critics not only against the CIO but against any group
or person that challenged the status quo. Be the threats real or imagined, “radicalism,”
“communism,” “socialism,” or any other “ism” deemed dangerous, all had to be stopped. These
ideas were all defined as being innately anti-American. In the South, since the majority of
persons were affiliated with Calvinist Protestantism, any organized group that challenged social
and economic conventions was seen also assumed by many to be anti-Christian in nature as well,
and thus particularly dangerous because they were against God. That some evangelical
Protestants like the aforementioned Holiness sect led union movements in the region did not
necessarily help the image of the CIO because such folk were usually of sects dominated by the
poorer members of the working class. Economic prejudice stepped in to assist hysterical
reactions over the presence of God-less, communist, radicals. 395 In contrast to the negative
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perceptions of and reactions to the CIO movement in the South, the AFL always had an easier
time in Dixie. The AFL’s support of conventional social relations and its historic rejection of
communism and socialism usually resulted in the union garnering some protections by the local
political and capitalist power structure. 396

Rhetorical warfare in the national labor war
The rhetorical viciousness demonstrated by AFL President William Green and John L.
Lewis during the 1930s labor war trickled down to lesser vassals and the rank-and-file,
sabotaging attempts to negotiate any lasting peace. Not even President Roosevelt was successful
in his efforts to bring the two sides together. For the first several years of the conflict FDR
worked behind the scenes on the problem, allowing Labor Secretary Francis Perkins to attempt
to mend the schism. But as the thirties wore on and FDR became increasingly concerned that
AFL-CIO war would hurt the nation’s ability to defend itself, he contacted Green and Lewis
personally. Despite administration attempts, the best the President could wrangle from either side
were pledges of interest in peace, but dual unionism and jurisdictional raiding continued and the
AFL in particular took aim at destroying the credibility of CIO affiliated unions. Lewis in fact,
became so aggravated at Roosevelt in the course of all this that he declared re-electing the
president would be “a national evil of the first magnitude.” 397
At industrial localities where conservative tradesmen could get it they garnered support
from the Federation organizers, company management, and local interested citizens to route the
CIO. Many among the public saw organized labor’s divisiveness as an additional threat to their
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precarious economic circumstances. For these persons, aggressive union action came to
represent, anti-social, anti-business dangers to their communities. Corporate leaders benefited
from such perspectives. Sometimes management operated in a clandestine manner to encourage
these attitudes, but just as often companies tried to cast themselves as defender of the American
way of life or at least as reasonable members of the community, anchors of the local economy in
contrast to those who would wage war upon it. The method worked especially well when during
any collective bargaining a company or the local pro-business press could portray an active
union as demanding too much power over labor at the expense of other working people. This
capture of the public’s trust by a company over an increasingly shrill cacophony between the
CIO and AFL was how TCC maintained its power in the Copper Basin. By some accounts, the
late thirties saw “labor’s moment… passing” as the public became increasingly frustrated with
the ongoing strikes and union wars. 398
Other pertinent regional reactions to the CIO and Mine, Mill, in Birmingham, Alabama,
Memphis, Tennessee, and Hershey, Pennsylvania provide some insight into the history of the
Copper Basin. The cases point to the origins of Mine, Mill’s checkered reputation in the minds
of conservative whites and anti-labor interests who would see the union’s affiliation with the
CIO Movement in the thirties as part of a full-on assault on race relations and conventional
regional labor relations. In some of these cases it was attempts by Mine, Mill to organize black
workers that aroused conservative white reaction. In other instances, reactions came from
challenges to political hegemony within established capital-industrial relations. In nearly all of
them where unions were allowed to remain, the AFL ultimately benefitted and burnished its
reputation as protector of the economic and social status-quo.

398

Harris, ibid., 24-25 and 37; Kersten, ibid, 139-49, passim; Kannenberg, The Product of GE’s Progress, 4-5.

230
In the Birmingham metals industry of the late 1910s, AFL leaders encouraged Mine, Mill
to organize black workers; the Federation’s reasoning was that if organized under Mine, Mill, the
workers would be less susceptible to management’s whims and thus less likely to hurt the
economic prerogatives of white workers. The fact that most black metals workers were
“unskilled and semi-skilled mine and furnace workers” made them a good fit with Mine, Mill
and allowed white metals tradesmen to remain in AFL craft unions. But, as Mine, Mill’s
recruitment efforts became more successful company owners used racial hatred to their
advantage by encourage white workers to join a company union. Through all this conservative
white tradesmen and others who stood against any organizing of black workers reacted with
direct animus which at once reduced the power of Mine, Mill in the city and diminished its
respect in the Alabama Federation of Labor. 399
Mine, Mill was down in Birmingham after this last incident, but revived under the New
Deal and was especially reinvigorated by the CIO’s efforts in the city. With the additional
assistance of US Department of Labor and government mandates regarding NLRB oversight of
collective bargaining processes, Mine, Mill was able to strike a blow against an all-white
company union at Tennessee Coal & Iron. Conservative whites had flocked to the firm’s
employee representative plan, the so-called Brotherhood of Captive Miners, with the idea that as
whites they would be treated better than if affiliated with Mine, Mill—at this point still
considered a “black” union by most city workers. The AFL’s role in all this was to maintain its
support for white-only trades unions and to remain recalcitrant in its stand against the CIO’s
recruitment efforts. Mine, Mill men at TCI who had tried to win access to collective bargaining
had been fired, but the union continued in its efforts to garnered collective bargaining rights. It
finally won these from NLRB examiners who found evidence of company favoritism. Senate
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investigations found clear evidence of violations of workers and CIO advocates’ freedom of
speech in the affair at TCI Birmingham; the findings embarrassed the company. In the
meanwhile, TCI’s northern parent company concluded contract negotiations with Mine, Mill and
ordered its Birmingham subsidiary to do likewise 400
. These victories were huge for Mine, Mill and the CIO in one respect, but for
conservative whites (who were the majority of white Birmingham workers), Mine, Mill and the
CIO’s gain was their loss. Any victory for black union workers was seen as a direct threat to
these men and the long-established status of white industrial workers over black ones. Mine,
Mill’s leadership had by now embraced a national policy to organize workers across racial lines
where necessary. That fact alone would have resounded among its enemies in the South. As a
result, it would take some years for Mine, Mill to garner any trust among white workers, and this
happened only after the collapse of the company union. That said, the new—limited--support by
some white workers came with strings attached: Prejudiced whites questioned the capabilities of
black union leaders and over time had many blacks officials removed. However, as Mine, Mill
was growing in power many whites saw this as a negative development. To most whites in
Birmingham, those who joined Mine, Mill’s “nigger union” in its efforts to integrate organized
labor were seen as traitorous betrayers of the white solidarity and society and as “communists.”
White concerns and fear of Mine, Mill’s possible expansion of black rights anywhere would
have made it very difficult for the a lot of white workers in the Copper Basin to consider the
union anything other than a “communist”—read integrationist—institution. Mine Mill therefore
stood as threat to the social status quo. 401
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Along the Mississippi, at Memphis, CIO efforts to organize black workers in the tire
industry ran smack into a coalition of anti-union politicos, Chamber of Commerce allies, a pliant
AFL confederation of craft unions, and a xenophobic and negrophobic white working class.
White race prejudice provided the foundation for anti-CIO actions here, because most whites had
long supported black workers’ disenfranchisement in civic life and at the workplace. Led by
Tennessee’s most powerful politician, “Boss” Edmund Hull Crump, the anti-CIO forces kept the
town free of “radicalism” and “communistic” “nigger loving” labor advocates. 402
At Hershey, Pennsylvania, a labor narrative unfolded that illustrated how economic, not
racial conservatism among the general public beyond the immediate ranks of industrial
employees determined the fate of the CIO. At Chocolate Town, as it is popularly known, two
generations of workers had benefitted from innovative chocolate baron Milton S. Hershey’s
paternalistic control over his clean and modern “industrial dream city” filled with respectable
workers’ housing, churches, and commercial conveniences. Workers at Hershey’s plants
received on average three times the typical pay rate for American candy workers. Through the
years, Milton Hershey’s intimate style with nearly all of his workers had earned him their trust,
but he grew even more esteemed in their eyes when during the first years of the Great
Depression, instead of firing or laying off workers, Hershey set upon a massive building program
employing many locals laid off in other businesses. Consumer demand for sweets in the
depression at first remained strong, but these eventually shrank before the economy’s
overwhelming contraction—as did the great welfare capitalist program Hershey had used to keep
out unions. The company began to lay off workers out of desperation. The circumstances
attracted CIO organizers who came to town and rallied workers to fight for increased wages and
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a closed shop. Led by a local football hero, the new United Chocolate Workers claimed all but
500 of Hershey’s 2600 employees and chased out non-union workers when it commenced a sitdown strike in the summer of 1936. 403
The strike directly impoverished Amish farmers who had been selling Hershey their milk
for years; indeed, it was known that the Amish milk was the reason for the company’s especially
fine milk chocolate and caramels. Furious at the CIO actions, the farmers and thousands of other
locals put on anti-CIO parades in neighboring towns. Placards carried by anti-CIO folk read
“CIO equals Communistic Idiot Organization.” Empowered by an overwhelming support among
local people and now unwilling to negotiate a peace with the union, Amish men and boys raided
the Hershey chocolate plant, dragged out CIO strikers and forced them to run the gauntlet down
the middle of the city’s streets. These actions made it impossible for the CIO union to survive.
For a time workers organized an independent union, which was eventually replaced by an AFL
one. Confused about religious particularities, but quick to report on the incident, the New York
Times blazoned the incident in its headline reports: “Mennonite women in little black bonnets
and their men folk in broad-brimmed black hats and long coats… joined in bruising and
walloping [the striking CIO sympathizers], spanking many unionists as if they were misbehaving
children or pummeling them with fisticuffs.” 404
Failure to garner local support beyond its immediate ranks was a critical weakness for the
CIO in each of these cases, making the union vulnerable to charges of “communism.” Used by
anti-Mine, Mill and anti-CIO forces, the charges reflected the pliable nature of the label
“communist.” As regularly described in Dixie, “communist” usually meant integrationist and
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promoting the rights of unskilled and semi-skilled workers; at Hershey, Pennsylvania,
“communist” meant anyone challenging the established industrial relations of the community.
Only in the latter TCI Birmingham case, did “communist” CIO union organizers win contracts in
spite of conservative working class community reactions. But this victory occurred only after
outside help came to organizers in the form of both government enforced collective bargaining
mandates and public embarrassment of the company at the national level. The actual number of
real “communists” in the ranks of these unions (despite some specious “proof” in the scholarship
of ideological leanings at the international level) was probably not that important. No sources
examined here can reveal such percentages anyway. Perception, however, did matter.
In the Copper Basin, Mine, Mill and CIO organizers and sympathizers would have to try
and defend their standing among TCC workers before an increasingly hostile craft union and a
public fearful of the union’s “communism.” Representing largely Isabella and Ducktown
workers, Mine, Mill and CIO folk would try to increase positive public sentiment, but they
would do so without substantial government or corporate support. A paradox in all this was that
these workers’ advocates would marshal their efforts during a period when economic fortunes in
the Copper Basin seemed poised for another boom.

Collateral damages: The Georgia Federation secession movement and Copper Basin labor
When it became clear that Mine, Mill’s migration to the CIO would be permanent,
conservative tradesmen in the Copper Basin established alternative AFL locals. A larger AFL
secession movement against CIO influence in the Georgia State Federation supported the Copper
Basin tradesmen. Georgia Federation leaders then assisted in a Copper Basin campaign to shut

235
down the CIO through the use of intimidation and propaganda financed by Tennessee Copper
Company and augmented by local and federal police authorities.
While the Mine, Mill locals at Isabella and Ducktown revived quickly in 1933, the
Copperhill local did not come back fully till 1936. This was indicative of the reluctance of
tradesmen there to risk jeopardizing their close associations with TCC management. 405 But
opposition to Mine, Mill soon arose in response to CIO and Mine, Mill integrationist actions at
Birmingham and in Memphis that were perceived as part of a larger CIO campaign to remake the
labor and social relations in the South. AFL concerns were not unsubstantiated. Real action was
being taken by CIO organizers and their sympathizers. As George Tindal has shown, by 1937
CIO organizers were holding meetings at the Highlander Folk School, near Monteagle,
Tennessee where union sympathizers taught young radicals to advance both industrial unionism
and race integration. In the following decade these CIO classes trained some 6,900 labor
sympathizers in “labor history, economics, strike tactics, public speaking, current events, and
parliamentary law.” The exact influence of all this on the CIO’s campaign in the Copper Basin
cannot be known, but it is probably true that Copper Basin labor organizers not only knew about
the school, but obtained literature and lessons from it for dispersal at union meetings.
Furthermore, the actions taken by Mine, Mill in the Copper Basin reflect exactly the kind of
actions and demonstrations attendees at Highlander would have learned. 406
As a result of such events, fear among conservatives grew. Granted, CIO and Mine,
Mill-led integrationist action occurred in cities with large black populations. Therefore one
might not expect race fear to be of such concern in the Copper Basin. But as has been shown,
locals had long before determined their home would remain nearly lily white; their repeated and
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resolute maintenance of the white dominance in eastern Polk County underscored the tenacious
power of race fear among the population. In spite of the near total absence of black workers,
when the CIO sent veteran Mine, Mill organizer Mitchell Clifton Anderson, of Bessemer,
Alabama to the Copper Basin in 1938, opponents to the CIO claimed that Anderson’s efforts in
the Copper Basin were typical of outsider agitation and would result in workers aligned with the
interests of “red” unionism—and thus possible integration. 407
Anderson was known to CIO enemies for his outspokenness against TCI attempts to
destroy Mine, Mill gains through the firm’s manipulation of its white-only employee
representative plan. Anderson claimed, and NLRB examiners had agreed, that in Birmingham,
TCI “dominated and interfered with” the company union and thus that union was not truly
representative of workers’ needs. His mere presence then represented (to conservatives and
management) a threat to property and the possibility a serious labor challenge to corporate
industrial relations. To social conservatives, Mine, Mill’s advocacy of blacks’ interests in
Birmingham leant credence to fears that Anderson would threaten the racist social conventions
and erode white privilege in the Basin’s labor market.408
Convincing the workforce and the public at large that a CIO presence in the Copper
Basin could not be tolerated became the main focus of Mine, Mill’s enemies and conservative
tradesmen through the late 1930s. Local efforts were undoubtedly aided by the February 1938
official split between the CIO and the AFL at the national level. All peace efforts in the labor
war were now blocked. 409
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Later that February, Leo Carter, an AFL organizer, and James F. Barrett, a Federation
publicity director gave a talk in Copperhill entitled, “The Truth and Facts” on the AFL and CIO
in the Copper Basin. The public was invited to attend. The meeting was a public advertisement
for AFL membership as an alternative available to those workers troubled by the CIO
Movement; it occurred after the AFL petitioned the National Labor Relations Board “for an
election to determine the bargaining agent in the Basin.” In light of what had become now two
competing union factions in the Tennessee Copper Company workforce, the meeting was critical
in that the company had yet to announce which labor organization it would recognize. 410
Though the new AFL efforts had established a new local for workers in the twin-cities of
Copperhill and McCaysville and would also oversee the establishment of one at Ducktown, the
moves were part of a larger movement directed from Georgia that occurred before the national
AFL-CIO split. Instigators of the Georgia AFL secessionist movement had determined the CIO
influence in their federation represented only the latest in a long series of dangerous invasions by
outsiders into Dixie. The new national labor mandates rekindled for these workers mythical
memories of invasion by forces intent on imposing their will on a defiant people. Real courage
was now required by conservative tradesmen to separate themselves from “communist” radicals
who were set upon destroying the Southern workingman’s way of life. The actions taken by
Georgia Federation men to resist CIO influence included pleas to AFL President William Green.
Reacting to Georgia Federation President Steven Nance’s support for CIO textile workers,
conservative tradesmen fled their old Georgia Federation and established a new one. They
claimed their new organization held authentic American Federation of Labor values: pro-
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capitalist, volunteerist, and most important, anti-communist, pure-and-simple unionism. Thus,
for a time in Georgia there were actually two AFL state federations. 411
The new state federation held the mass of Georgia’s rank-and-file AFL men. The new
AFL locals established at Copperhill and in Ducktown were connected to this insurgency owing
to McCaysville’s location on the Georgia-Tennessee border. Francis J. Dillon as leader of the
state defection said the actions by anti-CIO men represented a necessary divorce, which “finally
and definitely” separated loyal AFL men “from all individuals and organization which have been
classified as dual and antagonistic to the laws, principles and policies of the great American
Federation of Labor.” 412
Secessionist reorganizing of the Georgia Federation of Labor relied heavily on reigniting
passionate Confederate and Lost Cause patriotism. This was a rather ironic development in light
of the AFL’s historic patriotic support for the United States. Georgia AFL loyalists had managed
to portray CIO influence as if it were an invading army. To defend themselves, just as their
forefathers had once done against a similar invasion, brave union men in the AFL would have to
thwart these new Yankees and affiliate with the new conservative federation led by Dillon.
Dillon’s explanation of these terms led to Green’s recognition of the legitimacy of the new
federation. “We are truly marching through Georgia with the Labor banner high,” Dillon bragged
to Green. 413
It is telling that the Copperhill-McCaysville AFL movement had its office in the First
National Bank of Copperhill; the location underscored the historically cozy relationship
conservative Twin-cities tradesmen had with the local commercial and banking elite as
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upstanding members of the community. This relationship would remain a crucial one as the new
AFL locals took on the CIO in Ducktown and Isabella. 414
One month after AFL leaders Carter and Barrett held the first of their “truth” meetings,
George L. Googe, a Southern Federation representative and personal assistant to William Green,
spoke at the event held in the Copperhill High School. Googe had also been present at the
AFL’s coming out “truth” meeting, but on this occasion he lectured local workers about the
necessity of a new NLRB election that would determine which union would be the sole
collective bargaining agent for all TCC workers. In a most embarrassing move for Mine, Mill
and the CIO, the AFL trotted out former local General Counsel for Mine, Mill, John Busby who
joined Googe in trying to win over the crowd. Busby said he had left Mine, Mill when it went
CIO. As one of the key men who had helped initiate Mine, Mill’s second incarnation in the
Copper Basin in 1936, Busby would have been well-known to these men. His abandonment of
their old union than stood as particularly damning. Devoted in his anti-communism, he could no
longer stay in Mine, Mill. 415
Meanwhile, Mine, Mill local leaders protested any new collective bargaining
representative election. In their minds the dust had settled on the issue and the AFL’s moves
were the radical ones. Mine, Mill claimed it already stood as the rightful representative for all
workers having secured contracts with the company since the early thirties. Migration to the
CIO had not changed the character of the union one iota, its leaders argued; the CIO affiliation
simply placed the union within the right confederation to fight for workers. It should be noted
that until the secession by conservative craftsmen, TCC executives and local management
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appeared to have had little real trouble accepting an AFL affiliated Mine, Mill. This fact was
admitted before NLRB examiners and Mine, Mill Reid Robinson during Labor Board hearings
on the disputes Though company officials likely resented the diminished importance of
Lewisohn-Houser employee representative plan, they had been working directly with Mine, Mill
since 1933. When the internecine labor war began, TCC claimed “neutrality” on the
representation question. But the AFL secession muddied the labor relations waters and provided
the company with an opportunity. Said the Copper City Advance on the subject of
representation, TCC managers “want[ed] the question decided so they will have an authorized
organization to deal with.” Company reports summarized a now peculiar circumstance of trying
to negotiate with five union locals as “impossible”: The two new AFL locals at
Copperhill/McCaysville and Ducktown joined the three original TCC Mine, Mill locals at
Isabella, Ducktown and Copperhill, with 183, 184 and 176 numbers each respectively. 416
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Chapter 4 Conflagration and the CIO Strike of 1939-40

Mitchell C. Anderson and Mine, Mill in the late 1930s
Mitchell C. Anderson led Copper Basin Mine, Mill locals through what must have been
their most exciting and challenging years. As a former skip tender at Tennessee Coal & Iron
Anderson had lived, worked and raised a family in Alabama mining communities and therefore
understood first-hand the hard life and tenuous domestic and industrial economics that bound
working people in a common culture. A tried and true veteran of Mine, Mill actions, Anderson
had worked tirelessly in Birmingham toward ending circumstances where a company union had
“dominated” miners. He had lately served over three years as TCI’s Mine, Mill president.
What met Anderson in the Copper Basin was nothing new for him. He had fought and won
again Federation anti-CIO efforts which benefited a select class of tradesmen and management.
His good nature augmented his credentials as an organizer, many said. Key company and
government officials acknowledged Anderson had an ability to establish a special rapport among
workers and their families. 417
During the late thirties Anderson’s personality and helpfulness grew in renown in the
mining villages. Even some TCC executives later agreed that Anderson was a fair-minded man;
they complimented his handling of problems among working families during the roughest years,
even though they tried to thwart his union’s attempt to increase workers’ power in the workplace.
Said a local druggist about Anderson in the direct manner of mountain folk, “He is an honest
man, I’ll say that; Yes, sir. I’d trust him.” 418
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In spite of Anderson’s best efforts though, fear and resentment set in among the people of
the mining villages. Incited by AFL rhetoric—and the kind of anger and disappointment that can
only arise in domestic disturbances wherein both parties live in close proximity—peaceful
intercourse between union men could not be sustained. This was particularly vexing to Mine,
Mill leaders in light of what they had been able to accomplish over the previous several years:
The trio of Mine, Mill locals and Tennessee Copper Company had signed a contract “in joint
negotiations” in 1933. 419 The contract was the first for Mine, Mill in the Copper Basin since
early twenties. Only certain classes of workers fell under the terms of the labor contracts.
Supervisory and clerical employees, foremen, chemists, and engineers of TCC were excluded
from being allowed active membership in Mine, Mill as these people were not considered
producers. Non-union company employees had individual employer-employee contracts with
Tennessee Copper. 420
One big irony about Mine, Mill’s fate in the Copper Basin in the late thirties would be
that while the union’s international was having more and more success in establishing locals and
winning NLRB elections, Mine, Mill in the Copper Basin hit a wall. Scholar Vernon Jensen
credited the national success of the union’s international to the expansion of the defense industry
after the war in Europe commenced. An economic boost accompanied nonferrous producers’
general decision not to resist unions and to accept NLRB rulings even when Mine, Mill won
collective bargaining elections. Houser and his team complied with NIRA and Wagner Act
federal mandates until the union decided to support their international’s decision to join the
aggressive CIO movement for industrial unionism and ultimately remove itself from the
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conservative AFL. At that point, TCC management established an initially tacit alliance with
conservative workers and refused to acquiesce. 421
Business was going well for TCC in the late thirties. Copper and fertilizer markets had
improved even after the sharp downturn of late 1937 due to rearmament programs overseas,
increased opportunities for use of copper and derivative alloys in home building and the
expanding use agricultural chemicals. Lewisohn-owned companies made more money than they
had since the late 1920s. A rise in the price of copper from a modest 9.5 cents per pound to 12.5
cents by spring 1937 allowed Tennessee Corporation’s owners to share the wealth with
shareholders and employees. To add another fiscal feather in its cap and to advance corporate
facilities development, Tennessee Corporation got approval from its shareholders to raise $5
million via the sale of debenture bonds. The funds’ purpose was to retire an earlier bond issuance
that had been employed for expansion of corporate operations. The move reflected the kind of
investment in technologies that allowed Lewisohn firms to emerge from the Depression with
ever more diverse products. 422
A March 1937 new Mine, Mill contract gave TCC workers an additional 32 cents
increase per day. This was the second raise the union had gotten within a year; TCC workers had
been given a Christmas gift raise of five percent in late 1936. Within just a few weeks of the
March 1937 raise, Tennessee Copper gave it workers another twenty-four cent raise per eighthour shift. The company announced this last increase on the same day the New York Times
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reported parent-company Tennessee Corporation profits for the previous year were the best the
firm had seen since 1930; they were even better for 1937 at nearly $1 million after taxes. 423
The direct effects of all this on workers’ pay lay in the records. Though wages had run
lower for a time, Mine, Mill contracts could now garner TCC workers better pay on average than
they had seen since the Depression began. While exact statistics are missing for TCC smelters
and chemical works, the Copper City Advance noted that additional wage increases for all
company employees followed those given in 1937. By January 1938 average wages for workers
ran at $5.66 or about $28.30 per week 424
By early 1938, it seemed the second incarnation of the International Union of Mine,
Mill and Smelter Workers had done its duty for local workers. As substantiated by one outside
report, over the years, Mine, Mill in the Copper Basin had been “strong enough to get a contract
providing for an eight-hour day, abolition of the task system, and substantial raises in the wage
scale.” 425
Company reports recorded additional Mine, Mill victories: men now were paid for half
the travel time to and from a job, schedules had been worked out to allow men more efficient
access to the mine-shaft cages (cutting wasted commuting time to their job sites). “Holidays
were increased to four” from the two given through the early thirties and beginning in January
1938 a new vacation system “for day wage employees was begun.” Other TCC workers got
vacation benefits too by receiving “one week’s vacation with pay” equaling “five shifts at
straight time rates.” 426
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These union victories were substantial, but reports from 1938 also show erosion in TCC
workers’ power and provide additional insight into miners’ angst. Average wage rates actually
declined in 1938-1939 standing at only $5.26 by July 1939. This was a seven percent average
drop from late 1937 early 1938 levels. While the company had not lost money during this
period, corporate profits declined 63 % from their middle thirties peak. What explains this
reversal? Very likely it was a combination of technological advance and the effects of the
Roosevelt Recession. Contractions in miners’ average pay may reflect all these developments,
but average pay also reflects a statistical paradox born of the union’s success. From 1936
forward, Mine, Mill’s international sought to organize “all persons working in and around all
mines (except coal mines), mills, smelters, refineries… open pits… power shovels… and
reduction plants.” 427

Consequently the newer agreements between TCC and Mine, Mill likely

included a broader spectrum of job types and more unskilled labor. The change increased the
number of workers on contract and thus affected the average pay at TCC mines.

Managing their image: competing unions and TCC
The contract benefits and wages Mine, Mill secured through the middle thirties for TCC
workers were simply not enough to quell conservative tradesmen’s fears that any union
associated with John L. Lewis’s CIO would continue to threaten their hard-earned special status
before TCC management and supervisory staff. Broader coverage of TCC’s workforce had
diluted craftsmen’s stature and many feared they would be dragged into sit-down strikes like
those breaking out at other non-ferrous facilities. One such action took place at a former
Lewisohn-owned smelter in Perth Amboy, New Jersey. The strike had pulled 1,500 workers off
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the job for eleven days. In the end, workers got only a small increase; the company had pushed
back and forced workers to take much less than they had hoped for. It was days before smelter
workers could immediately return to work even after the settlement because the furnaces had
been shut during the strike. 428
It should be remembered that such actions came during the disquieting times of the
Roosevelt Recession which toppled commodities prices. While TCC would survive through this
period, that outcome could not yet have been known. Union actions like those take by Mine,
Mill and the CIO at Perth Amboy frightened and angered management and seemed risky to
conservative workers—neither of whom wished to see the hard times of the early thirties return.
As a result conservative TCC tradesmen sought solace in new AFL locals.
AFL loyalists in late November 1937 petitioned the NLRB to investigate collective
bargaining arrangements in the Copper Basin. In light of the establishment of new AFL local no.
21164 in the Twin-cities the Labor Board obliged. After notice was given to TCC and to Mine,
Mill leaders, hearings on the matter occurred in Chattanooga before the case trial examiner, Earl
S. Bellman. Bellman and other NLRB officials determined certain conditions for collective
bargaining representation in the Copper Basin including what they saw as the appropriate kind of
unit for TCC workers and who could be included in such a unit. The AFL contended that a single
unit “composed of all the employees of the Company, except supervisory employees… in the
mines, plants and facilities … of the Ducktown Basin… is the appropriate unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining.” But Mine, Mill wanted three separate units, “corresponding to the
locals which it originally chartered in the Basin… and that not only supervisory employees, but
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also clerical employees, chemists, and technical engineers should be excluded” from the
union. 429
According to NLRB examiners, at TCC “the high degree of interdependence and division
of labor among [its] several mines and plants” The company also “observed a seniority rule” and
regularly transferred certain kinds of workers “among the several locations.” Thus the Labor
Board determined that a single unit should cover TCC’s entire workforce. That unit would not
include some craft workers that AFL organizers so desired in their ranks: there would be no
supervisory employees, chemists, or technical engineers. As to who could vote, the Board said
company employment rolls as of 19 November 1937 would determine qualification. The
election deciding which rival union would get collective bargaining rights occurred on March 18,
1938. 430
The Federation petitioned and received approval from the Labor Board that an option be
removed from the ballot that would have allowed workers to select “neither union.” To remind
workers of the power of the Federation’s national status, AFL leader John Deal and others made
certain that the ballot read “American Federation of Labor” instead of the much more parochial
designation “American Federation of Labor union No. 21164.” 431
The AFL won the election 543 to 488. The ballots included twelve where men wrote in
“for neither” themselves; election proctors tossed out four votes for being either improperly
filled out or “challenged” for reasons not explained. But the victory was pyrrhic. Of the eligible
1122 workers, seventy-five men chose not to vote for reasons not explained, though it may have
been due to the allegations that Mine, Mill and CIO sympathizers now made against the AFL and
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the company. The CIO demanded that the election results be found void. After an investigation
the NLRB agreed; examiners had found “substantial” evidence which “raised material issue with
respect to the conduct of the ballot.” Notice was given to all parties and the hearings began. The
evidence against the AFL and the company was considerable to say the least, consisting of a
half-dozen separate complaint categories that involved intimidation, threats, misinformation, and
a general collusion between AFL loyalists, TCC supervisory staff, and a company management
that turned a blind-eye to the goings on. 432
The NLRB reports made something else quite plain. Tennessee Copper managers were
not going to be victims in the continuing labor war between the CIO and the AFL. What TCC
management actually allowed and supported was a considerable stretch from the rhetoric of
company’s progressive owner. From the beginning of the dispute between the AFL and the CIO,
TCC managers had clearly favored the AFL. If the company was going to have to deal with the
reality of organized labor under the regime of the New Deal’s mandates, the corporation
preferred to do so on its own terms. TCC wanted to maintain control over how many of the men
would be unionized, what kind of power those unionized men could hold and what ideological
notions that workers’ association would advance. Company official Barclay made it plain in his
journal entries during this period that any union affiliated with the CIO would not be a favorite
of management. 433
The NLRB reports substantiated claims by the CIO of AFL favoritism at TCC. While a
direct link to particular TCC executives could not be found, it was to clear that the Board’s
examiners did not doubt TCC operators directed or allowed supervisory staff to help squash CIO
sympathy among the workers. At hearings held after the first disputed TCC election, witness
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after witness admitted before the Labor Board his part in trying to manipulate the outcome of
NLRB elections. 434
Testifying with pride, indeed often demonstrating a sense of duty, TCC supervisory staff
and workers recounted how they had engaged in regular intimidation and interference intended
to strengthen AFL support. They all considered themselves loyal Tennessee Copper Company
men. They concentrated their anti-CIO efforts on Isabella and Ducktown workers where they
knew where company loyalty was weakest. Workers from the mining burgs testified as well and
described how they had been targets. In many instances those accused of unlawful actions had
no remorse and saw their actions as patriotic. By putting down CIO influence, conservative
workers believed they were protecting their livelihoods and ridding the Basin of radical labor
ideas. They all held fears of John L. Lewis as a would-be labor dictator. The logic and ideology
espoused by AFL sympathizers tended to be simple: They wanted to continue working in the
manner they had been accustomed to at TCC and within the Federation. To them, those
arrangements were the very essence of Americanism. CIO-style organizing was collective and
limited a man’s own destiny. 435 What is fascinating is how these men appear to have believed
Mine, Mill had suddenly changed once it joined with the CIO. Any regard or loyalty these
former members of Mine, Mill may have once held for their old union evaporated once it left the
Federation. 436
Truck foreman Arthur Dalton and labor foreman Ed Donaldson for instance had each
decided it was time to shut down the CIO. Both fellows were strong supporters of the AFL and
each admitted he had engaged in open electioneering and lecturing of employees they
supervised. Assistant general foreman Young Querry likewise argued the benefits of the AFL to
434
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his Isabella men. Walter Loudermilk remembered these exchanges. Querry had told him, “if the
CIO won John L. Lewis would call the employees out on sympathetic strikes.” 437
Querry, like many anti-CIO men, had become convinced CIO affiliation would pull TCC
workers into fights that were none of their business in a larger war to establish a collective
workers’ society. D. B. Epperson, an Isabella general foreman had been sizing things up. He
then set upon his men, telling them “he would know what was what soon before long,” implying
their ballots would not be kept secret. In a world where armed violence often accompanied pride
in conflicts, such vague threats disturbed a man. 438 Epperson declared he wanted no part of a
union, but were he to join one it would be the Federation and not Lewis’s dictatorship. If you
vote for the CIO, he claimed, you vote away your jobs. Foreman O.K. Lyle informed associate
Noah Parris summarized the CIO as “un-American.” “If the CIO wins,” the Lyle had threatened,
“employees would have no jobs.” 439
The concept of “industrial unionism” was not one that many of these men understood
very well. To them it was a just a new kind of “bolshevism”—and promotions of it conjured up
stories from newsreels shown at the Cherokee theater and newspapers of violent overthrow of
society and the confiscation of private property. It was clear from the intensity of the actions
recorded through the NLRB hearings that a true sense of panic lay among rank-and-file
Federation loyalists in the Copper Basin. Copper sulphate foreman Arthur Bellew told David
Queen that “he had done everything he could” before the election to make his men vote AFL. 440
In Noah Parris’s mind, to align with the CIO would be to align against the company and
opportunities for capitalist employment. General rigger Marion Hamby let his suspicions be
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known about men he knew who had gone CIO. “I understand you lined up with them Ducktown
boys,” he had threatened some. “You better lay off that bunch there. The CIO isn’t anything to
have here [in Copperhill].” Hamby’s point was a class-based fear. The specter of life with the
CIO meant an end to the kind of middle class status and distinctions enjoyed in the TwinCities. 441
In the hearings, not a single foreman denied any charge of illegal interference. NLRB
examiners were somewhat taken aback by the pride demonstrated by these men and the intensity
of the men’s attitudes as expressed in their raw emotions surprised official too. The number of
incriminating accounts by workers such as Wes Helton, Isaac Turner, Carl Panter, Gus Nelson,
A.J. Harper was large enough that Board officials found it easy to conclude that other instances
of interference by foremen existed. Concluded the Board, the “uncontroverted evidence
previously described established such employer interference as to require a new election.”
Supervisory employees engaged in “threats of reprisals” and Board examiners ruled that any
defense of these actions as simply examples of workers protecting their livelihoods was
“unsatisfactory and alarmist.” As a result of the aggressive acts, the Board ruled the AFL
election victory in 1938 “null and void.” 442
The rhetorical war moved into a new phase when news of a new election made the rounds
among TCC crews. Through the summer and fall of 1938 rhetorical barrages from the opposing
sides flew across the Basin’s red hills. Copperhill AFL local President John Deal and his
secretary J.P. Chastain, launched the first offensive volley. Warning time and again about
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dangerous repercussion were TCC workers to allow Mine, Mill full regional control, he urged
workers not to break from the Federation’s powerful forces in labor’s war against its foes. 443
In light of the substantial benefits Mine, Mill wrung from TCC operators in the thirties,
AFL leaders had a considerable challenge before them. How does one convince workers to
abandon a union that had clear advantages for miners and for men with fewer skills than the
craftsmen? Copper Basin AFL leaders met this challenge by ignoring Mine, Mill victories and
instead exaggerated the danger of “communism” for working people. In doing so the AFL
redirected public debate from reality to fear.
Deal and Chastain summarized CIO complaints over the election as sinister tactics, proof
of pro-communist ambition by Mine, Mill sympathizers and typical of communist actions taken
nationally. The had the Copper City Advance post a warning “To the Workers of the Copper
Basin.” The long notice was an appeal to all TCC workers not just AFL sympathizers. Deal and
Chastain hoped that a listing of the dangers of CIO affiliation would persuade practical TCC men
to see why the Federation must prevail in the collective bargaining struggle. Deal chronicled
recent developments in the union war and where CIO challenges had been met by advance forces
of the Federation. The battle in the Copper Basin had gotten so important, Deal said, that AFL
officials far away had grown keenly interested and were doing what they could to aid TCC men.
In the nation’s capital, Joseph Padway, Chief of the AFL’s Executive Council, had been urging
National Labor Relations Board officials to recognize that “the majority” of TCC men did not
want the CIO. The full Executive Council, having met in Atlantic City, sent notice to Copper
Basin men that workers had most benefited while their union had been in the AFL family. It was
not Mine, Mill that had been most beneficial to workers, Deal claimed, but the Federation itself.
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“Every advancement that Labor has made—in any industry,” stated Federation officials from
Atlantic City, “has been made under the leadership of the American Federation of Labor. “ 444
Such unsubstantiated assertions required no proof; they stood as fiat declarations and
were wholly improvable one way or another, but that fact never mattered. This method of
attacking the CIO, maintained throughout the late thirties, relied on emotional appeal, not
rationality.
To rally more support among the local rank-and-file, Deal announced the imminent
arrival of certain labor personalities. Gerald Foley, President of the Tennessee Federation of
Labor and secretary-treasurer of the Chattanooga Labor World, and AFL representative and
Knoxville Labor News editor W. Clay McKenzie were both coming to have direct talks with the
working men of the Copper Basin. Foley’s office stated the members of the Tennessee
Federation’s Executive Board would “do all in their power for the workers in the Copper Basin.”
Chattanooga AFL men joined up too: Tommy Cuthbert threw in his support as editor of the
Chattanooga Labor World 445 .
All this outside support had increased AFL popularity in Copperhill, which Deal claimed
was growing everyday. It should be noted in all this that it was never okay in the minds of their
enemies that CIO “outsiders” might come to Ducktown and organize for Mine, Mill’s
“communistic” organization, but it was perfectly fine and indeed stood as proof of powerful,
regional camaraderie that AFL men from outside the Basin were willing to come to Copperhill
and rally the conservative cause. AFL men never let obvious hypocrisy in their own actions
interfere with their campaign.
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“Nearly one hundred good men” joined the new AFL local in a single week claimed
Deal. This occurred in spite of new allegations by a CIO union organizer Deal dismissed as
“Pitiful Little Pegues.” “Pegues”—whose first name lay nowhere in the record—had attacked the
integrity of the AFL’s bookkeeping in the pro-CIO People’s Press. Deal derided the article as
being just another example of propaganda from a “communistically-colored rag…as red as the
shirt worn by [any] CIO” lawyer. 446
CIO rhetorical attacks on the AFL focused on the Federation men’s often overly cozy
relationships with important local businessmen. The CIO also sought to remind workers that
craft unions historically operated as “social clubs” sometimes “organized by employers.” The
location of new Twin-Cities AFL local within The First National Bank fueled more suspicion
among CIO sympathizers. AFL unions had seen a lot of embezzling and in an era of
considerable economic hardship, any alleged abuse of precious dues money became a scandal.
CIO leaders were intent on portraying the AFL as a selfish organization, one abusive of others’
interests. In defense, Deal tried to assure locals that transparency in AFL accounting had been
arranged. “We have invited Brother Payne, secretary of the CIO local at Ducktown to come in
and examine our books.” In fact, Deal offered, “we shall be glad to have any reputable member
of the Ducktown or Isabella Locals to come in and examine our books.” 447
Deal then returned fire on the CIO. He asserted that Mine, Mill’s International and its
friends in the press were “constantly planning methods whereby the money in [Mine, Mill
Copper Basin locals] would be wrested away” to finance communist activity in other places.
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CIO claims of AFL financial insecurity, he argued, were a smoke screen to distract from Mine,
Mill’s own thieving.” 448
AFL assertions were a collection of contradictions. On the one hand, Deal wanted
workers to be aware that the AFL was watching out for their ambitions while the CIO tried to
destroy the interests of organized labor. “The [AFL] Committee in Washington is bringing out,
every day, evidences of the diabolical plots of Communists to destroy America, and these
Communists are all active officers in the CIO.” But in other remarks Deal claimed the CIO
movement as disintegrating. “Read your daily papers, listen to the Radio. In the automobile
industry the CIO is split into factions, each cussing the other side out, both charging that the
other side is filled with Communists.” “Throughout the country,” Deal went on, “today and
everyday the CIO is folding up like cornshoots!” 449
AFL supporters printed and distributed flyers with such rhetoric throughout 1938-1940.
They all held hysterical appeals that had gained a great deal of potency from the public’s reaction
to the Dies Committee Congressional investigations held in August 1938. One notice placed by
local AFL organizer James F. Barrett, cited AFL President William Green’s assertion that
testimony from recent Dies Committee hearings “shows that [the] CIO organization has two
hundred Communists employed as organizers.” This horde threatened “the wives and the little
children in the homes of the workers.” Labor officials and the common man must join forces to
reveal the true nature of the CIO. “The man who faithfully performs…[for] workers, their wives
and little children MUST tell the Truth.” 450 Barrett’s immediate purpose had been to respond to
recent attacks made by Copper Basin Mine, Mill men that it was in fact the AFL where
communists lurked. Barrett called on Mine, Mill leaders to admit to being written up in
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Pittsburgh communist newspapers and that according to Green the CIO was “dominated and
controlled by communists.” 451
Green attacked the CIO later that month using another tactic by claiming that the NLRB
was regularly disobeying Congressional intent by consistently siding with John L. Lewis and the
CIO. In a conspiratorial manner Lewis was now using “Federal Government agencies as
recruiting agents” for CIO unions. Referring to a recent NLRB decision as an example that
granted the CIO collective bargaining rights over coal mines in Harlan County, Kentucky, Green
claimed that Lewis’ tactics in influencing the NLRB effectively disenfranchised the working
man. CIO tactics thus stood in contrast with those of the AFL “which operates on democratic
principles as the true representative and choice of the miners.” Green equated CIO membership
with being a mere vassal under a labor despotism. 452
The Congressional hearings of the Dies Committee (known more commonly as the House
Un-American Activities Committee) had been covered in regional papers and likely too in local
radio reports. In one report from the hearings, John P. Frey, head to the Federation’s Metals
Trades Department—a direct jurisdictional competitor with Mine, Mill—declared the CIO and
Mine, Mill was “honey-combed with Reds.” Frey admitted the CIO leadership itself was
“opposed to communism” publically, but that it used communists to the union’s advantage. “280
Communist party members were or had been on CIO pay rolls as organizers and officials” Frey
had said. These circumstances could not be allowed to continue unnoticed by the public. It was,
he declared, “time the public knew the truth about the efforts of the Communist Party in the
United States to carry out the purpose of Moscow and the Third International, whose purpose is
revolution.” Frey went on to condemn CIO tactics like the sit-down strike and mass picketing as
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“frontline” actions in the “trenches” of this revolution. To alarm religious Protestants, Frey
linked the communists who had infiltrated the CIO to Soviet efforts attacking religion. Then
Frey went further by claiming the American Communist Party had been trying to enlist working
class Catholics. As with nearly all such anti-CIO attacks, Frey did not attempt to provide
specifics or absolute proof in his testimony. His rhetoric stood mainly as pure allusion and
suspicion, the links vaguely possible and always conspiratorial. Most important, they were as
impossible to disprove as they were to prove and thus worked to weaken public trust in the
CIO. 453
Anti-CIO and anti-communist rhetoric was not of course limited to AFL loyalists.
Partisan politics supplied additional opportunities to exploit fears of a red menace. Republicans
and other pro-business conservatives used the fear of the CIO and communism to their advantage
in combating the policies of the New Deal. As well, local papers caught the anti-communist
fever which was sometimes combined with attacks on the New Deal. Both the Copperhill and
country-seat newspaper, the Benton-based Polk County News, appeared to be run by
Republicans, but of the two, the Polk Country News was by far the most regular and strident
critic of the New Deal. The paper ran a special Picture Parade feature, “Communism, 1938
Variety” which reported on recent investigations done by the Dies Committee. The report stated
that “while American Communism of 1938 is less red-bearded than a decade ago [and] less of a
threat to national security than popularly supposed… this does not minimize its importance in the
American scene.” 454 The article provided images and short summaries on the office and
activities of the American Communist Party, based in New York City. Granted, the tenor of the
article was mostly one of fascination and sensationalism but given the regular editorial pitch in
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the pages of The News, the article was not intended as a casual conversation piece. It was
intended to remind locals—especially Copper Basin workers, no doubt—of the threat
communism posed to them. The article contributed to the anti-organized labor sentiments in the
Tri-state the Polk County News had been promoting through its editorials and front page political
cartoons for years. Throughout the next decade the paper continued its attacks on liberal policies,
federal expenditures, “communism” and organized labor.455
In a last plea “to the employees of the Tennessee Copper Company,” published by the
Copperhill City Advance a few days before the scheduled NLRB election in late fall 1938, local
AFL organizer James F. Barrett made a very long and exhaustive plea. He echoed national
Federation allegations of NLRB favoritism toward the CIO and summarized the Federation’s
past ability to deliver to workers. Barrett warned men their power to garner favorable contracts
would lessen if they chose the CIO over the AFL. Barrett said the Labor Board was merely a
tool of the CIO and part of Lewis’s attempt to gain complete control over national labor which in
the end would only benefit Lewis. The Labor Board’s previous decision to ignore the will of
TCC workers had been, he said, “one of the strangest and most flagrantly unjust decisions ever
handed down by any tribunal.” 456 Barrett announced an AFL plea for an injunction, which he
hoped might lead a federal court to intercede and shut down the election. But were the election to
take place, each man must remember that he would have to live with the consequences. 457
Barrett questioned CIO accounting practices and warned that if given the chance Mine,
Mill would levy assessments at will. He also reminded TCC workers that Mine, Mill had been
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unable to secure a new contract since the representation controversy had begun. Wasn’t this
proof of CIO impotency? Most important, he alleged if the CIO won,
“You will be working under orders and directions of the Communists, for there are so
many Communists in positions of power in the CIO that all International and all local unions
affiliated with the CIO are under control of these Communist leaders. In fact, there would be no
CIO if it weren’t for these Communists.” 458

In contrast Barrett argued Federation men were churchmen and members of fraternal
orders and this “fact” stood in stark relief to the values embraced by CIO organizers, whose way
of life would destroy conventional morality. “Communism,” he claimed, “destroys the churches
and is making every effort to wipe out religion.” Finally, Barrett asked the men to think about
the power of connections they would lose if the AFL went down before the power of the CIO.
No CIO workers’ organizations stood between the Copper Basin and Atlanta. In fact, no
organized labor groups in Atlanta were CIO, nor in Knoxville nor even in Chattanooga. If
Copper Basin workers joined the CIO movement they would be alone. But if they went AFL,
they would have huge regional organizations in Tennessee, Carolina, and Georgia that would
support them. These claims contradict the evidence, but this does not seem to have made a
difference to Barrett, who may have figured a lot of men would not know the difference. 459
Barrett then offered an olive branch to his opposition. No matter what the outcome of
the 4 November NLRB election, it was his hope all persons involved remember:
“the majority ought to rule in every instance in this land of ours… we may differ in our
opinions as to the best way to go, but I want to say to you fine men in this Copper Basin that as
Almighty God is my judge I wish for each one of your good health, happiness, and of those
things that will best contribute to your happiness and to the happiness of your wives and
children.” 460
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Barrett’s last ditch at graciousness may have been owing to his suspicions of how the
election would turn out. Too many disgruntled miners knew that the copper industry was on the
rebound; the mere fact of the CIO movement’s existence was a kind of defeat to conservatives.
For all its efforts, the Twin-cities-based AFL secession-movement from Mine, Mill had been not
been a successful in the mining villages. At some point all TCC men would have to come
together and begin to heal their wounds.
When the votes had been counted after the 4 November 1938 election it was clear
hundreds of men among Tennessee Copper’s 1,122 eligible workers remained loyal to Mine,
Mill and the CIO and they now stood as the majority of workers. For these 516 men, affiliation
with the CIO would now mean even unskilled men would have a say in labor negotiations and
that the craftsmen were not going to control the union. Still, fear had remained strong among
many workers: over one hundred men avoided the polls and twelve men again voted for no
union whatsoever. NLRB officials considered several complaints and appeals made by TCC
and the AFL, but found them all wanting. Mine, Mill was declared victorious in January, 1939.
Suspicions about the election’s outcome must have been keen among AFL sympathizers and
CIO critics. Mine, Mill had the Copper City Advance print word for word NLRB Chairman
Warren Madden’s “Certification of Representatives” in hopes that would quiet any dispute. 461
It is clear Mine, Mill wanted now to mend relations among the war crews as soon as
possible. The certification notice in the paper was accompanied by a Mine, Mill union
membership application and an invitation to all TCC workers to join the “reorganized”
Copperhill Mine, Mill Local 176. Everyone was invited to a mass meeting wherein the whole
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community could discuss the next step in regional labor relations. Union membership was being
offered at a discount for a very limited time—just two days!--at $2; reinstatement for wanderers
would be $1. The deal was a good one given that regular membership cost $4 and reinstatement,
five bucks. To further entice locals, union organizers said “good music, singing, eats, and
speaking” could be enjoyed at the meeting to be held in the “Copperhill High” school
auditorium: “Everything is free!” “At last peace can rule in Ducktown Copper Basin, instead of
bitterness, strife and turmoil” announced a hopeful Copperhill Mine, Mill. “As the old saying
goes, ‘United We Stand, and Divided We Fall.’” 462
No uniting commenced however, neither between warring factions in the workforce nor
between Mine, Mill and TCC. The last negotiated contract expired in April 1939 and
negotiations remained bogged down. By early summer 1939, it was clear Mine, Mill was having
real problems getting AFL loyalists to join efforts in coordinating a united front for collective
bargaining with TCC. Buried in a late June issue of the Copper City Advance lay a notice “to
whom it may concern,” by Local 176 President Clarence Sutton and his secretary Freed
Townsend. The two wanted to remind workers who had not yet joined Mine, Mill that their
Local 176 now had a new constitution and by-laws. Now was time to take advantage of another
round of reduced union initiation fees. Meanwhile, AFL loyalists remained active advocates of
their union, refusing to give up the fight to oust the CIO from the Copper Basin. 463
Fed up: Anderson and Mine, Mill call for a walkout
Believing it had secured a mandate from local working people, Mine, Mill set about
demanding that TCC provide back-pay from the stretch-out era, and that every worker’s
paycheck now include payday deductions of union dues. More important for overall company
462

IUMMSW notice, Copper City Advance, 10, February 1939.
Lampell Report, NCPR, 4. Local 176 IUMMSW, “To Whom It May Concern,” Copper City Advance, 30 June
1939.

463

262
relations, the union complained that TCC was not supporting the results of the January election.
Mine, Mill accused TCC of refusing to let the old AFL-CIO conflict lie and stalling contract
negotiations. “As we see it,” wrote Anderson to J.N. Houser in a letter summarizing the union’s
frustrations that summer, “if democratic principles of majority rule had been adhered to in its
entirety with no concession or encouragement given to the minority, then at the present time we
would not be faced with the situation we have today.” 464
Believing TCC had backed it into a corner, Mine, Mill employed radical measures; the
union called for a mass walkout in mid-July to protect the interests of its rank-and-file and their
communities. The strike demonstrated the breadth of Mine, Mill support in Ducktown and
Isabella, the devotion of the rank-and-file to their union, and that the cohesion NLRB observers
described between the mining communities was real. But the strike also revealed persistence of
divided loyalties. Although this was a Mine, Mill strike, both unions publically advocated on
behalf of their respective rank-and-file. Both the CIO and the AFL supported the families of their
respective membership in lieu of regular pay. Each union put on public displays of support for
their cause, which included rallies, pamphleteering, processionals, picketing and appeals to the
local citizenry for support. Although the walkout had been peaceful, the disturbance of the
region’s industrial peace—the most extensive one in a generation—was frightening to many
citizens and they demanded local police authorities step in to calm tensions. Sheriff Broughton
Biggs found in the disturbance an opportunity to ingratiate himself with citizens while garnering
largess from TCC by leading a deputy army. 465
R.E. Barclay’s diary stated that by the summer of 1939 rumors in the mining towns were
strong that a strike was pending. His comments betray an understanding that all was not happy
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among the mining folk of Ducktown and Isabella despite previous TCC contracts with Mine,
Mill. “The miners have been threatening to strike for several years,” Barclay claimed. “The CIO,
headed by an outside organizer named Anderson [was] engineering the discontent.” Mine, Mill
called for the strike while Houser was in California for the week, the CIO strike against
Tennessee Copper Company commenced on July 14 and in response acting manager F.J.
Longworth shut down the plant. “There is no dispute about wages, hours, or working
conditions,” Barclay claimed in his diary. Further ignoring facts, he claimed that “the CIO is in
the minority [but] Longworth shut the whole pant after the CIO had served its strike
ultimatum.” 466
Barclay may have thought he knew Mine, Mill’s demands, but either he was ignorant or
simply dismissive of CIO complaints. Others investigating the strike stated Mine, Mill
organizers told them that working conditions and back-pay were in fact central complaints
against TCC. Mine, Mill wanted guarantees about shift schedules and “no more violations of the
eight-hour day”; the union also wanted improved safety conditions—Houser’s focus
notwithstanding. The union claimed that mine hoist cages had too few men overseeing
operations and since these requirements were now the law in Alabama, Mine, Mill wanted the
same protections brought to Ducktown. Regarding grievance reporting, Mine, Mill claimed the
current system was too favorable to TCC and requested “all disputes be turned over to the
Conciliation Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor.” Furthermore, the impoverished living
conditions of a lot of the poorest miners demanded attention. 467
It was no surprise then that the strike’s heart beat most furiously in the struggling mining
communities and not in Copperhill. The strike began without violence though Mine, Mill
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installed collections of union men as guards and pickets at all the mining and plant facilities. The
CIO’s main strike headquarters sat in a hut below the General Office at the foot of Smelter Hill
where a dozen pickets stood as sentinels. Only TCC train crews “and a few other men” continued
to work delivering cars to the L & N, but eventually almost everyone went home. 468 Pump men
remained to keep the mines from flooding and company firemen stayed on the job at all TCC
facilities to protect the property from fire. No interruption of electricity or water occurred. The
strike did not affect any salaried men, “but all day pay men are out” recorded Barclay; as a result
he noted salaried men could do “no work of any production or maintenance nature.” 469 By 17
July Barclay was lamenting the state of operations: “The old plant as quite as a tomb … for the
first time in longer than anyone care[d] to remember operations at the Tennessee Copper
Company has ceased.” 470
One week after the strike commenced no negotiations had yet begun, but Mine, Mill men
did not abandon what they saw as their duty to assist TCC Mining Department managers in
maintaining machines and safety. The Copper City Advance made no mention of union
cooperation in this regard and instead warned of the dangers risked by encouraging the strike to
go on; the paper reminded all interested parties that “the plant was the only means of livelihood
for thousands of people in and around the [Copper] Basin.” 471 Pickets had remained peaceful in
all the towns, but the circumstances among “merchants and professional men here have [been]
keenly felt as business has been at a standstill.” The paper said you could call the troubles either
a shutdown or a strike “use either if you prefer,” but the fact was that “several families are
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already destitute.” The rival unions both claimed they would take care of such people. Records
indicate they did. 472
The AFL did not sit idly by during all this and took advantage of what it saw as
miscalculation on the part of Mine, Mill in calling for a walkout. The union may also have
helped Mining Department officials in stowing explosives in surface magazines. AFL organizer
James F. Barrett sought outside assistance. He told the Copper City Advance that he planned to
appeal to the regional Tennessee Federation for help. His assistant, A.A. Crabbe, spoke before a
crowd of locals in Copperhill and received a round of applause when he said that he hoped the
whole affair could be settled without violence. “I am praying that the strike will be settled
without a fist doubled, a knife opened or a pistol drawn.” AFL officials ingratiated themselves to
locals by informing workers and their families that “various local churches” would be praying
for their welfare and “asking for divine providence to take a hand in the situation.” 473
Mitchell C. Anderson’s well-honed administrative skills were especially noted during his
oversight of Mine, Mill’s relief efforts. Apparently a meticulous record-keeper, he earned the
trust of his International which assisted him by sending in $30,000 worth of groceries for use
during the walkout. This was a huge sum and Anderson remained true to form in his
administration of this relief. He accounted “to the penny” the distribution of $1,000 of union
goods to Mine, Mill men and their families each week for the duration of the strike.474
During the strike the warring unions and local police authorities used organized
processionals to try to persuade local people to rally round their respective cause. For instance,
AFL leaders put on a huge parade in downtown Copperhill that galvanized their support in the
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Twin Cities. The union reminded local people that it was not on strike, that the AFL was abiding
by the law, sticking with the company and concerned with the people’s needs. The strike and its
terrible consequences were the CIO’s doing. Barclay said the AFL action was “followed by a
mass meeting at the school house.” 475 Photos of the town taken during the strike show a
prominent banner supporting the AFL hanging across the Copperhill’s main street. Despite a
dearth of reports, it seems likely that public AFL actions would have resembled other
conservative labor processionals of this era. The Federation parade would have likely had an
anti-communist theme and featured the families of AFL sympathizers. During the Hershey labor
disturbances, for example, anti-CIO families, that later supported an AFL local, rallied in a
patriotic manner showing their support for capitalism, Christianity, and for their employer.476
AFL support in the region had been growing as a result of the Copper Basin union war.
In late July 1939 a contingent of union men from Tennessee Corporation’s North Carolina
Fontana mine came to Copperhill to announce their new allegiance to the Federation having just
withdrawn from Mine, Mill. 477 To maintain the momentum of their cause AFL leaders held
rallies at the Basin’s recently completed Johnson “College” building as paydays got ever
slimmer and the economic effects of the strike hit hard. Reports are unclear, but Mine, Mill
efforts notwithstanding, not all workers received aid during the strike. Some anti-union workers
refused CIO or AFL help, while others may have been too isolated or proud to ask for help.
Others in the Basin seemed detached from the immediacy of the strike’s hardships. Barclay, for
instance, remained at work and was convinced that his superiors would prevail. In his journal he
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down-played the effects of the shutdown and claimed that among the general public there was
“little uneasiness over the ultimate outcome of the strike.” 478
But AFL men apparently saw things differently and claimed that many families suffered
during the strike; there is little detail as to just how the Federation responded beyond
acknowledgements that it did. Disaffected men and men who had never wanted union
membership were in a particularly dire position as they had no assistance from any union and
likely had to rely on local charity. In one of its rare non-editorial accounts of the strike, The Polk
County News said that some 1,500 people had applied for unemployment compensation as a
result of the strike. This figure included more than just TCC’s employees and underscored the
fact that unemployment relief would have been especially essential for men who had attempted
to remain independent from all unions. For such independent souls, having to rely on public
assistance must have been humiliating. Dozens of other working people who relied on income
from support industries at TCC must have been included in the 1500 persons. 479
The use of public processionals was not a strategy limited to AFL union organizers.
Sheriff Broughton Biggs burnished his Polk County police authority during the strike in part by
organizing a processional of “deputies” to remind local folk that he was on the job to provide law
and order at a dangerous time. There was some cause for alarm in light of the recent violence by
angry workers. According to a report on the strike in the Birmingham Labor Advocate, several
local AFL men sustained attacks that autumn. The paper attributed the attacks to “CIO thugs”
but it gave no names and no arrests had been made. The report also recounted another incident.
“One man was shot with a shotgun and two members of the CIO were charged with the
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shooting.” 480 As was typical of its coverage on the issue, the AFL-sympathetic Birmingham
paper provided no names of the attackers or evidence that they were indeed members of Mine,
Mill. In fact, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that only CIO sympathizers were
responsible for the violence endured by locals in the Copper Basin at this time.
During the strike, The Copper City Advance continued its anti-CIO coverage of events.
Proposals put forth by Mine, Mill officials, the paper said, would require every working man at
Tennessee Copper Company to join the union, pay a fee for the privilege and have pay withheld
by TCC for the CIO. Proposals to TCC had been delivered, the paper said, to the company by
none other than Clarence “Red” Sutton. In its reportage on Mine, Mill’s rival, the City Advance
presented Federation proposals as reasonable in nature. Federation officials stepped in and
proposed a settlement that would benefit the company and themselves. Their proposed status quo
antebellum: All men were to return to work just as they had done up to 13 July 1939 and, “that
within five days both the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. unions [would then] agree to enter into a consent
election…. Which ever party receives the majority of votes cast shall be the sole bargaining
agency for one year and that the losing party agree [sic] to withdraw entirely for one year from
the date of the election.” 481
The CIO refused to accept any self-serving AFL olive branches. Mine, Mill leaders
decided instead they had to tighten control over TCC facilities to strengthen their position; the
union dug in its heals, joined the AFL in passing around circulars, and prevented more men from
reporting to work. Mine, Mill did the latter by narrowing its list of allowable work at TCC plants
and mines. Pickets now refused to let TCC chemists go to their laboratories. The number of
supply house men allowed to report for duty was cut to three. Supply house clerks would be
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required to pass through a more rigid security. Rumors spread that soon all clerks would be
barred from the plants in Ducktown, Isabella, and Copperhill. Given the extensive maintenance
needs of vast and various TCC facilities, these CIO actions fully shut the company down. 482
Meanwhile, the crowds of CIO sympathizers that had been gathering at the picket huts and
company property gates grew in size. Men began to spend their idle time around the huts as the
strike settled into a kind of routine: whittling. Indeed, as captured on film, because of the
extensive whittling done by these men the grounds around the picket huts lay covered in wood
shavings several inches deep in some places. 483
The rival unions rejected each other’s proposals to end the strike. Neither union had taken
a position that would allow for the establishment of a true middle ground and neither side was
willing to compromise because both sides had defined the other’s position as not merely
incorrect, but unjust. The AFL had been especially sharp in its attacks, but to leaders of both
unions, compromise equaled surrender. As a result of their intractable positions, paydays came
and went and no pay went out for most men. What few men who did get pay saw their earnings
dwindle. Barclay said TCC remained like“a graveyard” and local municipal and business elite
now saw the strike as killing business and frustrating citizens. Thousands of dollars that typically
rained down upon local businesses were not forthcoming. The Copperhill paper described the
town as a land of idle hands as a result of union “deadlocks” and “flat rejection.” In this region,
so informed by an overwhelming Calvinist religiosity, idleness itself was too close to willful
sinfulness to excuse without suspicion; for CIO detractors idle hands were just another reason to
condemn the union. 484
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Tennessee Copper’s public campaign: “A Pictorial Outline of the Ducktown Basin”
One of the few direct windows into management’s role during the strike came from R.E.
Barclay’s mid-level administrative perspective. Too important to management to be sent home
given his responsibilities in overseeing company paperwork, but not important enough to
delegate day to day responsibilities to other men, R.E. Barclay remained at work and watched the
action unfold. TCC sent most of the upper management from the mines and smelters on
“vacation” during the walkout; these salaried men were to stay away from company works—
getting their regular pay no doubt—and only “return as needed.” Barclay’s own office work
slowed to a crawl; he noted he could do nothing but complete the regular reports to his superiors
and hang out at his office with a few middle managers, E.C. McCay and Homer Wehunt from the
Acid House, Robert Kilpatrick from the Mining Office, and “Ritchie” from the Smelter Office.
485

According to Barclay, official company policy during the first several weeks of the strike
was to resist direct confrontation with the CIO. But in truth, the company held almost all the
cards in this game of industrial relations poker. The fact that 1,500 men showed up to replace
strikers is one indication of the weakness of the local labor market. In Barclay’s mind, provoked
and provocative union men would have to return to work at some point, but his comments on this
require qualification. Barclay did not know all the strategies his superiors might employ and he
does not appear to have been a confidante of members of the inner most circle of Tennessee
Corporation or TCC corporate heads. As a result, his remarks were merely reactions and were
not always consistent. One day all appeared to be fine with the company in spite of the walkout
and a few days later a sense of alarm bursts forth from his journal. Barclay, it seems, got his
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information on a need-to-know basis. Therefore, he tended to convey company positions in the
manner of someone trying to explain events. His circumstance as a middle level administrator
left him often speculating without any specific reference to a source. One telling instance lay in
his remarks about company strategy: “Enough rope is being let out to insure a complete ‘suicide’
on the part of those responsible for the wholly uncalled-for strike—or at least this seems to be
the belief generally.” 486
General Manager J.N. Houser did put Barclay to work on one very special public
relations project during the strike. Barclay was to review the conditions of the facilities and then
work a Knoxville reporter to create a multi-page insert for the Knoxville Journal, a popular TriState newspaper that had tens of thousands of readers. The full title of this masterpiece of
corporate propaganda included a reminder for the public of the Tri-State: It was “A Pictorial
Outline of the Ducktown Basin… in which is located one of the largest of the major industries of
East Tennessee.” 487
Barclay’s historical expertise and renown among locals appeared everywhere in the
multi-page spread. Its purpose was to advance TCC’s corporate image and to position the
company as the most reasonable force for industrial peace in the Tri-State. To prepare for the
insert, TCC management told Barclay to take sympathetic reporters and local photographer T. S.
Weaver on a tour of TCC’s facilities. The timing of the piece coincided with an editorial report
in the same issue of the Journal condemning the effects of the ongoing national union war
between the AFL and CIO. The Journal’s editors and TCC left it up to readers to make the
obvious connection between the significance of both pieces. The day The Pictorial appeared was
important too, a Friday. This timing allowed readers a weekend to consider and discuss the
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consequence of a CIO union destroying the critical and benevolent company The Pictorial
described. 488
The Pictorial advanced the idea—without a direct attack on organized labor—that it was
Tennessee Corporation through the Tennessee Copper Company that deserved the public’s trust
in these uncertain times of radical labor strikes at home and increasing threats to the nation’s
security. Once the public was informed of TCC’s significance to the region, the company would
appear more trustworthy than either quarreling unions or meddling, vaguely socialist-leaning,
“outsider” government officials. 489
New South boosterism at its finest, The Pictorial provided Tri-State readers with a
combination history lesson and company hagiography. The text and illustrations had a friendly,
if instructive manner about them. In a section of the piece perfect for high school geology
instruction, the insert explained how a single lump ton of ore—made to resemble a comic book
superhero—had been transformed through the magnificence of TCC production into valuable
products: 500 lbs. of Sulphur; 17 lbs, or zinc; 23 lbs. of copper; and 700 lbs. of iron. Other
illustrations outlined the benefits TCC granted the people: the hundreds of thousands of tons of
raw ore taken from the mines, the thousands of cars of materials that kept cities like Birmingham
churning out steel and allowed towns to pave their roads in concrete; the vast amount of payroll
money which poured into the local economy, the vast amounts of annual revenue the company
spent on local companies for its supplies, and the critical importance TCC tax monies gave to
local county and state treasuries, revenues that totaled at least $200,000 to those institutions
annually. All this was chronicled, illustrated, and drawn in the most flattering of terms. Friend of
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the farmer, businessman, steel and iron worker, forestryman, industrialist, and even the humble
gardener, TCC benefited them all and thus you. 490
Tennessee Corporation’s oversight of TCC’s image through the Pictorial Outline of the
Ducktown Basin reflected efforts by other progressive companies contending with empowered
organized labor. General Electric, which throughout the 1920s and 1930s held a reputation for
progressive cooperation with organized labor had to change its industrial relations when unions
shifted strategy and sought inroads into areas traditionally controlled by the company. When,
GE’s management team decided it was necessary to contain the power of organized labor it did
so through a public relations campaign designed to strengthen the public’s perception that the
ambitions of the corporation were synonymous with the health of a community and that notions
of free enterprise were synonymous with American concepts of freedom. In this way GE was
able to build on anti-communist sentiment to neutralize union power, but at a price. In the end
the home town of GE, Schenectady, New York, once absolutely loyal to General Electric, was
not rewarded with prosperity. In spite of GE’s rhetoric, corporate loyalty to the town was weak
and GE ultimately shifted to more profitable operations centers. 491
In contrast to TCC’s magnificent public relations barrage, Mine, Mill sympathizers could
rely on only a limited number of advocates to publish any positive accounts of striking TCC
workers and their families: the union’s paper and the reportage of the CIO-allied National
Committee For People’s Rights. As for the AFL, beyond some brief accounts of that union’s
assistance to striking workers, Federation coverage of the Ducktown Basin war was limited to
the union’s regional publications. With its greater resources and connections in the print media,
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TCC was doing a fine job trouncing its competition in garnering support among the general
public. 492

TCC and Mine, Mill during the strike
The Mining Department at Tennessee Copper managed to advanced the development of
the firm’s extraction resources and maintain respectable production levels throughout the
summer of the strike. The manner in which the company organized its workers from foreman to
supervisor to miner lay behind its success. Mining department officials relied on new company
production techniques that reduced costs and improved rates of development throughout the
strike while operators steered clear of labor politics. In company reports there was little mention
of striking workers beyond acknowledging their absence and the costs inflicted upon production.
In light of the detail contained in the reports it is unlikely that managers would not have reported
union-related difficulties at job sites had those occurred.493
Inventories of work completed in the mines the summer of the strike were impressive.
Some was routine maintenance. But in place of striking miners, operating staff operated surface
and underground pumps for drinking- and fire-water. At Ducktown, new timbering of shafts
allowed completion of safe haulage tunnels where once lay unpredictable possibilities for
collapse. New blasting, maintenance, and production regimens had been going so well by midsummer 1939 that Superintendent of the Mines Lamar Weaver bragged: “Foremanship [sic] has
improved and a fine spirit of cooperation with the crew on the job and with the union committees
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has been experienced.” Weaver’s comment and others like it in his reports illustrated the
cooperation Mine, Mill gave to company operators so that the union could not be criticized as
being irresponsible. 494
The company tried to advance resource development and site maintenance, but the effects
of the walkout on production were stark. The strike allowed only 8 full days of work. Monthly
ore production levels, which had been near or above 50,000 tons of ferrous and non-ferrous
material, dropped to just over 15,000 tons in July. Mine clearage and advancement collapsed by
two-thirds. As a result, production costs per tons skyrocketed upwards of twenty-five percent. 495
In the meanwhile, world events determined how much patience TCC owners would
exhibit while Mine, Mill tried to makes its point about the necessity of democratic principals in
labor relations. Owing to increased tensions in Europe and East Asia, demand for copper took
off and prices soared. In Washington, the Roosevelt Administration, chaffing at the limits set by
the Neutrality Acts, announced that it wanted US manufacturers to sell arms during wartime.
TCC owners decided that market opportunities now outweighed arguments for appeasement with
Mine, Mill; management considered how to affect a more aggressive stance in the dispute and
end the strike. 496
Back in Ducktown, anxiety and impatience grew among Mine, Mill sympathizers. Incited
by AFL rhetoric—and the kind of anger and disappointment that can only arise in domestic
disturbances wherein both parties live in close proximity—a peaceful intercourse between union
leaders could not be sustained. By mid-August fist fights were breaking out all around the
Copper Basin between rival union members. The CIO’s response was to reinforce the pickets.
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Rumors spread that a mass attack on the CIO was immanent, by whom, no one could say—AFL?
Anti-union men? Hired thugs? Other reports flew around town that CIO sympathizers were
arming themselves by trucks “presumably” coming from Ducktown. A battalion of CIO men at
one point began marching around the General Offices. Mine, Mill stated the men took the action
“to prevent some one from ‘sneaking’ onto Smelter Hill to fire down upon the mass of pickets
below.” Again, the company did not interfere. Armed, locked, and loaded, the CIO sentinels and
loyalists argued that they were the true maintainers of the peace. If trouble were to come, it “will
come from others.” 497
It should be noted that the CIO-led Mine, Mill strike of 1939 now stood as the single
largest and longest action ever taken by organized men in the Copper Basin. There had been
previous actions taken by organized workers in the Copper Basin and in many instances those
men had been unionized, but never had as many men been involved and never had the actions
involved the entire Basin. Usually the actions had been localized, involved perhaps one firm
among the many that once operated in the Copper Basin. Many of these previous actions had
started in Isabella, a town under the thumbs of a notoriously anti-union management team. But
now radicalism seemed to boil out of the mining villages, going from town to town, from one
end of the Basin to another.
The CIO met in mid-August and elected to continue the strike; leaders reassured their
rank-and-file they had the International’s support. The vote to continue the strike was
overwhelming according to Barclay. 498 Mine, Mill’s International then sent in President Reid
Robinson to the Copper Basin to end the strike. His job was to negotiate a peace among the
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arguing rank-and-file. Stated the CIO News, Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers Union Edition about
the visit:
Workers from any of the more enlightened sections of the country where AFL and CIO
unions are cooperating in brotherhood and amity probably could not believe their eyes if they
visited the Ducktown Basin and witnessed the fink back-to-work activities of what masquerades
locally as an AFL union. 499

A tone of false surprise lay in this report because nearly every paper in the nation was
filled with stories of AFL/CIO rivalry. That said, the report did include a point by point rundown
on Federation activities in the Copper Basin. Careful reading of the CIO News account reveals
the aggressive efforts of the AFL to turn the strike into an opportunity to eliminate the CIO and
strengthen the AFL’s ranks. Emboldened from their home base in Copperhill—where banners
flew declaring the town the “Headquarters American Federation of Labor: Membership of those
eligible and who desire to return to work solicited”—Federation loyalists worked hard to rid their
Basin of “reds.” They marched provocatively through the mining villages and according to CIO
reports were up to no good. After some digging when the Federation men departed, “Mine, Mill
men found three truck loads of clubs that they were sure were to used against striking miners.”
This stash was allegedly going to be used in an attack directly on the CIO. 500
As the strike wore on towards September CIO men knew they had to take even bolder
action. They engaged in what appears to have been a multi-pronged strategy to control as much
of the territory of TCC’s plant as possible, maintain the loyalty in the mining villages and
improve the union’s reputation among the public—something CIO leaders understood was
critical for their success. Some of the approaches worked, but others backfired. It is unclear
whether Mine, Mill President Reid Robinson had set Mitchell Anderson on this course. To
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further secure company property and prevent vandalism by Mine, Mill’s enemies, CIO men
Elmer Williams and James Denton started requiring all TCC salaried men from the manager and
superintendents on down to sign passes when entering or exiting TCC property. Mine, Mill men
themselves stood guard off the TCC property as a general rule. Management’s choice it seems
was to allow the CIO a heavy presence around company gates, even near the main offices. The
leniency would have worked in TCC’s favor: Picketing Mine, Mill union men looked as if they
had taken over the mines, smelters, and sundry TCC works and were holding the Basin hostage.
Company leniency would have given credibility to AFL arguments that the CIO movement was
in fact an occupation force. 501
In another attempt to enlist public support for their union and its cause, Mine, Mill
leaders flooded the Basin with propaganda in response to similar actions taken by the AFL. Each
pamphlet argued the rightness of the union cause and pled for a compassionate public to assist in
ridding the Copper Basin of scourges to working people. These flyers would have framed their
position just as their international did, in terms of the strike being an action for democracy, for
workers’ liberty as they fought for the rights of the common man against a discriminatory AFL
hierarchy. Mine, Mill bragged about its generosity. The union’s Ducktown executive board had
even sent aid to a faraway Federation strike: Mine, Mill men “voted $50 to aid striking AFL
unions at the Green Mountain Dam in Colorado” where “vigilantes shot seven strikers and
threatened to break [the AFL] strike.” The point of this last report was to demonstrate the
willingness of the Mine, Mill to work with it rivals on a compromise. 502
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TCC management and the AFL were not impressed by CIO demonstrations of amity,
concord and goodwill. According to Barclay, the only real impact CIO circulars had on the
disputes was to increase local tensions and incite more anger between the warring factions—
making cooperation between the AFL and Mine, Mill more difficult to achieve. 503

The CIO strike on film
The official CIO strike would last into spring 1940. A film record of it exists from midfall 1939. Noticeable seasonal changes in the scenery suggest that it captured events until the
walkout ended. Grocer Carl McConnell had been on a hand during the strike and with an 8 mm
camera captured scene after scene of strikers at Ducktown outside the village’s mines, and
sundry sectors of TCC and the Copper Basin –some not easily identified. Referred to here as
“the grocer’s film” it holds remarkable imagery of striking men, their families, and union
activities over the great arc of the strike. It reveals how much of this labor conflict took place in
very public spaces and thus underlines the significance of community in the success or failure of
this and other 1930s strikes. 504
McConnell’s film stands as rare footage of an organized labor action in a Southern
industrial community complete with scenes of the men at pickets or welding signage and
placards, engaging in Appalachian folkways or employing various tactics used in that era by
strikers. Poignant scenes abound some of which must have been the most exuberant moments
for Mine, Mill folk. Others captured somber moments of anticipation where union families
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waited for relief from Anderson and his crew. Finally, the frames hold silent images of toppled
picket huts made void of their sentinels. 505
The images of a restless queue before Mine, Mill’s storehouse gave visible proof of the
efforts the union took to keep its rank-and-file from enduring economic hardship during the
walkout. Unfortunately McConnell did not capture Mitchell Clifton Anderson who personally
distributed a lot of the provisions supplied by the CIO. It was, as has been mentioned, a service
for which Anderson got considerable recognition—even from company managers. 506
Behind the scenes Anderson was doing even more. According to reports by the National
Committee For People’s Rights, Anderson had to contend with belligerent Polk County school
officials who were trying to shutdown the CIO. When the public schools stopped providing
government relief lunches to the children of striking Ducktown and Isabella workers Anderson
knew he had to contact the proper authorities in Washington D.C. Anderson’s efforts got the
Surplus Bureau in Washington to intervene, correct school officials’ illegal actions and to restore
the meal program for the children. 507
Mass demonstrations organized by Mine, Mill at Ducktown and captured on the film hold
holiday-like revelry. These lively scenes likely record the beginning of the strike, when the
weather was warm and hopes were high for a quick CIO victory; in them bands of smiling
strikers cavort and laugh; others mill about round tents along the pickets. Often the scenes
resemble more a family reunion than charged labor offensives. There are even barbeques put on
by the strikers like those enjoyed at any summer fair. But whereas fairs or fetes would be filled
also with women and children, in many images of the strike the grocer caught only the men folk
tending to their union duty. McConnell panned his camera across sites where dozens of
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determined strikers manned their stations outside TCC gates set throughout the Copper Basin.
They were part of a community in civil war and dutifully watched out for sabotage, invaders, and
scabs.
But not all the time spent among the pickets reflected defensive actions against possible
AFL incursions or heckling strike-breaking scabs. To pass the long, slow days as the strike wore
on, strikers played horseshoes in the streets, laughed and joked with one another, dealt cards and
gambled and more than anything it seems from the film, the striking men whittled. Indeed,
whittling appears to have been a nearly universal skill among the strikers, their kindred
Appalachian roots conjoining in the clay hills as they created great piles of wood shavings. One
man set about whittling copies of an entire set of tools a typical miner would have used on the
job deep underground: picks, hammers, drill bits, flash lights, clips, claws, vice grips and
more. 508
The absence of women and children in most of McConnell’s film owed more to the
cameraman’s timing than to actual events according to witnesses. Barclay alluded in passing to
women and children visiting their brothers, uncles, fathers, cousins, and grandpas at the pickets.
Women and children brought food and likely relief from boredom. There were certain times
when women kept their kids away from the men folk, such as when the men passed around
bottles of local spirits and got too raucous, exchanging rough humor as they rolled their own
smokes. 509
McConnell also managed to film a collection of threatening signs and placards made by
Mine, Mill sympathizers during the strike. Plain words, in hand-painted letters, splayed
sometimes catawampus across rough-hewn boards and sheeting, admonished the ambivalent and
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warned potential strike-breakers of the shame that would befall callous souls that crossed CIO’s
pickets. “Any man going through [the] line is a scab,” “Men don’t scab, be loyal to your fellow
man,” “Don’t have your kids say Daddy’s a scab.” More damning yet was one that read: “A scab
is yellow to the core.” One sign queried patriotic, “what would the old US be if everyone
scabbed?!” 510
Police authorities featured prominently in the film. Led by Sheriff Broughton Biggs, a
TCC-subsidized “deputy army” displayed a completely different nature than did striking
workers. Circumstances resulting from the strike and its reactions had provided Biggs an
opportunity to demonstrate power he had only recently, and narrowly, secured by defeating a
electoral challenge to his family’s dynastic power in Polk County. 511 At once head of the local
Democratic Party and the top police authority figure, Biggs acted as protector of conventions that
maintained Southern county-seat elite and TCC control over Polk. 512
Made up of hundreds of men, most from outside the Copper Basin, Biggs’ “deputy” army
appeared comical on film despite their rifles, pistols and bats. It was said they came from the
lowest sort in the Tri-state and their clothing reflects their general impoverishment. Disheveled,
baggy, unkempt, some “deputies” came suited in jacket and tie, hats akimbo; others wore their
farming togs. All of them got $5 a day for the privilege of marching with Biggs. Many partook
in a series of over-the-top theatrics and arbitrary actions intended to intimidate folk in Ducktown
and Isabella. Allegedly the deputies walked into homes without any warrant, broke open cartrunks and searched property at will on a whim. Intending alternately to threaten or
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incarcerate—it mattered little—they sought out and entrapped the suspicious and surly among
the CIO’s “radicals” and “communists.” 513
It is difficult to determine from the record just how effective Biggs’ march was. Some
sources say there was a thinning of the strikers’ ranks after the deputy army’s show of force.
Barclay claimed that “the public [was] much pleased at the presence of the deputies” and he
predicted there would be little more trouble from the CIO. 514 However the deputies also
undoubtedly elicited some negative reactions. Biggs split his men up and assigned the groups
special missions all around the Copper Basin, but it was easy for this amateur police force to step
over the line and abuse the citizenry. In light of Biggs’ admitted attitude toward the strikers,
crossing that line happened a lot. One report summarized the conduct of Biggs’ deputies: “Over
five hundred affidavits testify to violence, to threats, and illegal searches of strikers’ homes and
cars by [the] deputies.” 515
TCC offensive and Mine, Mill strike parades
In mid August 1939 TCC operators decided it was time to present their workforce, strike
sympathizers and others alike, with an ultimatum. J. N. Houser composed an open letter to
Anderson that Barclay called “a masterpiece of diplomacy and self-restraint, but its meaning was
unmistakable.” The chief clerk and his crew reproduced and stamped copies of Houser’s edict to
employees in “an all-night job.” Barclay then sent them “at a cost of two cents to local men and
six cents to workers who lived beyond the Copper Basin.” Thirteen-hundred of the letters went in
the mail. Barclay said in his diary, the “gist of the letter was that unless the CIO rescinded its
demands for the closed shop and agreed to terminate the strike within the next few days the
Company would disregard the union and resume operations.” The note further informed all TCC
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workers that they needed to decide their own fates. Any man not returning to work would lose
his job. 516
Furious at this new provocation Mitchell C. Anderson replied to Houser indirectly in the
only media forum that would allow an objective CIO report. Through an interview printed in the
Chattanooga Times, Anderson repeated Mill, Mill accusations that the company failed to
compensate workers for work done during the early thirties stretch-out, laid out a chronicle of
TCC stalling and lambasted the company’s failure to respect the NLRB election results.
Anderson then accused the company of committing a number of additional sins, the most
damning of which was colluding with AFL sympathizers through intimidation and threats by
supervisors. In a most important detail, found nowhere else in the records, Anderson reminded
Houser that all had been well between Mine, Mill and TCC until 1936 when “the American
Federation of Labor chartered a group of skilled employees at your Copperhill plant, headed by
one of your foremen.” 517
This last, perhaps critical assertion may have been true, but Anderson’s claim regarding
the birth of an AFL local in Copperhill is unsubstantiated by reports. NLRB examiners
concluded that AFL secession in Copperhill did not occur till the summer of 1937—the time of
the Georgia Federation secession movement. Barclay dismissed Anderson’s claims in the
Chattanooga Times as “misstatements of fact,” indicative of the organizer’s character. In a
statement that likely reflected his superiors’ opinions, Barclay claimed Anderson himself had

516

Barclay diary, 19 August 1939
“Company Blamed for Copper Strike: Unionist Charges That Plant Fostered Conditions Which Brought About
Walkout,” Chattanooga Times, 21 August 1939

517

285
failed to address the General Manager’s requests. But just exactly what those demands were
beyond dropping the closed shop and payday withholding Barclay did not say. 518
Barclay recounted in his journal, howver, an event that does cast Anderson in a much less
favorable light. Anderson apparently failed to show for a scheduled mid-August negotiation
meeting between J.N. Houser and Mine, Mill organizers. It should be remembered that Houser
did not live in the Copper Basin. Meeting attendance required that he travel from Knoxville.
About 150 picketing Mine, Mill men had stood outside the meeting place, their presence adding
to Houser’s humiliation and furor when Anderson and his team failed to arrive. Why Anderson
acted in this manner is unclear. Perhaps the CIO leader had been trying to give Houser a bit of
his own medicine in light of Mine, Mill frustration with TCC’s stalling tactics. Perhaps
Anderson had been delayed or sick and TCC officials never got word. Whatever the real
reasons, Mine, Mill men further aggravated the circumstances by leaving the scene in a noisy,
dusty cavalcade of about one hundred cars and trucks. TCC officials found the retreating
processional irksome even if harmless, but the bluster must have really angered Houser. The
GM responded by ordering the letter containing the company’s ultimatum. The notices informed
all who might be concerned that TCC “operations would resume at 7 am, Monday morning,
August 28th.” Barclay said that among most people in the Copper Basin, “except [for] those in
the CIO,” Houser’s “determined” actions “were hailed with delight.” 519
Biggs’ “deputies” and Houser’s ultimatum had their effects on withering CIO support
among the general public. Certainly the Copper City Advance was excited by these
developments. In earnest reports the paper stated Mine, Mill President Reid Robinson had
retreated to Denver, but said little more on the subject of negotiations with the company. The
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paper reminded citizens however that as a result of Houser’s order local merchants would soon
be seeing the fruits of revival of the company payroll. Families could once again “buy
necessities… and in many instances, pay debts accumulated” during the CIO strike. 520
After operations resumed, one sympathetic report to the AFL trumpeted with glee in the
Birmingham Labor Advocate that the “CIO Movement At Copperhill [was] vanishing.” The
report also claimed that TCC’s facility had seen a “nearly 100% return” of its workforce. The
claim was an exaggeration, but it was echoed by reports in the Polk County News, that said that
1000 men had gone back to work in the Basin. 521
Frustrations among the Mine, Mill men around the Basin now grew even more heated.
CIO members Clyde Huffman and George Earley were arrested and placed in the Blue Ridge,
Georgia jail after they allegedly hit coworker G.M Queen with a shotgun blast while Queen
walked to work one morning. The victim of the shooting had just returned to work at Tennessee
Copper—as ordered— joining hundreds of AFL workers who supported Houser’s re-opening of
the TCC works. More violence would follow. 522
TCC Reports on August work in its mines reflected the positive effects of the new
company offensive. Superintendent Lamar Weaver mentioned that in the wake of some de facto
blacklisting and replacement hiring “two very interesting safety meetings” had been held with
“the new Crew to explain our plans and procedure in applying safety first on the job.” Each of
the new men were assigned in “groups of four to six… to instructors, foremen or mine
engineers” for “a more detailed job of training these new men at their several work places.” 523
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Men were put to work to supply ore for blast furnaces and to return the works to full production.
Weaver enthused about the new men and said cooperation among the new and returning men
was excellent, allowing management “to completely reorganize crew safety and build up the
production as needed.” Soon the company even managed to set aside thousands of tons of
smelter ore at Copperhill solely for emergency use. 524
Anderson and his Mine, Mill leadership attempted to remain a potent force in spite of
these new developments. They placed their hopes on NLRB intervention and an investigation in
what Mine, Mill determined was illegal manipulation of the workforce. They held onto this hope
even though the last meeting of company officials and union leaders conducted through the
NLRB had led to nothing. 525 Accounts of Anderson and Mine, Mill’s actual strategy get sketchy
from this point forward. Before Reid Robinson left the district, he went on the radio at
Chattanooga to try and persuade listeners of the goodness of the CIO cause. He used the term
“scab” time and again in his address to drive home his point that the AFL and other enemies of
the working man were at work in the Copper Basin. Barclay dismissed the address as being full
of as many “misrepresentations of the facts” as it was of the word “scab.” 526
Reflecting the embittered mood of many workers, Labor Day 1939 came and went with
no regular community celebration. The absence of festivities was notable in a place where for a
generation people had used the day as a proud marker which put the working man in the center
of community life. The CIO tried to replace the normal festivities by putting on another strike
parade of thirty-nine cars filled with strikers and their families from Ducktown and Isabella.
Anderson’s car led the “parade” and the rest, according to Barclay, were filled with noisy women
and children. “It was a bedraggled looking outfit” he said in condescension. Barclay noted that
524
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the CIO caravan travelled as far north as Epworth. The motorcade seemed to impress Barclay as
being as predicable as a regular summer rainstorm “with much thunder and lightening” that
closed that day. 527
Other images of strikers taken by Farm Securities Administration photographers like
Marion Post Wilcott, reporters with the National Association for People’s Rights and McConnell
were more positive. The images captured by these folk provide insight into how determined
Mine, Mill families were to show solidarity and to win the support for their efforts among their
Copper Basin neighbors. The people of Isabella were especially determined to trudge on.
According to Barclay almost none of the miners from that town had returned to work. 528
But for some families in Ducktown and Isabella, there was no longer much choice. Some
few men had never supported the strike, but of the men that did return, it is most likely they
could no longer afford the luxury of not reporting. TCC swung its hammer hard once it realized
it had a nearly bottomless well from which to draw replacements in the Tri-State. The company
fired foremen and all the Isabella and Ducktown commissary clerks of the company’s Smelter
Stores for failing to come to work. Word spread of the dismissals and fear grew fast. A day
after the plant opened, men from the mining burgs began the slow trickle back to work, each day
increasing the Tennessee Copper rolls. The second day after the ultimatum twenty men came
back to work at Burra Burra—eleven alone from Isabella. The pressure to keep their jobs in the
face of the massive response by TCC and the competition from desperate men in the Tri-State
frightened many strikers back to their jobs. When some men went back to work, they were met
with violence and scorn. Anger aimed at presumed betrayals led to some homes being fired
upon by angry neighbors. Men who saw others cross pickets saw them as Judases, treasonous to
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the cause. Other men, once back on the job, came under attack by men who had never wanted a
strike or who had been loyal to the AFL. The damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don’t
experiences of workers aggravated wounds from the strike still further.529
TCC remained determined however and as every day passed, more and more men were
hired to replace strikers. By early September Barclay stated there was “little doubt now” that
TCC would be able “to continue operations on a gradually increasing scale.” The production
increase at once improved the company’s image among local citizens who wanted things to get
back to normal. In contrast to the company’s success, the works’ reopening cast Mine, Mill’s
leadership as impotent agitators. Barclay laid all future random acts of violence during this
period at the feet of Mine, Mill. “The CIO is showing its true colors now that the strike is lost,”
he declared. 530
There appeared to be fewer and fewer people willing to stand up and sacrifice for the
Copper Basin’s beleaguered miners. While their union’s leadership was determined to fight on,
it was clear that many miners could no longer afford to maintain the walkout. They were
trickling back to work. Adding to this painful fact was management’s diminishing interest in
Isabella workers and the industrial works in this oldest of the copper towns as the full costs of the
merger with DCI hit TCC’s bottom line. One of Barclay’s comments made shortly after the
resumption of operations made this attitude clear: “With the old men who returned to work and
new men hired, there is now nearly a full crew at the mines. The Isabella plant is still closed
tight, but little concern is felt over that place.” 531
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In late summer 1939, in this most desperate point in the strike for Mine, Mill, Anderson
and union leadership determined that another, more awesome and engaging strike parade should
occur to protest the reopening of the plant and to garner public favor. Ducktown grocer
McConnell got this parade on film too. CIO leaders hoped a special processional of miners’
families would convey both the personal significance of the miners’ demands to the public while
also reminding working people of their common dignity. The great parade would be a tool to
unite kith and kin of working husbands, fathers, sons, and uncles, wives and children and show
that the miners represented the same kind of respectable, patriotic, hard-working lot as those who
claimed loyalty to the AFL. It was also intended as a reminder that Copper Basin folk were
bound by race loyalty.
It was this last message which is most essential to grasp when assessing the nature of this
particular CIO strike processional. Certain aspects of this parade by CIO families as captured on
film appear unique in the history of the union as is generally told by labor historians. Not
because it was women and children marching, although typically men manned the frontlines in a
strike owing to the possibility of violence, but because it shows how workers relied on racial
symbolism in trying to establish camaraderie with Copper Basin working people by employing
racist symbology. By late August 1939 Anderson and his team had endured years of attacks by
conservative laborites and anti-union forces for being affiliated so-called “communists” and
“radicals”—malleable terms which in this region of the country were also used to attack anyone
supporting racial integration at the workplace. It mattered little that there was not much chance
of integration happening in the Basin owing to its long heritage in maintaining a lily-white
society. But exaggerated fears that the CIO might demand employment of black workers could
have been active. By this point, many root-causes fed irrationality in the anti-CIO camp.
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Anderson had to contend with coded propaganda and misconception. He had to remind
local people of the common white humanity of their cause. Being CIO he also held a deep
conviction about the importance of democratic demonstrations of the will of the people. For all
these reasons it seems Anderson approved employment of the race card in the strike parade, or at
least, and equally significant, he did not object to a message of white solidarity delivered by
miners’ wives and children, the local CIO Ladies Auxiliary. This tactic was at once innovative
and rooted in Appalachian loyalty to family. For although the use of women and children as the
featured members of an organized strike parades was nothing new—women marched upstate in
Elizabethton, Tennessee in the 1920s when their textile union was under siege—the use of
women and children as symbolic members of the white industrial class, representing
Appalachia’s greatest and most vulnerable treasure, had not been typical of the Mine, Mill’s
tactics in Dixie. The tactic was also one building on TCC’s Sentinels of Safety program which
relied on men’s duty to provide for their families by employing safe work practices. Anderson
and union leadership hoped that the march by the Ladies Auxiliary would promote a neighborly,
respectable side of the Mine, Mill community, underscoring links between the union (and its
demands) and the common values of Copper Basin society. 532
McConnell’s film caught provocative images of young children apparently dressed in
blackface. In the Mine, Mill parade led by the union’s Ladies Auxiliary, nestled among the
throngs of women and children dressed in their Sunday best who marched arm-in-arm,
surrounded by hundreds of their men folk who lined the streets of Ducktown, there marched a
small band of black-faced “scabs.” 533 Having just recited the Pledge of Allegiance, the
procession led these “enemies of the people” through the town, like some French Revolutionary
532
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sans culottes’ band. The enemies to the white working people were wore the raggedy duds of
hobos and ne’er-do-wells. The kids had “scab” signs hanging around their necks. Through
costume these dearest members of the community had been transformed into familiar symbols of
dark enmity recognized instantly by Appalachian whites. The image created by these blackfaced “scabs” would have stood at a nexus familiar to those who had an understanding of how
enemies of working people had used blacks to shutdown white opportunity in the past. For two
generations, blacks had been used by white management to shutdown white workers’ protests as
black strikebreakers neutralizing white working peoples’ challenges to tyrannical management.
The specter of the black strikebreaker would have been well known to working people even in a
region where there were so few blacks and perhaps even more so in light of the region’s
notorious racism. Children dressed as scabs alone would have been at once sympathetic and
terrifying. 534
Crowded streets and sidewalks filled McConnell’s scenes of Ducktown during the
parade, onlookers’ continence festive, if determined. This must have been the high watermark of
Mine, Mill hopes and aspirations. Things were really were going to change as the people of the
mining villages took their destiny into their own hands. 535
In spite of such enthusiasm, the Copper City Advance wrote nothing on the parade. The
Polk County News report on it was short saying only “more than 200 women paraded in
Ducktown” to protest the reopening of TCC. The article made no mention of the hundreds of
onlookers caught on film. Editor Shamblin of the News, never sympathetic to the CIO
movement or the strike, understood exactly how to dismiss the parade as being little more than a
gathering. The paper was also silent on the black-faced “scabs.” Shamblin focused on other
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strike developments: Sheriff Biggs and his men had been on hand keeping order during this
“disturbance.” 536
The thinness in local reportage doomed the effectiveness of the CIO’s last great strike
parade in the Copper Basin. It all came and went with little public fanfare beyond Ducktown. If
locals heard much about it, it would have been limited to hearsay. In an era before television
however, the persuasive power of this kind of an exhibition was limited by its extreme
parochialism. Fearful perhaps that an AFL-controlled and Biggs army-occupied Copperhill
might greet such a processional as a provocative act of war, Anderson and his CIO sympathizers
chose to hold their parade only at Ducktown. This was a terrible public relations mistake though
at the time it may have seemed pragmatic given the animus AFL men had for Mine, Mill in
Copperhill and the fact that there were lots of guns in the hands of angry, frustrated and
quarreling workers. So, although throngs of Mine, Mill supporters came to Ducktown from the
mining villages and surrounding districts carloads at a time, the fact was that the spectacle was
seen only by a sympathetic audience. Barclay penned a dismissive comment on the parade in his
diary: The whole affair had been “much more barking than biting.” 537

Regaining TCC command of industrial relations
The tactics the company employed during late summer and fall had been multifold.
Tennessee Copper kept the Isabella plant closed into September, thus limiting the number of men
there who could get an income from work. Lack of pay to the men weakened Mine, Mill’s
treasury. In contrast, TCC continued to pay Biggs’ deputy army to occupy the several Copper
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Basin communities. The company’s tacit support of the AFL emboldened the Federation and
men joined its ranks. Tennessee Copper gave no public support of either union, but neither did
its management condemn the Federation. TCC still went through the motions of negotiating an
end of the strike with Mine, Mill leaders through fall but by this point the company was awaiting
the a Labor Board decision to hold another election. Barclay recorded the state of TCC
production and his assessment of company efforts to meet NLRB obligations after one of these
negotiation meetings with the CIO:
”The strike conference convened at about 10:15 AM and continued until noon. Went into
solemn session again at 1:00 pm and “negotiated” until about 4:15 pm. The only result was the
setting of a date for another meeting, on Sept. 28. Meanwhile the plant is operating as though no
strike was on. New men are still being hired to take the jobs of the CIO strikers.” 538
Total average wages were about twenty percent less than before the strike; these lower
rates continued till late Spring 1940. The wage rates reflected not only a reduction of wages for
returning men, but the reduced rates paid to the new hires, because one way that TCC maintained
support for the returning men to return was to pass on the benefits of rising copper prices owing
to the European war’s effect on the copper markets. In early October, TCC granted returning
employees a twenty cent per day raise. Salaried men saw their incomes jump $5 a week. 539
TCC had managed to turn the strike to its advantage and was now actually profiting from
the walkout. By May 1940 the company’s mines were churning out 5000 tons more per month
than they had the previous April. The safety record had been maintained. For over four months
not a single hour was lost to accidents and since the resumption of operation the previous August
only two lost time accidents had occurred. In a rare tragedy, employee T.S. Green had died from
falling in the shafts, but fellow miner Clyde Bellow had recovered since from his “slight hernia.”
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The safety-on-the-job emphasis reminded workers that the company was looking out for their
needs. 540
Christmas 1939 found Mine, Mill paralyzed by circumstances in the Copper Basin.
Meeting after meeting with Houser or other TCC representatives ended in nothing for the union.
TCC was merely going through the motions until the NLRB could be convinced that a new
election was needed. Barclay called it “an incongruous situation, made so by the labor laws.” 541
CIO members had long been replaced by new, non-CIO men. If Barclay’s opinion is any
measure of how TCC regarded the NLRB arbitrators, let it suffice to say that company officials
had little regard from what they saw as small men manipulated by a whining CIO. 542
Never a player on the frontlines of the labor war, R.E. Barclay himself had remained a
popular figure in Copperhill during the strike. Just how popular he was among the mining
villages is unclear from the reports. There is little doubt that the chief clerk shared his general
disdain for the CIO around his friends and with management. Yet comments by his son and later
accounts of his life portrayed Barclay as a friend to the working man. Certainly his prestige had
not diminished during the strike at the company’s hub in Copperhill. He stood as local sage for
many citizens when he waxed eloquent on the importance of events within the greater history of
the Copper Basin, on Armistice Day 1939. He gave a talk at Copperhill High School on the
meaning of the national memorial. There is no record of any remarks on the strike at this time;
he penned more perspective on the cause and results of the labor war years later. But in his
diary, on the last day of 1939 he did opine. It had “been a tumultuous year, fractured by wars,
strikes, drouhts [sic] and other disasters.” Through it all though, Barclay said, business had
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“revived.” His hope for his community was simple. “May the decade of the forties be better than
the one just ending.” 543
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Chapter 5 War and Redemption: Taming labor and tending to the Old Red Scar

Determining appropriate wartime labor relations
Business reports revealed how the Roosevelt Recession of 1937-38 “stunned” industry
and indicated why owners and management were so keen on protecting their interests against
aggressive organized labor. Stated one account, “corporate income, except in aviation, dropped
to [the] lowest level in five years.” A nervous US Congress and President had returned to
conservative government budgets, cutting expenditures and in turn, devastating commodities
markets. “The general business depression became one of the swiftest and most severe in the
history of the country,” according to the New York Times. 544
Global commodities markets remained tough well into 1939 even though the
International Copper Cartel corralled most producers to shore up pricing. But imbalances in
world demand led to more price slides. Price collapse ensued in spite of increasing European use
of copper in part because US consumption had dropped by nearly 50% for 1938. New reserves
in Arizona and South Africa promulgated further declines. Although the outbreak of the
European war encouraged speculation through late summer and fall 1939, most producers
experienced a rough end to another volatile decade. 545
Then in mid-1939 heavy foreign copper purchases sparked a new round of speculation as
French, English, Polish, Japanese and German manufactures began buying enormous amounts of
ore and processed copper “for military operations.” 546 Domestic use for the red metal began to
rebound at this time too, not only from a renewal of government spending in public works
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projects, but also from an improved housing industry. The Secretary of the Copper and Brass
Research Association of New York, Bertram B. Caddle, stated that consumption of copper for
roofing, brass pipe and tubing increased 40% in May 1939. Caddle attributed the use to
recognition of the metal’s special resistance to corrosion making it essential for use along the
seacoasts, inland waterways and the Great Lakes regions. Caddle also mentioned the importance
of copper in the manufacturing of agricultural chemicals, which, when properly used, could
create a shield in the war against insects. “Insects destroy about $50,000,000 worth of property
annually throughout the United States according to Government statistics.” 547
Advances in consumption encouraged copper producers, but soon after war commenced
in Europe US domestic policy makers responded to the crisis by passing legislation designed to
prevent a repeat of the speculative markets seen during the Great War. That World War I system
had begun well, the government’s choice to allow speculation encouraged even the smallest
producers to run at full capacity; the war’s sudden end in 1918 made apparent the catastrophe of
not limiting the creation of enormous excess stocks chasing record profits. During the
subsequent sharp slump few producers benefitted from the kind of proactive and rational
corporate renovations Sam A. Lewisohn and J.N. Houser commenced at Tennessee Corporation
and subsidiary Tennessee Copper Company. As has been shown, the TCC leaders’ approval of
production and labor relations schemes led to improved industrial relations through the New
Deal era until ideological and organization differences among workers led to a challenge
management’s prerogatives. During the same period more reactionary producers had seen their
works repeatedly paralyzed by aggressive union activity. 548
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Industry’s experience during the Second World War differed from that of World War I in
part because by the late thirties the nation had become generally more tolerant of government
regulation and intervention in the marketplace. It was clear from the start of World War II that
the government should continue in its role to shore up markets. Throughout World War II,
domestic producers had to accept prices set at prewar levels of 11 cents with government
“bounties paid to companies that could not produce at 11 cents.” The major producers could do
this, but for smaller ones—like TCC—“most bounties fell within the 11-17 cent range.” Further
limiting profiteering, the government imposed “stiff excess profits” taxes “based on an average
profit in recent years.” Despite government mandates protecting workers’ interests, TCC could
not afford to lose opportunities in the new war economy by allowing aggressive union activity to
shape corporate destiny. 549
Adoption by TC and TCC of rational management and product diversification into
several metals products and agricultural chemicals shielded the firms from the worst effects of
the Roosevelt Recession. Tennessee Corporation profits had plummeted 42 % in 1938, but they
dropped only slightly to $349,000 for the next year. Contraction rates at TC equaled those
experienced by the top four domestic copper producers. TCC was an integral component in this
performance. The same corporate attributes that buoyed the companies through the 1938-1939
storms put the firms in a wonderful position to take advantage of the burgeoning war
economy. 550
Corporate diversification notwithstanding, TC and TCC had experienced almost two
decades of off-again-on-again profits and could not afford to allow the 1939 CIO walkout at
TCC to set a pattern in labor relations that might limit opportunities in the accelerating war
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commodities markets. TCC management had to end the strike as soon as possible with the least
amount of damage to its works and corporate image. It would then work to prevent future unrest
by harnessing the energy that underlay the labor unrest and channel this toward focused, patriotic
production; this task would become easier as national defense circumstances deteriorated and the
public’s patriotism increased. By the middle of the war, it was clear that TCC had fully
renovated its image and stood as a fine corporate citizen. War work allowed TCC to build upon
the positive image the company promoted through its public relations, which in turn had helped
the firm maintain its control over organized labor. During the war, a mostly tamed work force
assisted the company in burnishing its reputation still further by producing record amounts of
critical munitions materials, supplying materials used in the manufacture of LOMA brand
agricultural chemicals (useful for nurturing Victory Gardens), and by rejecting a CIO campaign
to wrestle control of collective bargaining rights from the AFL. 551
Two important post war reports, one by TC President Sam A. Lewisohn and TCC
Manager T.A. Mitchell revealed how Copper Basin operators maintained effective industrial
relations and kept the power of organized labor in check. Lewisohn’s assessment “What the
Employer Can Do: An Employer Charts the Roads He Believes Will Lead Toward Peace
Between Industry and Labor” appeared in the New York Times. Mitchell’s report, given at a
managerial conference, contained an historical account of thirty years of TCC labor relations.
These reports outlined the kind of “successful strategic planning” attributes TCC adopted which
scholar Thomas Navin argued many other copper producers lacked during the Second World
War. These attributes included “management depth” in numbers and attention while running
day-to-day operations, “expertise in management… beyond the immediate requirements of
running the company,” willingness on the part of management to delegate to lower management,
551
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an ability to “think and plan in terms of interactive ‘systems,’ maintenance of a strong financial
base and the use debt in proactive ways as “a competitive tool.” Overall, Navin argued, executive
management should exhibit a “venturesome leadership.” 552
Lewisohn’s and Mitchell’s remarks provide keys for understanding workers’ experiences
in the Copper Basin. They outline management’s efforts to affect a profitable industrial peace,
fortify a positive corporate image during the war and set a course for sustainable post-war
industrial relations. As described by Lewisohn and Mitchell, TCC modified Houser’s rational
EMP plan for use during the war. The company established worker-management crews that
harnessed workers’ production energy while fulfilling federal labor mandates which protected
workers’ ability to form unions for collective bargaining and grievance reporting.
Sam Lewisohn had taken control of Tennessee Corporation as its chairman following the
death of his father Adolph Lewisohn in 1938. He also now served as chief officer of TCC and
president of Miami Copper Company. Throughout World War II he had continued his public
defense of “give and take” managerial approaches that eschewed anti-union reaction and
defended collective bargaining, by appealing to management “to shoulder responsibility for
cooperation in labor relations… and to take the initiative in promoting good-will between
employers and employees.” In “What the Employer Can Do” Lewisohn summarized the success
his firms achieved during the Second World War. His summary represented an update of the
comparatively progressive views he had promulgated twenty years earlier in support of
“enlightened” and “compassionate” company management. 553
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The best managerial tactics to employ to affect an industrial peace, Lewisohn said, should
not “inveigh against government or union interference.” Recalcitrant businessmen who sought
to limit government presence in industry were wrong. Government could play an important role
in nurturing industry through training supervisory staff to direct efficient production regimens
and to secure fair collective bargaining opportunities. But Lewisohn also understood that
government could assist management in defining the limits of union power. Were workers to
choose a union, trade unions supplied management with the most effective means to engage
workers in collective bargaining and respond to workers’ grievances. But Lewisohn did not think
unions should be responsible for taking on roles traditionally assigned to foremen and
supervisory staff such as initiating teamwork or overseeing the “the proper adjustment of the
individual to his job.” In light of his firms’ positive experiences he believed managers should
bear the primary responsibility for developing effective on-the-job safety regimens, promote the
enhancement of workers’ skills, and provide opportunities and facilities for healthful worker
recreation. The summary was classic Lewisohn welfare-capitalism shaped and extended by New
Deal mandates and war economy realities. 554
A most important opportunity for management-union cooperation lay in what Lewisohn
referred to as “the constructive fields” or what would be called today personnel development.
Developed in the 1940s through the War Production Drive Division of the War Production Board
as “labor-management production committees,” these units had impressed Lewisohn by
improving the production efficiency of eight million workers in 4600 war plants. Lewisohn
wanted to see labor-management committee model extended into the post-war because it had
proven capable of efficiently addressing “manpower utilization, absenteeism, accident
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prevention, suggestion systems, quality of work, and conservation of materials as well as
quantity of output.” While he acknowledged two-thirds of these committees “were affiliated
with unions,” committee effectiveness was not dependent on any connection with a union, but on
its engagement with a manager. “What he puts into them in ability and interest,” said Lewisohn.
For the astute manager, incentives, training, and promotion made the difference. 555 Lewisohn
did not specifically state one obvious fact about labor-management committees: use of them
allowed management some navigation around union power. The labor-management committees
also clearly performed similar duties assigned to New Era employee representative plans
established at TCC through the Sentinels of Safety program. 556
Lewisohn’s experience in the thirties and during the war had proven to him that unions
could have certain powers in negotiating wages, outlining workers grievances, and assisting in
personnel development and production standards. But these responsibilities did not mean the
corporate chairman was comfortable with all union demands then popular among organized
labor’s advocates. For instance, Lewisohn had little use for seniority. He believed the practice
protected bad work habits and assailed union insistence on the matter. “The excessive weight
now given in union contracts to the mere priority of the date on which a person is hired is a
deplorable trend toward [industrial] rigidity and stagnation [in the labor market].” 557
TCC Manager T.A. Mitchell provided another perspective on the effects of adopting the
model Lewisohn had outlined and which J.N. Houser, as TCC general manager had
implemented. During a managerial retreat at location in Pinehurst, North Carolina in October
1946, Mitchell read his report on the evolution of company labor relations and the benefits now
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provided for workers. 558 As management was known to enjoy its golf, “Pinehurst” was likely
the famous resort in the sandhills of central North Carolina designed by Frederick Law Olmstead
and professional golfers—its comfy and expensive environs being far from anything in the redscarred hills of Polk. 559
Mitchell’s report included the dates of official recognition by the company of local
unions, contract outlines and “special provisions” made by the firm owing to union demands
such as improvements in travel time pay to and from work, vacation and overtime pay, general
statements about the company’s life insurance program, seniority and probation practices, and
present policies on union dues. The report continued with a summary of wage hikes from 1940,
the number of workers employed, eligibility for collective bargaining representation, and a
comment on the general state and hopes for labor relations. 560
It was clear from Mitchell’s report that while Lewisohn’s rhetoric on the subject of
industrial relations had always included a general respect for the working man, his firm’s
managers in the Copper Basin held their prerogatives for shaping labor relations dear. Granted,
the company had officially recognized Mine, Mill as early as 1919 and had, under pressure from
the union, agreed to shorter work days, overtime pay, and compensation for “emergency work on
Sundays.” But as soon as General Manager Houser could, he had installed the rational
management plan, co-opted union power and secure more oversight on job performance and
production schemes. During the union interregnum there was no back-tracking by TCC on
previous agreements, but little progress was made to increase workers’ benefits beyond safety
improvements and life insurance “for death or total disability” until union power returned in the
New Deal. As indirectly described by Mitchell, Houser’s system had not been air-tight and had
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unable to prevent the resurrection of Mine, Mill, but it was clear management was proud of the
way the company neutralized the union when it went CIO in the later thirties. 561
Mitchell does not appear to have made any direct attacks on the CIO during the war
years, however certain comments he made on the subject were rather revealing. Furthermore any
opinions he held of the AFL appear to have been condescending at best: “I can state that our
relations with the union are active.” But then Mitchell qualified this statement with rhetorical
questions and anecdote:
“Are relations running smoothly, or beset with troublesome interference with
management?” If a person has a painful acute physical ailment which might prove fatal,
and also at the same time has the itch; and he finally, after much suffering, is relieved of
the painful serious ailment, he feels that he can endure the itch indefinitely. We had the
serious affliction several years ago, It was apparently arrested, and it shall be our
endeavor to prevent a recurrence.” 562
Mine, Mill’s demands to management after the union’s exit from the business-friendly
AFL represented the “painful… ailment” afflicting TCC management in Mitchell’s story; CIO
affiliation disrupted TCC’s cozy influence over the union’s leadership. When Mitchell alludes to
unionism itself as being “an itch” it begs the question as to how long it might be before the
company might scratch any union that agitated management. As one of the Copper Basin’s more
important civic and business leaders Mitchell had a special interest in securing industrial peace in
the region because his responsibilities went beyond his managerial duties at TCC. T.A. Mitchell
was one of three Twin-cities bank directors and therefore a key custodian of local assets and a
leading member of the Kiwanis. His labor relations report contained what Mitchell and
management agreed now constituted an appropriate relationship with a union, one where union
leaders deferred to management’s interests for the good of the firm and for the entire community.
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“We have encouraged the union officials and committees to give the proper attention to
their duties and handle justifiable grievances promptly and efficiently. Over the years
there have developed workman skilled in the art of negotiation. They are sensitive to
criticism from the members [of the union] and at times are inclined to ‘go the limit’ on
any fancied grievance, whether or not it has merit—in other words, pass the buck to the
management for the final say.” 563

The war narrative: TCC munitions production
US Labor Secretary Francis Perkins made public her hopes that a war economy would
end the nation’s bitter domestic political squabbling and that new job opportunities in the defense
industry would distract Americans from “knifing each other.” 564 Joining in Perkins’ optimism
was Chamber of Commerce President W. Gibson Carey, Jr. and US Army Brigadier General
Frank M. Andrews, assistant chief of staff in charge of operations and training. These officials
wanted to impress upon the public and feisty leadership in organized labor the importance of
supporting the war effort; the government intended that labor assist the maintenance of an
industrial peace through a policy of “equality in sacrifice.” 565
Copper Basin workers quickly learned how they would be a part of the re-energized
industrial economy. News of promising industrial production expansion came to TCC in Spring
1940. In preparation for what it expected its role might be for shoring up the nation’s defense
TCC had began construction of a new “reverberatory furnace” and had plans to “start on a pit
and handling equipment for iron calcites” at Isabella. 566 Near the Basin’s ancient Boyd mine,
now revived after being abandoned for nearly ninety years, the company extended the mine to
connect with Ducktown’s Burra Burra shafts. Near Boyd, TCC erected a hoist house and new
mine head-frame so as to better access ores. The company got a new Service Department at
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Copperhill to better attend personnel work and prevent accidents. Extension of Houser’s AllMilling Program would have to be suspended again owing to all this, but the exponential
expansion of production necessary for World War II made that postponement much less
bothersome. In conjunction with increased needs nationally for copper and ferrous products sold
in Alabama, production expansion had put TCC back at full capacity. 567
Additional good news rained down like manna from heaven in first weeks of 1941. The
National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) announced that new amortization rules would
allow defense manufactures tax advantages for the construction of new plants for next five years.
Tennessee Copper was among these most recent sixty-seven firms awarded “certificates of
necessity” by the NDAC; nationally 875 firms had applied for the tax breaks. TCC stated that it
would use some of the savings to construct $1.1 million of new facilities in the Copper Basin.
News of the expansion came just as locals were readying for a “big day of fun” at Ducktown that
would include skating, bowling, tennis, baseball, music, and myriad patriotic speakers for the
July 4th holiday. 568
The biggest news though came as a result of the Lewisohns’ adept promotion of the
corporate facilities and their connections with the Roosevelt Administration: The War
Department announced in early summer 1941 that Copperhill would get a new $2.3 million acid
plant. Local Congressional Representative Estes Kefauver contacted editor Frank Middleton of
the Cooper City Advance immediately with this good news for Tennessee. The new Copperhill
facility would make only oleum, the “high test” sulfuric acid used in TNT manufacture. TCC
would ship its oleum to a new TNT plant being built in Ooltewah, Hamilton County. The U.S.
Government would actually own the plant, but TCC would operate it and it would employ forty
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men. The facility would sit adjacent to the main sulfuric acid plant already at Copperhill. The
anticipated war boom was on. 569
TCC finished construction and began running the government’s new East Tennessee
Ordinance Works (ETOW) within a year. It is unclear from the records whether the AFL
represented the workers at this plant, but management did maintain a management-labor safety
plan and likely debuted the kind of labor-management committees Lewisohn praised after the
war. By 1943 the new works had helped advance “a successful Third Front” against the Axis
while maintaining a strong safety record. “Since the local plant… began operation in July 1942,
there [had] not been a lost-time injury reported.” 570 The City Advance noted that the safety
record was of particular importance “in face of the fact that in 1941 industrial accidents were
responsible for a nation-wide loss of 460,000,000 man days or enough time to make 11,000,000
Garand rifles.” Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Hyde, first officer of the acid plant, stated that this
was the same amount of time it would have taken to make all the war equipment for outfitting
two hundred thousand soldiers. Hyde credited the local plant’s record to the “eternal vigilance”
of the safety programs of the firm’s overseer, TCC and regular surveys by the firm’s safety
engineers. 571
No records could be found as to exact amount of materials TCC produced for the
government throughout the entire war, but newspaper accounts suggest that the War Department
relied on TCC to satisfy critical munitions production quotas and the company’s reputation as the
greatest sulphuric acid producer in the world remained solid. 572 In an early 1945 announcement,
Captain C.E. Middleton, commanding officer of the East Tennessee Ordinance Works stated the
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Army planned to expand oleum production. To do so, the government would add to the existing
plant at ETOW. Here then was an opportunity not only for non-ferrous craftsmen and engineers,
but also men of the construction trades. Although a Baltimore firm would be responsible for the
actual construction, local men would make up much of the crew, augmenting work overseen by
the US Army Corps of Engineers. The City Advance stated that at least three hundred men “from
this area” would be needed to get the building done. 573
Headlines in August 1943 captured an excitement and pride in war work among Basin
workers that had not been seen since the CIO walkouts of 1939. TCC-managed plants had been
setting production records and were now earning national notoriety. The War Department
awarded workers at the East Tennessee Ordinance Works the Army-Navy “E” for excellence; it
was not one “lightly bestowed” because said one army representative, “all angles of a war
contractor’s contribution to the arming of the nation [were] explored.” Underscoring the august
nature of the August 1943 ceremony, war hero Corporal Frank King of the Army Corps of
Engineers came to pin the “E” award on local outstanding workers. The soldier had recuperated
from war wounds in nearby Swannanoa, N.C.; his harrowing experiences in the war had aroused
locals’ patriotism and secured their empathy. “Shot in the legs, arms, back, head, and stomach
during a 45-minute machine gun battle with three Axis planes,” the Copper City Advance
reported, King was “the recipient of the Silver Star, Purple Heart, and Oak Leaf Cluster.” 574
TCC officials L.H. Long and H.F. Keener of Ducktown and Harry McNally and A.C.
Duncan of Copperhill represented the company at the affair. General Manager Houser was to
attend the ceremonies too as this was known to be the grandest event ever held in the Copper
Basin, but unfortunately Houser fell ill and had to remain in Knoxville. Before a vast crowd for
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the region of some three thousand people, field director of Army ammunition plants, Col T.C.
Gerber, stated that he had the honor to represent War Department Secretary Robert Patterson and
Undersecretary of the Namey James Forrestal. 575
Throughout the ceremony army officials and management applauded workers’ success,
but cautioned them to avoid slacking off after winning the award and, indirectly, to avoid
aggressive labor organizers who might get between them and winning the war. What workers
had been doing, they were told, had worked and they needed to stay on task. They were not to
interfere with management’s intent to maintain industrial peace.
Said Col. Gerber to the crowd,
“This award… is symbolic of your success… let it ever be a constant reminder to
everyone engaged in the war effort to subordinate everything to the winning of this war…
Every wasted moment, every lost hour, every careless action reduces the effectiveness of
our splendid manpower and aids the enemies of our way of life. Works such as these
display eloquently our cooperative spirit… workers, management, government, [and]
enterprise.” 576

By following Lewisohn-Houser prerogatives of management through labor-management
committees, TCC workers had not only exceeded production quotas at Copper Basin mines and
works, but had also shown a strong “general all-around performance” achieved through “proper
utilization of equipment, effective management [that included monitoring of] labor policy, and
absenteeism.” 577
Money poured into the Copper Basin from the federal government’s choice to expand
facilities in the Copper Basin. The history of the afore-mentioned new Copperhill acid plants
reveals this. In autumn 1941, TCC signed contracts with Leonard Construction and the War
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Department to provide $2 million for the construction of an oleum plant at Copperhill. The final
cost of the plant would be $3.3 million. The new plant would be larger than a new plant that had
just gone up in Isabella and its product would be shipped to Chattanooga to make TNT.
“Tennessee Copper Co. has moved into front-line defense with some half dozen vital priority
products… she leads the world with the biggest sulphuric acid chamber plant in existence,”
wrote an awestruck Knoxville News Sentinel editor Lee Davis in a two-page on TCC’s
contributions to the national defense appearing less than two weeks before Pearl Harbor. 578
Upon permission by J.N. Houser, Davis had been given a special tour of just what TCC
was up to in protecting the United States. Through “its own little defense army” of 1600 workers,
Lee claimed that even Horatio Alger would have been impressed with the possibilities TCC
Copperhill provided for any young man interested in becoming part of a company payroll that
added $2 million to the local economy. TCC’s magnificent cache of products was being sold to
firms like the Indiana Ordinance Company for the production of smokeless gun powder. With
TCC’s help, Indiana Ordinance made over 100,000 tons annually of the stuff annually. Davis
expounded on the important role the “strings of tankers” from Copperhill had in “moving out
ammunition for democracy from nature’s own vast underground arsenal.” On each shift,
“unending tests” by “company researchers at Copperhill” continued to strengthen the company’s
advance against national enemies. But Lee’s article did not focus on the workers who made all
this happen, but on the Company as the savior of the republic. Dismissing its massive workforce
as incidental, Lee gave the credit for the company’s output to its impressive technology.
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“Personnel totals… give no idea of operational scope… the bulk of work is done by electric,
mechanical, and chemical agents, and the human ones, by comparison, are relatively few.” 579
As a result of the war contracts, Copper Basin economic life had clearly been on the
rebound. Headlines in the Copper City Advance reporting substantial increases in the holdings of
the First National Bank of Polk County show how the war boom rewarded the citizenry. As the
bank of choice for many TCC workers, its reports provide a good measure of just how strong the
local economy had been in the forties. The first year that the U.S. was in the war the First
National Bank of Polk County showed a gain of over 37 ½ % over the previous year’s
balance. 580 Reports from the bank’s 1945 annual shareholders and directors meetings revealed
that the region’s premiere financial institution now had “total resources of $3,061,140.44… the
highest total in the bank’s history” and an increase of 26% over 1944. 581 Since the effects of the
Depression had been so crushing on the bank, these numbers were all the more astounding. Back
in 1933, the bank only had total assets of $423,739.69, this total having plummeted a third in just
over two years. 582 But the war had turned things around and there was money to spare for
patriotic investment by the workers as well. For 1944 alone, “war-time activities… included the
purchase of $526,500 US Government Bonds.” 583
Tennessee Corporation’s balance sheet for the war era shows that Lewisohn and Houser
steered a profitable course. A bump in 1943 profits reflected at once the most intensive
defensive struggles in the conflict and the high point of US defense production. Tennessee
Corporation made over one half a million dollars in the first six month of 1944 compared with
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just over $721,000 in 1943. National industrial profits in 1944 were not at all bad and they likely
buoyed the company despite some reductions in copper needs as the war wound down. By 1944
US corporate profits had risen to 329% of 1939 levels. 584 Tennessee Corporation profits held
firm at just over $1.1 million profit for both 1944 and 1945 as nationally war production leveled
off. This was an important fact because many firms had seen a significant drop off immediately
following the victory in Europe. In fact, 1946 saw Tennessee Corporation numbers rise to $1.4
million in profit. 585

From scandal to patriotic service: “LOMA” and the “Victory Garden”
As a major producer, TCC benefitted from the expanded need for agricultural chemicals
resulting from New Deal land husbandry legislation and the war mandates promoting home
gardening. New Era allowances for cartels did not immediately give way under sometimes
confusing New Deal directives. During the twenties, fertilizer companies had combined their
efforts to thwart the kind of cut-throat business competition that seriously cut profits during
economic downturns. Similar collaboration was seen as dubious and troubling to some New
Dealers who claimed the cartels limited free markets. 586
That said, as the saying goes, life itself had become impossible without chemicals. The
embrace of better land use techniques by the late 1930s spurred astounding profits in the
chemicals industry. Tennessee Corporation and TCC took advantage of the expanding markets.
But during the depression, high profits tended to lead to investigations of possible wrong doing.
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Government officials on the hunt for inappropriate collusion found what they had suspected
among chemicals producers. According to a report done by the WPA for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, for 1937 alone—despite the Roosevelt recession—nineteen of the top
US chemical firms earned a profit of $192 million with dividends distributed totaling $151
million. These numbers equaled profits of roughly $6 billion and $5 billion in 2007 dollars. The
increase in sales for these companies had doubled in just four years so that by 1938 annual sales
were nearly $1 billion ($33.6 billion in 2007 dollars). After charges including gains and losses,
prior claims, interest on loans and income taxes, profits represented just over twenty percent of
sales. 587 New Deal regulators cited the top chemical firms for engaging in “monopolistic
methods.” Underscoring the confusing business climate as a result of the New Deal’s promotion
of certain legal business cartels, there had not been a great deal of secrecy in the whole affair.
Tennessee Corporation and four other chemical firms had colluded as the Agricultural
Insecticide and Fungicide Association (AIFA), a group the Federal Trade Commission contended
published “white lists” of “favored dealers to the exclusion of others.” 588 The AIFA maintained
“an understanding… among the companies… to restrain competition in the sale of their
products… to fix and maintain uniform prices, terms and discounts.” 589 Toward this end,
“association members held regular meetings at which trade policies and prices were established
and ‘distributor guides’—white lists—were shared. The FTC accused AIFA members with
“suppression of competition” and “a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act.” 590 Within
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a year, the FTC ordered AIFA companies to halt the cartel practices and to stop “clearing house”
activities. 591
Tennessee Corporation made a lot of money at this time even after news of the scandal
hit the streets: The corporation cleared $349,000 in 1939 with dividends of forty-one cents and
three times that much in 1940, making its profits of $1.36 per share or $1.1 million total the
finest the company had experienced since the 1929 crash. Some of this was owing to the
aforementioned increased copper commodities markets, but diversification at TCC had surely
helped. Tennessee Corporation shareholders enjoyed a dollar per year dividends. Profits rose
again in 1941 to over $1.3 million or nearly $1.60 per share and by the middle of 1942,
Tennessee Corporation looked as if it might beat its record profit of all time. 592
The New York Times reported huge increases in the use of chemicals during World War
II. This was especially true in the area of organic chemicals—those used for agricultural
fertilizer and food stuff production. 593 Tennessee Copper Company had a special role in this
aspect of the war economy. As a subsidiary of Tennessee Corporation, its contributed product
support for the federal government’s popular Victory Garden campaign. Begun to encourage
thrifty conservation and allow the government to funnel precious industrial agricultural products
to US troops overseas, the Victory Garden campaign directed Americans to plant their own little
plots. Soon hundreds of thousands of Americans were digging in the dirt; the campaign became
a favorite patriotic endeavor. Toward these ends, Tennessee Corporation sold the perfect pair of
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products manufactured from TCC’s line of non-ferrous chemicals: a chemical fertilizer or “plant
food” known as “Loma,” and a pesticide known as “Loma Dust.” 594
Highlighting for potential customers the patriotic use of its products, TC advertised Loma
items as “important… in the maintenance of the Nation’s morale and spiritual vigor.” Loma and
Loma “2-in-1” Dust helped Americans to garden successfully and kept their efforts thriving,
“free of pests!” and “neat and attractive” throughout. Mindful of the rationing spirit of the age,
TC reminded citizens not “waste garden materials, time, and effort [but to] plan intelligently
[and] properly.” Citizens who bought Loma fertilizer—“The Quality Plant Food”—would “save
money and effort” and because “a little goes a long way!” anyone could “have more luxurious
lawns and gardens.” American gardeners were doing their part because “quality garden
materials always mean[t] economy.” “Everywhere … quality garden supplies were sold,”
consumers could purchase 100 pound bags of the miracle product for four just bucks, but more
modest amounts could be had too. “For Everything Green that Grows” Loma was the plant food
of choice for citizen-gardeners who aimed their green thumbs at the eyes of Hitler and
Hirohito. 595
Maintaining the patriotic theme, Tennessee Corporation advertised the toxic non-ferrous
concoction Loma 2-in-1 Dust as a “quick, easy way to ward against chewing and sucking
insects” and fungi. Developed by the company’s “great Research Laboratories” yet still declared
“organic” in nature, the potent pesticide saved hours of work “in minutes” as it defended “Mr. &
Mrs. Victory Gardener” from a host of “fungous” growths and critters including “aphids, leafhoppers, flea beetles, fruit worms, sawflies, thrips, caterpillars, striped cucumber beetles,
594
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Mexican bean beetles, cabbage worms, tomato worms, leaf-spot, leaf scorch, rust, mildew,
blight, scab, anthracnose, and black rot.” Loma Dust was especially helpful in repelling Japanese
Beetles! 596

Defeating the CIO and taming the AFL during World War II
TCC management’s quest to wrestle back control over its labor relations gained
momentum in winter and early spring 1940 after a series of dynamite blasts shattered several
Basin nights, rattling nerves, and cutting off Basin electrical power several times in the towns
and throughout TCC works. Allegedly the work of CIO supporters, the explosions poisoned any
chance that Mine, Mill might cultivate additional support among the public and further crippled
the vitality of the walkout. Having recently just won a tough campaign, Sheriff Biggs went
immediately into action, sensing an opportunity to strengthen eroding constituent support. But
because the “dynamitings” had twice destroyed TVA electrical towers coming from Parksville
Dam, the Federal Bureau of Investigation sent agents to the Copper Basin to join Biggs and “run
down the guilty parties.” The Bureau’s presence further aggravated the ongoing local labor war.
After some poking around, the FBI arrested a couple men but then let them go owing to a lack of
direct evidence. Another blast and a Basin blackout for seven hours elicited demands by the
public to find the perpetrators and brought a frustrated FBI Chief H.E. Plaxico to Copperhill to
look into the matter himself. 597
Biggs and the FBI then undertook a dragnet relying on members of Biggs’ “deputy” army
to act as foot soldiers in the ferreting out. Aiming their searches almost exclusively in workers’
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neighborhoods sympathetic to the CIO, Sheriff Biggs and his thuggish troops again intimidated
folk throughout Ducktown and Isabella, inspected workers’ cars and property without proper
warrant. FBI men stood back being mindful of the limits of jurisdiction and of the traditional
hostility generally held by locals toward federal authorities. The “investigation” moved quickly
and led to the arrest of Mine, Mill organizer M.C. Anderson one rainy late April day. He was
taken from the Basin to Chattanooga, his bail set at $25,000. Bureau agents and Biggs men
rounded up more “suspects” and G-men brought in “a big Grey Hound Bus” to carry away
fifteen deemed guilty. 598
Rumor had it that the men had confessed to the explosions while “detained” in the
Copperhill jail. No reports of workers’ outrage about the dragnet, which would be made plain by
witnesses in the suspects’ trials, appeared in local papers. Instead the papers went on the attack
against the CIO. Highlighting a comparison of the good old days with the dangerous present, the
same Polk County News issue that notified citizens of the passing of an era (in the death of
beloved, local, “family physician” physician of thirty-six years Dr. William Herman Schultz),
contained reports recounting the dangerous labor radicalism now spreading through the Copper
Basin. The paper’s editors were convinced a more poisonous atmosphere had arrived with the
New Deal labor laws. The Polk County News identified seventeen of the nineteen men arrested
for the recent destruction of power lines as “CIO strikers.” 599
The Polk County News had long since condemned New Deal legislation as leading down
the road to communism. One of the regular conservative cartoons from the paper’s front page
showed a “badly warped” plank man with “National Labor Relations Board” stamped upon his
chest, his body twisted all out of shape, strutting down the road with a crocked cane. Stogy-
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smoking, its face angry and menacing and bearing a hat, the warped plank was clearly drawn to
look like CIO leader John. L. Lewis. 600 The recent arrests of CIO men in the Copper Basin had
given the paper more editorial ammunition to fight communist incursions and revealed its
commitment to the Biggs dynasty through its support of the sheriff’s handling of the Basin’s
latest troubles. The Polk County News opined on the good fortune locals enjoyed in having a
sheriff who cooperated with federal agents in gaining the arrest of all suspects and returning an
industrial peace. 601
Reports on the arrests in the Copper City Advance had the tone of a radio detective and
mystery show as they recounted details of the coordinated investigation. They also contained
more anti-CIO bias. “Working swiftly since their arrival in the Basin,” Biggs and his deputies
“have worked night and day… to clear up the mystery” of the explosions. FBI chief H.E.
Plaxico stated his satisfaction in arresting Anderson and the gang of culprits for having
“feloniously conspired, combined, and confederated… to violate the laws of … and the property
of the United States of America.” 602
Satisfaction filled TCC Clerk R.E. Barclay’s diary after the arrests and the entries reveal
his conviction that local industry could now resume without irritating CIO interruption. In an
entry characteristic of his self-appointed role as a paternal local civic leader, typically dismissive
of Mine, Mill supporters’ pain, Barclay claimed “a great sigh of relief went up around here when
it was learned that Anderson had been arrested and when the bus pulled out today with its cargo
of suspected dynamiters.” 603 Five of the fifteen men, according to Barclay, pled guilty at a
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preliminary hearing including Feltan Woodward, Earl Hubbard, Edward Simonds, Robert “Bob”
Rhodes, and David Queen. The rest of the men pled “not guilty”: Martin Simonds, Clint
Huffman, Gordon Parr, L.B. Green, Tate Green, Ben Cross, John McGhee, Nayar Henry, R.S.
Petelle, and Marion Ellis. Records are unclear as to whether all these men were CIO
sympathizers or members of Mine, Mill though in light of the local animus against the CIO this
was likely the case. A bond of $3000 each was set for each man. A May 1940 report stated that
three more men had been arrested in connection with the explosions: Arthur Shillings, RM.
Coltins, and Robert Bellow. None of those arrested were AFL men. 604
Its campaign in the Basin a shambles and local organizers in jail, Mine, Mill’s
international responded to salvage what reputation might still remain among its TCC rank-andfile. In early May, Mine, Mill President Reid Robinson met with General Manger J.N. Houser
and Manager T.A. Mitchell in Chattanooga at the Patten Hotel, where, Barclay recorded,
Robinson “tentatively agreed to call off the strike.” Houser then returned to Knoxville and while
Anderson languished in jail, Mine, Mill supporters met in Isabella and voted to call off the strike.
Within days of the strike’s end, CIO picket sheds were tipped over around the Basin, “mute
evidence of the failure of the strike,” judged Barclay. Loyal Mine, Mill men came round to
salvage what they could from upset sheds and hauled them back to Ducktown as if the sheds
were wounded comrades. Barclay now sneered with pleasure at the CIO’s misfortunes. “Having
lost in their every appeal to the Labor Board and to the courts,” he wrote, “they were at the end
of their road.” 605
For the most part Barclay had been right, but in Chattanooga some hopes prevailed. CIO
lawyers got federal judges to show some mercy toward the arrested men by reducing bonds to
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$1000 each. Only Anderson’s remained enormous at $25,000—an amount only slightly less
than Tennessee Corporation top executive E.H. Westlake’s annual salary during this period and
equal to over $800,000 in 2007 dollars. 606
For the next several years, newspapers reported on the experiences of the defendants as
Anderson, his arrested compatriots, the CIO, battled government lawyers in the courts to reveal
exactly what had happened that early Spring 1940 regarding the explosions and the subsequent
arrests. Part one in these narratives ended nearly a year after the explosions first began when
juries convicted Anderson and eight other men. The men were “subject to a maximum of two
years in prison and fines of $10,000.” 607 The courts also convicted the aforementioned Simonds,
Woodward, Hubbard, Queen, Rhodes, Ellis and Robert L. Ballew along with Anderson. Six of
the men had signed statements that the F.B.I. considered “confessions” and only one of the men
entered a plea of “not guilty.” Neither Anderson nor Ellis had signed such statements. The
government prosecuted the men for three of the many explosions experienced in early 1940. The
men’s lawyers immediately moved for a new trial claiming they had proof of malfeasance
committed by FBI agents, Sheriff Biggs and the “deputies.” 608
Local newspapers held only part of this story though. Before the trial had even begun,
Mine, Mill had become convinced that the whole affair of the dynamitings, dragnet, and the
arrests had been some kind of frame-up. The union hoped NLRB officials would refuse any
attempts by the AFL to take advantage of Mine, Mill’s circumstances. But Mine, Mill leaders
also sought assistance from a non-governmental ally the CIO had cultivated. The CIO called for
an investigation by the National Committee for People’s Rights into the Ducktown dynamitings,
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conditions in the mining villages, alleged accusations of police brutality, lax FBI supervision and
collusion, and TCC bribery of local officials. The NCPR was not some disinterested party in all
this. It was, according to one report “a left-wing organization based in New York whose
leadership included such well-known Popular Front figures as Rockwell Kent.” The committee
investigated what its members considered particularly heinous incidents of corporate abuse of
workers throughout the late 1930s and through these investigations the NCPR had developed a
special fondness for Mine, Mill causes. 609
The NCPR sent “trained observers” to Polk County who “talked to dozens of people
including the sheriff, trial witnesses, local townspeople, defendants, and law enforcement
officers.” The committee also reviewed court transcripts from the dynamiting trials and
published its assessment in a bound set of reports entitled “Report on The Ducktown (Tennessee)
Dynamiting Convictions.” The report was in two sections: a published account from what
appears to be the NCPR magazine, National, and a typed report containing testimonials from the
CIO dynamiting trial along with pertinent industrial and labor history. Investigating committee
members Millard Lampell, Wellington Roe, and Elizabeth Wade White prepared this latter
special section. Identified here as the “Lampell Report,” it included the team’s assessment of
recent events, a brief history of Mine, Mill struggles in the Copper Basin since the Great War era
and a summary of local working conditions that did not reflect the glowing reports of TCC labor
relations once contained in the pages of the Explosives Engineer. 610
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NCPR investigators concluded that the Ducktown dynamiting arrests represented just
some of the illegal actions taken against workers and Mine, Mill by TCC and its allies and that
the arrests were unjustified. This “was not an ordinary criminal case,” declared NCPR
observers. Anderson and the other men “should go free” because “no one has yet brought to
light the truth about the crimes that actually have been committed and about those who
committed them.” 611
In prose that typically would have aroused ire among defensive locals, NCPR writers
purposely painted a disturbing portrait of the Basin with vivid descriptions designed to elicit
sympathetic reactions from an audience of those who committee members no doubt hoped would
be influential readers. “The eroded valley,” the report declared, “is often as hard on people as on
vegetation.” An accompanying photo essay captured the cramped quarters of miners and wagers
which often held as many as “four families—nine adults and 14 children…using the same
clothes line.” Juxtaposed next to images of posh, tree-shaded homes of local TCC managers,
who had “tennis courts behind their homes,” the photos showed that miners lived in an
oppressive world where company power was absolute. “The company owns houses , streets, and
store” and “prices are high.” 612
Isabella stood out in the report as a village void of all but a few trees, mired in mud,
awash in winter water so deep that the only benefit was that the gully washes swept away “the
accumulated trash—and odor of rot.” Some of the Loudermilk clan—no doubt kin of the same
Loudermilk knifed at a CIO meeting during the strike—sat thin and crowded at a table for a
supper of “grits and pork gravy, plain bread, and coffee.” Food for the family had been
purchased during the strike by selling one of the kids’ few toys, a bicycle. “So now,” recounted a
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sympathetic NCPR investigator, “they have a home-made two-wheeled wagon, also used to haul
firewood, and an old tennis ball as toys.” When offered a nickel by NCPR reporters, one
Loudermilk boy exclaimed, desperately, “I want ice cream!” A specter of hunger and near
starvation hovered over workers’ lives. In trying to weaken the union and intimidate Mine,
Mill’s rank-and-file, Polk County officials restricted portions allocated for workers’ children
through the Federal Surplus Commodity mandates; the anti-union officials had substituted small
bowls of soup for more substantial meals enjoyed before the strike. 613
Illustrating holes in Houser’s safety regimen and what appears to have been favoritism in
the treatment of injured workers—in spite of manager T.A. Mitchell’s rosier assessment in his
post-war labor relations report—NCPR reporters interviewed miners fired from TCC after they
had been injured on the job. In one such case an injured man lost his employment after forty
years working deep underground. In contrast to Mitchell’s claims, the NCPR stated that a
number of maimed workers had received no compensation for their many years of service. The
report did not specify if the men had been fired by TCC or by the more notorious DCI which
TCC absorbed, but NCPR reporters laid the blame for poor treatment before TCC. It was clear
from the report that association with the CIO had resulted in prejudice against some injured men.
CIO men who tried to report to duty after the Mine, Mill strike had been blacklisted, told by TCC
agents that they now had “physical disabilities” and could not work. “Tough guy, Wayne
Henry,” former hoist engineer, as a result of one such medical appraisal now had to run a beer
joint after he lost his job. 614
The most damning evidence of illegal activity in the NCPR report came directly from the
prosecution’s witnesses during the trials. Neither Biggs nor many of the witnesses called by the
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prosecution appeared to express any regret for their illegal or questionable actions. Their dutiful
demeanor betrayed their commitment to TCC, their anti-union sentiments, and, in the case of
FBI agents and Biggs especially, their sense of entitlement. TCC’s reputation did not leave these
proceedings unscathed according to NCPR assessors. Sheriff Biggs recounted that TCC had
placed thousands of dollars into his personal account in the Hamilton National Bank, Knoxville
to subsidize the hundreds of “deputies” used to intimidate striking workers and in the dragnet.
“Technically,” reported the NCPR, these men “were employees of [Polk County] but the county
didn’t pay them” Biggs paid them personally from the money TCC gave to him. At $1,000 per
day this sum added up pretty quickly. Over the course of the strike this amount must have been
in the tens of thousands of dollars. When asked if he intended on paying the company back for
this service, Biggs seemed incredulous: “No, why should I?” 615
Biggs had also come to rely on a resentful and desperate mole within Mine, Mill, a man
named Fred Long. According to Biggs, “Fred Long came to him with information that the [TVA]
power lines…. in Polk… and Fannin Count[ies] were to be dynamited at 1:20 in the morning, [of
April 25, 1940].” 616 Long claimed that about thirty men had been involved in the plan and Biggs
contacted the F.B.I. The sheriff and FBI agents were still eating a late meal at the Copperhill
New York Hotel when they heard the explosions. “TVA lines had been dynamited just as Biggs
had told the FBI men they would be,” said Long. Because of Long’s claims, the men rounded up
were “all loyal union men, of course” NCPR investigators emphasized. 617
The NCPR reported that the sheriff spent the next several days after the early April
explosions breaking Tennessee law instead of enforcing it. According to the state statutes,
officers were to inform anyone arrested of their authority and to then immediately take a
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defendant before a magistrate. In Tennessee authorities could only hold suspects for seventy-two
hours of “questioning… before an arrest warrant must be sworn. In all cases, [a] suspect must
stand before a magistrate before being locked up.” Biggs did none of this according to witnesses.
Jailed suspects’ families were not notified; “in no case was anyone taken before a magistrate.” 618
According to Tennessee state law, if the local jail was not of sufficient size, arrestees were to be
moved to the nearest local jail suitable, not some random structure. Biggs ignored this legal
prescription too. For the next week the men were held without warrants and five of the men were
tossed into a tiny six foot square cage and kept there for four days. Biggs kept a lot of the men at
the Copperhill YMCA building and a TCC guardhouse. 619
Biggs, FBI authorities, and apparently police allies from North Carolina and Georgia who
cooperated in all this took suspects across state line without proper protocol. In the case of
Martin Simonds it was clear he had been handled with questionable, if not illegal, methods.
Simonds was picked up by authorities at his North Carolina farm and pulled in for questioning
after first being told to just sit in a car parked at the bottom of his property. When Simonds asked
for proper identification and proof of authority, Biggs’ deputy Clyde Dale held up a gun and said
simply “this is my authority” and then went and got an FBI man to help him escort Simonds to
the car. Simonds was not allowed to get his clothes or any other items that he might need; he saw
no warrant. 620
When questioned about the incident FBI Agent N.H. McCabo said sheepishly, “well, we
were out there, he has a rather small place and numerous children around there and his wife and
there wasn’t any suitable place to interview him.” 621 McCabo said Simonds had not complained

618

Ibid.
Ibid.
620
Ibid, 11.
621
Ibid.
619

327
at all when asked if they all might go to Copperhill “for a talk” since the Simonds home was
“inconvenient” as was the deputy’s parked car at the edge of Simond’s place. Taking him to the
Copperhill YMCA allowed for a conversation where notes could be taken “without being
cramped up,” said the G-man. McCabo also claimed he had no idea that the Simond’s place was
in North Carolina—this despite the fact that NCPR investigators later saw the two large border
signs at the state line McCabo and company would have passed on their way to Copperhill.
Furthermore, the surface of the road changed from concrete to asphalt. After the “conversation”
McCabo then claimed Simonds had been turned loose but chose to stick around the YMCA
while the G-men and Biggs’ deputies ate since Simond “had nothing to hide.” The NCPR argued
the Simonds case was typical of how Biggs and the FBI played fast and loose with the law in
rounding up suspects for what witnesses claimed had been “grillings… in the YMCA.” During
all this the FBI agents made no arrests but did rely on Biggs to bring them one “witness” after
another, none of whom had been served in the proper legal manner. In this way, the FBI could
state that they had nothing to do with the treatment of the men once they were “finished” with
questioning them. 622
Throughout it assessment the NCPR painted TCC in the same light as the Committee
might render hard-line industrial reactionaries and firms that would use whatever tactic they
could to shut down workers’ organizing and strikes. This was ironic seeing that TCC had been
working so hard to improve its local image and in light of owner Sam A. Lewisohn’s renowned
progressivism. But the reports underscore how subjective local reportage had become in
considering any actions taken by the most important employer in the region. The NCPR portrait
was important because it challenged the narrative supported by the local business class put forth
a perspective on Lewisohn-Houser operation of TCC rare in the history of the company. It also
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underscored a darker side to Lewisohn’s management scheme. As chronicled by the NCPR,
TCC management was determined to let little stand in the way of controlling the terms of its
labor relations.
Yet for all its in-depth reportage, the NCPR’s damning reports overlooked a couple
critical items that likely would have made a strong impact on workers, influential government
authorities, Labor Board officials, and the general public. The missing subjects would have been
well known already to readers of the local papers. Had their occurrence been shaped properly by
Mine, Mill’s advocates, news of these developments might have garnered more sympathy toward
Mine, Mill’s goals in the Copper Basin. Clarifying these incidents as important antecedents, the
CIO might have explained to the public that the destructive and disruptive acts perpetrated by
AFL sympathizers stood as evidence that is was more likely the AFL, and not the CIO, that was
responsible for recent acts against property and the public.
The first subject concerned the use of dynamite by angry locals not affiliated with Mine,
Mill. A year before the CIO strike, AFL electrical linemen who worked for local Tennessee
Electric Power Company allegedly destroyed steel transmission towers. No one was killed or
hurt but they certainly might have been. The blast ripped the concrete foundations of towers right
next to a family residence. More blasts followed. Company officials called upon local sheriffs
and police officers in a 75-mile radius to catch the perpetrators. Three AFL men were arrested,
found heavily armed and bearing the equipment necessary for more destruction. Being
somewhat unfamiliar with the region, NCPR investigators may not have heard of these
occurrences but that’s highly unlikely. It seems more likely that the NCPR feared reminding
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locals of all this because the reports could tarnish all unionism and highlight the precedent of
violent acts taken by local labor. 623
The other issue ignored by NCPR investigators concerned local developments in the
ongoing internecine war between the AFL and CIO. In April 1940 the AFL requested that the
Labor Board again investigate the representation situation in the Copper Basin. With CIO
support apparently on the wane, a contentious AFL demanded action to “benefit commerce”;
agreeing, the NLRB called for a hearing. Mine, Mill petitioned for a continuance claiming it had
not enough time to prepare and “that it was prejudicially surprised” by AFL membership
numbers, which Mine, Mill also challenged. 624
Board examiners denied the CIO’s motions for continuance. Oral arguments were then
heard in Washington D.C. by all parties except the International, which instead chose to file
written briefs. Just why the union did this could not be determined. It may have been that at
this time Robinson and Mine, Mill organizers calculated that the Copper Basin campaign needed
a thorough reworking in light of the dynamiting arrests; International officials may also have
been distracted by what it considered more important battles. That said, the failure to show in
Washington certainly had its effects. The Board found that yes, the continued representation
controversy in the Copper Basin had returned, reiterated its judgment that a single representative
unit should stand for all TCC workers (excepting non-supervisory and clerical staff, chemists and
engineers) and that a new election should be held. The third election for collective bargaining
representation at TCC would take place by just after the Fourth of July holiday, 1940. 625
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More damaging to Mine, Mill was the Labor Board’s determination that the roll call for
this vote be based upon the Tennessee Copper Company payroll as of early May 1940, the date
when Mine, Mill formally agreed to end its strike. Therefore, instead of including all TCCemployed Mine, Mill at the commencement of the strike in the summer of 1939, now a whole
class of workers who had lost their jobs during the strike could not vote and new hires could.
This was a mortal blow to Mine, Mill’s efforts and a paradoxical turn of events in light of Reid
Robinson’s agreement to end the strike against Tennessee Copper--a decision he had taken
intending to save the union. 626
For reasons not altogether clear, Mine, Mill’s leadership instructed the NLRB not to
place the union on the ballot. 627 The CIO saw this maneuver as a way to at once counter AFL
claims that a new decision on collective bargaining was necessary and de-legitimate the election.
Miners and CIO sympathizers won neither a Marathon nor a earned respect for a sacrificial
Thermopile by employing this peculiar strategy against the AFL phalanx. Instead, the CIO tactic
resembled a misguided and pouting sort of Picket’s Charge. For months the new Copper Basin
AFL locals had strengthened their offensive, petitioning the NLRB and railing against alleged
CIO-Moscow links. Emboldened by the consequences of the failed strike and the fear generated
by the dynamitings, the AFL could count on public pressure and workers’ impatience—neither
group could anymore endure CIO disruptions at a time of expanding anxiousness over the
spreading World War.
The AFL won “an overwhelming victory” in the July election where polling sites had
been limited to TCC’s smelter at Copperhill and to a single spot for “the Ducktown-Isabella
section.” The exclusion of clerical and supervisory staff, chemists, and technical engineers had
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not hurt the AFL: over 950 men voted for Federation representation. Yet of the 1369 men
eligible to vote, 240 chose not to vote at all and 174 checked “no union representation.” CIO
supporters passing among the workers before the vote had encouraged the latter choice, but it
had been a fool’s errand. The Knoxville Labor News greeted the AFL triumph and NLRB
certification of the election with earnest satisfaction. “Hope is expressed that a permanent and
lasting peace in the Copper Basin is now an assured fact.” 628
After the election Mine, Mill complained once again to Labor Board about a new round
of intimidating actions taken by TCC supervisory staff, Sheriff Biggs and his deputies before the
vote. The Board dismissed these complaints reflecting the new NLRB commitment to affect
industrial peace and industrial production for national defense. According to scholarship on this
period, the Board wanted “industrial disputes settled in decentralized, volunteerist negotiations
between the parties rather than on terms imposed by the state… or unilaterally determined by
employers.” Labor’s part in this was to provide for “strong , responsible unions” as agents for
implementation of the Wagner Act. The CIO and Mine, Mill had failed to secure broad enough
support among TCC workers toward this end. It seems likely that the NCPR chose not to report
on the developments and outcome in the union war because CIO leaders’ actions had been so
impulsive. 629

The Ducktown Dynamiting Trials
Thwarted in maintaining their collective bargaining rights in the Copper Basin, Mine,
Mill and its legal team now worked to aid Mitchell Anderson and the other CIO men arrested for
the Ducktown dynamitings. National reports carried news of the trials of Anderson and seven of
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the accused that commenced at the Chattanooga Federal Courthouse in January 1941 before
Chief District Judge Leslie R. Darr of the United States Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern
Division. By the end of the month Mitchell C. Anderson, John E. Simonds, Felton M.
Woodward, Earl Hubbard, John D. Queen, Robert L. Rhodes, Robert L. Ballew and Marion L.
Ellis had been found guilty of conspiracy to dynamite TVA lines, subject “to a maximum
sentence of two years in prison and fines of $10,000.” 630
CIO lawyers refused to accept the verdicts, deeming them a miscarriage of justice as is
evident in their lengthy assignments of error. Presented before the Sixth Circuit appeals, the
defendants’ lawyers claimed in their “assignments of error” that initial trial proceedings failed to
prove conspiracy, ignored evidence of collusion between TCC and Sheriff Biggs, relied on
uncorroborated confessions, false evidence, and faulty evidence obtained through mistreatment
of suspects, denial of due process of law, use of unlawful duress, sleep deprivation and the
application of narcotics. 631
The appeal to reverse the convictions eventually made it to the United States Supreme
Court. From comments summarized by the Court’s clerk it became clear that the first trial had
been rammed through the justice system by Judge Darr. Darr had demonstrated his disdain of
the CIO while overseeing the proceedings. He sustained the prosecution’s objections and
prevented any admission of evidence by the defense regarding collusion of the company and the
sheriff or about the employment of intimidation to garner confessions from the defendants.
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After a substantial investigation in 1941 that entailed interviewing dozens of local witnesses—
including Sheriff Biggs and many local law enforcement officers—and reviewing court records,
the National Committee for People’s Rights concluded in a report holding pages of evidence—
that the confessions by the CIO men came only after they had endured real physical abuse.
“Each of the men who signed [confessions] had about the same story to tell—a story of
inadequate sleep and food, of third-degree questioning, of misrepresentation of the papers they
were asked to sign.” 632
Supreme Court justices investigated these claims and found the tactics employed to force
the confessions unconstitutional. The Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions, and ordered
Darr in March 1943 to rehear the case because, as the defendants’ lawyers had complained all
along, “there was no evidence upon which a conviction might have been had and no competent
evidence [brought] before the [district] Court and jury.” Furthermore the justices let it be
known that they had disapproved of Darr forbidding proper questioning by the defense of Sheriff
Biggs. The sheriff had deputies search the property and automobiles of the defendants without
proper warrant. The sheriff’s financial relationship with Tennessee Copper was also quite
suspect. In short, the justices found, Darr had sided with the prosecution by preventing
important defensive questioning of key witnesses, including Fred Long. Justice Felix
Frankfurter delivered the Court’s opinion that made headlines in the Copper City Advance. “It
was error to admit these confessions and we see no escape from the conclusion that the
convictions of all the petitioners must be set aside.” Darr announced reinstatement of the case in
April 1943. 633
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The following February the retrial began again in Chattanooga. Darr summoned all the
original witnesses many of whom no longer living in the Copper Basin. Fred Long, for instance,
whose testimony at the first trial had not made him a very popular man in the Basin, had long
since fled Isabella for the Norfolk, Virginia shipyards. Weakened by the Supreme Court’s
dismissal of the confessions, the prosecution had to rely almost exclusively on Long’s testimony,
which now, under greater scrutiny, seemed shaky. Long again claimed he had attended two
meetings in April 1940 where CIO men had discussed shutting down TCC by dynamiting power
lines. The defense poked holes in Long’s testimony, discrediting his claims of knowing certain
key persons in the plot and then alleging that Long had been a paid agent of TCC and that owing
to his desperate financial circumstances at the time “would swear to anything” for $25. Darr did
not burden the defense team with a chorus of denied objections, nor did he let the trial drag. It
all moved swiftly and within a couple of days of testimony it was clear that regardless of Long’s
real integrity, the jury did not buy his accounts. Moving to Norfolk had not helped his reputation.
An honest man did not need to leave. In this pro-union, working class city, the jury, which
included two African Americans, took only ninety minutes to render its acquittal of the CIO
men. 634
A note about management’s perspective on the dynamiting affair is in order though
records were virtually limited to the observations of R.E. Barclay. Beyond the arrest of
“suspected dynamiters” and a passing remark that he was aware of FBI and local authorities’
“questioning” and arrest of Mitchell Anderson and “different members of the CIO,” the chief
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clerk’s diary stayed oddly silent on the dynamiting trials, convictions, and appeals. The absence
of comments on all this by Barclay was particularly mysterious in light of Barclay’s preceding,
regular chronicle of CIO actions. Determination of just what Barclay knew about the tactics
Biggs and the FBI employed in forcing confessions was impossible from the available records,
let alone whether he understood the full extent of his company’s relationship with the sheriff, but
it is unlikely he was completely in the dark. The illegal subsidizing of Biggs’ proxy army and
the employment of supervisory staff to intimidate workers were not the kind of actions Barclay
could ever publicly approve of or admit knowing about if he wished to retain his reputation as a
local historical sage. Barclay was concerned when conservative TCC workers complained to
NLRB examiners in Atlanta that the Mine, Mill was “nothing but a part of Red Russia.” The
chief clerk also expressed concern when a knifing at a CIO meeting resulted in bloodshed—but
in each instance Barclay seemed much more concerned with the potential damage to TCC the
CIO presence threatened than in the fate of miners. Still, he may have been bothered by his
supervisors’ approval of clandestine efforts that did not square with Lewisohn’s public
pronouncements on enlightened management. For all his regard for J.N. Houser’s production
schemes and managerial approach, the shady circumstances surrounding the Ducktown
dynamitings and their prosecution may have convinced Barclay to keep silent, protect his family,
to keep his job and his local renown. 635

TCC contains AFL power
Tennessee Copper Company’s sizable supervisory staff never sought sanctuary in Mine,
Mill. Reward for their loyalty came to 137 of these men in June 1940 when TCC threw them a
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party at the fabulous Cowanee Club atop Smelter Hill. The night included supper followed by a
program directed by popular Chattanooga entertainer, Vaughn Cornish. Chumminess between
managers and supervisors was evident. The men expressed feigned “disappointment” when
toastmaster and TCC official H.T. “Dad” Harper failed to toast himself after recognizing each
member of the supervisory staff. 636 The traditional absence of alcohol—a Lewisohn
preference—did not diminish the crowd’s enjoyment of music and gaiety. As the evening
wound down, Manager F. J. Longworth refocused the men’s attention to work and their
responsibilities in maintaining good industrial relations, reviewed company performance and
then restated “company’s policy with respect to Federal Labor Laws, particularly the Wagner
Act as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board.” Manager Longworth then
pontificated about TCC’s supposed “policy of neutrality” that in fact contradicted how TCC had
acted during the strike. Longworth went on to say it was critical for supervisory staff to reflect on
“the company’s attitude while serving in such capacity.” 637 Aware that a reporter from the
Copper City Advance was at hand, Longworth directed his remarks not only at those before him,
but also to the public at large who could then be assured that TCC practiced reasonable, if firm,
labor relations designed thwart any new radicalism that might arise among resentful workers. 638
By this point the AFL had effectively beaten the CIO and the representative election that
would follow in early 1941 merely formalized that loss. Once in position as the employees’
collective bargaining representative, it did not take long for the AFL leverage the war’s increased
need for labor to the direct benefit of its membership. By the end of August 1941, AFL
leadership announced they had secured a ten cent an hour raise for all TCC workers. The
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minimum rate was now sixty cents an hour or $4.80 per 8-hour shift retroactive from August 1,
1941. Workers cheered AFL leader John Deal when he announced the new contract; he had led
the negotiating team. 639
AFL district representative Paul Ayman, a guest speaker, also spoke, but his message was
quite different than Deal’s. He began by instructing the men on the fairness TCC exhibited in
the negotiating process. Ayman then said that it was the duty of all union men to be loyal to the
company. He spoke to them like a parent to his children. This was a very different attitude
toward Tennessee Copper than had been exhibited by Mine, Mill’s leaders. In fact, it is clear the
real purpose of this particular AFL meeting was to instill gratitude throughout a workforce that
might feel disgruntled. Such increases would only continue if workers maintained their loyalty
to TCC. Union leaders had effectively taken a paternal role over the rank-and-file. They would
not only be responsible for negotiating labor contracts but also for enforcing good working habits
and making certain that the men understood their role in being dutiful, grateful employees of
Tennessee Copper. The new regimen was in perfect keeping with Lewisohn and Houser’s
concepts for proper industrial relations. 640
To spread the new gospel of appropriate worker loyalty, the Copper City Advance placed
excerpts of Ayman’s lecture to workers prominently on the front page. “Give an honest day’s
work for an honest day’s wage,” Ayman admonished workers. “Because if you don’t you are a
thief [sic] and might as well steal the money from your employer’s pocket.” The Federation
leader went on to demand that every union shop delegate who witnessed any sloughing off on
the job was to report it to the union. Ayman also reminded the men of the benefits of sticking by
the Federation. But he ground his proselytizing in fear and threats instead of hope. The tenor of
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his remarks foretold the AFL authoritarianism over TCC workers that persisted through the war.
Union leaders would side with the concerns of company operators instead of relying on a faith
that men would naturally want to do their best on the job. 641
There was a paradox at work here: AFL loyalists and craftsmen had recoiled at what they
perceived as the communist, dictatorial, overly centralized and leveling influences on Mine, Mill
from the CIO; they had chaffed at the possibility of losing their own industrial liberty if forced to
work under John L. Lewis’s rigid standards and his authoritarian, autocratic and unpredictable
leadership. AFL attacks on the CIO in the Copper Basin had repeatedly sought to harness the
proud, some might say stubborn, independent spirit commonly reputed of mountain folk, which
AFL officials claimed, had been a proud aspect of the Federation’s heritage. Yet now Federation
district and local leaders implied that Copper Basin tradesmen possessed a weak work ethic that
would require collective police action and mistrust of one another. Heavy supervision was the
new liberty. Miners’ revulsion to all this makes complete sense and explains why CIO
sympathizers did not give up the ghost. The contrast of the AFL’s effective hierarchical
relationship with the rank in file with that of the CIO’s workers’ democracy and Mitchell C.
Anderson’s selfless, respectful, and deferential service to Mine, Mill’s rank-and-file and their
families, could not be starker. The campaign of the AFL was quite different from its actual
governance once in power. The company’s so-called independent union, now to serving as
company squire, bore the shield that protected the company’s image as protector of the people.
The Federation in the Copper Basin would be TCC’s vassal in controlling the rank-and-file’s
unfocused, suspect ambition; the AFL’s job was to galvanize workers’ efforts to make the
company successful and therefore make the community prosper. This was unionism co-opted by
rational managerial ambition and screened by republican, communal morality. The admonishing
641
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rhetoric of Ayman was the flipside to Lewisohn’s measured, reasonable instructions and
Houser’s prescriptions. 642
By late 1941 TCC now employed some 1600 men. This number would nearly double
during the war and yet Federation platoons were never established at Isabella, only in Ducktown
and Copperhill. The failure to establish an Isabella local appears to be, if not a punishment to
workers there for their CIO support, than a recognition that Isabella facilities would be less
important in the future. Had Tennessee Copper needed the AFL to organize Isabella men, a local
would have been established. Instead it appears the company stayed out of this and relied on
labor-management committees to oversee production regimens. The company likely took this
step to avoid possible conflict between resentful miners, craftsmen and supervisory staff. 643
The full extent to which the AFL organized the TCC workforce is unclear. It seems plain
however that the union had little direct effect on the coordination and maintenance of the safety
programs initiated by J.N. Houser. The labor-management teams, Lewisohn and Mitchell later
described as the backbone of the company’s success during the war, took the lead in all areas
responsible for overseeing production efficiency. The unions maintained its role in negotiating
wages, outlining workers grievances, and assisting in personnel development and production
standards, but it remained a responsibility of management, it seems, to oversee training and
safety standards through the labor-management committees. 644
A report from Thanksgiving 1940 captured the success of the system. TCC’s substantial
crew of leadburners had gone fourteen years without a single accident. The company threw 125
of these cautious tradesmen and their families a party. Toastmaster Herman Key entertained the
crowd in a congratulatory speech given over “a big chicken dinner by the Old Mill Grill” while a
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local quartet serenaded the crowd with violin and piano. Speakers contrasted the rise in
accidents outside of work and in industry generally with the TCC leadburners’ wonderful record.
Superintendent of the Copperhill acid plant E.M. Jones acknowledged the men’s great
accomplishment. In an amusing nod to the popular Shirley Temple film, “H.T. Harper, head of
the Service Department of the Tennessee Copper Company, was introduced as the ‘Admiral of
the Good Ship Safety.’” 645
Known as “Dad” among the men, Harper told jokes about many of the men, roasting a
few. A skit followed that reminded the crowd of the “Value of a Man” and included dangerous
and seductive characters such as “Carelessness” and “Gloom,” while in contrast, “Safety” and
“Employer” stood as heroes. A local reverend from the First Baptist Church of McCaysville
rounded out the program by praising the men and reminding them of their place in God’s plan.
Finally, Mrs. Carl Abernathy closed the meeting with a solo performance of “God Bless
America.” The entire affair was the quintessential Lewisohn and Houser creation: satisfied
operators and supervisors, grateful, proud, and dutiful workers, in communion, all sharing the
blessings of their effort. 646
Houser’s safety program maintained due diligence in other sectors of the company as
well as production levels increased in the early 1940s; incidents of injury rose only slightly.
Overall mine safety took a prominent place in mining reports being second only to total
production tonnage as a concern for the company’s mining superintendent, Lamar Weaver in the
monthly reports. 647
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Tragedy could still intrude though on what remained generally dangerous undertakings.
The first half of 1943 proved deadly, the week following New Year’s 1943 seeing the worst
mining tragedy in the Copper Basin’s history. At the end of their shift on the afternoon of
Tuesday 5 January, eight men were awaiting the electric locomotive to take them out of the
Burra Burra mine. Sulphite dust in the mine was set off by a “routine blasting operation, which
knocked all five belts off the motor which blows fresh air into the mine.” Forty-five men were
trapped below for over an hour on level 10 of the mine between Burra Burra and Boyd mines.
Weaver and his rescue teams immediately went into action and got out fourteen men, but four
were already dead. Another thirty-two men remained underground for about an hour and a half
as word spread fast throughout the Basin and families and friends rushed to Ducktown to find out
about loved ones. Eight men were killed in the blast and another fourteen were injured, mostly
suffering lung burns and burnt eyes; every one of the men lived had lived in the Basin, from
Copperhill and Ducktown of course, but also from little settlements long since forgotten by most
people who live in the area today, from Palmer and Mary Mine. Of the eight men who sat nearest
to the blast, only one survived, Arthur Brown, who miraculously had not been seriously injured.
The dead included Simon Dunn, a pumpman, drillmen Tom Fritts, Homer Payne, L.G. Spurling,
Elmer Pless, and Ralph Hancock. Electrician W.D. Deal and trammer Earnest Helton, who
apparently had been driving to pick them up died in the blast too. An investigation by the
Bureau of Mines stated that the cause of the accident was “unavoidable” owing no doubt to
limits of era’s mining ventilation technology. 648
Management maintained due diligence at the TCC-run East Tennessee Ordinance Works
according to one report dated a year after the plant had begun operations. “Since the local

648

“8 Killed, 14 Injured in Mine Blast Tuesday,” Copper City Advance, 8 January 1943.

342
plant… began operation in July 1942, there [had] not been a lost-time injury reported.” 649 The
City Advance noted that the safety record was of particular importance “in face of the fact that in
1941 industrial accidents were responsible for a nation-wide loss of 460,000,000 man days or
enough time to make 11,000,000 Garand rifles.” Lieutenant Colonel Donald K. Hyde, first
officer of the acid plant stated that this was the same amount of time it would have taken to make
all the war equipment for outfitting two hundred thousand soldiers. Hyde credited the local
plant’s record to the “eternal vigilance” of TCC surveys by the firm’s safety engineers. 650

The CIO attempts a return
Increased national anger over aggressive unionism tarnished the reputation of the
conservative AFL, diminished its reputation, and made it susceptible to attacks from within and
without of the Copper Basin. Popular congressman Estates Kefauver captured the public’s
disgust with strikes that affected national defense. In his column “Week in Washington,” then
regular feature in The Copper City Advance, Kefauver compared the heroic actions of American
in Tunisia in driving back Marshal Rommel with the selfishness of homefront AFL strikes that
shutdown flying fortress production in the far west. Kefauver argued that AFL assemblymen’s
walkout and their demands for a 50% pay increase represented an attitude of dangerous
presumption among workers that the war was won, when instead, owing to labor strife and
failure to heed pledges not to strike, “our defenses are crumbling.” 651
Closer to home, Mine, Mill sympathizers in the Copper Basin accused the AFL of
timidity in negotiating contracts with TCC. The AFL’s 1940 contract with TCC had been
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renewed twice but was up for renegotiation in late 1944. Initially the company and the AFL
claimed each had agreed to informal arrangements to continue the contract, but a lot of miners
were not satisfied with this plan. In September 1944, Mine, Mill petitioned the NLRB, claiming
it represented “a substantial number of the Company’s production and maintenance employees”
who requested that TCC make no further agreements with the Federation until a proper
bargaining agent could again be determined. The company made no reply to Mine, Mill. The
company and the AFL both stated to NLRB examiners however that they had the right to inspect
CIO union cards and to “cross-examine” the CIO field organizer. There was reason for doubt in
light of past union shenanigans in exaggerating membership figures, but the Board decided to
overlook the complaints because, in light of the enormous burdens placed on the Board during
the war, it had for some while been accepting cards as “an expedient” in determining workers’
interests in a union. The Labor Board’s Field Examiner found that 561 of the 1,429 TCC
employees had CIO authorization cards all of whom were then present on the company’s payroll.
The NLRB also rejected claims that the AFL and the company had “automatically,” though not
in writing, renewed contract agreements with its workforce. In short, workers’ best interests
were not being addressed. That said, the NLRB directed that a vote be taken for a fourth time
among TCC’s rank-and-file and set eligibility to vote based upon 1944 employment rolls just
prior to the Board’s direction, including workers who had been ill, or had been in the armed
forces and could show themselves at the polls. The new election was to be held just after the
New Year, 1945. 652
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The unions now fought over the make up of electorate since the constituency of the
workforce had changed as a result of national defense production. The Board settled on a plan
whereby all TCC employees could vote excepting “clerical employees, chemists, technical
employees, militarized guards, and all supervisory employees.” The excluded employees
included about a dozen female high school students TCC had employed during the war as
“chemists.” 653
Sensing the seriousness of the challenge to the labor status quo just before Christmas
1944, TCC General Manager J.N. Houser took an unusual step and spoke directly to his workers.
The address was unusual for Houser because in all the years he had been TCC’s general manager
his remarks had rarely been reported in the local press even though he regularly visited the works
in the Basin. Houser used an occasion to praise workers for their “all time high” record acid
production as an opportunity to remind them also of their patriotic duty to buy war bonds,
maintain production levels and not become distracted by political or labor issues. For the
millions of men and women fighting the enemy, he said, TCC copper and chemical products
were critically important. Never mentioning any union by name, Houser understood that the
recent national election had stirred up demands for change so he directed workers to move on
and to get back to the job of winning the war. Leave the quarrels behind. “We hear the army and
navy need more copper and there is a demand for sulphuric acid that cannot be met, [Therefore]
we need more men to do our part and above all we need steady work on the part of those now
employed.” This last point was clearly meant to be a reminder to workers of the last time there
had been a challenge to the industrial peace of the Copper Basin led by the CIO and Mine,
Mill. 654
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Houser thus soldered patriotism and duty to mature acceptance of the results of
democracy. His point was to renew cooperation among the workers and neutralize the CIO
challenge to the status quo. The timing of Houser’s speech was important as well. Given in late
December, just before the Christmas holiday, this was to be a time of peace, spent with families,
not a time of disquieting labor unrest or worse… strikes. Houser’s call for maintaining homefront domestic tranquility in the workforce, lay situated alongside a regular feature in the Copper
City Advance that chronicled local servicemen’s experiences in the war, With Our Boys in the
Service. That feature’s content would have increased the collateral impact of the GM’s words,
because people learned about the many empathetic letters sent to Mrs. Campbell who had lost
her boy and of Copperhill Private First Class Fred Green who had been awarded the Bronze Star
for heroic achievement in Italy. They cheered in reading about Clement Bailey finally coming
home after nearly two years in the South Pacific, thrilled to the news of Copperhill gunner Virgil
Davis flying in the turret of a B-25, or marveled at the happenstance experienced by Lt. Edward
Middleton in China when he ran into some pals from Ducktown. 655
Through all this locals might mull over Houser’s admonitions and charges and rethink,
perhaps, whether any real change in labor representation was really needed. It may be that Mine,
Mill and the CIO leaders thought it prudent and advantageous to build on miners’ frustration
with the AFL. Houser’s call was also self-serving, of course. But to most other folk in the
Copper Basin, to challenge to the AFL’s position during wartime weakened the efforts the
community’s effort to destroy Hitler. The whole labor controversy could seem like just another
example of self-centered unionism.
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Houser and TCC benefitted from this sentiment and the CIO advance ended in a whimper
as the AFL won the election by significant margin, 593 to 458. The figures do not represent the
enormous increase of workers under the supervision of TCC in the Basin during the war owing
to the NLRB election restrictions and, most important, because the US Army owned the ETOW,
its employees were not affected by this vote. In all seventeen TCC men checked “no union,” a
dozen ballots were spoiled and hundreds of workers must have stayed away from the polls
completely. Their actions underscored a repetition of the unions’ failure to win over all voters
that had been active in the 1940 election. Another fact that must have frustrated CIO organizers
concerned the number of Mine, Mill members who held authorization cards but who chose not to
vote for the union; that figure stood at roughly 18%. What was going on here? Houser’s call for
restrain in his exceptional remarks before the Christmas holiday appears to have succeeded.
That said, many questions about this election remain because a lot of evidence about it was
missing from the records. Barclay’s diary said little and reports in the Copper City Advance
carried little more than the election results. More curious though was that for reasons that this
study has not been able to determine there was no follow-up report by the NLRB on this
election. 656

Tending to the Old Red Scar: Human and Environmental Costs
Organic chemical products made from the compounds and elements extracted from
Copper Basin ore and produced in Tennessee Corporation facilities in Florida and Atlanta no
doubt did the job of assisting patriotic gardeners. Folks who grew up in the Copper Basin stated
time and again, there were few snakes and other things that fed on insects because the sulphuric
acid in the random smelter emissions made certain that “there weren’t no bugs.” The paradox
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should not be lost then that the very ores which when smelted produced toxins destructive
enough to reduce orchards and gardens to dust also had the power to make those same gardens
bloom splendidly when properly refined. Sold by Tennessee Corporation as Loma and Loma
Dust, these products could easily have also been used around the Copper Basin by the men of the
Civilian Conservation Corps and Tennessee Valley Authority in programs designed to
“revegitate” the Copper Basin’s raw red hills. TCC officials worked closely with these
organizations as field teams of mostly young men planted millions of trees and countless kudzu
plants and later spread tens of thousands of pounds of seeds throughout the Old Red Scar and
across old lumber sites in Polk County. 657
Much has been written by outsiders of the Copper Basin chronicling some of these
efforts. Here it is sufficient to note that this long and ultimately greening process improved still
further TCC’s image as a benevolent corporate citizen and affected, to some extent, the dynamics
of the local labor markets. To the extent this work affected the reputations of the competing
unions during the labor war, the AFL may have gotten some peripheral benefit. The union had
successfully organized local TVA crews. The CCC on the other hand may have been seen as
unfair competition to local workers. AFL President William Green had feared that creation of
the CCC might lead to the ‘“militarization of American youth” and drive down the wages of …
employed forest workers.” Yet government policy preventing CCC unionization helped
maintain the positive reputation this most popular program enjoyed even among the most
reactionary critics of the New Deal. 658
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By the end of 1933 the CCC operated four such camps in Polk. Their activities were
expanded from road building and forestry preservation and conservation to “revegitating” the
Copper Basin after the most necessary local road improvements had been completed. 659 Polk
County benefited enormously from both the CCC and TVA. The Copper City Advance praised
the CCC’s “leading activity” in educating local young men, regularly applauded the work of the
Corps and noted the activities at CCC anniversary celebrations. When federal officials tried to
de-mobilize a local camp, a cadre of local civic groups including Kiwanis, the American Legion,
and the Copperhill Local (AFL?) Union worked to keep the camp alive and 300 young men on
active duty. The Copperhill paper applauded these efforts. “This [CCC] camp has been [of] much
value to this vicinity in the way of forestry protection and road building and inasmuch as further
profitable and beneficial work can yet be done.” 660
Old U.S. Forestry Department correspondence revealed another symbiotic relationship
between TCC and the government beyond the munitions and chemicals industry. 661 During the
war, TCC added to its goodwill by releasing reports on company initiated environmental
improvements in the Copper Basin that sometimes accompanied updates on expanding war
production. Reforestation of the Basin by the CCC had commenced in cooperation with the
TVA long before the war, but these expanded in the early forties. It was hoped these efforts
would transform the Copper Basin into “a different looking place” and augment company efforts
“in reducing the volume of escaping Sulphur gas.” “Coupled with better atmospheric
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conditions,” the Copper City Advance continued, “these [environmental] improvements would
benefit all residents of the Copper Basin.” 662
TVA oversaw CCC men who worked to limit erosion affecting two main creeks that ran
through Tennessee Copper Company property. Potato and Brushy Creeks flowed into the Ocoee
and the silt from these streams had been a problem for dams below the Basin years. According to
the Associate Chief of TVA’s Watershed Protection Division, Kenneth J. Seigworth, “Mr.
Mitchell [was] entirely in accord with this plan.” 663 Mitchell’s assent was not surprising given
TCC’s influence on the project. TVA press releases regarding progress on the projects went
through his office so that the company had an ability to edit the mission of the CCC in the
vicinity. TCC took advantage of this relationship by making certain the press releases notified
other regional private property owners that TCC was not getting special treatment. 664
But of course the company was getting special treatment. No other surviving firm or
private citizen in the area had done as much damage to the environs over the course of a couple
generations as had TCC. But by stating that other private land owners could benefit from CCC
erosion control and prevention work, the Company shaped its image as a good corporate
citizen. 665 Evidence of Mitchell’s use of such releases to benefit company goodwill came in one
report that clarified TCC was working with the University of Tennessee in “experiments…
conducted in the most badly denuded areas [of the Basin] to determine what reclamation
measures will be possible there [sic].” 666
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As a result of this convenient relationship between a federal agency and the Tennessee
Copper Company, the firm could avoid the direct costs associated with the renovation of its own
toxic and denuded properties. It also managed to avoid the labor problems associated with this
venture and thus avoid any more negative influence on its well controlled labor relations. The
same cannot be said for the CCC officials overseeing the camps charged with doing the grunt
work in the Old Red Scar. Regional CCC Officer A.W. Hartman had a devil of a time keeping
boys in those red hills. In a plea to his boss, Hartman complained, “the camp has been
consistently low in enrollee strength and the TVA has asked that a special effort be made to build
up to normal strength so that work can be pushed along more expeditiously.” 667
It should be remembered that the Copper Basin once had the reputation among locals as
being the “only desert east of the Mississippi”—a notoriety sensational for selling postcards to
shocked outsiders, if also proof to locals of their region’s industrial potency and might. But the
Basin played hell on CCC boys digging and planting in late summer on the treeless, dusty,
stinking, sweltering terrain around Ducktown. “The location of this camp is such that a number
of former enrollees have considered it undesirable and the turnover has been rather large.”
Hartman wrote, understating the brutal conditions. Still, he had little sympathy for men who
complained on the public’s dime. His recommendation was to ship all CCC whiners to
Ducktown from CCC camps as they were disbanded. It was a suggestion no doubt resented by
boys who had hoped for CCC placement at more sylvan camps in the Shenandoah. 668
The CCC boys did their part in trying to re-green the red hills until the government
disbanded the corps. Then TVA continued these efforts with later owners of TCC property, but
it would take many years for real progress to be made. After Cities Service razed Smelter Hill

667
668

A.W. Hartman, Regional CCC Officer, Memorandum for Liaison Officer Graham, 30 October 1941.
Hartman to Graham, 30 October 1941, ibid.

351
in the 1960s, a creep of green brush overtook the old grange site’s red knolls and gullies. Over
the next two decades mines shut when ores ran out or became too expensive to extract and more
and more of the old TCC works slipped first into rusting brown then greening silence. By the
early 1980s the collection of trash trees, pines, kudzu and weeds had spread so much locals who
remained after collapse of the Basin’s non-ferrous industry disparagingly called it all the
“common green.” 669
Although new growth aided the looks of the Basin—in least in the eyes of visitors—
contemporary government reports by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
assessed the continuing local health conditions and the threats resulting from generations of
industrial dumping and seepage into the Copper Basin’s air, soil, and water. The consequences
and warnings in one 2005 report supports the collective memories of locals who remembered
how common it was for folks around the Basin to be sick. Miners remained susceptible to
silicosis in spite of improvements in ventilation. New Deal era physicians had noticed
malnutrition among some miners’ children and had worked to improve local diets. Records were
scarce on the subject for the middle twentieth century, but residents remembered that to TCC’s
credit, the company had paid a worker’s medical bills if one became injured on the job; others
remembered that no money was ever exchanged for medical treatment at the TCC hospital at
Copperhill. Improvements in pediatric medicine improved and Copper Basin infant and
childhood mortality rates declined, but industrial workers continued to succumb, their
constitutions worn down by the toxins. Older folk had an especially difficult time of it, but local
residents of all ages contracted respiratory disease too and other chronic ailments. The list of
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injuries in recent medical assessments goes far beyond general repertory diseases and miners’
silicosis. 670
In the early 2000s, owing to community concerns, the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health Involvement, began a study “among former employees of the Copperhill
smelter” and those who had worked as little as three years “in the smelter, mill, or sulfur
operations after 1946. Local people had become convinced some diseases could be directly
attributed to Copper Basin industrial emissions and waste exposure: Acute sinusitis, asbestosis,
asthmas, bronchitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, emphysema, lung disease, shortness
of breath, tuberculosis, hypertension, myriad hematologic (blood) disorders, immunologic
diabetes, multiple sclerosis, neurologic amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease),
stroke, Parkinson’s disease, liver failure, liver disease, acute hepatitis, kidney disease, psoriasis,
and twenty kinds of cancers. 671
Health and Human Services assessments of mortality rate support locals’ claims. Ageadjusted mortality rates in the late 1990s owing to nonmalignant respiratory disease among Polk
County white males was one-third higher than for Tennessee generally and even for coal mining
regions of the state; age-adjusted mortality rates for lung and thoracic cancer in white females
through the early 1990s was also one third higher than in the coal regions and nearly four times
more often than among Tennessee women generally; and age-adjusted mortality rates for lung
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and thoracic cancer in white males stood half-again as high in Polk County than in both the coal
regions and the state generally. 672
Granted, some workers smoked, abused alcohol, or ate poorly, but this was an
exceptionally poisonous industrial site. Other assessments reveal the level of exposure endured
by locals for generations. These were all the more astonishing because they record the amount
of toxins that seeped into the water systems from former industrial sites long after most industrial
work stopped in the late 1980s. Put out by the triumvirate of state, federal, and private interests
who presently oversee clean-up of the region, these Basin Briefings revealed that only after
extensive and expensive clean-up measures commenced in the early 21st century was it now
possible to prevent almost 200,000 pounds per month of heavy metals from being dumped into
the Ocoee River from Copper Basin creeks. “Put another way,” stated one report bluntly, “every
day, iron and other metals that weigh as much as a full-size car are [now] prevented from
entering the Ocoee River.” For a century before these clean-up efforts began, toxins constantly
seeped from poisoned ground or blew as dust across the Old Red Scar and into the lives of
people. 673
Markings from burial plots now much older than any living generation provide poignant
reminders of the costs endured by working people in the Basin’s toxic environment. Although
local folk relied on a stern Protestantism to fortify themselves when dear ones passed, the many
lamb-shaped tombstones set for children in the Copperhill Cemetery make plain the pain
accompanying high mortality rates among children. Their deaths must have been debilitating to
their families. “Weep not father and mother” pled the markings on a stone for “Chelsey son of
672
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W.F. & M. L Dilbeck.” Another stone counseled that expecting perfection in this world would
be vain gesture “for we fail walking for glory for Thee.” Around the grounds the remains of
Copper Basin Founding Families lay everywhere underfoot. The McCays had their dead interred
on this mount as did the Barclays and Sissons, the graves of the latter scattered in pieces, many
made anonymous by vandalism and the elements. Other sentinels of the dead abound, for Jones,
Davenports, Longs, Guinns, Bowers, and Gethers, Vellenowells, Robinsons, and Browns. 674
The juxtaposition of old sentiments for the dead carved in once glimmering marble,
granite or the red-gneiss common in the hills and the present generation’s casual dismissal of this
place can sadden or bring hope: “She was a kind and affectionate wife, a fond mother, and a
friend to all,” “He was beloved by God and Man.” “She has gone to her home in heaven and all
her afflictions are over.” It speaks volumes that this place is now in such disrepair considering
how much effort people long ago put into it to make the cemetery a place for eternal memorial.
That there has been little weeding of the place over the years is clear. In many places the old
rawness of the Old Red Scar is exposed here—no common green covers a century of industrial
battering. Most of the grave sites are in ruin and it appears that only a very few locals ever
venture up to the cemetery anymore to pay respects to the dead. On a recent mid-summer’s day,
only a lop-sided, Christmas star made of incandescent lights watches over the place now.
Crooked, its sights set out across the valley and over the river and no longer upon this oncecherished resting place for the Copper Basin dead. 675
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